






“Was das freie Versammlungs- und 
Vereinigungsrecht zu bedeuten hat und wie wichtig 
es für die Freiheit ist, weiß ja jedes Kind und ist 
nicht nötig, viel davon zu sagen.”1 (Theodor 
Mommsen) 
The challenge of freedom of assembly 
 
In legal decisions and commentary, freedom of assembly is widely cherished as a 
precious human right, indispensable for the individual person, for groups within society, 
and for the whole society, including for the preservation of democratic governance. 
However, even at a superficial glance it becomes apparent that constitutional law and 
human rights law allow so many and such serious limits on freedom of assembly as 
perhaps on no other right, especially not on free speech. Prior restraints such as permits, 
bans, conditions; and restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the assemblies 
abound in every jurisdiction, de facto in addition to general restrictions allowed on 
speech or expression, as courts reconfigure the activities at assemblies within the 
framework of freedom of speech or opinion.   
Other disciplines, namely, psychology and sociology, which engage with 
assemblies on a more empirical basis, echo a similar ambivalence. Mass psychology finds 
‘masses’ dangerous, emotionalised, prone to evil manipulation,2 where group 
                                                 
1 Theodor Mommsen, Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes. Mit Belehrungen und Erläuterungen 
(Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1969 cop. 1849) 52. 
2 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd. A Study of the Popular Mind (New York, MacMillan, 1896), William 
McDougall, The Group Mind (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1920), Sigmund Freud, 





membership contributes to hostility, reduces rationality, and so on.3 Social movement 
studies – in apparent contradiction – claim to document a rational and rationalisable 
panoply of motivations,4 grievances, structures,5 organisations,6 and events of 
contestation;7 pointing out incentives to moderation,8 and describing the creation and 
transfer of meaning incommunicable by other means and ways.   
More philosophical approaches either ignore freedom of assembly9 or oscillate 
between Schmittian acclamation and fear of subversion,10 even going as far as 
questioning whether there is any basis for freedom of assembly in a democracy which 
guarantees freedom of speech.11  
Gatherings of people in public clearly have a potential to transcend or transgress 
normalcy, be it the psychological, moral, or religious status quo, the political mainstream, 
                                                 
3 Eg Henri Tajfel, ’Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination’ 178-186 in Intergroup Relations. Essential 
Readings, Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams eds, (Philadelpia, Psychology Press, 2001), Marylinn B. 
Brewer, Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation. A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 98 
Psychological Bulletin 307 (1979), Marylinn B. Brewer and Roderick M. Kramer, The Psychology of 
Intergroup Attitudes and Behaviour, 36 Annual Review of Psychology 219 (1985), Leon Festinger, 
Pepitone, A., & Newcomb, T., Some Consequences of De-individuation in a Group, 47 Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 382 (1952). 
4 Eg Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970), Thomas Crawford 
and Murray Naditch, ‘Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The Psychology of Social 
Protest’, 33 Psychiatry 208 (1970), Clark McPhail, Civil Disorder Participation. A Critical Examination of 
Recent Research, 36 American Sociological Review 1058 (1971). 
5 Eg David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity’, 82 Social Forces 
1457 (2004). 
6 Eg Elisabeth S. Clemens, ‘Organizational Repertoires’ 187- 201in The Social Movement Reader. Cases 
and Concepts, Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper eds, (Chichester, Blackwell, 2003), John D. McCarthy, 
& Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource 
Mobilization (Morristown, NJ, General Learning Press 1973), John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 
‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements. A Partial Theory’, 82 American Journal of Sociology 1212 
(1977); Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New 
Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1987). 
7 Eg Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
8 Eg Marisa Chappell, Jenny Hutchinson & Brian Ward, ‘“Dress modestly, neatly … as if you were going 
to church”: Respectability, Class and Gender in the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Early Civil Rights 
Movement’ in Gender in the Civil Rights Movement, Peter Ling & Sharon Monteith eds. (New York, 
Routledge, 2013) 69-98. 
9 It is telling how Mill does not have a single word about freedom of assembly in his chapter on freedom of 
speech in Liberty. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter II (1859, David Spitz ed. 1975.) 17-53.Note also 
that Benjamin Constant did not include freedom of assembly in his constitutional draft.   
10 John D. Inazu elaborated in detail how Rawlsian liberalism does not provide a sufficient basis for the 
freedom inherent in assemblies either. John D. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012), especially chapter 4.  
11 Tamás Gyorfi, 'The Importance of Freedom of Assembly: Three Models of Justification' in András Sajó 
(ed.), Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. (Issues in Constitutional Law, vol. 5, 





the ordinary rules of the game of democracy (or any other form of government), or even 
social peace. Revolutions and pogroms start with assemblies, and end – or so we hope – 
with the establishment of other assemblies, allegedly deliberative and representative ones. 
What remains in between is freedom of assembly. The object protected by freedom of 
assembly is foundationally in-between, mirroring and realigning the line between our 
fears and hopes, between past and future, reason and emotion, people and government, 
minority and majority. The object protected by freedom of assembly is also in-between in 
another regard, between the solitude of the writer or the vulnerability of the speaker and 
the discipline and strength of the police and army. For some, it might seem to be 
something between the individual and the People. It is also something in between the 
argumentation of the press and the decision-making of the voting booth, referenda or 
legislation. It speaks as much as it acts. It asserts, shouts and wills, but it has no power to 
impose. It is a performance, a creation – but only of meaning. It is theatre, but not art. It 
threatens, but does not kill. It is disobedience, protest or conspiracy but not revolution.  
It is a challenge to all of us, and certainly a challenge to the well-educated, literate 
judges and scholars whose natural form of communication is the argumentative essay. 
Assemblies are sometimes too messy and disorderly for a learned mind, sometimes too 
organised and disciplined for a free one. Still, sometimes even judges take to the streets. 
How do they draw the limits on this activity when pursued by others – often by radical 
others?  
Before answering this question, the object of the inquiry needs to be defined more 
precisely.  
A concept of assembly 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of assembly in either jurisprudence or 
scholarship. The – often implicit – notions of assembly are framed by historical 
experience, the political and legal-doctrinal context. These will be discussed below in 
Chapter 1.  
However, as every investigation necessarily proceeds from some preliminary 
assumption about the object to be examined, it is useful to make that assumption explicit. 




important, because a biased assumption about the object of inquiry simply derails the 
whole investigation from the outset. There is less space for error if this preliminary 
notion is too broad rather than too narrow.  
In this widest possible sense, one could define assembly as the common presence 
of at least two persons in a common space at the same time.  
In order to be meaningful, however, a concept, broad as it is, needs be 
distinguished from other concepts. In human rights law, this means a delineation from 
activities not protected by human rights, and a delineation from activities protected by 
human rights other than the subject of inquiry, in our case, freedom of assembly.  
Some instances of people being together at the same time in the same place 
evidently fall outside of legal protection. This includes group violence, just as individual 
violence is not protected by human rights. Legal documents specifically require that the 
activity of assembly be peaceful (or peaceable), testifying to a general aversion of law to 
assemblies, not present with regard to other, typically individually exercised rights. More 
intriguing is the question of whether any peaceful types of group behaviour, such as, for 
instance, standing in a queue, ought also not to be protected by human rights. Common 
presence has to imply that the persons have some link with each other beyond the mere 
coincidence of being at the same place at the same time. Thus, the link might be some 
shared activity, emotion, opinion or the like. An important question is how law defines 
that link, or, more precisely, how it selects what sort of link it accepts and what sort it 
does not. As will be seen below, different courts do not define this link in the same way, 
and this question is hotly contested in some countries. As to the above example, in my 
view, standing in a queue as such is not an assembly, but it can easily turn into one, for 
instance, if people outraged by the waiting time start discussing how to handle it or start 
protesting against it.   
In contrast, it appears less problematic – and has not given rise to significant 
controversy in practice either – to distinguish the scope of assembly from that of the 
private and family life or privacy. It is assumed that some sense of private-ness or 
intimacy brings a grouping of people within the scope of privacy rights, and freedom of 
assembly is reserved for more social (including political) gatherings. A family dinner or 




assembly. Therefore, I will not deal with these instances of ‘assembly’ in this book any 
further. This does not mean, however, that limitation of the scope of assembly by some 
courts to political gatherings will not be discussed and criticised as overly restrictive.   
As to the spatial element of the concept, physical assemblies differ in significant 
respects from ‘virtual assemblies.’ Though it is conceivable that the ‘digital commons’ 
shares enough characteristics with the physical commons to make them a sufficiently 
unified object of discussion, this book only deals with offline, real-life, or physical 
assemblies that take up a segment of real space. In fact, this book adheres to the view that 
an important characteristic of assembly from a legal point of view is its taking place and 
taking a stance, also in the strict senses of the words.  
The temporal element in the above preliminary definition is relevant because it 
distinguishes – at least for my purposes – assembly from association. Exercising the right 
to association does not cease if the assembly of the association has ended. Restrictions 
related to the membership in a group affect the right to association, while restrictions 
related to the meeting of the group affect the right to assembly. Furthermore, not only 
associations (or members of associations) can hold assemblies, but anyone can. Thus a 
temporary bond between participants already establishes a claim to freedom of assembly, 
but not to freedom of association. This might be commonsense for a European audience, 
but it is not in the United States. For instance, John D. Inazu has written a book about 
freedom of assembly according to its title, but often discusses issues pertaining to 
freedom of association in the European and international understanding.12 Inazu is 
justified in applying ‘assembly’ in this broader sense because that offers the most 
effective way for criticising the ‘expressive association’ doctrine of the Supreme Court, 
and because association is not mentioned in the First Amendment. However, as both 
assembly and association do appear in most European and international human rights 
documents, this (comparative) book will follow this more wide-spread use of the 
concepts, although without claiming that the two rights are not closely related, or that 
their relationship is fully clarified. 
                                                 
12 John D. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, (New Haven, Yale University 





While for most audiences, the distinction between association and assembly is 
fairly clear, it is much more difficult to differentiate assembly from expression. Later on, 
this confusion will play a central role in my argument. Here it suffices to explore only 
how the collective, spatial, and temporary nature of assembly contributes to the 
specificities of expression on such occasions. For that, it is useful to differentiate between 
types of assemblies, although the categories are not exact and most assemblies are a mix 
of these types.   
Firstly, collective expression at demonstrations is generally of the sort which is 
proclamative rather than argumentative, and aims first of all at exerting pressure by the 
sheer significance of the number of people present. Assembly is essentially about 
quantity, and particularly so in a democracy. Furthermore, demonstration-type assemblies 
not incidentally make use of material objects and symbols of all kinds: material and 
symbolic aspects are an essential component of generating and conveying expression via 
the specific form of assembly. Symbols at an assembly are not only rhetorical (which is 
regularly the case with most types of expression), but importantly are also material (like 
flags, placards, uniforms, effigies, fire, etc.) and bodily, including visual and aural (like 
marching in formation, specific hand gestures, chaining yourself to a fence, dancing, 
shouting and chanting loud slogans, and songs, etc.). Assemblies also often make use of 
the symbolic potential of specific places or dates: the spatiality13 and temporality of an 
assembly might be expressive.  
The message at demonstrations largely falls within a few recognisable categories: 
protest, dissent, outrage, grievance, joy, threat, hate, empathy, commemoration, and other 
emotionally laden and moral content. Most demonstrations have a central purpose of 
addressing the rest of society and government, because participants feel their cause is 
particularly important and worthy of public attention.14 Such expression is naturally 
committed, animated, agitated, often disruptive, and so on, perhaps best contrasted with 
the scholarly expression of a mathematician or the disengaged scientist in the positivist 
fashion.  
                                                 
13 Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors, Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
14 Charles Tilly describes social movements by characteristics of ‘WUNC’ symbols, ie showing worth, 





It is these characteristics that have led many commentators, as mentioned, 
especially in the tradition of crowd psychology, to see protesting ‘masses’ as by nature 
irrational, dangerous, and prone to violence, as a place where the individual loses his 
capacity to reason.15 It remains certainly – and relevantly – true that more people can 
generally cause more destruction than a single individual, and in that sense, assemblies 
are potentially more dangerous than individuals. Still, most of these early assumptions 
were later shaken by research in social psychology. The ‘deindividuation’ hypothesis16 
collapsed when tested empirically:17 there is no mass mind, neither is there any automatic 
irrationality or anti-normativity in ‘crowds’. Mainstream social psychology – in 
particular, social identity theory – shows that persons in a ‘mass’ (in fact, a group) follow 
group norms which make group identity salient in the particular situation. Participating in 
a group enables a switch from norms related to personal identity to situational norms 
related to group or social identity.18 Thus, crowd behaviour – though different from 
individual behaviour – is still rational in that it follows a norm (although of course the 
norm might be murderous, destructive, invidious or simply mistaken).  
The second type of assembly with regard to expression is a ‘meeting’. Meetings, 
as opposed to demonstrations, are occasions for collective expression in the sense of 
deliberation and discussion. These assemblies have – compared with demonstrations – an 
inward tendency: the participants are engaging first of all each other, not the outside 
world. Meeting-type or deliberative assemblies might make less use of symbols, be less 
emotionalised (though not necessarily), and are thus often seen as less dangerous by law 
(this is, for example, the case in France and Germany). Note however that conspiracy 
                                                 
15 With different overtones, see the works of Le Bon, McDougall, or Freud, above n 2.  
16 Eg Leon Festinger, Pepitone, A., & Newcomb, T., ‘Some Consequences of De-individuation in a Group’, 
47 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 382 (1952), P. G. Zimbardo, ‘The Human Choice: 
Individuation, Reason, and Order vs. Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos’, in Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation, Vol. 17, W. J. Arnold & D. Levine eds (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press 1969) 237-
307, E. Diener, ‘Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation in Group 
Members’, in Psychology of Group Influence, Paul B. Paulus ed (Hillsdale, Erlbaum, 1980), S. Prentice-
Dunn and R. W. Rogers, ‘Effects of Public and Private Self-awareness on Deindividuation and 
Aggression’, 43 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 503-513 (1982).  
17 Tom Postmes & Russell Spears, ’Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis’ 123 
Psychological Bulletin 238 (1998).  
18 Steven Reicher, Russell Spears & Tom Postmes, ‘A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation 
Phenomena’, in European Review of Social Psychology Vol. 6, Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone eds 




needs exactly this kind of assemblies, and that social psychology shows that intra-group 
discussion enhances hostility towards other groups.19 
Often, meetings do not primarily aim at expression, but have a different focus 
(most importantly, religion, but also other activities such as artistic, sport, recreational, or 
any other activity). However, when the state intervenes into their business, it will 
generally be related in one way or another to expression: if nothing else, then state 
intervention will relate at least to potential expression of group identity through shared 
activity.20  
A final type of collective expression in an assembly, in my view, is the interaction 
between a lone demonstrator or performer and her audience. Here the observable 
expression stricto sensu is not necessarily collective (though the audience might react to 
the performer); still, the event as such is fundamentally collective and expressive at the 
same time.   
These three types of collective expression – demonstration, meeting and 
performance – are easily mixed with each other in many ways. Meetings and 
demonstrations might come about at the initiation of a speaker or performer. Meetings (of 
the organisers or the core) might precede or follow demonstrations (of the larger public). 
An assembly might have deliberative (introverted) and demonstrating (extroverted) parts 
as well (such as an open-air film screening and discussion within the context of a Pride 
Parade). Or it might even not be possible to distinguish these aspects from each other 
(such as the Occupy movement’s many assemblies, in fact demonstrating deliberation). 
That is one of the reasons why the different jurisdictions examined below apply diverging 
categorisations of assemblies.  
In sum, I consider the contemporaneous common presence of at least two persons 
in a common space to be an assembly. From among these assemblies, the book – in line 
with jurisprudence – will not deal with those which are so intimate that they are better 
protected by the right to private and family life.  
Furthermore, this book takes the stance that the so-conceived (‘public’) assembly 
is always at least potentially expressive, either in the sense of creating or in the sense of 
                                                 
19 Laura G. E. Smith & Tom Postmes, ‘Intra-Group Interaction and the Development of Norms which 
Promote Inter-Group Hostility’, 39 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 130 (2009)  




conveying a socially comprehensible meaning, something all of us easily understand and 
potentially internalise. Sometimes, for that creation or conveyance to come about, an 
assembly looks essentially like a theatre, a symbolic re-enactment, carefully set in place 
and time.21 In this regard, an assembly is certainly strategic,22 but not more than a 
theatrical play, an opera, Hundertwasser or Dalí. Or, for that matter, the rhetoric of a 
politician, the most sacred object of freedom of speech. Some prefer to read Shakespeare, 
but most prefer to see it – partly because that is also re-enactment. As the circle of 
creation and conveyance is complete, there is no way to claim that what has acquired a 
meaning in social interaction somehow does not convey it. Still, as I will try to show 
below, courts often exactly claim that.  
That means that this book contends that freedom of expression doctrines are 
framed in a way that leaves out an important bulk of actual expression, and denies it the 
protection of rights without justification. This is especially true about the United States, 
which comparative lawyers traditionally cherish as the world champion of freedom of 
expression. But it is also true, to a large extent and for different reasons, of Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom. The European Court of Human Rights – after an initial 
period of almost complete disregard for the value of freedom of assembly – has recently 




In order to reveal general problems in the nature of freedom of assembly, a sufficiently 
wide pool of comparative material is necessary. It still has to remain reasonably narrow 
in order to be manageable, and to avoid falsely attributing problems to assembly which 
arise from systematic deficiencies elsewhere in a legal order. Therefore, this book deals 
with generally well-functioning, human rights–respecting democracies, and maps even 
among them only the representatives of influential constitutional traditions. It will 
                                                 
21 Eg Matthias Reiss ed, The Street as Stage: Protest Marches And Public Rallies Since The Nineteenth 
Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), Baz Kershaw, ‘Fighting in the Streets: Dramaturgies of 
Popular Protest, 1968-1989’, 13 New Theatre Quarterly 255 (1997). 
22 Maybe even in the – negative – sense associated with strategic as opposed to communicative action by 
Habermas. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, transl. Thomas A McCarthy, (Vol 1 




analyse in detail the assembly-related jurisprudence of constitutional and supreme courts 
and quasi-judicial bodies of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and 
Germany. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights adds an 
international dimension. Especially in cases where the European Court proves either 
especially cautious, or especially rights-protective, it is reasonable to suspect a general 
problem or pattern less visible from within the legal order of the nation state.  
In discussing the particular issues in each of the jurisdictions, hard choices had to 
be made as to the order of discussion, that is, which court to consider first and which 
next. Mostly, I sought to start with the court where the particular issue has been 
especially controversial or where the court had created a model or determined the 
conceptual frame in an influential way. Often, but by far not always, I begin with the US 
Supreme Court, and rarely if ever with the French Constitutional Council or the Conseil 
d’État. The German Federal Constitutional Court and courts in the United Kingdom are 
mostly in the middle, and sometimes are the starters, while the European Court of Human 
Rights is always the last for reasons of its internationality. I also do not insist on finding, 
or inventing, answers to each question, to each issue examined in every jurisdiction; 
rather, I have sought to find the answers only where they exist. This method is justified in 
a project aspiring to form a general view of the nature of freedom of assembly by 
examining arguments that judges actually employ and weigh in their reasoning. 
A caveat: the many important questions of practical policing of – especially 
unpeaceful – assemblies are largely left out of the scope of this study, not least because 
these are traditionally seen as issues pertaining not to the right of assembly, but to right to 
life, bodily integrity, right to liberty, and so on. This omission is not meant to imply that 
some of these aspects could not be conceptualised as interferences with freedom of 
assembly as well, or that they could not rightly be the object of another inquiry.  
Chapter 1 discusses origins, forms, and values of assembly in order to provide a 
general framework for discussion. The remaining chapters deal with the limits of the right 
to freedom of assembly, which often coincide with the limits of freedom of expression. 
Chapter 2 discusses prior restraints on assemblies and shows that, tellingly, this is an area 
where assembly is not reconfigured as speech by courts. Chapters 3 to 6 analyse 




prevail over assembly. Substantive limits include the prevention of violence, disorder or 
crime (Chapter 3); prevention of coercion, direct action, and disruption (Chapter 4); 
protection of dignity (Chapter 5); and, lastly, protection of property (Chapter 6), though 
that will be – for reasons explained there – treated only in brief. The remaining chapters 
discuss restrictions related to the time (Chapter 7), manner (Chapter 8) and place 
(Chapter 9) of assembly, and claim that those issues (sometimes seen as secondary, as 
‘modality’, ‘speech plus’, or ‘conduct’) belong equally to the core of freedom of 
assembly as the ‘substantive’ issues. The Conclusion provides an assessment of the 
comparative findings, an evaluation and critique, and suggests a path forward for 




Origins, forms and values  
I. Historical origins of the right to freedom of assembly 
 
People have of course always assembled in some of the senses discussed above, 
though some forms of assembly came into being only later. For instance, social 
movement literature shows there was no practice of demonstration before the 19th 
century.23  There is no specific treatise on the history of assemblies as such. Social 
movement studies, eg, the works of Charles Tilly show a complex development of a 
whole repertoire of movements, an element of which is assembly.24 Tilly also 
demonstrates that democracy, especially high capacity democracy contains violent 
protest.25 Thus it is likely that before the modern democracies, assemblies tended to turn 
violent more than today. Also, in earlier eras much more prone to open and legitimate 
violence in interpersonal relations, assemblies like festivities or popular protests were 
                                                 
23 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder, Paradigm Publishers, 2004) at 33. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See especially Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2008), 




more likely also occasions of mob violence. Ruff for instance tells the story how in the 
early modern times, local ‘youth abbeys’ exercised half-legitimate, often violent control 
over marriages throughout Europe, manifested clearly in assemblies.26 Regularised and 
ritualised group violence was part of social life also because of the lack of a state 
monopoly on violence. In addition, the function of popular protest early on has been 
essentially conservative, or reactionary to innovation by central authorities, and such 
violent conservative riots were often led by local elites.27 In general, regimes which are 
by nature less responsive to popular will logically oppress social movements more, and 
drive them into violence.  
These appear to be the factors why freedom of assembly has not been legally 
recognised before the middle of the 19th century, except for the United States. As with 
many other rights, assemblies were not the object of legal protection, but legal 
persecution or at least official suspicion, control and aversion. Tellingly, ‘tumultuous 
petitioning’ (above ten petitioners) was made illegal in 1649 in England, reaffirmed in a 
1661 act, which was repealed only in 1986.28  
Both the literature and the case law often view freedom of assembly as related to 
the right to petition. However, I only found a clear legal-historical connection between 
petition and assembly in the United States. There, assembly, as will be shown, is indeed 
historically related to the right to petition, understood to be a right of the Englishmen, and 
in this sense claimed by American settlers against the Crown and the English Parliament.  
The right to petition itself has a long and dynamic history. One author traces its 
first appearance back to as early as somewhere between 959 and 963, ie to the so-called 
Andover Code.29 In the relevant part of the Andover Code, Edgar the Peaceful stated30:  
2. And no one is to apply to the king in any suit, unless he may 
not be entitled to right or cannot obtain justice at home. 2.1. If 
                                                 
26 Julius R. Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
Chapter on Ritual group violence, especially 160-163.  
27 Ruff, Violence, above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at 184-188. 
28 Schedule 3 of the Public Order Act 1986, repealing Tumultuous Petitioning Act 1661, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/schedule/3/enacted.  
29 Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and 
Interpretations, Texas Tech University, Ph.D., 1971. University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 12. 
30 Dorothy Whitelock (ed), English Historical Documents, Vol. I. (New York, Oxford University Press, 




that law is too severe, he is then to apply to the king for 
alleviation. 
This or similar versions of a right of petitioning for redress re-occured in several royal 
charters, and then was famously reinforced in the 1215 Magna Carta. The difference 
between the early charters and the Carta is significant. The early charters are all written 
by the monarch, and it seems, they were adhered to only as long as it was convenient for 
the monarch. Smith cites the prologue to the Laws of Canute which also entailed a 
guarantee of petition as typical for the early understanding: ‘This is the ordinance in 
which King Canute determined with the advice of his councilors, for the praise of God 
and for his own royal dignity and benefit...’31 At this time thus the aim of granting some 
sort of a right to petition was not in the interest of the petitioner, but for the praise of God 
and for the dignity and benefit of the King. These aims might be intended to mean 
something like objective truth of justice, which in the medieval understanding would 
necessarily overlap with the ‘interests’ of the people: still, a petition ‘right’ based on 
these criteria could be easily turned into a clause of discretion.  
Later on, the Magna Carta used somewhat stronger language,32 and, with time, 
and through various detours,33 the right to petition developed into a proper common law 
right. At the same time, petitions became the most important form of broadening 
parliament’s power vis-à-vis the monarch. This is a significant change not only in the 
history of ‘democracy’, but because it shows again a potential inherent in the right to 
petition. In a certain sense and incrementally over the centuries, the petition as a form has 
turned into substance: the right to complain has transformed into power to change the 
law.34 This process was then completed – at least from the hindsight it appears as a 
logical subsequence – by the widening of franchise and the elaboration of the idea and 
practice of a representative government.  
                                                 
31 Whitelock above n 30 at 419 as cited by Smith, Petition, above n 29 at at 14.  
32 § 61 Magna Carta, available eg http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/mcarta.asp. 
33 Cf. Smith’s analysis of the history of petition after the Magna Carta. At times, kings would deny any 
obligation on their part not to ignore or at least not to punish petitioners, while at other times, petitioners, in 
or through Parliament would claim ‘ancient liberties’ while indeed creating new ones. Smith, Petition, 
above n Error! Bookmark not defined. , 17-30. 
34 By 1414, the Commons successfully secured that the petitions of people which are transmitted in the 
form of bills by the Commons to the House of Lords and the Monarch cannot be modified by the latter ones 





An analogous pattern appears to have worked in the colonial context: the 
renunciation of representation undermined English sovereignty in the colonies, and the 
result here was also the overcoming of a previous regime, and the creation of new rights. 
In the English case, the right to petition significantly contributed to the development of 
representative government. In the American case, later, the perceived violation of the 
right to petition supported the legitimacy of the revolution, and, as a by-product, freedom 
of assembly started to regularly appear in post-revolution state constitutions.  
During colonial times, the Molasses Act of 1733 provoked the first petition 
coming from the American colonies. Sir John Barnard, speaking on behalf of Rhode 
Island, the petitioning colony, made a claim that the new inhabitants of the colonies have 
claim to an even stronger right to petitioning:35  
[T]he people of every part of Great Britain have a representative 
in the House who is to take care of their particular interests as 
well as of the general interest of the nation... but the people who 
are the petitioners ... have no particular representatives in this 
House, therefore, they have no other way of apply or of offering 
their reasons to this, but in the way of being heard at the bar of the 
House by their agent here in England… 
Settlers regularly claimed the right of petition as a right of British subjects.36 Some 
petitions, like that against the Stamp Act,37 were finally successful, while others, notably 
                                                 
35 George Elliot Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution 1763-1775, Vol. XIII, in The American Nation: A 
History (A.B. Hart ed, 28 vols., New York, Harper and Brothers, 1905) as cited in Smith, Petition, above n 
29 at 56. 
36 See eg the Stamp Act Congress’s resolution to the Declaration of Rights and Grievances of October 19, 
1765: ‘That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies, to petition the king or either house of 
parliament.’ Zachariah Chafee ed., Documents on Fundamental Human Rights (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1951-52, Preliminary edition) at 149 as cited in Smith, Petition, above n 29 at 64.  
37 5 George III, c. 12 (1765) Full title: ‘An act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, and other 
duties, in the British colonies and plantations in America, towards further defraying the expences of 
defending, protecting, and securing the same; and for amending such parts of the several acts of parliament 
relating to the trade and revenues of the said colonies and plantations, as direct the manner of determining 
and recovering the penalties and forfeitures therein mentioned.’, available at America’s Homepage, 
Historic Documents of the United States, http://ahp.gatech.edu/stamp_act_bp_1765.html. The act evoked 
strong resistance, including the Stamp Act Congress, on which the representatives of the colonies adopted a 
petition against a British measure for the first time. See the documents in Journal of the first Congress of 




against the Townshend Act,38 invoked repression. Repression went so far that several 
colonial legislatures, which supported Massachusetts’ initial protest against the 
Townshend Act, were dissolved by the Governors.39 The situation radicalised further in 
that the Virginia House of Burgesses proclaimed that solely it had the right to impose 
taxes in Virginia. Along with that proclamation, however, the House felt necessary once 
again to confirm the right to petition: ‘….it is the undoubted privilege of the inhabitants 
of this colony, to petition their sovereign for redress of grievances; and that it is lawful 
and expedient to procure the concurrence of his majesty’s other colonies in dutiful 
addresses, praying royal interposition in favour of the violated rights of America.’40 
Importantly, at the First Continental Congress ‘the good people of the several 
colonies’ declared41  
That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North-America, by 
the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English 
constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the 
following RIGHTS:  
… Resolved, N.C.D. 8. That they have a right peaceably to 
assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the king; and 
that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and 
commitments for the same, are illegal. (emphasis added) 
Here the right to assembly appears already as a natural precondition of the right to 
petition, a development clearly missing from English law. Afterwards, similarly worded 
guarantees were enshrined in several state constitutions. In each of those cases there was 
                                                                                                                                                 
October 7, 1765 (ed. Lewis Cruger, 1846, New York, Winchester), text available 
https://archive.org/details/journaloffirstco00stam. The Stamp Act was repealed by the An Act Repealing 
the Stamp Act; March 18, 1766, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/repeal_stamp_act_1766.asp. 
38 The Townshend Act, November 20, 1767 available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/townsend_act_1767.asp. 
39 Smith, Petition, above n 29 at 63. 
40 Chafee, Documents, above n 36 at 150 as cited in Smith, Petition, above n 29 at 64.  





a conjunction of assembly and petition. For example, the Pennsylvania constitution of 
1776 and the Vermont constitutions of both 1777 and 1786 all proclaimed ‘[t]hat the 
people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct 
their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances, by 
address, petition, or remonstrance.’ Interestingly, the 1776 North Carolina constitution 
omitted exactly the reference to address, petition or remonstrance, ie the oldest right.42  
As to the federal constitution, during the debate, representative Mr. Sedgwick 
opposed the inclusion of freedom of assembly as being superfluous next to freedom of 
speech,43 because freedom of speech self-evidently includes freedom of assembly. After a 
very short debate at which Congressman Page recalled the famous 1670 Penn trial over a 
‘tumultuous assembly’,44 this motion was rejected, and the assembly clause was included 
in the federal constitution. There was basically no debate on it, because the debate was 
dominated by a serious motion to include a right of the people to instruct their 
representatives. Importantly, James Madison, who was keen on determining the proper 
number of legislative assemblies,45 did not raise any objection in relation to the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble.  
In any case, by the time of the revolution and especially the drafting of the 
constitution, petition and assembly had become intertwined in the minds of the colonial 
people. Remarkably, the right peaceably to assemble was a new right, not one of the 
rights of the Englishmen, and it was never included in any sense in the English 
constitution. The colonists thereby claimed a right the English in England never had as a 
right. What happened was an incremental change in meaning, whereby petition started to 
include assembly, in some state constitutions with the addition ‘to consult for the 
common good’. Note that the state level texts are often unclear about whether the people 
are entitled to assemble in order to consult for the common good and to petition or 
                                                 
42 A very similar provision became part of the Alabama constitution of 1819, available at the Avalon 
Project http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ala1819.asp. 
43 Annals of Debates of Congress, August 14, 1789, 759 ffff, available http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
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44 See in more detail John D. Inazu, ‘The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly’, 84 Tulane Law Review 565 
(2010), 575-576. 
45 See, eg ‘In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest 
the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still 
have been a mob.’ James Madison, Nr. 55, in John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, The 




whether these are separate rights. The federal constitution forbids Congress to make any 
law abridging ‘the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances’, which does not suggest that assembly is 
dependent on either petition or on requesting redress of grievances.  
In social practice, assembly life has been quite intensive since the early days of 
the new republic. John D. Inazu tells the story of a politically active citizenry claiming 
and practicing a broadly understood freedom of assembly including political discussions, 
pamphleteering, memorials, but also festivities, parades, and the like around the 
Democratic-Republican Societies, which though short-lived, and easily suppressed, 
certainly influenced the outcome of the next election when Jefferson became president.46  
In the early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court freedom of assembly did not play 
an important role, but neither did free speech. In the first half of the 20th century some 
important cases mentioned right to free assembly, mostly together with the right to free 
speech.47  
In England, the right to petition has clearly not implied a right to assembly in 
either of the above senses – that is, neither in the sense of presenting or consulting on a 
petition in assembly nor as logically following from the right to petition as a separate 
right to assembly. The mentioned ban on tumultuous petitioning remained in force from 
1649 till 1986, in itself disproof of recognition of a right to assembly at least in the sense 
of a right continuously flowing from a right to petition. Furthermore, the common law 
breach of the peace has traditionally been ‘breathtakingly broad, bewilderly imprecise in 
scope’48, providing police with such powers related to assemblies which also defeated 
any claim as to the existence of a ‘right’.  
Dicey also famously proclaimed that ‘it can hardly be said that our constitution 
knows of such a thing as any specific right of public meeting’ and ‘[t]he right of 
assembling is nothing more than a result of the view taken by the Courts as to individual 
liberty of person and individual liberty of speech.’49  
                                                 
46 Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, above n 44 at 575-581. 
47 Eg, ibid.  
48 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 4th edn ( Abindgon, New York, Routledge 2007) at 
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Interestingly, in UK legal history, recent decades have seen an extraordinary 
mushrooming of legislative restrictions on freedom of assembly from public order laws to 
terrorism and antisocial behaviour legislation; even harassment provisions are applied to 
restrict protest – while this is the first time that arguably something of a right to freedom 
of assembly in the UK is emerging due to the ECHR and section 6 of the Human Rights 
Act. The UK history also shows that having a right does not necessarily imply less 
restriction on its exercise than during the times when it was only a liberty.  
In Germany and France, there was not any proper right to petition, let alone 
assemble, until well into the 19th or even 20th century constitutions. Neither does a 
historical connection seem to have existed between petition and assembly, unlike in the 
United States. Some authors in Germany mention the so-called aristocratic privilege of 
self-assembly of the estates in the medieval Holy German Empire as a particular 
appearance of freedom of assembly, without ‘the moment of generalisation’, ie a 
privilege which was to be later extended to the whole society.50 Others mention the right 
to petition, but without further concretisation, so it most probably refers to the right to 
petition as it evolved in England.  
Freedom of assembly itself started to emerge in the early 19th century in 
Germany, after the feudal regime of capriciously revocable permits had faded away.51 An 
1802 treatise reports that an assembly can be banned for reasons of public safety and 
order, but the ban cannot be imposed arbitrarily or at the whim of the police. What is 
more, already at this time the author emphasises that only prior notice can be required, 
not request for permission.52  
Later on, however, German states which adopted a constitution in the early 
constitutionalist era between 1814 and 1824 did not include freedom of assembly in their 
                                                 
50 Eg Otto Depenheuer, ‘Kommentierung zu art 8’, Rn. 10, in Maunz/Dürig Grundgesetz, Loseblatt-
Kommentar (Roman Herzog, Rupert Scholz, Matthias Herdegen & Hans H. Klein eds, 62nd 
Ergänzungslieferung, München, Beck, 2011).  
51 Cf. „Versammlungen und Vereine sind an eine jederzeit widerrufliche landesherrliche Genehmigung 
gebunden, politische Vereinigungen aber und alle geheimen Gesellschaften sind unter allen Umständen 
strafbare Vergehen.’ (Assemblies and unions are bound to a permit which the feudal landlord can revoke at 
any time, while political associations and every secret society are under any circumstances criminalisised.) 
Otto von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, Vol. 1. (1868), 873 as cited by Depenheuer, above n 
50 at Rn. 16.  
52 Günther Heinrich von Berg, Handbuch des teutschen Policeyrechts, Erster Theil, 2nd. edn. 1802, at 244 




basic document. They thought freedom of assembly was necessary in a state where there 
was no representation of the citizens, but it did not fit a representative state structure.53 
As we see this is quite the opposite of what underlies English and especially American 
constitutional history: there it is exactly the representative government which has to 
guarantee freedom of assembly, as an independent right or in conjunction with the right 
to petition. This opposition mirrors the partly still existing tension between German and 
US courts with regard to the value protected by freedom of assembly, to be discussed 
below under democracy-related values. 
Soon after 1815, the rest of the German states that kept the feudal constitution 
(re)turned to authoritarian government, which was repressive of freedom of assembly 
(and association). The German Confederation (Deutscher Bund, 1815-1866) adopted in 
1819 the Karlsbader Resolutions, which targeted – among other liberties – secret or not 
authorised alliances, especially fraternities which were traditionally politically active at 
German universities.54  
Still, the repressive legal environment could not prevent 30,000 people from 
gathering at Hambach between 27 and 30 May 1832 – under the guise of a popular feast 
– but in reality to discuss political reforms and the state of liberties.55 It provoked a 
reaction from the German Confederation, which not only banned any political unions, but 
introduced permit requirements for every such festivity which is ‘as to the time and place 
neither usual nor allowed.’ Even on permitted popular assemblies, ‘addresses or 
suggestions for resolutions should incur an enhanced penalty.’56  
The 1849 Paulskirche constitution did protect freedom of peaceful and unarmed 
assemblies in its Article 8, but it has never entered into force.57 The Weimar constitution 
of 1919, similarly to the Grundgesetz, guarantees freedom of assembly without permit or 
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prior notice in general, but it allows for prior notice in cases of open air assemblies, and 
also for prior ban in case of immediate danger to public safety.  
In France, significantly, the Declaration of 1789 does not include freedom of 
assembly at all. The Constitution of 1791 guaranteed ‘as natural and civil rights … the 
liberty of the citizens to assemble peacefully and without arms, in accordance with the 
laws of police.’58 Article 7 of the declaration of rights included in the Montagnard 
constitution of June 24, 1793 (which was never applied) repeated this same formulation.59  
Most of the revolutionaries, so explains Duguit, were suspicious of any collective 
right or any right of a group because of the dangers partial loyalties represent for national 
unity and the general will, the latter being derivable only from individual wills.60 The few 
proclamations of freedom of assembly in the mentioned documents during the Revolution 
are considered not more than ‘paying lip service’ by a French law professor today.61  
Later French history illustrates the ambivalence of classic liberalism and freedom 
of assembly, too, in that Benjamin Constant did not include it in the 1815 additional act 
to the constitutions of the Empire,62 which he drafted for Napoleon and which was 
approved in a plebiscite, 63 but was never really applied due to the defeat of Napoleon.  
Freedom of assembly was not mentioned in constitutional documents until the 
second republican constitution of 1848 which in Art 8 guaranteed freedom of peaceful 
assembly within the limits of rights of others and public safety.64 Unusually, this article 
protects first freedom of association, then freedom of peaceful and unarmed assembly, 
then petition and then freedom of manifestation of thoughts by press or in other ways, 
and then prohibits censorship of the press. This order of guarantees is actually the 
                                                 
58 Title Premier, § 2, Consitution de 1791, available at http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/co1791.htm.  
59 See http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-
constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-24-juin-1793.5084.html.  
60 Duguit as cited by Pierre-Henri Prélot, Droit des libertés fondamentales (Paris, Hachette, 2nd  ed. 2010), 
289. 
61 Prélot, ibid at 289.   
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opposite of what is in general the standard order in human rights documents (opinion, 
press, petition, assembly, association).  
In any case, all these documents were rebutted later, and none of them serves as 
point of reference in contemporary constitutional discourse either. Freedom of 
manifestation (more or less, freedom of demonstration) has since 1995 been interpreted 
as part of freedom of expression of opinions and ideas as granted in the 1789 
Declaration,65 while freedom of meeting (réunion) is a legislatively granted right from 
1881,66 but it has not been elevated to constitutional status.  
 
What is the overall picture that emerges from this short look at legal historical 
predecessors of the right to assembly? Much remained uncertain, as if to confirm the 
claim about the neglected nature of freedom of assembly not only by courts and 
comparative lawyers, but by legal historians alike. I have not been able to verify exactly 
why the American colonists started to think petition is intertwined with assembly as a 
right, while clearly their English peers did not, apart from the fact that the Crown had 
repressed violently the assemblies of the settlers many times. It seems most likely that 
this very fact, this experience, and not a legally perceived relationship, preceded the 
inclusion of an assembly right before the right to petition in the many documents of the 
evolving American system. It also remained unexplained in any serious detail why 
Madison actually did not have a single word of caution with regard to assemblies of 
people as compared to assemblies of representatives, if not simply because he was 
preoccupied with preventing the introduction of bound mandate of representatives  – 
certainly a vital question. 
France’s very inconsistent history testifies to great aversion on the part of both 
Rousseauists and later liberals to a right of assembly. A right to assembly allegedly both 
prevents the realisation of the general will because it fragments it, and poses a danger to 
individual liberty, a strange coincidence.67 According to some early German views, there 
is no need for freedom of assembly if there is a representative government. This link 
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might have been seen similarly by those during the debate on the First Amendment, who 
would have struck out the reference to the right of assembly, but would have included a 
right of the people to instruct their representatives. Thus, freedom of assembly might 
appear superfluous also in a system of ‘bound mandate’, which, as mentioned, Madison 
in turn might have feared significantly more than the right to peaceful assembly. All these 
contingencies and inconsistencies of the legal history of freedom of assembly left their 
mark on the forms of assembly recognised by the right, which will be discussed next.  
II. Meeting, marching or speaking: forms of assembly and its relation 
to the right to free speech and expression 
1. United Kingdom: stationary and moving assemblies  
 
In the United Kingdom, the law traditionally has not granted a right to freedom of 
assembly; therefore, the conceptions as to the forms of assembly are to be understood 
from the laws regulating public order. The act which currently controls a large segment 
of freedom of assembly in the UK is the 1986 Public Order Act (POA). POA was born 
out of a perceived need to provide stronger power to the police in cases of assembly in 
reaction to the 1984-1985 miners’ strike, one of the country’s most serious events of 
public disorder in the twentieth century. The 1986 act still governs the law of freedom of 
assembly in England, although quite a few additional laws have been adopted specially 
targeting terrorism and ‘anti-social behavior’. The 1994 Criminal Justice and Police 
Order Act (CJPOA) inserted the notion of trespassory assembly as sections 14A-14C in 
the 1986 Act. One of the most important recent modifications has been section 57 of the 
Anti-social Behaviour Act of 2003, which reduced the number of participants required in 
an assembly before the police may impose conditions from 20 to 2. Thus, for purposes of 
restriction, one can safely assume that already an assembly of two is an assembly in 
English law. Note however that this is not a guarantee of heightened legal protection, but 
quite to the contrary, an authorisation for interference.  
Otherwise, the public order law of the UK with regard to assemblies has not been 
monolithic. Historically, the so-called right to passage divided the law related to 




the nineteenth century the right to passage preferred processions to meetings, according 
to one commentator because of sympathy towards the Salvation Army which marched, 
and because of hostility towards the socialist movement which regularly held mass street 
meetings.68 Nevertheless, the law was considerably changed when confronting the Fascist 
marches in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1936 POA, largely targeting the 
Mosleyan movement, authorised the police to ban processions in a given area if an officer 
was of the opinion that imposing conditions was not sufficient to prevent serious public 
disorder. This, however, did not mean that the legal schemes for dealing with processions 
and meetings were integrated.  
The possible theoretical unlawfulness of any kind of stationary meeting has 
endured well into the 1980’s. A 1987 case, Hirst and Agu69 first recognised that a non-
moving demonstration is not necessarily an unlawful use of the street (though this 
interpretation is still quite far from acknowledging a fundamental right of assembly). Yet 
even recent amendments to the 1986 POA preserved the traditional duality of processions 
and stationary meetings not only in a formal sense, but also in the sense of some 
substantive differences, which will be discussed later.  
2. France: réunion and manifestation 
 
In France, two, or, rather, three kinds of assemblies [rassemblements] are differentiated. 
An assembly might be a manifestation, a réunion, or an attroupement. One element of the 
definition of these concepts seems to be the place where people assemble; others are the 
aim, the organisation, and the modality. None of these elements is completely clear.  
As to the place, one thing is clear: a manifestation, which is closest in meaning to 
demonstration in English, is an assembly on the public route [voie publique]. The concept 
of public route, however, is also slightly unclear, voie normally meaning road, and not 
necessarily including, for example, square. It is not included in the definition if 
manifestation means only moving or also stationary assemblies. Certainly, in contrast, a 
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réunion is a stationary assembly, thus it is likely that under manifestation a procession or 
march is understood.   
An assembly might be a réunion which means meeting, more in the static than in 
the active sense, somewhat like reunion in English (if the French mean the act of 
gathering or coming together, they use rencontre).  
The usual translation of assembly into French as réunion causes some confusion. 
Some would allege that the ECtHR70 and the American jurisprudence place manifestation 
in the category of réunion, clearly misunderstanding that ‘assembly’ as a matter of 
linguistic convention can both be a meeting and a demonstration (let alone the text of the 
First Amendment which actually speaks about ‘the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble’). Others, however, albeit a minority, use the word réunion so that it 
presumably includes71 both meeting and demonstration. 
According to the classic definition of the commissaire du gouvernement Michel in 
his conclusions72 to the famous Benjamin judgment73 of the Conseil d’État of 1933:  
‘a réunion constitutes a momentary grouping of persons formed in order to listen to 
exposition of ideas or opinions, in order to consult for the protection of interests.’74  
The comma in the original implies that the two aims are disjunctive, alternative.  
Bernard Stirn would understand réunion to be ‘un groupement de caractère 
momentané, organisé en vue d’un objet déterminé’.75 That means that he does not find it 
necessary to specify the aims of listening to exposition of ideas or opinions or consulting 
for the protection of interests as stated in the conclusions of Michel to the Benjamin 
judgment.  
According to the Court of Cassation, a passing meeting (rencontre) of persons 
who do not have between themselves any relationship (engagement) is not a réunion. 
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That’s why it denied the quality of réunion to the faithfuls’ gathering, who, leaving the 
mass, stayed to listen to an improvised speech of a delegate.76 Also, the Conseil d’État 
affirmed that the meeting (rencontre – ie in the active and not planned sense) of 
consumers in a café is not a réunion. The commissaire du gouvernement Corneille 
defined réunion in his conclusions to this case as an assembly concerted or organised for 
the defence of common ideas or interests.77 This early formulation of the Delmotte case 
was extended in the Benjamin case also to include listening to exposition of ideas or 
opinions, with the apparent implication that a literary lecture would fall within the scope 
of réunion. The commissaire du gouvernement argued that since there was a chance that 
someone from the audience would react to what the speaker was saying, a discussion 
might develop, and that is why the lecture is closer to a réunion than to a mere 
spectacle.78  
Still, although both are different from a spectacle, there should be some difference 
between réunion and manifestation. Again, more according to common sense than to any 
specific legal or judicial definition, a réunion is convened in order to listen to a speaker, 
who might be the only person expressing his opinion, without the others necessarily 
sharing it, while on the other hand, manifestation is about conveying a message to the 
outside world, ie all the demonstrators’ opinions are expressed by participating physically 
at the manifestation.79 In the words of Bernard Stirn, manifestation presents a dual quality 
by being organised on the public route and by having an aim of expressing a collective 
sentiment.80 The line is in my view blurred, since there can be – and usually is – one or 
more speakers at the manifestation, who might react to each other, with different views, 
and, also, demonstrators might express differing views, or it might not be possible to 
differentiate between demonstrators and audience. In the same vein, it is well possible 
that at a réunion more people express opinions, same or different, or discuss some 
proposition. While Alain Boyer would paint a picture of the participants of the réunions 
as passive81, Colliard and Letteron would differentiate réunions and manifestations from 
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the spectacle, where the spectators are passively observing the ‘actors’.82 Thus, they 
would claim that the underlying criterion of réunion is that it is about expressing and 
exchanging views.  
It is hard to deny that the novelty of the Benjamin judgment was that the mere 
possibility of exchange of ideas, or communication between speaker and listener, changes 
a spectacle into a réunion. The difference between réunion and manifestation lies 
therefore not so much in the fact that the people at the réunion are not necessarily 
expressing or exchanging their views. At least linguistic convention rather imposes 
delineation from membership: the dividing line is who is considered to be part of a 
réunion or a manifestation. Réunion is conceptualised as a gathering of those who speak 
and those who listen, meaning that both the speaker and the audience belong to the 
réunion. A manifestation, to the contrary, is conceptualised to include only those who 
demonstrate, and not their audience or spectators. That leads one to the affirmation of a 
common goal or issue which ties together the group. At the réunion, the non-speakers are 
listening and might speak, there is no non-interested person affected. At the 
manifestation, in contrast, the common goal will include addressing outsiders who might 
be interested, disinterested, disturbed or delighted by the manifestation. There is no 
outsider at the réunion, while the whole point of the manifestation is to interpellate others 
who do not participate at the demonstration itself, but possibly might join it.  
The relevance of the distinction is that réunions on public road are flatly 
prohibited in French law, 83 even though it seems that the authority remains free to 
authorise the usage of the public route for a réunion.84 This led some commentators to 
define réunion as not taking place on the public route, a move which shows very clearly 
the loi-directed thinking of French jurists. Jean Morange would for example distinguish 
réunion and manifestation by the sole criterion that manifestation takes place on the 
public route.85 However, to my mind, it is rather a decision of the legislator which 
precludes réunions on public roads, and not a question of linguistic convention, let alone 
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essential difference. Otherwise, it would have been neither necessary, nor sensible for the 
legislator to prohibit réunions on public road.  
Furthermore, French law is definitely not elaborate enough to clarify whether for 
the purposes of constitutional protection, the scope of freedom of assembly includes 
‘réunions sur la voie publique’ or not. If so, the legislative prohibition of réunions on the 
public route could theoretically be examined for conformity with the constitution. If not, 
réunion in the sense of the constitution would be limited to réunions not on the public 
route. However, the question itself is moot, so far at least, since neither the Conseil 
Constitutionnel nor the Conseil d’État has granted in any sense fundamental rights 
protection or analogous protection to the liberté de la réunion. The legal sources of 
liberté de réunion are the same as the legal sources of prohibiting réunions on the public 
route.  
On the other hand, réunions enjoy definitely more protection than manifestations, 
for example, there is no notification requirement in the case of réunions. Furthermore, 
French law differentiates private from public réunions. Public réunions are those which 
are open to the public in the sense that participants are not invited by name. Private 
réunions are not regulated at all.86 Manifestations on the public route are perceived to be 
more dangerous to public order than réunions.87 Nonetheless, as réunions are prohibited 
on the public route, it seems that the legislator deems réunions on the public route (i) the 
most dangerous or obstructive, followed by manifestations (ii), then public réunions not 
on public route (iii) – which are then réunions taking place in closed areas or in buildings, 
owned by the state or by private entities to which people are not invited by name, but 
everybody is free to join – and, lastly, private réunions (iv) to which people are invited by 
name are perceived to be the least dangerous or otherwise in need of regulation. 
However, as the line between manifestation and réunion is extremely blurred if 
not non-existent, it is highly unlikely that the categorisation, together with the ban of 
réunions on public route, is really enforced. Suppose an announcement has been posted 
on a billboard on the street about an upcoming réunion of the teachers of lycée X to 
discuss the new educational reform plans. As the public réunion is by definition 
something to which everybody can come, it is within the concept of the (public) réunion 
that the organisers advertise it in order to inform strangers about the event. According to 
French law, this event cannot happen on public road, unless it can be perceived as a 
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manifestation. As probably there would be some audience, outsiders, etc., who would 
come out of curiosity to observe the discussion, this might turn it into a manifestation 
according to the approaches sketched above. What renders a public réunion into a 
manifestation, ultimately is the presence and reaction of outsiders. For example: 
probably, public gardens which are fenced and have opening hours, like that of the Jardin 
des Tuileries, are not a public route, thus, public réunion can be held there, what is more, 
without prior notice.88 However, depending on who comes, the gathering may easily 
become a manifestation in the sense that it is about addressing outsiders and not 
‘discussing an issue among us’. What is more, who is supposed to bear responsibility if 
the réunion ‘transgresses’ and becomes a manifestation in the sense that people leave 
the garden, and, let’s say, start blocking the traffic on the Concorde square?  
Most probably, whenever one wants to organise any sort of gathering on the 
public route, one will qualify it as manifestation and then one will notify the police (or 
préfet) about the event. Presumably, however, if someone wishes to avoid the duty of 
notification, he or she will claim that the event is a réunion and the place is not a public 
route. A route – voie – would conceivably be a way on which there is traffic, ie streets in 
any case, but also squares insofar as there are crossroads or crossing traffic. As I can see 
it, exclusively pedestrian places would not necessarily qualify as voie publique, therefore, 
a square might be either a voie publique or not, or even some parts of a square might be 
voie publique while other parts are not.  
In effect, it is likely that the difference between ‘réunion’ and ‘manifestation’ 
cannot be maintained solely with reference to the modality of the assembly, its dialogical 
as opposed to monolithically expressive nature, but also relates to the destination of the 
place used. This is similar to the German approach discussed below.89  
Finally, French law traditionally has distinguished the concept of ‘attroupements’. 
Attroupements, in the formulation of the criminal law are assemblies which are capable 
(susceptible) of disturbing public order. It is therefore again an improper concept in the 
sense that it is just spelling out the limits of legal assemblies. Stirn would claim that 
attroupements are – apart from the tendency to disturb public order – unorganised as 
well.90 Intuitively, one might think that disorderly assemblies are unorganised, since 
disorderly and unorganised seem close in meaning. However, in this case, law is 
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counterintuitive: there is nothing about organisation in the legal definition of 
attroupement in art 431-1 Code penal, and from experience in other jurisdictions it is 
clear that spontaneous demonstrations can easily be orderly and peaceful.  
That a demonstration or réunion should be driven by a common goal is 
understood self-evidently and not put out explicitly anywhere in decisions. That’s why, as 
mentioned above91 a passing meeting (‘rencontre’) of persons who do not have among 
themselves any relationship (‘engagement’) is not a réunion. Accordingly, the Court of 
Cassation denied the quality of réunion to the faithfuls’ gathering, who, leaving the mass, 
stayed to listen to an improvised speech of a delegate. What is more, the common goal is 
not simply a common goal of the theatre-goers to enjoy the performance, but implies 
some sort of active interest.92 As we have seen in the Benjamin judgment,93 the 
possibility of a dialogue between speaker and listener renders a mere spectacle into a 
réunion. One could then argue, as for example, Colliard & Letteron do, that the common 
goal present both at any manifestation and réunion is to exchange ideas or defend 
interests, ie the Benjamin conclusions are extended to manifestations as well.94 
However, Alain Boyer points out a difference between réunions and 
manifestations with regard to the common goal. He thinks that the people at the réunion 
come together in order to listen to a message, while people in the manifestation are 
expressing a message by their presence. Therefore, he is only willing to accept that there 
might be in both cases expression of opinion, though in the réunion the only necessary 
element of freedom of expression the participants are exercising is ‘freedom to be 
informed’, and the speaker exercises freedom of speech. In contrast, at the manifestation, 
the demonstrators (all in one, and one-by-one) express an opinion. Therefore, he thinks it 
is justified and necessary to attach freedom of demonstration to freedom of expression, 
and not to freedom of reunion.95 To express an opinion is a necessary common goal of 
the demonstrators; and Boyer would specify the goal as being addressing the government, 
or public opinion.96  
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Léon Duguit derives freedom of réunion from freedom of opinion in a way that 
gives a possibility to define réunion from its function. Freedom of opinion in Duguit’s 
view implies the freedom to manifest, to communicate one’s thoughts to others, and, 
consequently, ‘the liberty to convene réunions of men where these thoughts will be 
exposed publicly.’97 Therefore, freedom of opinion implies freedom of reunion (which, in 
my reading, by Duguit covers both meetings and demonstrations). Further on, he makes 
clear that this approach to réunion neither excludes, nor necessitates the possibility of 
debate or contradictory statements on the réunion, the point is to present an opinion or a 
‘report’.  
3. United States: expressivity discounted by ‘forum’ and ‘action’ 
 
In the United States, contrary to the approach taken in the UK or France, little attention is 
paid to the possible different forms a gathering might take as long as they are expressive. 
That is, for the purposes of First Amendment protection, currently there is no initial 
difference between an indoor or outdoor meeting, just as between a stationary or moving 
assembly (procession). There used to be a difference approximately until the end of the 
19th century between assemblies on parks and streets, and the moving assemblies. Indoor 
meetings (the clear case of reunion in the French understanding) are also covered by the 
First Amendment.  
Whether out- or indoor, however, the extent and the manner of the protection will 
depend on the kind of ‘forum’ to which access is sought. Government property and 
private property naturally enjoy different status, but more interestingly, within 
government property there has evolved a complicated classification in the ‘public forum’ 
jurisprudence. After a long history of twists and changing emphasis on which Robert 
Post’s 1987 article98 is the seminal analysis, the public forum doctrine classifies 
government-owned places in three categories.  
First, most highly protected is the public forum, ie streets, parks which were ‘time 
out of mind, immemorially held in public trust for purposes of assembly, communicating 
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thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’99 On such ‘quintessential 
public forums’100 as called in the Perry decision, general First Amendment standards 
apply; a compelling state interest needs to be shown for content-based (see Chapters 3 to 
5), and some legitimate interest for content-neutral restrictions (see Chapters 7 to 9), the 
required link between the two is strongly varying.  
Secondly, there is the limited public forum, government property which was 
opened up for communication by the government. Here it is quite unclear what sort of 
standard applies. Robert Post actually thought already in 1987 the limited public forum is 
dead. Perry claims that as long as the state keeps the forum generally open, the same 
standards apply as on the traditional public forum. Decisions discussed in more detail 
under place restrictions101 below will prove Post’s point, eg a publicly accessible military 
base can discriminate on the basis of content, ie it belongs to the third, rather than to the 
second category.  
The third category consists of ‘[p]ublic property which is not, by tradition or 
designation, a forum for public communication.’102 On such nonpublic forums the state, 
in addition to time, manner, and place (TMP) restrictions, ‘may reserve the forum for its 
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view.’103  
How these three – or, in effect – two standards operate in practice will be also 
visible in the book, even though it is structured not along the lines of the US public forum 
doctrine, but along the line of prior restraint-substance-modality restrictions, more 
common to the other jurisdictions.   
  What sort of ‘assemblies’ – though again, the expression ‘assembly’ is basically 
never used – are worthy of First Amendment protection is also delineated by the speech 
plus theory, ie expressivity does not matter if it is done by ‘action’. Speech plus is not a 
full-fledged doctrine, but the Supreme Court, especially Justice Hugo Black, found it 
often useful to differentiate elements of assembly into ‘speech’ and ‘conduct’ or ‘action’, 
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and to accord lesser protection to the latter ones. Justice Black’s view about conduct 
being unprotected expresses perhaps most clearly the judicial aversion and/or ignorance 
as to how meaning is generated on assemblies. Justice Black still is considered a 
champion of free speech, exactly because he meant anything what is speech should be 
absolutely protected. As early commentators put it: ‘peaceful, orderly and  almost  
academic  discussion  is  the  only  mode  of  communication which  Black  would  
absolutely  protect.’104  
In a classic speech plus reasoning, in Cox v. New Hampshire105 from 1941, the 
Supreme Court accepted the fact finding of the state court according to which the 
gathering ‘was a march in formation, and its advertising and informatory purpose did not 
make it otherwise. . . . It is immaterial that its tactics were few and simple. It is enough 
that it proceeded in an ordered and close file as a collective body of persons on the city 
streets.’106 That it was a march in formation, resulted in the applicability of a statute 
requiring special permit for parades even on sidewalks, and, thus, in conviction of 
otherwise peaceful Jehovah’s witnesses who were moving in four-five single line groups 
and holding up signs. Thus, the qualification of their activities as march actually 
worsened their legal status, which would have been otherwise just that of the simple 
passersby or shopper on the sidewalks. As Edwin Baker pointed out, the only legally 
relevant difference between the conduct of the 88 Jehovah’s Witnesses gathering at the 
intersections on a street of Manchester, New Hampshire, and the other hourly 26 000 
passersby who crossed the intersection was that the Witnesses engaged in First 
Amendment activity,107 they were ‘marching in formation.’ Certainly, that a group shows 
its unity by formation (which was in this case a very modest formation, the reader should 
not have the image of Hitlerian militant marches in her mind) renders the group 
expressive. The Court does not say explicitly that the formation rendered the parade 
under the protection of the First Amendment, however. The Court only stresses that the 
permit requirement is not aimed at the expressive content. It accepted the state supreme 
court’s interpretation that the statute ‘prescribed ‘no measures for controlling or 
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suppressing the publication on the highways of facts and opinions, either by speech or by 
writing’; that communication ‘by the distribution of literature or by the display of 
placards and signs’ was in no respect regulated by the statute; that the regulation with 
respect to parades and processions was applicable only ‘to organised formations of 
persons using the highways,’ and that ‘the defendants, separately, or collectively in 
groups not constituting a parade or procession’, were ‘under no contemplation of the 
Act’,’ and the Act only served to secure public convenience in the use of the streets.108  
Thus, the Court considered the permit (and fee) requirement attached basically to 
‘formation’ as not burdening the expressive aspects of the activity. It remains unclear and 
even incomprehensible what the justices then think why the Witnesses were building the 
formation, if not for expressive purposes. Rather, it would seem that the formation is 
clearly part of the expression, just as Charles Tilly would claim, it is one of the WUNC 
(Worth, Unity, Numbers and Commitment) displays which contributes to the unity of the 
group.109  
This limited understanding of expression was reinforced in a 1965 case where it 
was ‘emphatically rejected’110 that  
the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of 
freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such 
as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as 
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by 
pure speech. 
 
It appears therefore that the USSC attempts to make a distinction between what is 
considered physical, external or maybe what takes up a space, and what is considered ‘the 
message’. 
4. ECtHR: subsidiarity and functionality  
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The European Court of Human Rights only lately explicitly contended that freedom of 
assembly, just as its twin-right in Article 11, association, 111 has an autonomous meaning 
under the Convention.112  Already the Commission noted, and the Court since embraced 
as constant reference that ‘freedom of assembly covers both private meetings and 
meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetings and public processions;’113 
and it can be exercised by individuals and those organising the assembly.114 Most 
probably, however, it does not cover ad hoc, accidental gatherings of people without a 
purpose, or for purely social purposes.115  
Protests and direct actions where only one or few participants appear will be 
covered by the freedom of expression right of art 10.116 Article 11 is in general 
considered lex specialis to art 10, thus art 10 doctrine can always apply to assemblies, 
while the connection is not valid the other way around. 
This merging conceptual approach does not have such negative consequences as 
the supersession of assembly by speech elsewhere for two main reasons. More 
importantly, the ECtHR does not  – at least so far – apply any modality doctrine which 
would allow for more restriction on the ‘form’ of expression than on the ‘content’. In 
relation to the press, the Court declared already in 1991 that ‘not only the substance of 
the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed’ is 
protected by Article 10.117 In 2009, the Court expressly applied this doctrine to an 
assembly advocating reproductive rights on a boat at the Portuguese shores which was 
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prevented entering territorial waters by a war vessel. A demonstration on a boat on the 
territorial waters of a state was considered by the Court to be the ‘mode of diffusion of 
information and ideas’, restrictions on which, in certain situations, ‘can affect in an 
essential manner, the substance of the information and ideas in question.’118 Thus in these 
cases the ECtHR appears clear about the meaning generating function of modalities.  
However, the Court recently contended that ‘even otherwise protected expression 
is not equally permissible in all places and all times.’119 From this, one could infer a step 
in the direction of applying different standards to the modality and to the substance of the 
expression. Still, in my view, this stance is fundamentally different from the stance taken 
in the US, because it does not split the expression into a superior and inferior aspect, but 
includes in the ‘meaning’ also time and place: ‘interference … might be legitimate when 
the particular place and time of the otherwise protected expression unequivocally changes 
the meaning of a certain display.’120  
Furthermore, and not less importantly, another recent decision implies a clear and 
empirically tenable distinction between expression and assembly for the purposes of 
fundamental rights restriction. The case involved a two-person performance next to the 
Hungarian Parliament consisting of hanging out several items of cloths on the fence, 
symbolising ‘the Nation’s dirty laundry’ in protest against the political crisis ongoing 
since 2006. The performance lasted only a few minutes, followed by a dialogue with 
journalists, and then ended. The performers were later fined for ‘abuse of freedom of 
assembly’ as they had not notified their ‘demonstration’.  
The ECtHR dismissed the government’s argument that the performance was to 
qualify as assembly, which hence falls under the assembly law, and can be subjected to 
prior notice. To the contrary, the ECtHR doubted that such a short two-person „event 
could have generated the gathering of a significant crowd warranting specific measure on 
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the side of the authorities’.121 Had the specific measure been warranted, then freedom of 
assembly (instead or alongside freedom of expression) would be applicable, which would 
allow for imposition of the notification requirement.122 By requiring advance notice for 
the 13-minute 2 person performance, however, „[t]he national authorities’ approach to 
the concept of assembly does not correspond to the rationale of the notification rule.’123 
The rationale of the notification rule is effective coordination and facilitation of the 
assembly, and prevention of public disorder or protection of the rights of others. The lack 
of these specific concerns rendered the short 2-person performance under art 10 instead 
of art 11, confirming the fall-back nature of art 10 (or the lex specialis status of art 11) as 
it was developed earlier, and implying that for the assembly law to kick in, some 
additional, specific concerns are required. In this regard, the freedom of assembly is 
considered freedom of expression discounted by the mentioned police powers, a kind of 
‘freedom of expression minus’.  
In sum, it appears that the ECtHR (i) is willing to recognise the expressive 
potential of the ‘modalities’ of an assembly, (ii) but it still might allow heavier or 
different restrictions on assemblies than on speech, if those restrictions correspond to the 
additional externalities of assemblies.    
5. Germany  
5.1. Narrow, enlarged or wide notion of assembly 
 
In and about the jurisprudence of the GFCC, there has always been quite an intense 
debate as to the notion of assembly (Versammlung).  
The text (art 8 I of the German Basic Law, ‘GG’ in the following) itself says that 
‘every German has the right without notice or permission, peacefully and without arms, 
to assemble.’ art 8 II GG: ‘For assemblies under the open sky, this right can be restricted 
by law or on the basis of a law.’ Thus, at the first sight, it seems that Art 8 I protects the 
act of assembling, just as the text of the First Amendment might suggest, except that it is 
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not the right of the people, but of the individual German citizen. In other respects, 
however, the German debate employs similar terms to what the French lawyers are 
arguing.  Literature and jurisprudence agree that the accidental, passing gathering of 
people is not an assembly protected by the constitution, similarly to France and the other 
countries where the issue is less explicit. Thus, there should be some common goal which 
connects the participants together, and the goal should also be actively common, not that 
of the theatre-goers. What that goal might be, however, is heavily debated, and even the 
GFCC seems to change sides on the issue. According to the ‘narrow’ notion of assembly, 
the goal must be about collective formation and expression of opinion in public 
matters.124 The ‘enlarged’ notion of assembly includes not only communication about 
public matters,125 but private ones as well, while the ‘wide’ notion126 dispenses with the 
goal of collective formation and expression of opinion or will, ie the goal is irrelevant as 
long as there is an inner connection among the participants who strive to achieve a 
common goal, be what it is.  
The implications of the different notions are significant. In the first case, freedom 
of assembly only covers political assemblies,127 ie in a sense is reduced to a sort of 
political right. Proponents of this narrow understanding argue with historical 
interpretation, which, however, seems to have only a rather weak ground. It has been 
shown that historical documents (notably the 1848 constitution of Paulskirche, the 
Prussian constitution of 31 January 1850, or even the Bavarian statute of 26 February, 
1850) have not typically limited freedom of assembly to questions of political or public 
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matters,128 though later courts started to interpret ‘assembly’ in a narrow way, including 
only political assemblies.  
In the second case, ie when an assembly has to have a goal of collective formation 
and expression of opinion or will on public or private matters, the value attached to 
freedom of assembly is the value of communicative freedom as a social value.  
It is only in the last case, applying a wide notion of assembly, that individual 
personality as a value comes to the fore, and where not only expression, but also any kind 
of (common) activity is protected. Therefore, it is only in this last instance that the 
assembly is protected because of the potential for ‘personality development’ of the 
participants. Here German literature, and, partly, the Court stress that at the assembly the 
person unfolds her personality in the group, the assembly is ‘personality unfolding in 
group form’129 whereby the element of expression might be incidental, but not the 
rationale for the constitutional protection.   
Recently, a partly similar, but in my view also importantly different notion of 
assembly has been put forward in the later editions of the Maunz-Dürig commentary by 
Depenheuer. He argues that freedom of assembly protects the act of assembling for 
whatever purpose, but it does not protect anything else, especially it does not protect 
expression, communication, use of the street, noise, etc. This view has been understood to 
advocate the wide understanding of assembly by some.130 I think what is gained in scope 
by the dispensation with a common goal, is lost by the exclusion of anything else than 
assembling itself. Thus I do not consider Depenheuer arguing for a wide scope, it is 
rather a kind of literary interpretation akin to that of Justice Black on the USSC, except of 
course that Black applies it to speech, and Depenheuer to assembly.  
The constitutional court itself has been reluctant to conclusively decide the issue 
for many years. In the seminal 1985 case (Brokdorf), the Court could be understood to 
accept the wide notion.131 However, in the so-called Sitting blockade III decision from 
2001, it describes an assembly as ‘a local gathering of several persons for the purpose of 
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common discussion or demonstration which aims at participating in the public formation 
of opinion.’132 The German original does not necessarily differentiate between formation 
of public opinion and public formation of opinion. It remains disputed if the Court 
thereby embraces the enlarged or the narrow understanding of assembly, since public 
opinion can be formed in private just as public, ‘political’ matters. I agree with those 
authors, who emphasise the futility of the distinction of public and private matters in this 
particular regard,133 because it necessarily enables the state to become the censor about 
what belongs to which category. To illustrate the problem Schulze-Fielitz mentions a 
North-Rhine-Westphalia judgment in which inline-skaters’ city run was not considered 
an assembly even though the inline-skaters wanted to raise the issue of recognising 
inline-skates as vehicles for the purposes of street traffic,134 ie a rather public matter.  
Nonetheless, the GFCC appears to side with ordinary courts in denying 
constitutional protection to ‘solely entertaining’ street events, such as the Love Parade, 
though the relevant decision was only a denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, and 
not a full judgment on the substance of the question.135 Here we see a drawback of the 
‘judicial democratisation’ of freedom of assembly,136 and the limits of functionalist 
interpretation of basic rights which easily turns ‘values’ to be protected into ‘limits’ to be 
enforced: if freedom of assembly serves democratic self-governance, then a contrario 
assemblies which do not fulfil this purpose will be denied constitutional protection.  
On the other hand, the text (Art 8 GG) itself clearly refers to two types of 
assemblies. In one category belong assemblies which take place unter freiem Himmel 
(‘under the free sky’), which is interpreted to mean assemblies which are not delimited 
(by wall, fence, etc.) from the side. Such open air spaces would be the streets, squares, 
                                                 
132 BVerfGE 104, 92, 104 (2001): ‘Versammlungen im Sinne des art 8 GG sind demnach örtliche 
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Meinungsbildung gerichteten Erörterung oder Kundgebung.’ 
133 Dietel, Gintzel & Kniesel, Versammlungsgesetz,  above n 127 at 37, Rn. 12. 
134 OVG Nordrhein-Westphalen, NVwZ 2001, 1316 as cited by Schulze-Fielitz, Kommentar zu art 8, above 
n 126, Rn. 27, note 107 at 897. 
135 BVerfG, 1 BvQ 28/01 vom 12.7.2001, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 28), 
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(unfenced) parks, and many more, most recently also other ‘places of communication’, 
like (open areas at) airports.137  
In the other category belongs every other assembly, ie which is surrounded by 
wall or fence. The at least partial overlap with French law is apparent: the first places 
would be largely voie publique, while the latter are not voie publique (there cannot be 
traffic). Nonetheless, what is considered ‘unter freiem Himmel’ in German law, might 
eventually not qualify as voie publique in French law, if there is no crossing traffic. As 
art 8 GG stipulates in paragraph I that freedom of assembly cannot be subject to prior 
notice or authorisation, and paragraph II only allows limits by law for assemblies under 
the free sky, it might appear that assemblies similar to réunions cannot be restricted in 
any way, and it also might appear that prior notice or authorisation is not meant by the 
‘limit by law’ (Gesetzesvorbehalt) in paragraph II.  
However, this clear division of the constitutional text has been largely eliminated 
by systematic interpretation. Firstly, the modalities [Art und Weise] of any sort of 
assembly belong under art 8, 138 while the content of any sort of assembly belongs under 
art 5 I, right to freedom of opinion.139 What this means in more detail will be discussed 
under the next heading on demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly 
and freedom of opinion. Secondly, prior notice was found constitutional in cases of 
assemblies under the free sky, as it will be discussed in the next chapter.  
5.2. Demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom 
of opinion 
 
Another debate with regard to conceptualities of freedom of assembly revolves around 
demonstration, an ever more important and sometimes troublesome phenomenon of civil 
society in Germany. Demonstration is not a legal term; it is not mentioned in either the 
Basic law or in the Law on Assemblies and Processions.  
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Thus, whether demonstration is protected by any constitutional right, depends on 
interpretation of both the particular right and also the nature of demonstration. Candidates 
from the Basic Law are freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
association, and general freedom of action and personality right in art 2 I, and even the 
principle of democracy as enshrined in art 20 (and entrenched in the eternity clause of art 
79 III). 
Some would deny any claim to constitutional protection, at least when it comes to 
‘large demos’140, saying that the gathering and going to the place of the demonstration 
itself is protected by art 8, freedom of assembly, but not the actual demonstration. Still, 
the majority of the authors confirm the constitutional protection of demonstrations, some 
conceptualising it as an aspect of freedom of assembly, others as a comprehensive 
category under which falls freedom of assembly, while again others consider it a 
combination of freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly.  
Roman Herzog famously attached freedom of demonstration to art 2. I, ie the 
general personality right including general freedom of action. In this understanding, the 
point of demonstration is ‘personality unfolding in group form’. Thereby he established a 
connection to human dignity, deemphasising (though not downplaying) the political 
importance of Article 8, and highlighting participation at a demonstration as a human 
need of the individual amongst increasing risks of isolation.141  
Most authors locate freedom of demonstration partly in art 5 (freedom of 
opinion), and partly in art 8, freedom of assembly. This is the doctrine of complementary 
delimitation (komplementäre Verschränkung), according to which demonstration as 
substance, as message is protected by art 5, while the modalities (arriving, gathering, 
standing, marching, dispersing, but as it will be apparent, many more) fall under the 
scope of art 8.142 In this understanding, freedom of demonstration is a medium of 
freedom of opinion; it is the instrument for collectively expressing opinions. The one 
                                                 
140 Hans A. Stöcker, ‘Das Grundrecht auf Demonstrationsfreiheit – eine ochlokratische Fehlinterpretation’, 
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141 Herzog, Kommentar zu art 8, above n 126 at Rn. 10-16 zu art 8. 
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single real event ‘demonstration’ is covered in its partial aspects by two different basic 
rights.143  
This approach has been almost consistently also employed or at least implied in 
the jurisprudence of the GFCC,144 in spite that it has not remained without strong critique. 
Critics claim that freedom of demonstration is a distinct (even if not distinctly 
enumerated) basic right, because the expression of opinion of the collectivity is 
qualitatively different from either the individual speaker or the discussing group. The 
bodily, direct presence of several persons at the same time and place makes 
demonstration specific. Being together, same time, same place, conveys a stance, an 
expression itself. This is very much an aspect the GFCC itself stresses in the Brokdorf 
decision,145 but only in par with the modality theory mentioned above.  
The debate, theoretical as it might sound, is by far not without practical 
implications. In case demonstration falls within art 8, it can be limited differently than if 
it falls under art 5, freedom of expression of opinions.  
Art 8 only allows for limitations with regard to assemblies ‘under the free sky’, 
while art 5 naturally does not include such a spatial distinction on the limits of freedom of 
opinion. Secondly, outdoor assemblies according to art 8 can be restricted in a statute, ie 
the form of the limitation is prescribed, but not the substance. Art 5 II, however, lists as 
limits of freedom of opinion general laws, protection of personal honour, and youth 
protection, and art 5 I prohibits censorship.   
The Holocaust denial decision146 informs also about the view of the GFCC 
between art 5 and art 8, more to the point of the relation between expression and 
assembly, and not the question of demonstration addressed more in Brokdorf. The Court 
interpreted a condition of no Holocaust denial imposed on a closed indoor meeting as a 
restriction to be judged by standards of art 5 II. It explained that as the contested 
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condition itself refers to ‘certain expressions, which the organiser is supposed neither to 
mouth, nor to tolerate,’147 its constitutionality depends on whether the expressions 
themselves ‘are permitted or not.’ An expression which cannot be constitutionally 
prohibited, cannot form the basis for an imposition of condition for the purposes of the 
assembly law, either, or so the Court holds.  
It remains unclear why it is not possible that constitutionally proscribable 
expressions are in fact not proscribed in the law on assembly, or why the right to 
assembly, as a right ‘without limits’ in this (indoor meeting) case, cannot prevail over the 
limits of freedom of opinion.  
This situation is known as Grundrechtkonkurrenz, competitition of basic rights in 
German doctrine, and it is not settled which right should be then applicable in general, ie 
the one with the more, or with the less limits.148 From the general basic rights friendliness 
of the Basic Law the less limits alternative would follow, and this view generally is 
shared by the majority of German scholars.149 The GFCC has not settled the question in 
general.  
Application of the general scholarly view to the case of competing ‘opinion’ and 
‘assembly’ rights would result, at least as to indoor meetings, in the prevalence of the 
right to assembly, as that has less limits.  
In contrast, the GFCC interprets the assembly guarantee as being about the 
modality, while the substantive guarantee is freedom of opinion. In the Holocaust denial 
case, the Court explains that the prohibition on Holocaust denial does not violate art 8 I 
GG even if the right to assembly in closed places is not subject to limits according to art 8 
II. Simply the Court argues that expressions which can be constitutionally prohibited 
under art 5 II are not protected by art 8 either. 150  
This in effect results in the confirmation of the theory, rejected by scholars, that 
the right with more limits is applicable when two rights are competing, especially if one 
accepts that the split into content and modality is artificial and false.  
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On the other hand, when it comes to open air meetings and demonstrations, art 5 
II’s general law requirement imposes at first look a higher justificatory burden on the 
state than the simple ‘condition of limit by law’ (einfaches Gesetzesvorbehalt) in art 8 II. 
Thus, for demonstrations, the Court has chosen the right with the less limit.  
The third sitting blockade decision sheds some light on what the GFCC means by 
content versus modality. There, the constitutionality of duress (Nötigung) as applied to 
sitting blockades was measured not on art 5, but on art 8, because the conviction has not 
attached to the ‘expression, but to the action of blockade aiming at raising attention,’151 as 
if to say the restriction was content-neutral. The question has to be put again: how come 
that ‘an action which aims at raising attention’ is not qualified as ‘expressive’?   
 
III. Fundamental right, or ‘mere’ common law liberty   
 
Freedom of assembly has different status in the examined jurisdictions, it is not 
necessarily a constitutional or basic right, but might be a statutory right or just a liberty.  
In the United Kingdom, originally, freedom of assembly was not recognised as a 
fundamental right. It is arguably not truly recognised as such today either, since the 
Human Rights Act (HRA in the following) does not allow a prevalence of freedom of 
assembly over explicit, contrary statutory provision which cannot be interpreted in 
conformity with the European Convention of Human Rights, for such cases only the way 
of discretionary legislative change initiated by courts via a declaration of incompatibility 
is foreseen.  
It seems that freedom of assembly has been protected only as a liberty, a „mere 
negative liberty’. A liberty in this interpretation meant only that individuals are free to do 
what is not prohibited, insofar and only as long as it is not prohibited.152 By exercising a 
liberty, one does not commit an unlawful act. In the terminology of Hohfeld, freedom of 
assembly was only a privilege.  
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This has two important consequences. First, liberty can easily be taken away, by 
legislation or even by common law. Secondly, as liberty does not amount to a claim-
right, there is confusion about the positive or negative nature of liberty. Some 
contemporary legal commentators suggest that liberty is not enforceable as opposed to a 
positive right in the European Convention on Human Rights or even a fundamental right 
in the U.S. Bill of Rights.  
It seems to me, however, that liberty differs from those two, otherwise different 
conceptions of rights not in its enforceability, but in its rank. This rank, on the other hand, 
follows not even simply from the nature of liberty, but from the constitutional system of 
the United Kingdom. Parliamentary sovereignty, to put it simply, easily trumps liberties 
in England while rights in the ECHR and in the U.S. Constitution are supposed to form 
limits on governmental (including legislative) powers. Liberties are not ‘constitutional’ or 
‘human’ rights in England because their nature is determined by their relatively low 
ranking in the hierarchy of norms. It is especially dangerous – it appears to me – to 
mistake liberties for negative rights as opposed to positive rights in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.  
Negative right means a claim-right for non-interference on the part of the state, 
like freedom of speech in the U.S. Positive right means a duty of the state to provide 
protection for the individual against some harm, or, in a loose sense, a duty of service 
provided by the state to the people.  
Under the ECHR, freedom of assembly is both a negative and a positive right 
meaning that people have a right to assembly free from undue interference, while the 
state is obliged to take positive measures to facilitate the exercise of the negative right, eg 
by protecting the demonstrators from violent attacks, or to investigate cases where a 
violation of the negative right has apparently occurred.153 
In any case, in England, freedom of assembly traditionally has been only part of 
the general liberty of citizens which could be restricted by law. As an important decision 
has put it, which was later cited by Dicey: ‘English law does not recognise any special 
right of public meeting for political or other purposes. The right of assembly … is 
                                                 





nothing more than a view taken by the Court of the individual liberty of the subject.’ 154 
The only limit to that power of regulation was some sort of reasonableness.155  
This approach has had particularly disturbing consequences on freedom of 
assembly from a constitutional point of view. Freedom of assembly concerns are almost 
completely substituted by public order concerns. In most of the casebooks on civil 
liberties, there is a chapter about public order law, and not on freedom of assembly. The 
textbooks, of course, only reflect the state of the law in the field. In the United Kingdom 
there are currently in force a number of statutes entitled as Public Order Act, Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act, Crime and Disorder Act, Anti-social Behaviour Act, and 
the like, all with a focus on preventing disturbances, and neither with a focus on securing 
a fundamental right. There is, accordingly, no single statute which would even allude to 
the right of assembly. The tendency is also clear: the statutes enacted later in time all 
enhance the powers of the police, all criminalise some previously lawful behavior, and in 
most of the cases widen the scope of police discretion in handling protests.  
Freedom of assembly ranks also lower than some other rights or freedoms in UK 
law. Certainly, the tradition to protect rights in the criminal procedure is much more 
strongly embedded, though this is one area where recent anti-terrorism legislation might 
render moot even centuries long legal truisms. Recently, some media freedom cases also 
suggest a tendency on behalf of the House of Lords to declare the existence of a common 
law ‘constitutional right’156 in the realm of freedom of expression. This is certainly not 
the case with freedom of assembly, not even after the coming into force of the Human 
Rights Act. 
Unlike in Britain, that freedom of assembly is a fundamental right was never 
questioned in the United States. In Hague v. CIO the Supreme Court summarised earlier 
statement on the right to free assembly:157  
…it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss 
these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally 
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or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United 
States which the [Fourteenth – O.S.] Amendment protects.  
… 
In the Slaughter-House Cases it was said,: 
‘The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are rights of 
the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.’ 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the court said: 
‘The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing 
else connected with the powers or the duties of the national 
government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, 
under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The 
very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on 
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in 
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. 
If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the 
defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case 
would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the 
sovereignty of the United States.’ 
No expression of a contrary view has ever been voiced by this 
court. (emphasis added – O.S.) 
 
The concurring justices found even broader the constitutional protection accorded 
to freedom of assembly, as they considered it is made applicable to the states by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the somewhat declined Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, as the lead opinion of the plurality judgment would claim. The main 
difference between lead and concurrence is as to the subject of the right, not so much as 
to the fundamental nature of the right. The Privileges and Immunities Clause only 
extends to citizens while the Due Process Clause to anybody coming within the 
jurisdiction of the United States. Nowadays one can safely maintain that in the United 
States the latter view prevails with regard to the fundamental right to free assembly, even 
if courts basically never talk of assembly, only about expression.  
In Germany, the Basic Law itself only grants freedom of assembly to citizens of 
the German Federal Republic. This, on the one hand, clearly does not hinder the 
recognition of freedom of assembly as a fundamental or basic right, which thus similarly 




German legal order.158 What is more, freedom of assembly according to the text of 
Article 8 GG is unlimited except in cases of assemblies under the open sky. This 
ostensible illimitability, however, is significantly reduced in the interpretation of the 
GFCC, as for such rights, the Court introduced the concept of inherent limitations, ie 
limits flowing from other constitutional rights are acceptable even on seemingly 
unlimited rights.  
In an opposite trend, another textual limit is interpreted away, too, which had the 
effect of broadening basic rights protection. In general, art 2 I of the Basic Law protects 
general freedom of action as a human right, under which also non-citizens’ freedom of 
assembly can be subsumed. Secondly, the federal assembly law – and also Länder 
legislation adopted after the federalism reform159 – also grants freedom of assembly to 
everyone, as only this would be in accordance with the ECHR.160 It is unrealistic that any 
Land will in the future restrict the right to citizens. In any case, in the German 
constitutional order, freedom of assembly is safely engrained as a basic human right.  
In France, as noted above, the freedom of manifestation has been attached to 
Article 11 of the Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen du 1789 (Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789, in the following ‘DDHC’) by the Constitutional 
Council,161 and that way it has a constitutional rank. Freedom of reunion is ‘only’ 
statutorily granted, even if that protection is more extensive as there is no prior restraint, 
and since the Benjamin decision the administrative court examines strictly whether the 
interference was proportionate. It has to be stressed that the statutory nature of the 
guarantee of freedom of réunion does not appear to bother French lawyers. Quite to the 
contrary, they certainly prefer the legislative guarantee over a ‘constitutional’ guarantee 
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proclaimed by the CC. Jean Morange in comparing countries of Common Law and 
countries of ‘legislative law’, ie France, explains that the value of the first is its unity and 
flexibility, while of the second is predictability and clarity,162 not considering that laws 
are also in need of interpretation, let alone that laws themselves might be substantively 
objectionable, unconstitutional or violating ‘human rights.’  
Still, historically, freedom of reunion is granted in a law from 1881 (which could 
always become interpreted by the CC as belonging to the fundamental principles 
recognised in the laws of the Republic, and thus get constitutional value), but the freedom 
of manifestation has only been regulated in 1935 in a so-called decree-law, an act issued 
by the executive but having legislative value (in 2012, the regulation was codified into 
the Code of internal security). Finally, again Morange explains that the liberté de reunion 
has been traditionally understood as more precious than freedom of demonstration 
because it appeared ‘more intellectual’, and, thus, more worthy of protection in line with 
the Enlightenment basis of French law.163 The ‘idealist’164 definition given by the 
commissaire du gouvernement Michel to freedom of reunion in Benjamin also is a 
reflection of this approach according to Morange.165  
Thus, all in all, this shows it is not useful to transpose on French law the 
categories of ranking in discussing of freedom of demonstration and meeting. Despite the 
fact that hierarchy of norms is in general an integral part of French doctrine (scholarship), 
it is not really applied to a particular right. The fact that freedom of demonstration was 
granted higher status first in 1995, testifies at once both to the general later emergence of 
the form of demonstration (as explained by social movement studies), and to the late 
constitutionalisation of the French legal system.  
A last enigmatic feature of French law is, or used to be, that organisers and 
participants have a different status. Traditionally, it was understood that organisers did 
not have a constitutionally protected right to either réunion or manifestation, while to 
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participate at a demonstration was fully protected activity.166 Courts and authorities 
nowadays however do not appear to bother with that, and so will I not either any further.  
IV. The value of freedom of assembly: contemporary judicial rationales  
 
After having discussed legal antecedents, forms, and status of freedom of assembly, it is 
now time to attempt some more abstract, but still judicially focused analysis of what is 
the sense of protecting assemblies according to the courts.  
Courts bring about several, shorter or longer explanations when they decide a case 
in which a party claims a violation of his or her right to assembly or protest. In the 
following I will examine those explanations, or, judicial rationales one by one, since it 
sheds light on a few problems related to the adjudication of assembly claims.   
For sake of clarity, rationales are best discussed in three main categories, as (i) 
expression-related, (ii) democracy-related, and, (iii) liberty-related values.167  
1. Expression-related values, or the judicial link between expression and 
assembly 
 
There is an apparently obvious link between freedom of assembly and expression. Still, 
courts differ in their perception of the more precise relation of the two as I showed above 
in relation to rights.  
The French CC frames freedom of demonstration as collective expression of ideas 
and opinions, while freedom of meeting, réunion is more about exchange of ideas and 
opinions. What ideas and opinions mean in this regard is not clarified further, thus we can 
assume that it does refer to any kind of message, in any case, the question is not even 
asked.  
The German court also stresses collective expression, however, there the focus is 
shifted from the message to the person expressing the message. The demonstrator, in the 
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German understanding, ‘displays his personality in a direct way’, demonstrators ‘take up 
a position in the real sense of those words [‘Stellung nehmen’ – O.S.] and testify to their 
point of view’.168 Thereby, the Court draws the attention to the physical, bodily nature of 
assemblies and demonstrations. In that way, the value to be protected is the person’s 
willingness or desire to show support for a point of view by her body. It is not ‘speech’ 
coming from the brain and the mouth, neither opinions or ideas, but the human body as it 
stands in front of the public that is worthy of constitutional protection.  
It is impossible not to notice that the German court eventually discards, or at least 
significantly weakens the importance of the collective aspects of assembly and 
demonstration with this focus on each protestor’s body taking a stance, filling up a 
concrete place. On the other hand, the focus on physically taking a stand also values the 
act of taking a stand more than the individual message, and in this sense it emphasises 
material, quantitative aspects of demonstrations, and a specific feature compared to an 
argumentative essay which I think is otherwise the paradigmatic view of the object 
protected by freedom of expression. The German court in this regard very clearly sees a 
specificity of public assemblies. Note however that the quantitative or bodily aspects of a 
demonstration are still integrated into an expression rationale, and not understood as the 
self-standing characteristic of assemblies. Apparently, the Court takes ‘expression of 
personality’ as the general category within which fall something like ‘intellectual’ 
expression on the one hand, and ‘bodily’ expression, on the other.    
At the Strasbourg level, the relation between expression as value and assembly is 
rather simple, or certainly not overtheorised: even though assemblies are covered by the 
autonomous right of art 11 which is lex specialis in relation to art 10,169 cases arising 
under that article shall also be read in the light of art 10. As the Court explains: ‘the 
protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of freedom 
of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11.’170 As one of the functions of art 11 is to 
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safeguard freedom of expression,171  art 10 doctrines are also applicable. This has – 
theoretically – a particular relevance in cases of political protest: as according to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence political speech, or, public debate related to issues of public 
interest enjoy a strong protection,172 the same should apply to political protests.173 The 
ECtHR is also aware of the specific characteristics of assemblies in enhancing the 
expressive potential of the lonely speaker or writer:174  
[I]n qualifying a gathering of several people as an assembly, 
regard must be had to the fact that an assembly constitutes a 
specific form of communication of ideas, where the gathering of 
an indeterminate number of persons with the identifiable intention 
of being part of the communicative process can be in itself an 
intensive expression of an idea. The support for the idea in 
question is being expressed through the very presence of a group 
of people, particularly …. at a place accessible to the general 
public. Furthermore, an assembly may serve the exchange of 
ideas between the speakers and the participants, intentionally 
present, even if they disagree with the speakers. 
Thus, freedom of assembly according to the ECHR furthers expressive values in several 
regards: it can be (i) about individual expression of the speakers; (ii) collective 
expression signifying (ii)a) the quantity of support for an idea, or (ii)b) support for the 
idea that the issue is worth discussing; finally, (iii) it enables exchange of ideas between 
supporters and dissenters.  
As mentioned, in the United States, freedom (or the right) of assembly is – but for 
a very few, mainly early cases – missing from the dictionary of the Supreme Court, 
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which either simply talks about the First Amendment, or freedom of speech or sometimes 
expression in cases related to assemblies. Thus, the value of the demonstrations and 
protests are in general considered to be the same as that of free speech. One dissent at the 
Supreme Court argued that speech by conduct can actually convey a message more 
precisely than if told in words. In the sleeping tent (demonstration for homeless persons) 
case Justice Marshall – joined by Justice Brennan – quoted Judge Edwards from the D.C. 
circuit:175  
By using sleep as an integral part of their mode of protest, 
respondents ‘can express with their bodies the poignancy of their 
plight. They can physically demonstrate the neglect from which 
they suffer with an articulateness even Dickens could not match.’ 
 
This point of view, rejected by the majority, rightly emphasises an important and 
valuable feature of protest demonstrations which is lacking in other ‘forms of speech’: 
that re-enactment and concrete, even theatrical display are not only more apt to induce 
empathy and emotions, but also more precisely express, because more directly re-present 
and demonstrate a particular issue, draws attention to a situation of crisis in our common 
life, and makes it comprehensible. This has always been a characteristic potential of 
protest and demonstration, and this potential deserves principled recognition in law as 
well.  
However, too often this potential is ignored by law, even constitutional and 
human rights law because of a forced doctrinal split into content and modality, and a 
satisfaction with requiring state neutrality only as to content. Such is the case in the US 
and Germany, while in the other countries the argumentation is not even transparent 
enough to clarify the court’s view in this regard.  
The ECtHR appears to be the only court which by attributing expressive values to 
the mentioned aspects of assemblies does not lower the standard of review. When the 
clash in this regard between ECtHR and national jurisdictions will be exposed openly is 
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hard to tell, but it might transform assembly law fundamentally. So far, however, this 
clash potential appears to be dormant.  
Therefore, strangely, even though freedom of assembly is often protected in the 
language of freedom of expression in courts, de facto this reference to expression does 
not necessarily benefit the demonstrator, as it will be visible in the chapter on time, 
manner, and place restrictions. Non-intellectual, physical, material, including ritualistic or 
theatrical moments of assemblies get read out from the enhanced constitutional protection 
by denying them the quality of ‘expression’. In other words, the protection accorded to 
assemblies also mirrors what counts as expression in the eyes of judges. An 
argumentative essay, with rationally supported facts and conclusions, ie what a scholarly 
or judicial piece is supposed to be, is certainly more worthy of protection under this 
standpoint than a messy protest where people want to sleep in a park. Reading the 
decisions on assembly by having in mind argumentative essay as the paradigmatic case of 
expression explains many of the apparent inconsistencies, and deliberately weakened 
jurisprudential standards, which are then unsurprisingly inadequate to protect the specific 
potentials of assembly.  
   
2. Democracy-related values: constituent power, direct democracy, 
check on representative democracy, on majoritarianism and on the 
powerful elite 
 
Most widespread, and most problematic, democracy-related values are even more diverse 
in the interpretation of different courts than expression-related values, mostly for reasons 
of the inconsistent use of the concept of democracy or self-government (to which now I 
partly join temporarily).  
2.1. ‘Inherent in the form of republican government’ 
 
According to the USSC, freedom of assembly is inherent in the republican form of 




saying that ‘[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the 
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to 
petition for a redress of grievances.’176 Republican form of government in general US 
understanding means representative democracy (ie in the Madisonian sense), where 
citizens supposed to be able to freely assemble so they can discuss public issues in the 
expectation that that discussion will influence governmental decisions. Cruikshank 
however also refers to the federal government, and that in turn makes the inherency 
quote quite ambiguous, at least for the contemporary reader. Cruikshank namely was 
decided still before incorporation, ie before the Bill of Rights came to be applied to the 
states, and that is the main motivating force behind the argument from inherency. Thus 
there cannot be too much read into this – though much quoted – early case, if not only 
by saying that since it is cited later over and over again, it acquired a new meaning 
independent of incorporation.  
2.2. ‘A moment of original, untamed, direct democracy’  
 
According to the German court’s most famous sentence on the nature of the right in 
question, the exercise of freedom of assembly, especially demonstration, is a ‘moment [a 
piece, literally] of original, untamed, direct democracy’177 which prevents the operation 
of politics to ‘petrify into the routine’ of daily business.  
This view, so close to Carl Schmitt’s acclamation idea, is false in every, but for 
the most metaphorical sense. The exercise of freedom of assembly is neither original, nor 
untamed, nor direct, nor democracy, at least in nowadays’ legal and political systems.  
First of all, assemblies are not exercising public power, and rightly so, as they do 
not possess any legitimacy for it. Assemblies are anything but untamed (ungebändingt), 
as law, German law included, imposes so many limits on the exercise of this right that for 
some it might appear to be not a right at all. It is not direct as it is not an exercise of 
legitimate public power, and because never is the People present at a demonstration, not 
even the majority, or any significant number compared to the entire polity. Admittedly, 
the people present in the demonstration might be so numerous that it challenges the 
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authority of the state, and it overwhelms police to incapacitation. In that sense, 
assemblies are able to gain power, de facto power, to ruin and destroy, but this is hardly 
what the GFCC (and Konrad Hesse, the originator of the quote) meant. I cannot interpret 
this – often repeated – reference in Brokdorf else than a romantic metaphor, with close to 
zero effective meaning.  
Similarly, the idea hinted in Brokdorf that freedom of demonstration is especially 
important in the Bundesrepublik because representative governments such as that 
instituted by the Basic Law only allow for referenda in limited cases, and therefore 
freedom of assembly plays a more important role, is equally half-baked. Representative 
systems limit referenda because of (justified or unjustified) fear that people can be 
manipulated or they are otherwise less apt than a fewer number of elected representatives 
within a system of separation or at least division of powers to decide on questions 
involved in governance. If so, assemblies (especially demonstrations), however, certainly 
provide even less a forum to decide on any of such issues than referenda, certainly can be 
manipulated equally if not more, and are prone equally or more to irrationality and 
emotionalisation.  
The German experience which mandated the constitutionally entrenched 
suspicion against referenda is essentially the same with regard to marches during the NS 
era. Thus it is neither logical in theory, nor historically justified to consider assemblies 
(and certainly not demonstrations) as a kind of benign functional substitute for referenda. 
If referenda are dangerous, assemblies are even more so. The function of referendum and 
assembly is also quite different, defeating any claims for substitution. People decide on a 
referendum while not decide on an assembly.  
2.3. ‘Formation of political will and opinion in a representative democracy’ – 
stabilising role?  
 
What really makes an assembly important from the viewpoint of democracy is actually 
the other rationale the German court stresses in this regard: assemblies contribute to the 
‘formation of political will and opinion in a representative democracy’178, they provide a 
                                                 




channel for expressing discontent with the course the government takes, and thus 
constitute ‘a necessary condition of a political early warning system’.179  
Formation of political opinion refers to public opinion in my view, while 
contribution to formation of political will includes also exerting some pressure on actual 
decision-making processes, but no decision-making itself. Even if we suppose that the 
elected government actually realises the political program for which it was elected, 
freedom of assembly serves as a tool of the (any) minority in general, of those whose 
interests are either never or temporarily not taken into account by majoritarian 
mechanisms.  
This rationale is actually the opposite of the previous one: assemblies are 
perceived to be eminently indirectly related to public power, exerting a mediating 
function from the people to government. I even think the two rationales are 
irreconcilable, as this one presupposes, the previous one denies a functioning, legitimate 
representative system. Thus, the less legitimate and representative a system is, the more 
the above discussed direct democracy argument gains strength and justification. 
Countries examined in this book are functioning, legitimate representative systems, a fact 
which counsels against the judicial construction and legitimisation of parallel centres of 
power (unless the court wants to go outside the system, eg by adopting a Marxist stance). 
Naturally however the more a system turns authoritarian and illegitimate, the more it 
becomes necessary and legitimate for assemblies of people to take over. 
Note how much the German court is aware of the double dual nature of 
assemblies, expressing and forming opinion and will, even if the Court overall or at least 
in rhetoric fails  – see the direct democracy argument just discussed – to keep the 
conceptualisation of will formation within the bounds of representative government. 
That the indirect, mediating rationale is to prevail despite all the grand rhetoric of 
‘untamed, direct democracy’, is supported by a further assertion in Brokdorf: that 
assemblies play a stabilising180 role in a representative democracy by functioning as the 
above mentioned ‘necessary condition of a political early warning system.’181 However, 
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for assemblies to be considered stabilising, a minimally responsive representative 
government is presupposed, and, also, only those assemblies can be stabilising which do 
not aim at destabilisation. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, assemblies might just as 
well be destabilising, for better or worse.  
A best light reading of these lines of the Brokdorf decision thus in my view 
requires government to consider the opinions (and will) expressed and formed on 
assemblies, even if government decides not to bow to the pressure exerted. To exert 
pressure is certainly considered legitimate because of the duality of opinion and will. On 
the other hand, – as will be shown later in the parts related to the scope and limits of the 
right –  the Court in final evaluation endorses potentially subversive and/or coercive 
assemblies to a much lesser extent than it might seem from the general contemplations in 
Brokdorf. 
  
2.4. ‘Essential to the poorly financed causes of little people’ 
 
A slightly different application of the democracy-enhancing rationale is famously 
formulated by Justice Black in striking down a ban on door-to-door leafleting since such 
means of communication are ‘essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.’182  
In the US no specific application of the little people argument to freedom of 
assembly in a strict sense (ie not door-to-door leafleting) can be found in the decisions, 
but as leafleting is part of the activities typically accompanying assemblies, the decision 
is highly relevant. The German Court in Brokdorf also acknowledges in general terms 
that influencing the political process is easier for big associations, financially strong 
sponsors, or mass media, and that’s why freedom of assembly is especially important for 
ordinary citizens and civil society organisations that otherwise lack access to media or the 
potential to influence political processes.183  
2.5. Self-governance and democracy arguments in free speech jurisprudence 
applied to assemblies   
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A final democracy-related rationale emerges actually from considering the relation 
between expression and assembly from an angle different from the one applied above as 
to the relation of assembly and expression.  
Famously, general free speech doctrine of especially, but not exclusively the 
USSC relies strongly on a so-called self-government or democratic theory rationale for 
the protection of speech, which then is applicable to assemblies as well if they are 
considered expressive. It is not possible to discuss various interpretations of the self-
governance speech theory of the USSC, interpretations vary strongly from Alexander 
Meiklejohn184 to Robert Post185 to Cass Sunstein186 and many more,187 all operating 
within the assumption that speech, especially on matters political is essential to foster and 
maintain a liberal democracy, and thus deserves special, enhanced legal protection. US 
political speech doctrine is well-known for explicitly furthering a conscious (and 
‘fearless’) citizenry, transplanting Millian and Miltonian truth seeking arguments into 
constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Holmes’ Gitlow dissent also clearly underlies the 
idea that public speech should be able to translate into political action should the 
‘dominant forces of the country’188 so decide, as it is ‘the only meaning of free 
speech.’189   
Indeed many great free speech decisions based on one or the other democratic 
speech theory actually involved assemblies, even if that does not merit any legal 
recognition in the judgment itself. Justice Brandeis has written the famous Whitney 
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concurrence190 to an assembly case, and most of the clear and present danger dissents of 
Holmes are about assemblies, only the regulations discussed were clearly content-based, 
and often aimed at ‘associational speech’. Brandenburg decades later which solidified the 
case law related to incitement was about a Klu-Klux-Klan assembly.  
Justice Brandeis in Whitney is exceptional in that he articulates a positive or 
affirmative principle; the ideal of civil courage which since then underlies much of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, as Vincent Blasi191 has shown. But the concurrence is also 
remarkable as it does refer to assembly next to speech, a rare case. Clearly, Justice 
Brandeis understood assemblies as deliberative meetings where reasoned argument might 
prevail, a view somewhat inapplicable to demonstrations which tend to only assert a 
stance or thematise an issue, and are less dialogical and discussing. On the other hand, 
mass hysteria according to him originates not from people assembling, but from 
government as manifest in the paranoia of the Red Scare.192 Thus, I still think Justice 
Brandeis would apply a very similar reasoning to demonstrations as well, because 
demonstrations are even more clearly practices of civil courage, and are the essential 
occasions to prevent falling into public ‘inertia.’ 
As discussed above (the relation between expression and assembly), the ECtHR also 
strongly endorses a democratic rationale of art 10 which then gets applied to assemblies 
as well.  
The Conseil Constitutionnel has not elaborated on this issue, but the 
collectivisation of arts 10 and 11 of the individualistic DDHC in the decision 
constitutionalising freedom of demonstration is certainly in line with an (untheorised or 
unspoken) democracy rationale of the mediating sort. Indeed this would be not surprising 
as the Conseil has rejected Le Chapelier traditions in relation to associations much 
earlier.193 Thus, – as a lesser danger – it is logical to also cease considering assemblies as 
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obstacles to and confounders of the full expression of the general will in the loi. It might 
be all the more so as there is no mentioning whatsoever of the sovereign in decisions 
relating to demonstration or réunions. Any parallel to the German idea of similarity with 
referenda is excluded also because of the jurisprudence of the Council to de Gaulle’s 
constitution amending (and violating) referendum which was found to be indeed the 
original, untamed, direct voice of the sovereign.194    
To sum up, democracy rationales proposed by the courts differ from each other. A 
large number of rationales consider assemblies as providing a mediating platform 
between the people (minority, majority, the non-powerful ordinary citizens, etc.) and 
government, or in other words, public opinion and governmental decision-making, 
including lawmaking. It varies from court to court or even case to case if assembly is 
considered important for self-government because it provides an expressive means for the 
poor, those lacking access to media or more because assemblies are occasions for 
deliberation or because they signal discontent to government, etc.  
Not exactly in these words, but the formation argument of the German court 
clearly emphasises the agenda setting function of assemblies, too, and might also refer to 
the potential of assemblies to provide forum of crystallisation for emerging political 
forces. The reverse, self-government theory of speech actually first characterises 
something as speech, and then explains its high protection by its instrumentality to further 
self-governance.  
At the other end of the spectrum there is only the idea of the untamed direct 
democracy mentioned in Brokdorf, the opposite of the representative, mediating 
rationales.  
3. The value of liberty 
 
Finally, freedom of assembly protects liberty, or furthers liberty in again a few senses.  
As explained above, for Dicey and the classic English understanding, freedom of 
assembly was not a right, only a liberty, meaning it could be restricted by reasonable 
                                                 






laws, regulations or common law. The value protected is the unspecified liberty of the 
subjects, which – as exigencies require – can be limited in rational and formal ways (by 
law especially).  
In the German understanding, freedom of assembly is a Freiheitsrecht, naturally 
securing a state-free zone for private initiatives, but this ‘freedom right’ is a claim right 
obliging the state not to interfere with its free exercise. Positive state obligations flowing 
from freedom of assembly do not contradict the nature of Freiheitsrecht. At least in 
theory the negative aspect of a freedom right has priority over the positive aspect as the 
Court regularly stresses that basic rights are first of all Abwehrrechte, rights to avert state 
interference within a sphere of freedom.195  
Clearly, Roman Herzog’s idea about freedom of assembly providing a space for 
personality unfolding in group form is closely related to both liberty and dignity, as it is 
the case also with the general personality right in German doctrine.  
In French legal scholarship, freedom of assembly is discussed under the heading 
liberté publique, a traditional concept in complete flux since the 1990’s. Liberté publique 
is translated as civil liberty and as bürgerliche Freiheit in scholarly articles of the field.196 
Liberté fondamentale, the newer concept is translated as fundamental right by some, but 
it still obviously keeps its liberty-centered function. It seems that with the passage from 
liberté publique to liberté fondamentale or droits de l’homme in legal teaching, and 
partially in positive law,197 the French are moving in the direction of German, American 
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PRIOR RESTRAINTS, EXEMPTIONS AND BARGAIN 
 
I. PRIOR RESTRAINT IN GENERAL 
 
Freedom of assembly is the right where prior restraints abound. The duty to notify or 
even apply for a permit is a common feature of national jurisdictions. Advance notice and 
permit might give occasion even to a prior ban of an assembly, and it is a regular option 
for the police to impose some conditions on route, date, duration, appearance, or even 
content of the message. Some legal orders like the German establish a duty to cooperate 
with police before the assembly takes place, again others might require high permit fees 
or insurance. These might have an effect of either completely preventing the assembly or 
changing its message one way or the other.  
Traditionally, prior restraint referred to censorship of press products. It is in this 
area where the special dangers of prior restraint were reflected by philosophers, lawyers, 
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and writers. Censorship in England has been introduced in a 16th century law requiring 
royal permission for every press product. John Milton brings about several reasons in his 
1644 pamphlet Areopagitica against a newly reintroduced censorship of press products in 
the midst of the revolution. According to Milton, censorship is bad because truth will win 
on the long run if let be in free encounter with falseness,199 and no book should be 
eliminated in advance because200  
as good almost kill a man as kill a good book: who kills a man 
kills a reasonable creature, God’s image; but he who destroys a 
good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in 
the eye.    
Blackstone writes in his Commentaries201:   
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free 
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon 
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter 
when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay 
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to 
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is 
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of 
his own temerity. 
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Though sometimes similar in argument, another famous proponent of free speech, 
John Stuart Mill in the 19th century intended to provide arguments for a much freer press 
and speech in general than Milton.202 Milton, just as Blackstone, can be distinguished 
from John Stuart Mill in that the previous ones would consider traditional ex post facto 
restrictions acceptable, even desirable, their main concern being the abolition of prior 
restraint.   
Closer to our time, Thomas Emerson reasoned that prior restraint is more inhibiting than 
subsequent punishment since: 203  
 It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of expression;  
 it shuts off communication before it takes place;  
 suppression by a stroke of a pen is more likely to be applied than suppression 
through a criminal process;  
 the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal 
process;  
 the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism;  
 the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all 
censorship shows. 
Martin Redish takes up only some of Emerson’s reasons arguing that 
administrative prior restraints ‘authorise abridgment of expression prior to a full and fair 
determination of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression by an independent 
judicial forum’, but thinks that no other basis ‘exists on which to disfavor prior restraints 
                                                 
202 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter II (1859, David Spitz ed. 1975.) 17-53. 




as compared to subsequent punishment schemes.’204 Redish therefore finds that prior 
restraints imposed by the judiciary in a procedure accompanied by a fair and full hearing 
should be considered less problematic than administrative prior restraints and judicial 
prior restraint issued in a procedure with lacking guarantees, as the evil of prior restraint 
lies in the lack of due process. Blackstone also did not mean by ‘prior restraint’ a 
restriction on speech which ‘a fair and impartial trial shall be adjudged of a pernicious 
tendency.’205  
In my view even judicially supervised prior restraint is more pernicious than 
judicially supervised posterior restraint, though certainly Blackstone and Redish are right 
in claiming that administrative restraint is always more pernicious to liberty than 
restraints found justified in a fair and impartial trial.  
In the case of freedom of assembly, both of these distinctions are relevant, 
because most often prior restraints are of an administrative kind, and often courts are not 
accorded prompt and substantive review powers, and even if they formally are, they 
might feel unfit for reviewing questions deemed ‘policing’.   
Freedom of assembly differs significantly from the press, thus the question arises 
to what extent the aforementioned dangers of censorship apply to permit and/or advance 
notice of assemblies, and the resulting possibilities of prior ban and conditions. 
Censorship of press products, as argued by Milton, hinders the ‘discovery of truth’, and 
equals the ‘destruction of reason.’ This argument clearly applies to freedom of ‘assembly 
as meeting’, or what the French call reunion, where there is a discussion of ideas. It 
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applies way less to demonstrations and protests where there is no discussion, and the 
point is to ‘take a stance’ and show support or exert political pressure. However, as 
demonstration is also communication, is also a meaning-producing act, thus, it can also 
contribute to the discovery of truth. Even if some ‘truth’ is rather ‘discovered’ alone, its 
distribution or effective dissemination to a larger audience is necessary in a democracy 
where ‘truth’ translates into law only if supported by a certain number of people, or 
representatives of the people. This is a function fulfilled by assemblies, including 
demonstrations.  
Furthermore, if one accepts that comprehension is not a solely intellectual and 
sterile undertaking, ie not only argumentative essays but also symbolic appeals or staged 
performances contribute to it, then assemblies fulfil a function to which prior restraint is 
harmful even in cases where there is no intention or hope to translate the message into 
law. It is not that an assembly does not produce and convey meaning (and, in this sense, 
‘truth’), though – at most – it might be that an assembly is potentially more immediately 
dangerous than a scholarly or newspaper article. 
Emerson’s concerns are also largely valid in relation to freedom of assembly: the 
possibility of prior ban administered by an authority within the executive power runs the 
risk of being overbroad, inflicted without proper investigation, thus either intentionally or 
accidentally in error, as the protestors did not have the chance to actually behave 
lawfully. Also, administrative discretion inherent in issuing permits and accepting or 
denying notifications might be exercised arbitrarily, ie favouring demonstrators 
promoting a mainstream or government-endorsed view while disadvantaging less 




The argument from public appraisal and criticism of Emerson applies in modified 
form to freedom of assembly: again, as to meetings, discussion there actually facilitates 
the very fact of public appraisal and criticism, and secondly, as to demonstrations, they 
often serve to put an issue to the agenda of public discourse at all.  
On the other hand, concededly, assemblies might be more immediately dangerous 
than argumentative essays, the paradigmatic press product. As John Stuart Mill’s 
example goes:206 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that 
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply 
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment 
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the 
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same 
mob in the form of a placard. 
 
Already the bodily presence of several persons enhances the potential for violence as 
violence needs bodies (except in the sense used by Catherine MacKinnon), while with a 
newspaper article one first has to read it, think it over, and go around and ‘attack the 
corn-dealer’. Certainly these barriers are partly not present at all on assemblies in front of 
the house of the corn-dealer. Thus, Mill is right, even if social movement studies often 
describe soberness and deliberate moderation on assemblies. However, Mill does not say, 
quite to the contrary, that assemblies in front of the house of the corn-dealer can be 
banned in advance. The most he would accept maybe is that a condition might be 
imposed on the organiser not to say that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, because 
                                                 




that would amount to incitement too close to actual harm. Still, the text itself only speaks 
about punishment, which is inflicted necessarily only after the incriminated sentences had 
been uttered in a concrete situation.   
In the following, jurisprudence on advance notice and permits will be discussed first, 
continued by the issue of possible prior bans and prior imposition of conditions on 
assemblies as those presuppose the awareness of authorities about an upcoming event, 
allegedly secured by the advance notice or permit requirement. Finally, the question of 
exemptions from prior restraint (in effect notice and permit) will be discussed, to 
emphasise also a curious resemblance of legal treatment of tradition and spontaneity.  
II. ADVANCE NOTICE OR PERMIT 
2. 1. USSC: proprietary theory, fight against vagueness and the turn 
to content-neutrality 
2.1.1. Governmental property versus vagueness  
 
‘Permit requirements were unheard of through most of the nineteenth century’ as an 
expert of legal history of the right to assembly in the US testifies.207 When they were 
introduced, however, courts largely upheld them.  
                                                 
207 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, ‘The Neglected Right of Assembly’, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 543 (2009) 545. She 
continues: ‘As late as 1881, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, St. Paul, and San Francisco had no permit 
requirements for assemblies in their streets. In fact, it was not until July 7, 1914 that New York City 
adopted a permit requirement for parades and processions in its streets, and as late as 1931 the city did not 




The first paradigmatic decision on permit to access public parks and streets comes 
from Justice Holmes while still sitting at the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts, 
ie the Davis case from 1895.208  
Holmes’ argument upholding the permit was essentially that the owner of public 
property (the state or, by delegation, the city) is in a similar situation as a private owner 
to completely control uses of the property, thus, it also can limit the uses which it allows 
(the greater power includes the lesser).209 The Supreme Court of the United States 
basically approved of this view in the case210, which is commonly called ‘the proprietary 
theory’ of public forums.  
The analogy with private property is fallacious for several reasons. Streets and 
parks are not owned by private persons (or, if private persons own similarly looking 
parcels of land, they are not considered to be streets and parks), and their function is 
public use, for the benefit of the user, and not for the owner.  
Also, at the constitutional level, it can be argued that the law cannot confer 
property rights to the government in the same vein as to private persons, since the 
rationale of protecting property is the protection against governmental intrusion.211  
Furthermore, the ordinance in question in the Davis case authorised the mayor to 
deny permit at his discretion. Both Justice Holmes and the USSC explained this unlimited 
                                                 
208 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) An ordinance prohibited (different kinds 
of) public addresses in or upon any kinds of public grounds without first acquiring a permit form the 
mayor. 
209 For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no 
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid 
it in his house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the right of the public to enter 
upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of 
limiting the public use to certain purposes. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, (1895) per 
Justice Holmes.  
210 Davis v. Com. of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731 (1897). 
211 M. Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association, 2nd edn (Columbia, SC, University of 




discretion again with reference to the proprietary theory: as the greater power includes 
the lesser, the power to absolutely ban public speaking includes the power to allow use of 
public places under whatever conditions (ie depending on a discretionary decision of the 
mayor) the legislative finds fit. As Abernathy points out, the simplistic formula of ‘the 
greater power includes the lesser’ ignores the dangers inherent in unlimited legislative 
delegation.212   
The proprietary theory of public places came under attack only 42 years later at 
the U.S Supreme Court, in Hague v. CIO.213 The lower courts found in favor of the labor 
demonstrators, and affirmed that their right of passage (not assembly!)214 upon the streets 
and access to the parks of the city and other rights (eg to a hearing, etc.) were violated. 
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts famously modified the Holmesian 
proprietary theory, nonetheless without having truly rebutted its fundamental 
assumptions. He wrote that even though public property, streets and parks have been – 
for time immemorial – held in trust for the use of the public for purposes of assembly and 
public discussion.215  
                                                 
212 IbIbid110 ff. 
213 Hague v. Committee of Industrial Organisation, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). A challenge was brought against a 
Jersey City ordinance which prescribed that no public assembly can be held without the permit of the 
director of public safety. Respondents wanted to organise meetings and explain to workingmen the 
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, and other issues related to the labor activities of the 
Committee of Industrial Organisation. They were denied permit and even ousted from the city by force, and 
they were also subject to searches, seizures, and criminal persecution. There was no allegation of violence, 
fraud, disorderliness etc. committed by the respondents, neither any danger of it. 
214 This reference clearly shows the inherited conceptual tools of the English law. Interestingly, the 
historical existence of the right to passage and its obvious influence on early American court cases do not 
seem to register for nowadays otherwise excellent First Amendment scholars, for example Edwin Baker 
speculates pages long on what could be the reason for the early privileging of  parades over street and park 
meetings in 19th century America, and he can only imagine ideological ones. Basically the same is true of 
the classic writer of the field, Glenn Abernathy.  See Baker, Human Liberty above n 224 at 139-142, and 
Abernathy, Freedom of Assembly, above n 211 at 94-98, on whom Baker largely seems to rely, Baker, ibid, 
notes 3, 9 and 13 at 318 and 320. 
215 The quote is at 307 U. S. 515, 516: „Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 




The Davis and Hague cases have been subject to considerable scholarly 
discussion ever since their adoption. I find important to point out that Justice Roberts did 
not reject the basic rationale of the Davis judgment: he did not question that as a rule 
places the title of which belongs to the state or municipality, can be controlled by the 
government as fully as if it were a private owner. It is just that he replied by his own 
common law piece to the common law piece picked by Justice Holmes: ‘trust’ for the 
benefit of the public is a catchy analogy, but it clearly stays within the paradigm of 
common law property rights216, or as Harry Kalven points out, it only allows for a kind of 
First Amendment easement217 on the otherwise absolutely controlled ‘private’ property of 
the state.  
The easement idea probably stems from Judge Clark sitting on the trial court, who 
proposed that a distinction should be made between parks and streets, and as to the use of 
parks, an easement of assemblage should be included.218 The Supreme Court adopted this 
idea but without restricting it to parks, thus, it also applies to streets as well. Thus, for 
those (maybe all) parks and streets which have been for a long time used for purposes of 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for 
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but 
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance 
with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.’ 
216 Geoffrey Stone, ‘Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places,’ 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 238 (1974). See 
also Abernathy, Freedom of Assembly, above n 211 at 111, who calls it the ‘private ownership theory of 
public property’. 
217 Harry Kalven Jr., ‘The Concept of Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana’, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 13 (1965). 
218‘For some quite, in our opinion, illogical reason the American cases do not seem to stress the obvious 
difference between a street and a park. We are not willing to eliminate the latter. It seems to us that the 
purpose of most parks is the reacreation of the public. … We include in that word recreation an easement of 
assemblage. … We hold then that a municipality’s proprietary right is subject to an easement of assemblage 
in such parks as are dedicated to the general recreation of the public.’ C.I.O. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 145 




assembly and public discussion, an exception has been carved out. As the argument is 
supported by tradition, not by a normative idea, its application can be limited.219  
The Hague judgment did not overrule Davis, for which one reason might be that 
at the time Davis was decided, First Amendment standards were not incorporated, thus 
were inapplicable to the states.220  
Technically, however, the court distinguished  Davis, even if in a rather 
unconvincing way. It said that the ordinance in Davis was different since it not only 
regulated the right to assembly, but also various other activities, and, unlike the Jersey 
City ordinance at stake in Hague, it was ‘a general measure to promote the public 
convenience in the use of the streets or parks.’221  
Significantly, the Hague trust argument does not mean that the permit system is 
impermissible, just that there should not be too much discretion in granting it. The 
ordinance authorised the Director of Public Safety to refuse permit only for the ‘purpose 
of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.’ The courts did not find any 
evidence on a danger of riots, disturbances or disorder, and, what is more, found the 
ordinance unconstitutional on its face. In a similar vein to what I argued above about the 
difference between prior restraint for violence prevention and for practical reconciliation 
of competing uses, Justice Roberts explains:222   
[the ordinance] does not make comfort or convenience in the use 
of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the 
                                                 
219 What is more, tradition is not meant to be common law history. It is a metaphoric statement which is 
supposed to evoke emotional support for the proposition. The high tone of the metaphor, however, does not 
make up for the lack of a clear constitutional theory. 
220 Cf  Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, Mark V. Tushnet, Pamela S. Karlan, The 
First Amendment, 2nd edn. (New York, Aspen, 2003) at 296. 
221 307 U. S. 515. 




Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such 
refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.’ 
It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of 
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national 
affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 
‘prevent’ such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression 
of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to 
maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right.  
 
Note that the court would consider ‘comfort or convenience’ a less discretionary 
standard than prevention of disorder and violence. Thus, I argue, it is to say that comfort 
or convenience is understood rather narrowly, eg when permits for two demonstrations 
are requested for the same time and place and the like, but this has never been clarified by 
the Supreme Court. Clearly, Martin Redish would advocate such an interpretation of the 
First Amendment which restricts administrative (and non-adversarial judicial) 
decisionmaking to the duties of the ‘reservationist’ who resolves schedule conflicts in 
favor of the first applicant for a demonstration.223 That would in effect transform the 
permit system in a notification system, as it is practiced or at least theoretically strived for 
elsewhere.   
                                                 
223 ‘[T]he clear constitutional preference for a judicial rather than an administrative determination would 
seem to require the administrators to resort to the judiciary to restrain a proposed demonstration for reasons 
other than schedule conflicts. Though authorities not given notice of a planned demonstration obviously 
will have insufficient opportunity to seek a judicial order, most demonstration planners will wish to notify 
the authorities if only to reserve the exclusive opportunity to parade at their chosen time and place.’ Redish, 




Edwin Baker goes even further or rather a fundamentally different way. He 
suggests that the current, mandatory permit systems should be changed to a voluntary 
one.224  
However, the US jurisprudence evolved and seems evolving neither in the 
Redishian nor Bakerian fashion. It quite clearly does not question the acceptability of 
prior restraint as such, be it judicially or administratively imposed. The question around 
which the doctrine on prior restraint revolves is not the whether and what, but the how. 
Through further cases on prior restraints on freedom of assembly and protest, the Court 
refined the above approach, without clearly rejecting the underlying proprietary theory. 
There is a strong legal technical jargon which came to be applied in matters of permit 
system, fees and the like, making the doctrine of prior restraints on assemblies not 
necessarily clearer or more consistent.225 The general doctrine of prior restraint was 
allegedly found applicable to protests and demonstrations, though this does not mean that 
permit requirements would be per se or even presumptively unconstitutional (unlike in 
‘general’ prior restraint doctrine). In Cox v. New Hampshire, a case decided just two 
years after Hague v. CIO the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of a group of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who assembled peacefully and non-disruptively on the sidewalks (!) 
without first having obtained a permit, without much theorizing about the point of the 
permit system. Dicta in Cox indicate that the Court finds the permit system something 
which enhances rather than restricts the rights of citizens in the use of public streets:226  
                                                 
224 Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1992) 137. 
225 ‘Presently these regulatory devices [ie prior restraints] are subject only to the most amorphous of 
constitutional controls. Although the Supreme Court has favored street protestors with volumes of rhetoric 
and numerous after-the fact legal victories, it has contributed virtually nothing in the way of concrete 
standards and procedures that have any impact when constitution is most needed – before and during the 
demonstration.’ Vincent Blasi, ‘Prior Restraints on Demonstrations’, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1482 (1969-1970). 




 Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the 
existence of an organised society maintaining public order 
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose 
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the 
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as 
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of 
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. 
 In later cases, the Court explicitly talks about ‘competing uses of public 
forums’227 and there is no indication that freedom of assembly would enjoy a privileged 
status among uses of the street. At least, however, there remains a significant difference 
between the language of the US American and the English courts: the US courts do not 
think that the primary use of the street is passage or transport, etc.  
 A further strain in the doctrine of prior restraint evolved in a curious 
intermingling with the doctrine on vagueness and overbreadth, sometimes found 
problematic in the literature.228 Still, the strongest protection against prior restraint of 
assembly is offered by vagueness (and, to a lesser extent, overbreadth) jurisprudence. 
Several decisions reiterate that a licensing statute or ordinance granting ‘unbridled 
discretion’ to a government official constitutes a prior restraint and ‘may result in 
censorship’,229 and that ‘a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to 
                                                 
227 Eg Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement 505 U.S. 123 (1992), 129. 
228 Eg John Calvin Jeffries, ‘Rethinking Prior Restraint’, 92 Yale L.J. 409 (1983). 
229 Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) 757 cites ‘Shuttlesworth, supra, at 349 U. S. 
151; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 355 U. S. 321-322 
(1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 340 U. S. 294 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 




the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide 
the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.’230  
 For example, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, an important case involving 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the statute in question prohibited ‘solicitation of money, services, 
subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic 
cause, from other than a member of the organisation for whose benefit such person is 
soliciting or within the county in which such person or organisation is located unless such 
cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council.’231 The 
Court found the statute unconstitutional, and spelled out two principles with regard to 
solicitation on public streets. The first one is that only ministerial authority and not 
discretion can be constitutionally vested in administrative city officials, and a decision on 
the religious nature of the solicitation is a discretionary decision. Furthermore, the Court 
declared applicable a principle established as to prior restraint in general speech and press 
cases. With reference to Near v. Minnesota,232 the Court affirmed that a ‘statute 
                                                 
230 Shuttlesworth, 349 U.S. 147 (1969) 150, 151. 
231 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 301 ff. (1940). The Witnesses went to a Catholic-populated area 
of New Haven, solicited books, and, if permitted, played phonograph records (critical of Catholicism, but 
directly advocating the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses). The listeners were not Witnesses and the solicitors 
did not have a permit. Jesse Cantwell played a phonograph record to two Catholic men who, ‘incensed by 
the contents of the record, wanted to strike Cantwell unless he went away, so he rather left indeed. There 
was no suggestion that he was personally offensive or entered into any argument with anyone.’ 310 U. S. 
296, 303, Supreme Court summarizing the fact finding of the lower court. 
232 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) was about perpetual  injunction imposed in an adversarial 
procedure against a newspaper. The statute applied authorised the court to shut down a newspaper after a 
malicious, scandalous and defamatory publication unless the statement was either true or published ‘with 
good motives and for justifiable ends’. That the Court qualified the injunction as prior restraint, instead of 
invalidating the law for other (chilling effect, vagueness, etc.) reasons, was criticized heavily by some. Eg 
Jeffries above n 228 at 414 ff. The claim is that the court decided Near on wrong procedural grounds 
instead of substantive ones, while it still reached the correct result. The wrong procedural grounds, ie the 
qualification of an injunction issued in an adversarial process as impermissible prior restraint, have put the 
prior restraint doctrine on the wrong track also for the future, which is unfortunate. To be truthful to 
history, I think one has to add that the reason for the allegedly improper confusion of procedural and 
substantive concerns might be that the Near court not necessarily had so many other ways to go in 1931, 
when none of the substantive doctrines of free speech was fully elaborated, let alone supported by a 




authorising previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial 
decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint 
by administrative action.’233  
 The Supreme Court thus rejected that the wrong of a discretionarily 
imposed prior ban on demonstration can be corrected by later judicial action. As the 
judicial bench will also rely on the authorising legal text, it is not possible for them to 
review whether there was abuse in exercising the discretion. As another USSC decision 
(on prior restraint related to newsracks, but equally applicable), Lakewood, put it, while 
allowing facial challenge to permit ordinances granting unfettered discretion: ‘[t]he 
absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish ‘as applied’ between a 
licensor’s legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power.’234  
 Apart from this impossibility for the court to review the exercise of 
discretion, there is another recurring argument against vagueness: the evil of self-
censorship or chilling effect. Lakewood quotes235 language from Thornhill v. Alabama236 
which is worth recalling here:  
                                                                                                                                                 
constituted common denominator among the justices. It is also useful to add that the Near claim that ‘a 
statute authorising previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after 
trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action’ takes up 
a different, far more complex use in later cases. As explained in the main text, in Cantwell it is said: the 
possibility of judicial review of an administrative prior restraint imposed on the basis of a law which grants 
unbridled discretion does not correct the vice of prior restraint. Thus, though Near has been about 
injunction issued in a ‘due process’, it also holds for administrative prior restraints, and it does have a 
relation to vagueness and overbreadth.  
233 Cantwell, 310 U. S. 306. 
234 City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) 
235 486 U. S. 757 
236 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97. Thornhill, on its own, is again a rather easy case, and it is not 
clearly about prior restraint. Petitioner was saying to one of his co-workers that ‘they were on strike, and 
did not want anybody to go up there to work’, in a peaceful manner, without the use of threat or any abuse. 
He was charged and convicted on the basis of an anti-loitering and anti-picketing statute which flatly 
prohibited a wide range of communicative acts except if done with a lawful excuse. Its significance lies not 
so much in the invalidation of the act, but rather in the idea (quoted in the main text) that not only ‘the 
sporadic abuse of power of the censor’ but ‘the pervasive threat’ of its very existence is what really 




Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been 
deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute 
purporting to license the dissemination of ideas. … The power of 
the licensor against which John Milton directed his assault by his 
‘Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing’ is pernicious not 
merely by reason of the censure of particular comments, but by 
the reason of the threat to censure comments on matters of public 
concern. It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the 
censor, but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that 
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion. (emphasis added) 
 
Dissemination of ideas and freedom of discussion are the particular values which 
are to be protected against fear, against self-imposed restraints, which would otherwise 
chill speech clearly constitutionally protected.  
After so many affirmations on narrow and objective standards required for prior 
restraints on solicitation, canvassing, book selling, labour picketing, solicitation of 
membership of organisation, and so on, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham237 (1969) 
was – apart from invalidating a completely standardless and arbitrary customary permit 
system in Niemotko238 – the first modern case on permits required specifically for 
                                                 
237 394 U.S. 147 (1969). The decision’s role in the civil rights movement is explained in David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, ‘Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964’, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 645 (1995) 650-54. 
238 The 1951 Niemotko v. Maryland was about park meeting permit system, where there was absolutely no 
standard, however vague, to be applied, and arguably there was even no legal base (no ordinance or 
regulation, just a sort of custom required permit for public meetings in parks) for the issuance of permits. 




assemblies where the Court found invalidity of standards.239 Shuttlesworth involved a 
march organised by a Black minister, who was earlier ‘clearly given to understand’240 
that his march would never be allowed in Birmingham. The ordinance prescribing the 
permit requirement conferred upon the local administrators an absolute power to refuse a 
parade permit whenever they thought ‘the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, 
good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused.’ The state Supreme Court in 
the appellate procedure four years later construed this language so narrowly, that it would 
pass constitutional muster. Nonetheless, the USSC made clear that such ‘an extraordinary 
clairvoyance for anyone to perceive that this language [of the ordinance quoted above] 
meant what the Supreme Court of Alabama was destined to find that it meant more than 
four years later,’241 is not expected by the constitution.  
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the argument that Shuttlesworth should 
have turned to courts before he went on with the march. A law subjecting the right of free 
expression in publicly owned places to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, 
objective, and definite standards is unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law 
may ignore it and exercise his First Amendment rights.  
Note, however, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, who would not dispense with 
the requirement to apply for permit because a minor official interprets a law in a way 
which is contrary to the constitution. Rather, he finds problematic the lack of an effective 
                                                 
239 At least I am not aware of any such case decided since Cox v. New Hampshire gave such a generous 
approval to permit schemes, and the Court in Shuttlesworth certainly does not cite any case where the 
ordinance requires a permit specifically for assembly, be it a march, meeting or otherwise. See Lovell v. 
City of Griffin, 303 U.S., at 452-453, 58 S.Ct., at 669; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S., at 159, 165, 60 S.Ct., at 
152; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S., at 419, 422, 63 S.Ct., at 668, 669; Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S., at 
602, 62 S.Ct., at 1241, adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S., at 104, 63 S.Ct. 890; Staub v. City of 
Baxley, 355 U.S., at 319, 78 S.Ct., at 280; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-57, 85 S.Ct. 734, 737-
738, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 all as cited in Shuttlesworth at 394 U.S. 151.  





and speedy remedy when facing such an official.242 Thus, one can say, Harlan’s view is 
less radical, and might be closer to the view of the ECtHR as put forward in Baczkowski, 
and will discussed below. At the same time, Harlan has a point, and this point seems to 
have been painfully ignored by the Court not so much in Shuttlesworth (the particular 
facts of which might indeed call for a radical dispensing of the permit application duty), 
but in later cases.  
The obligation to provide an effective and speedy remedy is conspicuously 
missing from the U.S. jurisprudence on freedom of assembly. The only case J. Harlan is 
able to cite in 1969 is Freedman v. Maryland,243 a movie censorship decision, which 
prohibits the state from requiring persons to invoke ‘unduly cumbersome and time-
consuming procedures before they may exercise their constitutional right of 
expression.’244 Freedman also takes into account that judicial remedy, even if formally 
granted, might come too late and be too costly to be meaningful.245 The Supreme Court, 
however, which neither before, nor after Shuttlesworth has fully accepted that the 
Freedman rationale applies to freedom of assembly, continues to ignore serious 
procedural inadequacies in the permit system of the several states. This, together with the 
rising hegemony of the single focus on content neutrality, is a development which might 
threaten freedom of speech and assembly to a far greater extent than it seems at the first 
glance.246  
                                                 
242 Ibid at 161. 
243 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
244 Harlan’s summary in Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 162. 
245 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 61. 
246 Cf. Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, ‘Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process and 
the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality’, 11 Comm. L. & Pol'y 225 (2006). With similar 
overtones in the context of ‘national security’ see Nick Suplina, ‘Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of 




Finally, permit fees are the other issue where the USSC limited the discretion 
available to administrative officials, but at the same time the Court did not question the 
basic acceptability of the fee paying duty. That it is normal to pay a fee for the use of 
public place for expressive purposes has again a clear connotation of proprietary theory, 
an author talks in this regard (without mentioning the proprietary theory) of a false 
assumption of a two-party business relationship between the speaker and government.247 
It remains unclear what exactly is the cost for which the fee can be exacted, and it is hard 
to resist the connotation of a ‘rental fee.’ Cox v. New Hampshire found the fee 
requirement as such acceptable, even adjustable fees were constitutional. A fee, which is 
‘not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Act 
and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed,’248 is constitutionally 
permissible, and the local government should enjoy flexibility in adjusting the fee to the 
varying circumstances of the particular assembly, as long as it does it in a fair and non-
discriminatory way. The Court even noted that the flexible adjustment might ‘rather 
conserve than to impair’ freedom of assembly.249 Cox did not specify the limits of the fee 
exacting authority. In two cases on advance fees on selling literature rendered shortly 
after Cox a flat fee not matching the expenses incurred by the government was found 
unconstitutional.250 Then, in 1992, the Supreme Court in Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement,251 struck down an adjustable permit fee regulation.252 The ordinance entitled 
                                                 
247 David Goldberger, ‘A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to 
Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?’ 62 Tex. L. Rev. 403, 412 (1983). 
248 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), at 577, again quoting the state Supreme Court’s decision. 
249 IbIbid 
250 Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105 (1943)., Follett v. Town of McCormick . 321 U.S. 573 (1944) 
For an analysis of the line of cases from Cox till 1983 see Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox,  above n 
247. 




the administrator to adjust the fee so as to meet the cost ‘incident to the administration of 
the ordinance and to the maintenance of public order’ 253, verbatim identical to the 
interpretation given by the state court in the Cox v. New Hampshire case.254 The Georgia 
ordinance in Forsyth, however, was further construed to allow the county administrator to 
charge the maximum fee or even no fee at all, or, in any case, less than the cost incident 
to the administration and maintenance of public order.255 This meant the fatal difference 
compared with Cox, and rendered the ordinance content-based according to the USSC. 
Since the judgment on how much police force the maintenance of public order would 
require, is necessarily based on the content of the speech.256 Forsyth has not clearly 
decided whether only nominal fees are permitted, though this was a controversy between 
the circuits because of a Supreme Court precedent (Murdock) invalidating a fee 
considered a flat tax on door-to-door solicitation of religious literature which can be read 
as allowing for nominal fees.257 Instead Forsyth said that the respective language in 
                                                                                                                                                 
252 The regulation at hand was enacted after civil rights demonstrations had been either seriously attacked 
or disturbed by counterdemonstrations organised by the Nationalist Movement, causing the police in charge 
of containing the counterdemonstrators unusually high costs, around 700 000 dollars. The ordinance 
adopted in reaction required every permit applicant to pay in advance a sum not more than $1,000.00 for 
each day of an assembly. 
253 Forsyth County, Georgia, v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 126-127. 
254 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) 577. 
255 IbIbid at 131. 
256 It remains unclear if in contemplating costs incident to maintain public order is always content-based, or 
because anticipation of hostile audience presupposes content assessment. Most often, the content of the 
speech in this context will be judged with an eye on possible counterdemonstrators, since the costs flowing 
from a containment of the hostile group and the protection of the applicant demonstrators might become 
high. To state a higher fee because the speech will possibly face a hostile reaction is inacceptable content-
based regulation. In that way, the hostile audience doctrine intermingles with prior restraint doctrine, even 
overbreadth, since the overbroad language of the statute allows for improper discretion which results in 
disadvantaging groups which might expect a hostile audience reaction in the view of the administrator. On 
hostile audience per se, see below Chapter 3. 
257 In Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) the Court held that the license fee 
levied on the distribution – because the Witnesses would ask for very little or even no money in exchange if 
the person interested did not have money, it is not really a solicitation – of religious literature was a flat tax 
imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right. The Court also noted that ‘the fee is not a nominal one, 
imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and 




Murdock ‘does not mean that an invalid fee can be saved if it is nominal, or that only 
nominal charges are constitutionally permissible.’ The only discernible principle in 
Forsyth is that anticipated hostile audience reaction cannot result in a higher fee.258  
2.1.2. From non-discrimination to content-neutrality: how prior 
restraint becomes content-neutral injunction 
 
The Supreme Court spelled out in several cases that the administration of permits shall 
not be discriminatory, ie denied for some and granted to others, when the some and the 
others are basically in the same situation. This is, one might say, an application of the 
rule of content-neutrality to the context of prior restraint on assemblies, though in the 
early cases when the Court has not yet developed the content-neutrality principle, the 
term used is non-discrimination. Basically in each and every case mentioned so far, the 
Court was checking if the permit scheme was administrated in a non-discriminatory 
way.259  
In 1983, in accordance with the general trend to systematize speech jurisprudence 
in the units of content-based and content-neutral restrictions, the Court adopted a new 
(formulation of the) test applicable to permit schemes. According to U.S. v. Grace, ‘any 
permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on 
                                                 
258 Note that the Court does not distinguish between fees exacted in anticipation of hostile audience, and 
fees exacted incident to the maintenance of order for reasons other than hostile audience. Probably, a fee 
adjusted to the expected size of the applicant demonstration would be considered content-neutral, and a fee 
adjusted to anticipated disorder by the applicants themselves would have to fulfill the Brandenburg criteria 
of imminent likely lawless action, since, compelling interest in strict scrutiny with regard to prevention of 
disorder must mean a high probability and immediacy of unlawful action. None of these, however, is 
indicated in Forsyth, what is more, Forsyth has not been refined in any later case. 
259 Cox: ‘There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair and non-
discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to require.’ 312 U.S. 577, Shuttlesworth 




the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication’.260 There will be a 
separate discussion on content-neutral restrictions on assemblies later;261 here it suffices 
to point to two developments. By the end of the Burger court, doctrinal thinking about 
prior restrictions on assemblies changes from the prior restraint framework to content-
neutrality framework. Thinking in terms of content-neutrality still shares with prior 
restraint thinking a complete lack of reflection, let alone responsiveness to a basic 
problem Edwin Baker and others remarked 20 years ago: that the permit scheme 
essentially discriminates against those who want to use the streets for expressive 
purposes, ie uses constitutionally protected – while those who are not expressing any 
views are free to walk on the streets without need of permit.  
A parallel development worth mentioning is the conundrum around injunctions 
which by the beginning of the 1990’s started to interest not only scholars, but the Court 
itself. In a series of cases related to confrontational (often, but not always previously 
violent) antiabortion speech, the Court approved injunctions restricting the right of 
protest in (limited) buffer zones around health facilities. In the most important case, 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,262 raising the question whether the injunction was 
directed against antiabortion speakers for their views, ie whether an injunction phrased 
regardless of the content of the speech, can still qualify as content-based if it had an 
exclusive impact on one side of the debate. Disputed among the justices was the question 
whether the injunction at hand was a prior restraint at all. Chief Justice Rehnquist writing 
for the Court argues in a footnote that the injunction prohibiting expression within a 36-
                                                 
260 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
261 See below Chapters 7 to 9. 




foot buffer zone was not a prior restraint, since it does not limit whether the protestor can 
speak, only limits the place of the speech. Also, it is not a prior restraint since it does not 
aim at the content of the speech, but it is issued because of protestors’ prior unlawful 
conduct. Justice Scalia in dissent argues that the injunction is clearly a prior restraint,263 
and is clearly content-based. Here what occupies me is less this latter issue, or who was 
right in the Madsen case.264 Rather, I want to point out that both opinions think the issue 
of prior restraint turns on, or, is at least closely related to whether the injunction was 
content-neutral or content-based. Clearly, prior restraint arguments have become 
increasingly infused or even overwhelmed by the content-neutrality principle and the 
attached variety of tests. The beginnings, however, can be found in early cases urging for 
limited discretion to ensure fair and nondiscriminatory use of permit schemes and other 
prior restraints.  
A final development related to permits on assemblies came in 2002 in Thomas v. Chicago 
Park District, a unanimous decision. 265 Justice Scalia wrote the very short judgment, 
upholding the constitutionality of a permit scheme against a facial challenge. The 
ordinance at hand required a permit for events involving more than fifty persons, and the 
Park District had altogether 28 days to decide. The ordinance listed thirteen grounds on 
which the permit can be denied, among them violation of a previous permit and 
misrepresentation of facts in the permit request. What might have come as a surprise, the 
                                                 
263 ‘[A]n injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, 
the prior restraint.’ 512 U.S. 797. 
264 Some commentators tend to find fault more with J. Scalia than with the majority eg Owen Fiss on the 
exact matter, but one can be sure Martin Redish would also not think injunctions should get a stricter 
scrutiny than criminal statutes. I personally find persuasive the critique by Scalia about assumed facts on 
the part of the majority – and that might change the outcome, but certainly would side with the mentioned 
authors on the question of injunctions as such, and especially would not accept Scalia’s claim that the 
collateral bar rule of Walker v. Birmingham justifies strict scrutiny. 




Court declared the procedural safeguards elaborated in Freedman are not constitutionally 
required in case of content-neutral regulations of permits for parks (this was advocated by 
Justice Harlan in Shuttlesworth, see above, though that was a vagueness case in fact).  
This means most importantly266 that no prompt judicial review is constitutionally 
required, or, it is left undecided whether the judicial review is to be commenced or 
determined promptly. Also, it was of no concern that the park authority has almost a 
month to decide on the granting of permit. Thus, one might need to ask for a permit 
months before a planned demonstration with over fifty participants in any of Chicago’s 
parks and other public property, if one wants to be sure to go on with the demonstration 
on or around the planned date (ie judicial review included).  
Thomas v. Chicago Park district shows the rather distorted nature of the allegedly 
speech protective American law when it comes to freedom of assembly, largely caused 
by the content neutrality or time, manner and place doctrine.267 Such an outcome is not 
possible in Europe since the Baczkowski judgment of the ECHR, as it will be explained 
below. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that lower courts in the U.S. are often willing to 
strike down permit schemes with long deadlines and even notification regimes especially 
when it comes to smaller or single-person demonstrations or performances.268 If one adds 
to this that Thomas was a facial challenge, it cannot be excluded that in the near future 
                                                 
266 Freedman 380 U.S. 51 (1965) 58-59 requires that „noncriminal process which requires the prior 
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film 
is unprotected expression must rest on the censor…..exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative 
judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to 
court to restrain showing the film…. …[T]he procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, 
to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.’ 
267 For a similar view see Robert H. Whorf, ‘The Dangerous Intersection at ‘Prior Restraint’ and ‘Time, 
Place, Manner’: A Comment an Thomas v. Chicago Park District’, 3 Barry L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
268 See the discussion in Nathan W. Kellum, ‘Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits 
Are Permitted?’ 56 Drake L. Rev. 381 (2008), especially 405-422, and Edan Burkett, ‘Coordination or 




the USSC will refine its stance on prompt issuance of permits and speedy judicial 
remedy. 
It is also clear that the press freedom cases can have some application to freedom 
of assembly, this, however, happens through the wide understanding of the concept of the 
press, and not through a wide understanding of the ban on prior restraint. In Lovell v. 
Griffin, the Court spelled out that269   
[t]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and 
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These 
indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the 
pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history 
abundantly attest. The press, in its historic connotation, 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion. 
 
That means that ordinances which condition leafleting, handbilling, and similar activities 
– which often, even typically accompany demonstrations and protests – on a prior permit, 
are unconstitutional.  
2.2. Germany: only notice and strict proportionality 
 
Unlike in the U.S., in Germany, prior restraint has not become a central issue in freedom 
of assembly, and I would say, neither that of free speech. This is somewhat peculiar 
regarding strong textual and historical aversion towards prior restraint. The guarantee of 
                                                 




freedom of expression of opinion in Art. 5 I spells out the prohibition of censorship, 
which is understood to cover prior limits solely. Art. 8 I guarantees the right to assemble 
‘without notice or permit’, though para. II allows for statutory limits in case of assemblies 
under the open sky.  
The prohibition of censorship in Art. 5 I did not so far have an application to 
assemblies and demonstrations, and as to the scholarly literature, there does not seem to 
be any claims as to the applicability of the prohibition of censorship either.270  
Art. 8 I GG guarantees the right to assemble without permit or notification, but 
paragraph II allows for restrictions on the basis of law regarding assemblies under the 
open sky.  
It follows first that a permit or notification regime with regard to indoors 
assemblies would be clearly unconstitutional, and any regulation can only aim at ensuring 
that no arms are brought to the assembly, and it remains peaceful. As to outdoor 
assemblies, however, this provision enabled the federal and – since regulating assemblies 
became a Länderkompetenz – Land legislation to require prior notice. The deadline 
traditionally has been way shorter than – as we have seen – conceivable in the United 
States, in the federal law it has been 48 hours. Also, there are strong voices in the 
literature claiming that to introduce a permit system for outdoor assemblies would be 
contrary to the German constitution.271  
                                                 
270 Though I heard once Alexander Blankenagel contemplating the possibility of applying Art. 5 I 
censorship rule against prior bans of Neo-Nazi demonstrations. This has not become the case, so far at 
least, see the Rudolf Hess memorial march decision of the Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2150/08, 4. 
11.2009. 
271 Philip Kunig, ’Kommentar zu Art. 8’ in Grundgesetz-Kommentar I. (Ingo von Münch & Philip Kunig 
eds., 5th edn (München, Beck, 2000), Rn. 27 at 592, citing also von Mutius, Jura 1988, 79 [81] and Gusy, 




Advance notice of outdoor assemblies, on the other hand, has explicitly been 
found constitutional in the seminal Brokdorf decision of the GFCC. Advance notice is 
required because outdoor assemblies have external effects which many times necessitate 
special advance measures. The notice includes information which enables the authorities 
to gain insights as to what measures are to be taken in order to facilitate the undisturbed 
course of the assembly, and, on the other hand, as to how to protect interests of third 
parties and the public interest, or, how to coordinate the two.272  
While upholding the constitutionality of advance notice, the Court restricted the 
scope of constitutionally permissible interpretation of some statutory rules related to it. 
The federal assembly law contained discretionary language allowing the official to 
disperse an unnotified assembly without any further condition. The Court spelled out that 
the verb ‘can’ (kann) does not mean unfettered discretion, dispersal is constitutionally 
warranted only if it is necessary for the protection of equally weighty values. Also, the 
proportionality of the restriction must be respected. The sole fact of not having notified 
does not warrant the dispersal of the assembly,273 but it might warrant fine or other 
smaller sanctions, as I see it. Also, the lack of notice decreases the threshold for 
intervention not automatically, but because and to the extent it results in a limited range 
of necessary information for proper policing.274  
These general principles have been further elaborated with regard to so-called 
spontaneous and urgent demonstrations where the notice requirement has been 
                                                 
272 BVerfGE 69, 315, 350. 
273 BVerfGE 69, 315, 315 (headlines) and 350. 
274 BVerfGE 69, 315, 350: „Auflösung und Verbot sind aber jedenfalls keine Rechtspflicht der zuständigen 
Behörde, sondern eine Ermächtigung, von welcher die Behörde angesichts der hohen Bedeutung der 
Versammlungsfreiheit im allgemeinen nur dann pflichtgemäß Gebrauch machen darf, wenn weitere 
Voraussetzungen für ein Eingreifen hinzukommen; die fehlende Anmeldung und der damit verbundene 




constitutionally relaxed by the Court. This will be discussed under exemptions, below. 
Here it suffices to note that the German approach is internally consistent, even if textually 
somewhat curious in light of the specific ban on prior notice in the guarantee of freedom 
of assembly.  
 
2.3. United Kingdom: notice only for processions 
 
A novelty of the 1986 act has been the introduction of the obligation of advance notice in 
case of public processions. (As mentioned, no such requirement is enacted for stationary 
meetings.) Advance notice is required in general except if it was not reasonably 
practicable to give any advance notice. The provision should have intended to exempt 
spontaneous processions, thus ‘any’ should not be interpreted as imposing undue burden, 
eg a telephone call five minutes before the procession starts. What is reasonably 
practicable in particular is a question not yet really answered by high courts.  
As to the scope, the provision (section 11 POA 1986) applies to all processions 
which are held ‘to demonstrate support or opposition to the views or actions of any 
person or body of persons, to publicise a cause or campaign or to mark or commemorate 
an event’.  
There is no duty to notify the police of processions customarily or commonly 
held, thus logically those commemorating processions which are customarily or 




have been aware of them.275 This also shows that the purpose of requirement is really just 
notifying and not obtaining an authorisation from the police. However, as Fenwick 
observes, the cases where the advance notice makes most sense because the police might 
wish to impose conditions on the processions, ie which might ‘disrupt the community’, 
will be exactly the cases which the police will be aware of anyway.276  
Thus, the notice requirement might be of little use. It requires further research to 
decide whether its introduction was induced by problems related to processions of which 
the police were not aware, or, simply by a tendency to make processions more difficult 
and more controllable. The sole purpose made explicit by the government when 
introducing the bill, which is, according to D.G.T. Williams, ‘clear enough’277, is that 
advance notice ‘will trigger discussions between the police and the organisers; and that 
surely must be to the benefit of both.’278  
In my view it is rather doubtful whether the exercise of a both politically, and 
‘individually’ important right should be made dependent on the bargaining skills of the 
particular demonstrators. The ‘discussion’ is not one between equal partners. Besides, the 
police exercise discretion in bringing prosecutions in case of unnotified assembly. 
Discretion might of course result in rigorous enforcement against unpopular marches 
while being lenient with more conventional ones.  
2.4. France: notice only for demonstrations (manifestations) 
 
                                                 
275 Cf. Richard Stone, Textbook on Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 5th edn (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004)  at 347. 
276 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 4th edn (London, Routledge 2007) at 456. 
277 D.G.T. Williams, ‘Processions, Assemblies and the Freedom of the Individual’, Crim. L.R. 1987, MAR, 
167-179. 




In France, demonstrations (manifestations) are subject to a notification regime, while 
réunions (meetings taking place not on a public route) can be held without advance 
notice. Earlier, the original 1881 law prescribed notification also for réunions, but that 
was abolished in 1907, the motivation behind it being the protest of the Catholic 
Church.279  
The piece of law prescribing advance notice for manifestations was a decree-law 
of October 23, 1935280 supplemented by a 1995 law281 which gave the opportunity for the 
Conseil Constitutionnel to declare freedom of demonstration protected by freedom of 
expression of opinions and ideas under Article 11 of the DDHC.282 In 2012, the 1935 
decree-law and its modifications were codified into Arts L211-1 – L211-4 of the Code of 
internal security. 283 
The CC itself has not found problematic the requirement of advance notice as 
such. In legal scholarship, however, the difference between permit and notification is 
most explicit because it relates to a general view on repression vs. prevention. French 
scholarship would dislike a permit system because it is a preventive type of regulation 
                                                 
279 Léon Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel, Volume 5, Les libertés publiques, 2nd edn (Paris, 
Fontemoing-Boccard, 1925) at 348. 
280 Décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935 portant réglementation des mesures relatives au renforcement du maintien 
de l'ordre public.A decree-law was a special type of legislation, issued by the government on the 
authorisation of the parliament. In the given case, the law authorised the government to take measures 
having the force of law in order to defend the franc, the French money. When in 1950 a court was asked to 
decide on the legality of the decree-law regulating liberty to demonstrate in order to defend the franc, it 
gave a rather curious reasoning. The Court of Appeals of Bordeaux found the decree-law was in accordance 
with the enabling law because it was in the general interest, as if everything which is in the general interest 
is capable of defending the franc. (Cour d’appel de Bordeaux, 18 juillet 1950, case Izaute as cited by Alain 
Boyer, ‘La liberté de manifestation en droit constitutionnel français’, 44 Revue française de droit 
constitutionnel 675 (2001)  at 693.) It is almost certain that such an interpretation would be unacceptable 
under the Fifth Republic, since the limits of delegation of legislative power are much stricter than in 
previous republics especially if it comes to ‘fundamental liberties.’ See also Marcel-René Tercinet, ‘La 
liberté de manifestation en France’, Revue de Droit Public, 1979, 1009, 1914. 
281 Loi n°95-73 du 21 janvier 1995. 
282 Décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995. 
283 Book 1, Public order and security, Chapter 1, Prevention of attacks to public order during 
demonstrations and crowdings [manifestations et rassemblements], Section 1, Demonstrations on the public 




and as such, it is considered to be the highest danger to liberty. Repressive regimes are 
favoured over preventive regulation, just as advance declaration is favoured over 
preventive ban.284 If one cannot even exercise a freedom because one is preempted or 
influenced in it as a default rule, then the freedom at hand is not really a freedom.285  
Therefore, French lawyers are particularly sensitive to the requirement of advance 
notice in the case of demonstration. There is a general fear of ‘glissement vers 
l’autorisation’286, ie a slide towards authorisation. As there is, however, in the positive 
law or in the history of French constitutionalism nothing which would prohibit a permit 
system in the case of demonstration, scholars cannot help but warning against such a 
possible development of the law.  
Some claim that already the system (régime) in place has basically become a 
régime préventif instead of a régime répressif.287 What makes a system to be based on 
authorisation instead of simple advance notice is the possibility of prior ban at the 
occasion of the notification. If there is no notification requirement, then there cannot 
really be a prior restraint, since the authorities do not necessarily know in advance about 
the upcoming demonstration.  
The notification has to be submitted between the fifteenth and the third day before 
the planned date of the demonstration. To hold a demonstration without notification is a 
delict under the Penal Code (Article 431-9). There is no mention in the positive law about 
a possible different deadline in specific cases, like that of an ‘urgent’ assembly. The 
                                                 
284 Claude-Albert Colliard & Roseline Letteron, Libertés publiques, 8th edn (Paris, Dalloz, 2005)at 73-96. 
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286 Colliard & Letteron Libertés publiques at 504 (§ 675-676). 
287 For example, Frédéric Dieu, ‘La ’soupe au porc’ et le juge des référés du Conseil d’État de France: la 
validité de l’interdiction d’une manifestation discriminatoire du fait de sa nature même’, 71 Revue 




authority – which is not the local authority, but the prefect,288 the representative of the 
central government – is obliged to immediately give a receipt (récépissé) which would 
prove that the organisers did not breach the notification requirement.  
Even though there is no notification requirement in the case of réunions, the préfet 
can authorise that a réunion take place on the public route. In that case, the organisers 
have to get into contact with the authorities in advance. This is, however, perceived not as 
a prior restraint, but as an extra possibility, therefore, it is also not subject to special 
guarantees. 
2.5. ECtHR: both permit and notice in theory acceptable 
 
In line with the general merge between Art. 10 and Art. 11, the ECHR’s strong 
presumption against prior restraint289 under Article 10 applies to prior restraints on 
assemblies and demonstrations as. This, however, does not invalidate, for example, 
permit requirements per se, but has made it increasingly difficult for a state to prove the 
necessity of blanket prior bans.  
A notification or even a permit required by national law is as such not an 
unjustified infringement on freedom of assembly and demonstration, not even if it 
involves a mandatory permit fee. In Andersson,290 applicant claimed that a 60 Swedish 
Krona permit fee to hold a demonstration was in violation of his Article 10 rights (He 
claimed Article 10 because although originally some people were planning to come to the 
                                                 
288 CE, 23 juillet 1993, M. Saldou, req. no. 107126. 
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Series A. 216, 14 EHRR 153, § 60: ‘[T]he dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the 
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demonstration, actually it was only applicant who demonstrated.). The Commission held 
the application manifestly ill-founded. It stated that even if we suppose that the permit on 
payment was interference, it was necessary for the proper regulation of traffic and to 
otherwise maintain order in public places. Also, the low amount of the fee made the 
claim of disproportionate interference implausible.  
The Convention organs have not deemed the distinction between permit and 
notification relevant or important, and have not required a number of persons necessary 
to qualify as an assembly that should be notified. For example, in the K. v. Netherlands291 
case the Commission found manifestly ill-founded the claims that the requirement of 
prior permission to make a one-person-demonstration by upholding a banner at the 
Amsterdam railway station was contrary to Article 10. Applicant was protesting against 
the Netherlands’ candidature for the 1992 Olympic Games by holding a banner on the 
platform, when she was removed by the authorities. She did not ask for permission, even 
though Dutch law prohibited, ‘the display of objects at a railway station without prior 
permission by the railway authorities in order to prevent disturbance of the order, safety 
or the good running of operations.’ The Commission, in tune with its general weak 
review in freedom of protest and assembly cases, did not consider fatal that the applicant 
evidently did not pose any danger of ‘disturbance of the order, safety or the good running 
of operations’. Rather, it emphasized that the applicant was not prosecuted, and she was 
not prevented from protesting at another place. Thereby, the interference was not 
considered disproportionate.  
                                                 




Oya Ataman v. Turkey292 is a more recent case involving protest of human rights 
advocates against so-called F-type prisons. The applicant took part at an unnotified 
demonstration which was dispersed by tear gas, and on the occasion of which also 39 
demonstrators, among them, the applicant, had been arrested. The Court declared a 
violation on the ground that the demonstrators, though convened unlawfully, did not pose 
any danger of disturbance to public order, not even to the regular flow of traffic.  
By actually requiring some chance of some substantive harm, these Court 
judgments imply a detour from the Commission’s earlier more dismissive approach. In 
addition, in Oya Ataman, the ECtHR also emphasized the advance notice’s role in 
facilitating for the police ‘to enable the assembly to occur’, ie the mentioned paternalistic 
argument which in my view logically implies only a voluntary notification regime.  
More novel is the idea – borrowed from the Venice Commission – that prior 
notice or permit allows ‘not to use powers that [the police] may validly have (for 
instance, of regulating traffic) to obstruct the event.’293  Thus, prior notice is not only or 
not at all an interference, but eventually an important tool in safeguarding or promoting 
freedom of assembly, and, controlling police themselves.  
Meanwhile, the usefulness, and general admissibility of prior notice and permit 
systems under the Convention do not imply that a demonstration which had not been 
notified, or authorised, and, thus, had been even banned, is deprived of Convention 
protection. The status of such prior bans, together with prior conditions set is a question 
which will be discussed next.  
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III. PRIOR BAN AND CONDITIONS 
 
In what cases can an assembly be banned in advance is certainly among the most 
sensitive issues as that prevents the exercise of the right altogether. Jurisdictions are split 
on the question, the U.S. having no special rule elaborated in jurisprudence, while the 
U.K. has introduced different threshold criteria for processions on public property, and 
for meetings on private land (a very broad category in the United Kingdom). In France, 
general public order fears justify a prior ban if applied proportionately, while in Germany 
there is a jurisprudentially imposed system of mutual cooperation, with gradually 
enhancing intervention powers in case of disregard. Conditions are related to ban in the 
jurisdictions, which still differ about the prerequisites for imposing them. France and 
Germany are most explicit about the dangers of governmental conditioning, ie the 
problem of changing the message of assemblies by conditions.  
3.1. United States: no special doctrinal rules 
 
It follows from the previous discussion under ‘Advance notice or permit’ that in the U.S., 
constitutionally acceptable grounds for prior ban and conditions include content-neutral 
ones, basically any (not vaguely defined) significant interest which is unrelated to the 
suppression of speech, if protected in a way that leaves open ample alternative channels 
of communication, a criterion not exactly clarified in jurisprudence.  
Content-based grounds are only permissible if Brandenburg-criteria are fulfilled, 
ie imminence lawless action is likely to occur unless the ban or condition is put in place, 




which could not be traced here, but all of them are controlled by USSC jurisprudence 
discussed above, which boils down to the doctrine of content neutrality, and the 
prohibition of unfettered discretion in regulating assemblies in advance. A spectacular 
example of the potentially mischievous operation of these facially innocent and well-
argued doctrines has been the controversy around a New York City march against the 
impending Iraq War, where only a stationary assembly instead of a march was allowed, 
leaving out such important symbolic locations like the UN Headquarters. This has been 
found constitutional under Ward and Forsyth.294 
3.2. United Kingdom: vague conditions, prohibited zone, loose review 
and the HRA 
 
In UK law, the regime is split into processions and stationary meetings also with regard 
to bans and conditions. The Public Order Act 1986 authorises the police to impose 
conditions on any sort of meetings, and marches, ie, also on those where there is no 
obligation of advance notice.295 Section 12 of the Act empowers the police – the Chief 
Officer of Police if considering in advance, or the constable at the scene if decided during 
the meeting – to impose conditions in a much wider range than it was possible under the 
1936 Act.  
As to processions, the police officer can impose conditions in one of four cases. 
The first three are the cases where the officer ‘reasonably believes’ that (i) ‘serious public 
                                                 
294 United for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In more detail see 
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disorder’, (ii) ‘serious damage to property’ or (iii) ‘serious disruption to the life of the 
community’ will be caused by the procession (Section 12 (1) a) POA 1986). The first two 
are obviously much clearer than the third.  
Serious disruption to the life of the community as a condition for restriction of 
rights is extremely vague in numerous respects. For instance, the smaller the community 
is to be understood, the wider the possibility of imposing conditions: virtually any 
demonstration will disrupt to some extent the life of a little number of people. The 
vagueness of the requirement is to some extent diminished by judicial interpretation: in 
Reid296 the court stated that the conditions should be strictly interpreted.  
The fourth case which authorises imposition of conditions (s. 12 (1) (b) of the 
1986 Act) is related to the purpose of the meeting. If the officer reasonably believes that 
the purpose of the assembly is the ‘intimidation of others with a view to compelling them 
not to do an act they have a right to do or to do an act they have a right not to do’, he or 
she might impose some condition to avoid such a result. For the imposition of conditions 
both coercive and intimidatory purpose is required which in the interpretation of the 
courts seems to be a rather stringent condition. It was determined for instance that 
shouting and raising arms might cause discomfort, but it does not amount to intimidation.  
If any of the above four triggers occur, the police officer is entitled to impose any 
condition which might be necessary for the prevention of the occurrence of the mischief. 
The conditions can include practically everything (including but not limited to changing 
the planned route or time) except for banning the whole procession. In DPP v. Baillie297 
the Divisional Court affirmed that the effect of overly burdensome conditions might 
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amount to a ban which is unlawful under sections 12 and 14, since a banning power only 
arises under more severe circumstances according to sections 13 and 14A (see below).  
Section 14 authorises the police to impose conditions on stationary meetings. The 
preconditions for doing so are essentially similar to the section 12 conditions which are 
valid for processions, ie some probability of disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation 
is required. On the other hand, the conditions which might be imposed on meetings are 
limited, not ‘everything what is deemed necessary by the officer’ can be imposed, but 
only directions as to the place, as to the duration, and as to the number of participating 
persons,298 ie issues which in the German, but depending on the exact wording, in the US 
understanding as well, would qualify as modality or content-neutral restrictions.  
The reason for the limited scope of imposable conditions on meetings as opposed 
to processions has been stated by the White Paper preceding the adoption of the POA: 
‘meetings and assemblies are a more important means of exercising freedom of speech 
than marches.’299 Discussion is considered superior to potentially pressuring expression. 
Case law on imposition of conditions also dealt with the difference between 
stationary meetings and processions. In DPP v. Jones300, a 2002 Divisional Court case 
there was an animals’ rights demonstration planned at Huntingdon Life Services 
premises. The police got advance notice, and imposed some conditions, including the 
route from the place where the demonstrators would disembark to the place of the 
demonstration proper. Ms. Jones was found to be outside the designated area when trying 
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to get back to the road, and arrested for not complying with the imposed conditions. The 
court found that under section 14 there is no power for the police to impose conditions as 
to the route the participants should reach the place of the demonstrations, since, at the 
most, the movement of persons could qualify as a public procession, and thus, it would 
fall under section 12, which, if at all, could be made conditional only in a different notice. 
What is more, the going from the disembarkation point to the place of assembly cannot 
be placed under conditions at all, since Gage J. thinks that the power of imposition of 
conditions in section 12 refers only to such processions where advance notice is required 
[28].  
As indicated above, this is probably a false interpretation of the POA. 
Nonetheless, there is much sense in the view of Gage J. that going to an assembly would 
not normally qualify as a public procession. At the least, there is certainly no inherent 
necessity of that. Meanwhile, the police are entitled to fix the entrance and exit points of 
a demonstration under a section 14 notice.  
The decision can be criticised for the almost untenable distinction of processions 
and stationary meetings. Meetings can easily become processions, and vice versa. Every 
beginning and every conclusion of a march consists of stationary gathering, while every 
stationary assembly is preceded by a movement of people, most of the times in groups, to 
the place. Should the police then really issue a notice under section 14 and another one 
under section 12 if they want to cover the whole event? This would invite claims of 
disproportionate burdening on a fundamental right,301 and would question the sense of 
having these two kinds of regulatory regimes in the POA as both should apply in every 
case.  
                                                 




At the same time, the decision should be welcome for at least not widening the 
already large discretion the police have in imposing conditions. It is always beneficial 
from the perspective of fundamental right if the police have to justify one by one the 
steps they take. On the other hand, the court reasonably acknowledged that in case the 
directions of the notice are severable, there is no need to invalidate the whole notice, if 
some of the directions turn out to be illegal.302    
A demonstrator incurs liability if he or she knowingly fails to comply with the 
conditions imposed by the police on a procession or meeting. Organisers cannot be made 
liable for a breach arising out of circumstances beyond their control, ie the organiser is 
liable for their own conduct, including inciting others to breach the imposed conditions. 
However, the incitement – just as the conditions – must actually come to the notice of the 
demonstrator who is incited to act upon it,303 and must contain an element of 
persuasion;304 otherwise the organiser will not incur liability, both according to earlier 
case law.  
A more recent case, Broadwith305 dealt with another aspect of liability for 
breaching the conditions. There were two assemblies notified which were supposed to 
follow each other. The police issued a condition that the second cannot start earlier than a 
given time. Broadwith approached the closed area before the given time, and was warned 
not to enter. When he did, he got arrested. The issue was whether the police order 
imposing conditions only applied to those who participated at the first assembly, since 
there was no evidence that Mr. Broadwith did, or, it applied to everybody who could be 
                                                 
302 Cf.  Parpsworth & Thompson, Imposing Conditions, above n 295 at 425. 
303 Krause, (1902) 18 TLR 238. 
304 Hendrickson and Tichner, [1977] Crim. L.R. 356.  




reasonably believed to intend to participate at the second procession. The court agreed 
with the police and the lower court that the conditions applied to Mr. Broadwith. Rose LJ 
here ignored the possibility of a situation where someone does not intend to take part at 
the protest and also did not take part at the preceding protest. Possibly, it was not the case 
with Mr. Broadwith, nonetheless, the rules on burden of proof and standard of proof as to 
such questions could have been clarified by the court.  
A post-HRA case related to monthly Critical Mass procession coinciding with the 
opening of the London Olympic Games is also characteristic of the light touch review 
courts exercise with regard to police and assembly. Critical Mass is exempted from the 
notice requirement (see below under 4.1.), but, as it turns out, still can be the subject of 
conditions imposed by police. What is more, though the Critical Mass does not have a 
predetermined route – a fact confirmed and accepted by the House of Lords –, police are 
still entitled to determine the route it takes by conditions under s. 12 POA, and all this 
when it is only police who apprehended the cyclists wished to disrupt the opening 
ceremony.306 Police arrested 182 people, but only interviewed 5, and later only they were 
charged for violating a s. 12 order (for fearing serious disruption to the life of the 
community). It looks like the power under s 12 served as a pretext to pre-emptive 
detention of persons feared to become ‘protestors’. Courts found it raised no problem.307 
The case is typical of the view where if something is perceived as protest than it appears 
somehow more subject to limits than when it is only an everyday activity.308 If the right 
to assembly and protest is a human right, then it should be the opposite.  
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All in all, it appears from the discussed cases that at least before the 1998/2000 
Human Rights Act (HRA) incepting the European Convention of Human Rights has 
come into force, the UK law had only allowed for review for procedural errors and 
unreasonableness in cases of conditions imposed by the police on marches and meetings, 
or, more precisely, the law certainly had not encouraged a strict review of policing 
demonstrations. The courts had lacked both the clear power of substantive review,309 and 
the willingness to interfere with the exercise of statutorily granted police discretion.310 As 
the HRA imposes a duty to interpret UK law in harmony with the ECHR if it is possible, 
courts are required to read into the police discretion of sections 12 and 14 a duty of 
proportionality in the fashion of ECHR. Thus, courts are currently entitled to review both 
as to the substance and to the form the decisions of police officers, the terms of the POA 
being vague enough to make possible an interpretation conform to the Convention. Still, 
not every decision appears to take seriously the human rights implications of public order 
law, as recent cases discussed above testify.  
As to the banning powers, the regime is split as well. Marches can be banned 
under the 1986 act under special circumstances. If the Chief Officer of Police reasonably 
believes that the powers under section 12 (imposing conditions) are not sufficient to 
prevent the holding of an assembly from resulting in serious public disorder, he or she 
must apply to the council for issuance of a prohibiting order. The council may make an 
order as requested or modified with the approval of the Secretary of State. The police 
officer shall reasonably believe in the occurrence of a serious public disorder, ie neither 
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serious damage to property, nor serious disruption to the life of the community is 
sufficient, unlike in the case of conditions. Secondly, once the officer apprehends such a 
danger, there is no discretion on the part of the police: the decision is compulsively 
conferred to a higher level: to the council and the Secretary of State. This reduces 
certainly to some extent the possibility of arbitrariness and discriminative enforcement.  
However, compared to the imposition of conditions, the banning order will have 
an extremely serious effect: it is possible that in a whole area no processions whatsoever 
might be held for as long as three months which can even be further prolonged. The 
provision is clearly overbroad: it catches not only those marches which might turn violent 
or disorderly, but any kind of processions to take place somewhere, even though the 
rationale of the banning power is admittedly the prevention of serious disorder. In Kent v. 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner311 the court refused to quash a banning order under a 
similar provision of the 1936 Public Order Act. The court declared that the ban could 
only be quashed if there was no reason whatsoever to impose it, and that the act provided 
sufficient remedy insofar as it allowed the revocation of the ban. Obviously, there is no 
possibility to challenge an order just by establishing that one particular procession will 
not turn violent if a ban is already in effect, but a revocation can only be applied for if the 
applicant can show that no danger of public disorder exist both in terms of area and time 
and possible processions.  
In other words, a banning order shifts the burden of proof in such a way as to 
render it practically impossible for even unquestionably peaceful demonstrators to march 
in a given area for a given period of time if they face a hostile police officer. Fenwick 
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mentions that the government rejected the possibility of a more specific banning order 
regime which would only target the ‘real’ target, ie violent marches, because it would 
allegedly have put too great a burden on the police. The argument is that same marchers 
could convene then under another name, but with the same violent purpose. Actually, 
Fenwick proposes a ‘compromise solution’ according to which marches with a similar 
political message to what was the message of the banned march could also be banned.312 
Nonetheless, I do not quite see why it is too much to expect from the police, council, and 
Secretary of State to make an individual evaluation in each case, or why police cannot be 
trusted to form a good case-by-case evaluation, reviewable by courts.   
The current system of ban on processions is thus certainly quite restrictive. Even 
though bans are rather rarely issued, the banning power can be easily used as a strategic 
weapon in negotiating with the demonstrators.313 It also seems that in practice there is not 
much control on the police. The more discretion the police is statutorily granted, the less 
will be other organs that have some say in the banning decisions willing to interfere: the 
council and Secretary of State will not risk serious disorder, and the court, as it is obvious 
from Kent, also will be reluctant to question the evaluation of the police.314   
As to stationary meetings, the law is less restrictive because it only applies to 
private land. The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act introduced the notion of 
trespassory assemblies, or, more precisely, a statutory, more or less comprehensive 
regulation of possibilities of banning a meeting on a private land. By amending the 
Public Order Act, it established a banning power for meetings parallel to that for 
processions.  
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The circumstances which might lead to a ban are the following. The police shall 
reasonably believe that the assemblers intend to assemble in a place (to which they have 
either no or only a limited right of access) likely without the consent of the owner and this 
may result in ‘serious disruption to the life of the community’ [or ‘in significant damage 
to the land, building or monument of historical, architectural, archaeological or scientific 
importance’] (Section 14A (1) b) i. and ii POA, as inserted by the Criminal Justice and 
Police Order Act 1994 ‘CJPOA’).  
Thus, though similar, there are some differences in the two kinds of banning 
powers. Banning is only possible with regard to stationary assemblies taking place on 
private land, the amount of which however considerably increased in recent decades.315  
Also, banning assemblies is possible on the condition that they would cause 
serious disruption to the life of the community while with marches it is only possible for 
the prevention of serious public disorder. What a serious disruption to the life of the 
community might be is a question for the police officer, and, on review, for the 
magistrates’ court to decide. It is certainly much less than danger to property or life or 
limb.  
The regulatory technique is otherwise almost the same: the chief officer of the 
police applies to the council of the district for a banning order which with the consent of 
the Secretary of State makes such or a modified order. The difference is that the police 
have discretion in launching the process. The similarity is that the order applies to a 
designated area (delineated in a radius around a specified point) for a specified period of 
time, thus again – possibly – catching up such assemblies also which are not likely to 
cause serious disruption to the community. What is more, the police are entitled to stop 
                                                 




any person within five miles around the prohibited place (the specified centre of the 
radius) who are reasonably thought going to that place. Non-compliance with such a 
stopping order might result in arrest and fine. (Section 14C)  
Section 14A was the basis for a banning order in the leading case DPP v. Jones 
and Lloyd (1999, House of Lords)316, which to some extent interpreted the law more 
favourably to freedom of assembly. The order prohibited demonstrating, or, more 
precisely, trespassory assemblies within a four miles radius around Stonehenge. Jones 
and others, however, were assembling on the highway around Stonehenge within the 
prohibited area, since they wished to protest against the order. The police told them to 
disperse, and when they failed to comply, defendants have been arrested. It was clear that 
the protesters were neither violent, nor disorderly, and it was not likely in any case that 
they would cause any disturbance. The question thus arose whether they had committed a 
trespassory assembly by assembling peacefully in the area to which a section 14A 
banning order was in force.  
The closer issue was whether the right of the public on a highway was in a sense 
limited that it excluded holding peaceful assemblies there while a section 14A order was 
in effect. Precedents seemed to support two interpretations of the rights related to the 
highway. Reasonable and usual activity on the highway should not be punished under the 
first interpretation,317 while only activity which is ancillary to passing and repassing the 
highway is reasonable under the second.318 Lord Irvine took the first view for the 
following reasons. First, he cited Collins L.J. in Hickman v. Maisey (1900) according to 
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which the use of highway was given a ‘reasonable extension’ in modern times. Such 
extensions are allegedly ‘in accordance with the enlarged notions of people in a country 
becoming more populous and highly civilised.’ That is a kind of general reason given by 
an at most authoritative (100-year-old case from a lower court) decision that the common 
law might change with the changes in society.  
Secondly, the other reason for including other reasonable activities in the scope of 
legitimate use of the highway was for Lord Irvine the absurdity of the rigid, exclusively 
right-to-passage view.319 Only allowing activities incidental to passage would render 
many common activities unlawful, though ‘the law should not make unlawful which is 
commonplace and well accepted’320. I.e. the respect is due to usage and public 
acceptance, not to a fundamental right, as often happens in English law.  
The last reason is again a highly technical one: to allow only uses of the highway 
which are incidental to passage would create discordance between the law of trespass and 
the law of obstruction.321  
Clearly, there is no ‘right’ to freedom of assembly here in the usual sense of the 
term. It is similarly unnecessary to invoke Art. 11 of the ECHR, because the common law 
is sufficiently clear.322 The law is simply323  
that the public highway is a public place which the public may 
enjoy for any reasonable purpose, provided the activity in 
question does not amount to a public or private nuisance and does 
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not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary 
right of the public to pass and repass: within these qualifications 
there is a public right of peaceful assembly on the highway.  
 
What is reasonable, is a question to be decided by magistrates’ court on a case-by-case 
basis, no further instructions can be given in that regard. That means that an assembly, 
though amounting neither to nuisance nor to obstruction, nor being unlawful in other 
respects, still may turn out to be an unreasonable user of the highway if the magistrates 
deem it, for instance, because it is neither ‘commonplace’, nor ‘well-accepted’. The right 
to passage prevails over other uses of the highway, since it is the primary one. Still, the 
Lords found the assembly a reasonable user of the highway, a clear step forward.  
3.3. France: substantive values as troubles to public order and 
proportionality 
 
Despite the general aversion and caution towards ‘preventive regimes’, French 
jurisprudence – similarly to the German where that aversion is largely absent – does not 
differentiate between the justifiability standards of prior as opposed to posterior 
restrictions on freedom of assembly. Therefore, much of what will be discussed next in 
relation to prior bans and conditions will actually display the substantive values to be 
explored in chapters 3 to 5 below. I still decided to go on with this framework because 




A demonstration can be banned if the authority estimates that the planned 
demonstration is capable of disturbing public order.324 Earlier, this requirement was not 
checked strictly by courts, the Conseil d’État having found sufficient the reality of a 
threat to public order.325  
Later on, however, the Conseil has brought its jurisprudence in relation to 
demonstrations in harmony with that of reunions publiques, and basically found the 
Benjamin necessity review applicable. When police banned a demonstration against the 
visiting Chinese president organised by the Tibetan community in France, courts and 
Conseil declared that if it is possible to secure public order by less intrusive measures 
than a ban then that’s the way to be chosen.326 Therefore, the police have to evaluate in 
each case whether the measures planned are ‘justified by the necessities of maintaining 
public order.’327 To avoid troubles in the international relations of France is impertinent 
to justify restrictions on a demonstration, as that has to relate directly to public order.  In 
a similar vein, the Paris Court of Appeals found a ban on a demonstration by police trade 
unions based on the ‘discredit to the position’ or public function of the police also void 
because of impermissible reason.328  
Even though dangers to the integrity of international relations or to reputation of 
police do not fall under public order, the concept is quite broad. A more recent case on 
référé-liberté329, an extraordinary procedure for the safeguard of fundamental liberties, 
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made clear that the freedom of demonstration can have its limits in the interest in 
antidiscrimination. In the famous ‘soupe gauloise’ or ‘soupe au cochon’ decision330 the 
Conseil d’État had to decide whether the ban on food distribution organised by a radical 
right-wing group (SDF – Solidarité des Français, SDF is a common acronym for ‘Sans 
domicile fixe’, ie homeless) with a probable racist animus is violating freedom of 
assembly. The organisers were advertising that they were distributing soup with pork – 
the message being obviously not to mean it for Jews and Muslims. The police banned, 
and the organisers went to court claiming a ‘grave and manifestly illegal violation’ of 
their fundamental liberty to demonstrate, which has to be shown in the référé-liberté 
procedure. The administrative tribunal decided in favor of the applicants, but the Conseil 
d’État reversed, relying basically on two major arguments.  
Firstly, the Conseil accepted that risks associated with an assembly motivated by 
discriminatory intent qualify as ‘troubles to public order’ which exclude a grave and 
manifestly illegal violation. More precisely, the risk stemmed from a possible reaction to 
what is conceived as a demonstration capable of infringing the dignity of the persons 
deprived of the offered aid (meaning the food).  
The Conseil did not make clear whether the reaction disturbing public order was 
meant to come from those homeless persons who – being Jews or Muslims – cannot eat 
pork, or from whomever seeing this kind of undignified happening on the public route. 
Similarly, it remains unclear whether any sort of immediacy of a danger, or even some 
higher probability is required. The adjective ‘susceptible’, ie capable would imply that 
the sheer possibility is sufficient for justifying a restriction on freedom of demonstration. 
                                                 





Frédéric Dieu interprets ‘susceptible’ here as implying intention on the part of 
organisers,331 but this might be only because this kind of discrimination can be only 
intentional. What is more, here the intention seems to be presumed – or, the important 
factor is what others think about the intention of the organisers.  
Furthermore, the juge de référé of the Conseil d’État states also that respect for 
freedom of demonstration does not hinder an authority invested with the power of police 
to ban an activity if that is the sole measure to prevent troubles to public order (emphasis 
added). Therefore, the Conseil does not grant unlimited discretion to the police in 
deciding about the existence of troubles to public order. Quite to the contrary, there 
seems to be a proportionality review, even if the Conseil does not put down the ‘exact 
weighing’ it pursued. If the measure has to be the sole measure which is capable to 
prevent the troubles to public order, then it seems that the Conseil accepted on its own 
judgment that the distribution of the pork would have had a consequence of disorder.  
The human dignity argument is thus not clearly self-standing; it mediates between 
the pork distribution and the disorderly or violent reaction. In this sense, the ‘pork soup’ 
decision might imply an argument analogous to ‘fighting words’, nonetheless, this 
evidently is an infinitely laxer requirement compared to that. Notably, the Conseil left 
unclarified if the (perceived) infringement of dignity of persons was automatically, in any 
case, conducive to troubles to public disorder, or just in the specific case. Also, it is not 
clear how far discriminatory practices or views per se, where there is no apparent 
harmdoing, would forfeit assembly rights.  
The Conseil definitely found proven that the views of the demonstrators were 
discriminatory, the source for this being the website of the SDF. If one takes the wording 
                                                 




seriously, it seems that the perception of (by the way indetermined) others as to the 
(intention of the organisers of) infringing human dignity is sufficient for the 
establishment of troubles to public order. Dieu rightly points out that it is embedded in 
earlier, even if not too early, jurisprudence that the ‘dignity of the person’ is part of the 
public order,332 notably in the (in)famous decision Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge in 
relation to the consensual employment of little people (people living with dwarfism) for 
the purposes of entertainment.333 As the police are entitled and obliged to protect public 
order, any (perceived and intended) attack on dignity is an attack to public order. It is 
another question, how to discover the existence of an attack to human dignity in a 
particular situation, and what the sufficient and necessary means are to counter it. 
Secondly, the Conseil also made a very interesting argument when it stated that 
the administrative tribunal could not uphold without contradiction that the distribution of 
pork on the public route was organised in a discriminatory manner, while at the same 
time find a grave and manifestly illegal violation of the fundamental liberty to 
demonstrate. Thereby, the Conseil basically said that the discriminatory exercise of a 
fundamental liberty is not protected by the fundamental liberty, since being free from 
discrimination (by private persons!) is also a fundamental liberty. Organising a 
demonstration of discriminatory character is illegal, and, what is more, this illegality is a 
more serious violation than the interference flowing from the prohibition of the 
demonstration itself.334  
                                                 
332 Dieu, La ’soupe au porc’ above n 287 at 893. 
333 CÉ, Ass., 27 octobre 1995, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Recueil, 372; RFDA 1995, conclusions 
Frydman. 




Nonetheless, as under the référé-liberté procedure only grave and manifestly 
illegal violations of fundamental liberties can be persecuted, this decision shall not be 
deemed decision on the ultimate limits of liberty of demonstration in the concrete sense 
of the word. As Dieu points out, however, the decision should be taken as delineating the 
principles to be considered while deciding a case at the level of facts.335  
In another (ordinary administrative review) decision, the Conseil d’État found that 
previous intimidating and threatening conduct of anti-abortion protestors invading clinics 
could serve as basis for prior ban of another demonstration – notified before the Notre 
Dame, and not explicitly next to the neighbouring clinic – even if this previous conduct 
was not considered in the judgments of lower administrative courts.336 In the weighing it 
was also relevant that the demonstration could have been held elsewhere, and no general 
ban was issued against the association. Previous disorderly conduct of the same 
association also was found sufficient for an advance ban of another demonstration in 
front of an abortion clinic by the Administrative Court of Appeals in another 
proceeding.337  
Apart from bans, the police have a right to impose conditions when they become 
aware of the upcoming demonstration, ie when the notification is submitted. Nonetheless 
I could not verify the exact legal source for this power, thus it most probably is the 
general police power of municipal authorities (police, mayor, or the prefect) as granted in 
the General code of territorial units.338  
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As to other prior burdens, there seems to be consensus that they have to be 
justified under a Benjamin type necessity review, ie only those limitations are allowed 
which are the sole means for the prevention of troubles to public order. As in other cases, 
it does not mean a very high standard of probability of ‘troubles’, but it does mean some 
evidence in the hand of the police that actually some harm perceived serious (disorder or 
violation of human dignity) might happen which they cannot handle unless the measure is 
taken.  
The main decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel on prior restraints other than ban 
is the decision on video surveillance and search of vehicles.339 The law (before 
promulgation) at hand regulated several questions related to video surveillance of public 
places (more precisely: the public route and places especially exposed to risks of 
aggression and theft), a provision of bringing and wearing arms and objects capable of 
being used as projectiles at a demonstration, and the possibility of search for vehicles for 
the purposes of finding arms or projectiles. The CC found the procedures related to the 
installation of video surveillance sufficient to guarantee the ‘individual liberty’ protected 
by article 66 of the Constitution, ie in this regard it did not consider if there might be a 
danger to freedom of demonstration.  
In finding the system constitutional, the Conseil imputed importance to the fact 
that there will be proper and permanent information on the video surveillance, i.e it is not 
secret, everybody is, in fact, aware of it. Meanwhile, blatantly, there is no chilling effect 
consideration present in the decision in this regard. Apart from the proper information, 
the Conseil found the video surveillance constitutional on procedural grounds 
                                                 




(independent commission, right to remedy, restrictions on the storage of the recorded 
data, etc.).  
As to the freedom of demonstration restriction proper, the Conseil held actually 
very little. It spelled out (third considérant) that the freedom of collective expression of 
ideas and opinions is constitutionally guaranteed. Individual liberty, and, freedom of 
movement (liberté d’aller er venir), mentioned together with collective expression in the 
very same sentence are likely not relevant with regard to the demonstration, but refer in 
general to the person’s rights when walking on the street. As the Conseil also affirmed 
that the prevention of attacks to the public order and notably to the security of the persons 
and goods is similarly of constitutional value, it admitted the legislator’s competence to 
bring about reconciliation between these two sides.  
As to the particular legislative provision which authorises the prefectoral authority 
to prohibit the bringing and wearing of arms or objects capable of being used as arms, the 
Conseil attached importance to the following. It weighed heavily that the law only 
allowed the prohibition in cases where the circumstances indicated that grave troubles to 
public order are to be feared, and that the prohibition can only be imposed in the 24 hours 
preceding the demonstration.  
The Conseil appears to have integrated a ‘réservé que’ type of interpretation 
without explicitly saying so with regard to the spatial aspect of the ban.340 It recalled 
namely that the authorisation of imposition is restricted to the place of the demonstration 
itself, its surroundings, and the entering points of the demonstration, and interpreted these 
to mean only immediate proximity.  
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Also, the Conseil seems to have instructed lower authorities – and eventually the 
courts – that the extent of the prohibition shall be limited and proportional to the 
necessities which the circumstances require.  
Further, with relation to the similar provision enabling the prohibition of bringing 
or wearing objects capable of being used as projectile, the Conseil held that the 
formulation is so general and imprecise that it violates the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of the individual (ie here the norm applied is article 66 of the Constitution 
‘proper’). Luchaire remarks in this regard that a similar imprecision and generality would 
have been well discernible also in the case of objects capable of being used as arms, since 
the Criminal Code (to which the law on video surveillance gives reference) is quite 
broad. The second paragraph of article 132-75 of the Criminal Code refers to objects 
which are used or meant (destined) to be used to kill and hurt by the perpetrator. Article 
132-75 was as such referenced by the law on video surveillance, the second paragraph 
seems therefore also applicable. However, as the law authorises search of vehicles in 
every case where the imposition of prohibition is permitted, it would necessarily 
authorise search of vehicles for objects meant (destined) to be used to kill and hurt. As, 
this, however, is impossible to tell in advance, according to Luchaire, it should be 
interpreted in a restrictive way. Either the second paragraph does not count in the 
application to the prohibition and to the search of vehicles, or, it can only constitute an 
infraction of the law from the point that it is used or meant (destined) as an arm, meaning 
only during the demonstration and not in advance.341 Such a (re)interpretation would 
certainly be desirable.  
                                                 




As to the authorisation of search of vehicles for arms or objects capable of being 
used as arms and the seizure of these objects, the Conseil took a strict approach. It found 
that to the extent that such a search and seizure would result in finding infractions and in 
the persecution of the perpetrators, the power to pursue search and seizure belongs to the 
judicial (as opposed to the administrative) police powers, controlled by the judiciary, and 
not by the executive, since the judiciary is supposed to protect individual liberty. As the 
law authorised the prefectoral authority for such a search and seizure provided that they 
notify (only) the prosecutors, it is unconstitutional. Here the value violated is not freedom 
of collective expression, but the individual liberty. Thus, this part of the decision also 
does not spell out a principle specifically related to demonstrations, but is more of a 
criminal-procedural argument, which nonetheless reinforces the line between preventive 
and repressive public order activities.  
The law which was finally adopted authorises the prefect to ban the bringing and 
wearing – without a legitimate reason – an object constituting arms in the sense of the 
Penal Code within a designated area around the place of the planned manifestation if 
grave troubles to public order are feared. The area cannot be larger than justified by 
public order necessities.342    
The Conseil d’État as highest administrative court also handed down a number of 
cases related to prior restraints in a similar manner. For instance, it did not consider 
disproportionate the temporary reintroduction of French-Spanish crossborder checks for 
one day at the occasion of an ETA manifestation planned in Bayonne for the support of 
ETA members held in prison in France and in Spain, because there was ample evidence 
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of danger of violence.343 The demonstration to be held was part of a series of 
demonstrations, the two preceding ones having had turned violent. In the second 
considerant, the Conseil d’État points out that there were street fights organised by 
separatists of Spanish citizenship, and that the expected fusion of this group with a 
French movement made the occurrence of violence again probable. The Conseil accepted 
that the reintroduced crossborder check might put a burden on the assembly rights of the 
applicants, because the procedure resulted in long queues and traffic jam, thus, some 
people who intended could not get to the demonstration. Nonetheless, the Conseil 
apparently deemed such an indirect prior restraint being proportionate to the danger of 
violence.   
3.4. Germany: graduality of cooperation, conditions and ban 
 
Not a full-fledged prior restraint, but the so-called duty to cooperate on the part of 
demonstrators and organisers is well understood to impose limit on the freedom of 
assembly, even more than in the UK since in Germany it has been imposed by the GFCC 
itself. In the Brokdorf-decision, the Court claims that the more the organiser shows 
cooperative spirit already at the time of the advance notification, the higher the threshold 
of permissible state intervention for the protection of public security and order will be.344  
The Court even advises the organisers to make one-sided measures which build trust 
between them and the police, and that would have the same effect of raising the level of 
danger where intervention is constitutionally permissible. In addition, the Court 
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apparently invites, if not obliges, participants to take into account ‘well-proven 
experiences’ of former demonstrations.345  
It remains unclear whether cooperation is an obligation, a Pflicht or just an 
Obliegenheit, this latter normally meaning non-enforceable duties or burdens. Still, as the 
Court puts a very clear obligation to learn and adapt to former well-tried experiences on 
the police, and expects cooperation from the organisers, the conclusion that the Court 
engages in a very dangerous ‘Vestaatlichung’, state-ization of a freedom, is well 
grounded.346 A constitutionally imposed duty of cooperation transforms freedom of 
assembly into a curious right to co-form matters of state competence,347  a rather serious 
distortion of the function of fundamental rights. The problem is, of course, that true as it 
might be, this critique certainly remains without response in reality: de facto there will be 
a bargaining, and the level of ‘friendliness’ or at least ‘correctness’ induced by 
cooperation certainly will have an effect on the legal evaluation of both the conduct of 
the police, and that of the demonstrators.  
One of the reasons for the acceptability of advance notice is to enable the 
authorities to impose conditions in case of foreseeable likely direct endangering of public 
security. Demonstrators have a right to self-determination with regard to date and time of 
their planned assembly, but practical concordance requires the protection of the rights of 
others and other substantive constitutional values, like public security as much as 
possible. Such protection might result in imposing conditions on the timing or the route 
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of the assembly.348 On one occasion, the Federal Administrative Court found lawful an 
obligation of would-be demonstrators to report at the police so those likely violent can be 
prevented in travelling abroad to the G8 summit.349  
Even mass detention of demonstrators before the G8 summit in Heiligendamm was 
permissible under German law (complaint rejected without examination by the GFCC), 
while the ECtHR found it violated the Convention.350 Thus though in theory the threshold 
is the concrete danger of violent conduct on an upcoming assembly, and previous 
violence also weighs in the assessment of danger, the concreteness and likeliness can be 
rather attenuated.  
Risk of violation of other substantive values – to be discussed under Part II. B – 
also might serve as ground justifying conditions, and – if conditions are not suitable – 
ban. These include commonsensical ones like damage to life, limb or property, then 
coercion in a reasonably narrow sense, and finally human dignity mediated by ‘public 
peace’.  
A characteristic of German law is the graduality of duties: the more willing the 
organiser is to cooperate, the higher the threshold for police intervention for first 
imposing conditions, and if they are not sufficient or suitable, a ban (or dispersal). This is 
very much in harmony with doctrines of proportionality, balancing, and practical 
concordance. Graduality is not required, but prohibited in one case: when the condition 
would change the message of the assembly. In that case, a ban might be constitutional if 
other criteria are fulfilled, while a condition is unconstitutional, at least in theory.  
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3.5. ECtHR: strong substantive and procedural protection 
 
As mentioned above, a demonstration which was held even though it had been banned or 
not authorised, is not deprived of Article 11 protection. Since only unpeaceful assemblies 
fall out of the scope, unlawfully convened assemblies are still protected.  
As a default rule, in case of denial of authorisation, or, any kind of measure 
having the effect of prior ban on assembly, the Convention requires that the authorities 
give proper grounds. The Court exerts substantive review, and it appears now settled that 
a prior ban cannot be justified unless incitement to violence or rejection of democratic 
principles would otherwise occur with some (unclear) level of probability. In Stankov it is 
stated:351  
Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom of 
assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to 
violence or rejection of democratic principles – however 
shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may 
appear to the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands 
made may be – do a disservice to democracy and often even 
endanger it. (Emphasis added.) 
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These two concerns were reaffirmed in Güneri352, thus it appears settled that a 
prior ban on substantive grounds can only be justified if either incitement to violence353 
or a rejection of democratic principles would occur on the banned assembly. The required 
probability is not exactly clear, just as what amounts to ‘rejection of democratic 
principles’ – secessionist speech according to Stankov354 does not, while eg ‘seeking the 
expulsion of others from a given territory on the basis of ethnic origin is a complete 
negation of democracy.’ 355  
Among newer cases on prior restraint, Baczkowski v. Poland356 ruling is of 
foremost significance. The judgment is quite unique because the Court managed to 
overcome rather serious preliminary objections and declare violation of freedom of 
assembly, the right to effective remedy with respect to assembly, and discrimination in 
the same regard basically by discussing at length the role of freedom of assembly and 
demonstration in a democracy as a tool of protecting vulnerable minorities and furthering 
pluralism.  
The decision is full of statements of principle, which serve as an answer to the 
Government’s technical objections. In a maximalist fashion, the Court reversed the 
Government’s preliminary objections into substantive violations of the Convention.  
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In the case, contrary to Güneri, the banned assemblies did take place despite the 
ban, and the police even protected the demonstrators. Also, the reviewing administrative 
authority quashed the first instance bans, and even the Constitutional Court – in review 
for compatibility initiated by the Ombudsman – ruled that some of the provisions the 
bans were based on were unconstitutional. Still, the ECHR declared a violation of Art. 11 
on the ground that the bans were not prescribed by law since they were imposed 
unlawfully.  
The case is important in various regards. First is the status of the ‘victim’as a 
requirement for standing before the Court. The Government claimed that applicants were 
not ‘victims’ since they did not suffer any moral or pecuniary damages, since the 
assembly did take place, and no sanction was applied against them. Besides, the 
Government also claimed that there was no interference into applicants’ rights to freedom 
of assembly for the same reasons. The Court rejected both of these claims and held the 
following in § 67: 
 
[…][T]he applicants took a risk in holding them given the official 
ban in force at that time. The assemblies were held without a 
presumption of legality, such a presumption constituting a vital 
aspect of effective and unhindered exercise of the freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression. The Court observes that the 
refusals to give authorisation could have had a chilling effect on 
the applicants and other participants in the assemblies. It could 




assemblies on the ground that they did not have official 
authorisation and that, therefore, no official protection against 
possible hostile counter-demonstrators would be ensured by the 
authorities. (Emphases added.) 
This quote is highly significant especially if understood in the context of the case. The 
assemblies at stake were demonstrations organised by Equality Foundation in order to 
alert the public to the issue of discrimination against minorities and women. The banned 
assemblies were those which were organised by members of NGOs protecting the rights 
of various sexual minorities. On the same day, other assemblies were authorised, which 
basically wished to convey a counter-message (eg protest against partnerships, 
‘paedophilia’, for ‘Christian values’, etc.).  
Secondly, there was another preliminary issue raised by the government, namely 
that of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Government argued that applicants failed to 
exhaust remedies because they did not submit a constitutional complaint whilst the 
ECtHR ruled in a previous judgment that the Polish constitutional complaint might 
qualify as an effective remedy under the Convention. The Court rejected this objection 
basically relying on the importance of timing in the freedom of assembly and expression 
context. This is one of the occasions when freedom of expression considerations 
successfully made their way into Art. 11 case law.  
As the Court did not specify why the dates the assemblies were planned for were 
of special importance, in essence it ruled that any remedy which cannot be obtained 




exhausted.357 What is more, regarding Art. 13, the Court even declared a violation of the 
right to remedy for basically the same reasons (§ 82 of the judgment):  
 […][S]uch is the nature of democratic debate that the timing of 
public meetings held in order to voice certain opinions may be 
crucial for the political and social weight of such a meeting. 
Hence, the State authorities may, in certain circumstances, refuse 
permission to hold a demonstration, if such a refusal is 
compatible with the requirements of Article 11 of the Convention, 
but cannot change the date on which the organisers plan to hold it. 
If a public assembly is organised after a given social issue loses 
its relevance or importance in a current social or political debate, 
the impact of the meeting may be seriously diminished. The 
freedom of assembly – if prevented from being exercised at a 
propitious time – can well be rendered meaningless. 
 
 
It seems therefore to be the state of the law that organisers are the sole masters of the 
timing of assembly in the sense that if they say that the timing is important, it should be 
unquestionably considered part of the content of their message, and as such, cannot be 
restricted.  
This stands in sharp contrast to the lenient review of the removal of the protester 
from the Amsterdam Central Station in the Dutch case (K. v. The Netherlands, mentioned 
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above) where the Commission considered the fact that applicant had the possibility to 
protest at other places (– most probably somewhere where the Olympic delegation, the 
target of the protest, would not have seen her), as one factor rendering the interference 
proportionate.  
Again, one might observe a strengthening of the Convention protection in the last 
decade, which might be also due to the different degree of restriction in the Dutch case, 
on the one, and in the Polish one, on the other hand, but it might also result from the 
increasingly rights protective mood of the Court. In any case, these strong procedural 
guarantees are a far cry from the lenient standard declared by the USSC in Thomas v. 
Chicago Park District as discussed above.358  
 
IV. EXEMPTIONS, DEROGATIONS FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 
4.1. Traditional processions – content discrimination or a reasonable 
exemption? 
 
The jurisdictions examined all carve out exceptions from the notification or permit 
requirement for assemblies traditionally held. The particular formulation and, thus, scope 
of the exception is naturally diverging from country to country.  
In France Art. L211-1 of the Code of internal security (replacing identical 
regulation in the decree-law of October 23, 1935) exempts processions (this time the 
expression used is ‘sorties’) conforming to local usage from the advance notice, having 
                                                 




first of all religious processions in mind, and it applies largely to those still today.359 
Nonetheless, within this scope, the interpretation is quite generous as even a seventy year 
interruption does not prevent a procession to qualify as conforming to local usage.360 
Such manifestations are also exempted from the ban of disguising the face.361 Légifrance 
does not yield any search results which are not about religious processions, thus the 
conclusion that French legal practice hereby de facto institutes a content-based exemption 
for religious processions appears inevitable. This, however, seems to raise no controversy 
in the country, and it is possible also that whenever a group would claim its manifestation 
should be considered conforming to local usage, courts will accept it. 
In German law, there is a more complicated controversy around traditional or 
religious processions. Art. 17 of the Federal Assembly law362 exempts from the notice 
requirement (and indeed from ban and conditioning) open air worships, masses, religious 
processions, funeral and wedding processions and traditional popular festivals. The 
apparent privilegisation of such assemblies over political ones resulted in scholars 
claiming the regulation unconstitutional,363 others in need of an interpretation conform to 
the constitution.364  
Since 2001, however, as the GFCC appeared settled on a narrow (or enlarged) 
concept of assembly, which in any case restricts the scope of Art. 8 GG to public 
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matters,365 some of the authors argue that Art. 17 Assembly Law does not even cover 
assemblies protected by Art. 8 GG.366 Thus, the regulation does not privilege them: to the 
contrary, these assemblies are subject to general police law with a wider range of 
intervention possibilities than it is the case with Art. 8 assemblies.367  
This approach however strikes back on the opposite end: most of these 
processions certainly should enjoy basic rights protection because of the applicability of 
freedom of religion, simple freedom of action (with its easier limitability) will not do. It 
is hard to see why one basic right (freedom of assembly within the narrow notion) and 
another (freedom of religion) should be subject to different regimes when the activity is 
actually the same (procession). The problem has thus in my view become moot neither 
because of the mentioned decision of the GFCC, nor because the regulation of assemblies 
became a competence of the Länder. Saxony’s new assembly law contains an identical 
regulation,368 while the Bavarian assembly law exempts such assemblies from the ban on 
disguising the face and of bringing ‘protective weapons’.369  
The UK POA section 11 (2) dispenses with the notice requirement for processions 
commonly or customarily held in the given area, and also funeral processions ‘organised 
by a funeral director acting in the normal course of his business.’ ‘Commonly or 
customarily held’ includes traditional May Day or Good Friday processions,370 but the 
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category is not limited to it as the rationale of the exemption is that police are aware 
anyway.  
A 2008 House of Lords judgment in Kay371 on Critical Mass cycle rallies in 
Central London found that a twelve year practice certainly qualifies as customary, thus 
the notice requirement does not apply. The Court has not clarified how long a practice 
below twelve years will suffice, but the case affirms that the exception as applied does 
not relate to the content of the message, but really to its recurring nature. The House of 
Lords disagreed with the Divisional Court372 about whether the route of the procession 
needs to be known to police in advance in order for the notice to be dispensable. Though 
Critical Mass does not have a predetermined route, the House of Lords decided that it is 
still the same procession, ie it falls under the exemption. This generous understanding 
however did not prevent the Divisional Court to find subsequently that police are still 
entitled to impose conditions as to the route of the Critical Mass, despite the fact that it 
does not have any predetermined route.373  
As to funeral processions, the somewhat meticulous formulation of ‘organised by 
a funeral director acting in the normal course of his business’ appears to exclude mass 
funeral processions which normally are political, and might be source of danger and 
occasion – eg in Northern Ireland – of intergroup conflict. However, exactly the 
regulation regarding Northern Ireland exempts simply ‘funeral processions’ from 
advance notice, without further specification.374 This same regulation still contains a hint 
on the specific history: it does not exempt customarily or commonly held processions 
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from advance notice,375 though the Secretary of State can regulate in an order those 
processions which are exempted.376  
In the U.S. the situation of exemptions for traditional assemblies is unclear. 
Traditionally, funeral processions were exempted by laws and regulations in some of the 
states and municipalities.377 Early state court cases sometimes struck down such 
regulations for being discriminatory.378 However, there not only funeral, but some other 
processions were also exempted, and the Court has even left open the possibility later to 
allow for an only funeral procession exemption.379  
The USSC has not ruled exactly on this issue. Major assembly cases of the USSC, 
such as Shuttlesworth involved ordinances exempting funeral processions, but this was 
not the main reason for their unconstitutionality. In Shuttlesworth, the exception only 
appears in a footnote, only for the sake of being precise.380  
Although such regulations is clearly content-based, and thus would fall under 
strict scrutiny, the widespread practice in state and municipal laws to exempt funeral 
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processions from the permit requirement either indicate that such exemptions would pass 
strict scrutiny, or that it raises no controversy.  
4.2. Spontaneous and ‘urgent’ assemblies 
 
A demonstration can be unnotified for several reasons. Unnotified demonstrations form a 
special category in freedom of assembly literature. They are usually perceived to be 
potentially more dangerous or disturbing; nonetheless, in some sense the worthiest of 
protection since they are presumably prompted by some important event, and are thus 
spontaneous, somehow genuine.  
In addition, it often happens that organisers do not give prior notice because they 
can be sure that the authorities would ban the demonstration unlawfully. Therefore, the 
leniency which is required in the handling of such assemblies functions as a safety check, 
or a last-resort built-in guarantee of freedom of assembly. As it can be seen on the 
example of the Baczkowski case, local authorities might well render freedom of assembly 
meaningless by constantly rejecting permit requests or issuing clearly biased bans in the 
guise of upholding traffic regulations. Though second instance administration and the 
courts were eager to quash the first instance ban, even they could not remedy effectively 
the once lost opportunity to protest at the right time and right place. In some cases, 
however, even higher instance authorities or courts are not willing, or are – as a matter of 
positive law – not able to correct the first instance bias or mistake. If such official 
conduct can be taken for granted, protestors might wish to risk an unnotified assembly 




For this, and the proper spontaneous protest situation, the European Court of 
Human Rights spelled out general principles in the Oya Ataman v. Turkey case, 
mentioned above,381 and the Bukta v. Hungary case.382  
In Ataman, the human rights protest of applicants – historically and theoretically 
at the core of freedom of assembly as essentially political protest, a form of petitioning 
the government in the interest of the most vulnerable: mal-treated prisoners383 – had not 
been notified, and was dispersed within half an hour by tear gas. In the view of the 
applicant, the dispersal took place in order to prevent the reading out of a press statement 
protesting against the isolation and possible mal-treatment of prisoners.384   
The Court did not find evidence that the demonstrators posed a danger to public 
order, apart from minor disruption to traffic, and was ‘particularly struck by the 
authorities’ impatience in seeking to end the demonstration, which was organised under 
the authority of the Human Rights Association.’ As a statement of principle, the Court 
declared in para. 42: ’[W]here demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence it is 
important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards 
peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
Convention is not to be deprived of all substance.’ Therefore, it concluded that there was 
a violation of freedom of assembly, since the state failed to show the necessary tolerance 
in handling an unlawful, but peaceful demonstration.  
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The Court had the opportunity to reiterate and further elaborate on its stance on 
unnotified assemblies in the 2007 case Bukta and Others v. Hungary.385 The facts of the 
case are closest to a spontaneous demonstration proper, though, in German terms, it 
might still qualify only as Eilversammlung, urgent demonstration, and not a spontaneous 
one.386  
In Bukta, the applicants held a protest in front of a hotel where the Hungarian Prime 
Minister participated at a reception given by the Romanian Prime Minister on the 
occasion of a national holiday which commemorates the 1918 declaration of transfer of 
Transylvania from Hungary to Romania. The Hungarian Prime Minister made public the 
day before the event that he intended to participate. Thus, applicants, wishing to protest 
against the participation of the Hungarian Prime Minister at such an event, did and could 
not adhere to the three days notice required by the Assembly Act, but held the protest 
without prior notification. The police dispersed them, relying first of all on the Assembly 
Act the text of which did not grant discretion to the police if facing an unnotified 
demonstration, though also mentioning a sharp noise heard which might be a danger for 
the delegation in the hotel. That every unnotified demonstration is unlawful under the 
Assembly Act, and will be dissolved, was confirmed on appeal by the domestic courts. 
Though the Hungarian government tried to argue in Strasbourg that there was a 
detonation heard and that was the cause of the dissolution, the European Court of Human 
Rights dismissed this argument, as domestic courts did not rely on it either. Rather, it 
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pointed out that if special circumstances justify an immediate response to a political event 
in the form of a demonstration, it is disproportionate to disband the ensuing peaceful 
assembly solely because of the lack of prior notice.387  
That means that there is an obligation flowing from the Convention to guarantee 
the possibility of spontaneous demonstrations. Nonetheless, it is also clear that it does not 
mean more. Prior notice is not contrary to the Convention, and it cannot be considered 
redundant unless (i) special circumstances justify an (ii) immediate response to a (iii) 
political event. If these conditions are fulfilled, the lack of prior notice is not a sufficient 
reason to disband an otherwise peaceful and orderly assembly. 
Recently, the demonstration blocking a central bridge in Budapest for several 
hours was understood (not decided, as that was not the issue) clearly illegal by the 
ECtHR. 388 The issue to be decided was the dispersal of a later demonstration – in support 
of the dispersed bridge blockade, both in protest against election results pronounced two 
months before – halting vehicular traffic and public transport in and around a main 
square. The Court found that proportionate, especially as the demonstrators could express 
their solidarity with the illegal bridge blockade as their demonstration was only dispersed 
after several hours (§ 42), despite the fact that it seriously disrupted traffic and was not 
notified.  
Bukta does not mean that ‘the absence of prior notification can never be a 
legitimate basis for crowd dispersal.’389 The exact contours of the exemption remain to be 
clarified, such as the issue of urgent assemblies or ‘Eilversammlungen,’ eventual 
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permissibility of delayed notice requirement, or the proportionality of measures other 
than dispersal.  
Some of those issues are clarified in German law, the apparent origin of the 
doctrine of spontaneous assembly. According to the GFCC spontaneous demonstrations 
are those which form instantaneously from an actual occasion.390 Literature differentiates 
between several sorts of spontaneous assemblies. According to a dominant categorisation, 
spontaneous assemblies in the wider sense include (i) instantaneous; (ii) urgent; and (iii) 
flash assemblies.391  
Instantaneous assemblies are spontaneous assemblies in the strict sense, as it is 
only in their case that the determination of holding an assembly and its realization cannot 
be separated, but coincide. In case of urgent and flash assemblies, the moments of 
determination and the demonstration itself are separate, though the assembly follows 
shortly the determination.392  
The difference is legally relevant as in case of urgent assemblies, the Court has 
not dispensed with the duty of notification, just it acknowledged a shortening of the 
deadline for notification. In case of really spontaneous assemblies, to give notice is 
impossible, as there are no organisers, and as there is no time anyway: the decision to 
hold an assembly and holding it actually coincides. Thus, so to speak, spontaneous 
(instantaneous) assemblies are exempted because of the factual impossibility of notifying 
in lack of planning and organising.  
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Urgent (or rapid) assemblies are, however, planned and have an organiser, but 
their goal would be endangered if the organisers adhered to the deadline.393 Thus, here 
the constitutionally acceptable solution is to allow for a shortened deadline for advance 
notice which should be given in any form (phone, fax, email, etc.)394 without delay right 
after the decision to hold an assembly was made.395  
An assembly which is meant to surprise is not considered ‘spontaneous’, because 
it was in advance planned by its initiators. What is more, it seems that such 
demonstrations count even to be malicious, as ‘pretended spontaneous actions.’396 
Maliciously unnotified assemblies, however, are to be dispersed, at least according to 
some commentators and courts.397  
In my view, it is well possible – and regularly the case with flash mobs, eg – that 
an assembly is not spontaneous in the strict sense, but still would lose its sense if it were 
notified. At the same time, most such assemblies do not cause any sort of disturbance, 
and do not require any policing. The surprising intent in itself is neither consequentially 
nor even symptomatically related to direct dangers to public safety or order as required 
by the law on assemblies. Therefore, here legislator and courts seem to engage in an 
obscure moralizing by disapproving ‘pretension’. In the meantime, I was not able to 
clearly verify to what extent this interpretation of unnotified flash mobs as malicious 
assemblies is really applied in practice apart from a single OLG Düsseldorf case. 
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The French Conseil Constitutionnel has not yet adopted a stance on spontaneous 
or urgent assemblies. According to the Code pénal, a manifestation held without prior 
notice is an illegal demonstration, punishable by six months imprisonment or a fine.398 
The law which reformed the Code and inserted this crime was adopted in 1992, but it was 
not submitted for review to the Conseil. Some in the literature would claim that every 
unorganised demonstration is an attroupement.399 Thus, it would follow that the 
spontaneous demonstration being unorganised, therefore, is an attroupement, and as such 
illegal. Such a view runs clearly counter to both Oya Ataman and Bukta.  
In USSC jurisprudence there is no explicit discussion on spontaneous or urgent 
assemblies. Shuttlesworth of course exempts from the duty to notify (ask for a permit), if 
the permit scheme is unconstitutionally vague.  
Apart from Justice Harlan’s remark in concurring to Shuttlesworth,400 arguments 
related to spontaneity came up in 2002 in Watchtower,401 where an ordinance requiring 
permit (basically registration) for door-to-door canvassing was found unconstitutional by 
the USSC, partly because such a system effectively prevents spontaneous expression.402 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not elaborated further on this issue, it has not 
developed a proper doctrine or test. Especially seen in light of Thomas v. Chicago Park 
District, decided the same year, Watchtower’s lines emphasizing the importance of 
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spontaneous speech might be inapplicable to demonstrations. Lower courts, including 
circuits nonetheless sometimes carve out an exception for spontaneous expression, 
especially in cases of smaller or even one-person demonstrations or performances.403  
In the United Kingdom, section 11 POA 1986 requires advance notice of 
processions ‘unless it is not reasonably practicable to give any advance notice’. This 
exemption is meant to cover spontaneous and urgent processions, such as that in front of 
an embassy prompted by the news of execution of a political prisoner within 24 hours, or 
such as a demonstration for a ‘pedestrian crossing outside a school after a fatal road 
accident.’404 Considering that literature has not indicated any significant controversy 
related to the interpretation of ‘reasonably practicable’, the conclusion might be drawn 
that UK law is the most generous among the examined jurisdictions with regard to notice 






FROM VIOLENCE TO PUBLIC DISORDER TO CRIME PREVENTION 
 
                                                 
403 Eg, Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006), or 
 Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 9th Cir. 1994), Ariz. Right to Life PAC v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 
1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2003), Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 701-03 (6th Cir. 2004) all as cited and discussed 
in Kellum above n 268 at 410-412, and Burnett above n 268.  
404 See Home Office, Review of the Public Order Act 1936 and related legislation, The Stationary Office, 
1980, aka Green Paper § 68 as cited by David Bonner & Richard Stone, ‘The Public Order Act 1986: Steps 




1. The peacefulness requirement: a determinant of scope or a limit 
 
No constitution or human rights instrument protects the right to unpeaceful assembly. 
There is always a restriction, – mostly already included in the concept and scope of the 
right – of peacefulness. Criminal codes through time and place regularly punish armed 
participation at a demonstration, ie even legally possessed arms cannot be taken to an 
assembly.  
Apparently it is assumed that an assembly should be about expression and not 
about threat or violence. Of course, quite a few assemblies are about violence, threat, or 
coercion in one way or the other, and they are still protected by the constitution. It is a 
fiction of the law that the would-be Skokie marches, or the Neo-Nazi rallies in Germany 
are not about violence. In some sense, the sit-ins and mass protests organised by MLK Jr. 
were equally about violence. Some of them were occasions of civil disobedience, and 
most of them could count very well on the violent reaction of the Southern racists. This 
was actually the strategy of the civil rights movement: to shock the conscience of the 
nation by forcing the racists to manifest their violence openly. Hidden forms of violence 
which pervaded the South well into the post-war period were not perceived as violence 
until the civil rights protesters provoked open violence.405 The extent to which 
‘provocation’ is condemned or confirmed by constitutional jurisprudence, will 
accordingly also be explored later, the doctrines most relevant are ‘heckler’s veto’ and 
‘fighting words.’  
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The peacefulness requirement only aims at preventing the most violent, the most 
threatening, and the most coercive assemblies, or, one is tempted to say, openly displayed 
or openly attempted violence. The general problem posed by violence for law, or, the 
other way round, the problem posed by law for violence cannot be resolved here. Clearly, 
demonstrations are sites of confrontation and often in the sense of challenging state 
authority. There is arguably an imbalance already in the prohibition of arms at an 
assembly, since the police do dispose of some arms (though rather tools for crowd control 
and dispersal). This imbalance is however only the usual Hobbesian imbalance flowing 
from the state monopoly on violence, which I do not intend to question or theorise, just to 
note here.  
The most interesting exception in this regard is the U.S. where weapons are not eo 
ipso banned at public assemblies. What counts as unpeaceful is otherwise also diverging 
among the jurisdictions, just as the concrete notion of violence and its watered down pair 
concept of public order prevailing over freedom of assembly.  
1.1. Germany: peaceful and without arms 
 
The German Basic Law defines the scope of freedom of assembly as ‘peaceable and 
without arms’.406 Peaceful or peaceable is according to commentators an assembly which 
does not take a ‘violent or subversive’ turn.407 The language stems from the federal law 
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on assemblies and processions, which allows for preliminary ban in case there is evidence 
that the organiser or his or her supporters strive for a violent or subversive course.408  
Especially the adjective ‘subversive’ [aufrührerisch] sounds rather vague and 
problematic from a constitutional point of view, and there is no echoing parlance by the 
GFCC to this effect. Instead, in the Court’s formulation these are ‘acts of a certain 
dangerousity, such as aggressive excesses against persons or things or other violent acts 
[Gewalttätigkeiten]’ that turn the assembly unpeaceful, thus it requires some intensity and 
concreteness.  By distinguishing different sorts (or degrees?) of coercion, the Court 
emphasises that ‘a mere obstruction [Behinderung] of third persons’409 does not deprive 
the assembly of its peaceful nature. Passive resistance, some level of implied coercion 
does therefore not in itself deprive the conduct of constitutional protection. 
The prohibition on bringing arms to an assembly includes weapons in the 
technical sense of the word, and in this case it is irrelevant why they are brought to the 
assembly. Other dangerous tools which are capable of taking the life of another are also 
constitutionally prohibited from assemblies, though it is unclear whether non-traditional 
arms fall under the ban on arms or unpeacefulness.410  
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The literature is virtually unanimous that gas masks, helmets, and similar 
protective covers (which in German are casually called protective weapons, 
‘Schutzwaffen’) do not fall under the ban on arms, though their wearing can be 
constitutionally restricted for other reasons if the requirements of proportionality are 
met.411  
Probably more interesting is the clear stance the scholarly literature takes on 
individual responsibility at a demonstration. The general view is that the assembly 
remains ‘peaceful’, thus, protected, even if there are unpeaceful, violent ‘elements’ 
present, as long as the violence of the individual troublemakers is not supported by the 
solidarity of the majority who are thus supposed not to become either active or silent 
accomplices. The organiser is especially required to disavow violence, though the exact 
moment where the organiser’s omission is already beyond the limit, is disputed.412  
All in all, police are allowed to intervene first only against individual 
troublemakers whose conduct is thus outside the scope of freedom of assembly. If such 
an intervention fails or is insufficient, then the police can only take measures against the 
assembly itself if the conditions under Art. 8 II GG, are fulfilled, ie the intervention 
would have to pass constitutional muster, including the proportionality test.413   
1.2. United States: no ban on guns 
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The First Amendment also only guarantees the right of the people peaceably to assemble. 
What peaceably exactly means has not been the subject of extensive Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  
This is in a sense the result of the dogmatic structure of constitutional law in the 
United States. Unlike in the ECHR or Germany, the American understanding does not 
differentiate between scope of the right and permissible limitations on the right which 
would then in the particular case allow for restriction. Rather, traditionally at least, the 
American jurisprudence is more categorical: either something is protected or unprotected. 
Thus, it does not need to differentiate between unpeaceful assembly and for other reasons 
unprotected assembly. The kind of very obvious or inherent limits to freedom of 
assembly which are comparable to other jurisdictions’ peaceability criteria can be seen in 
such quotes as eg the following in Cantwell v. Connecticut:414 
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of 
freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot, or that religious 
liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack 
upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present 
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public 
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order 
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious. 
 
A more significant difference in the U.S. compared to other jurisdictions is the lack of 
explicit, general ban on carrying guns and weapons to a demonstration. This does not 
mean that various gun control laws may not affect the legality of bringing arms to a 
                                                 




demonstration, but certainly the federal constitution does not restrict it as such. The 
passivity of police in handling demonstrations of visibly and openly armed persons also 
testify to a general view that this is constitutionally protected. Even in cases where permit 
for assembly is required, bringing guns to a demonstration will not by far result in 
denying the permit for grounds of unpeacefulness.415  
The Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the issue of carrying guns to a 
protest or demonstration yet, but the 2008 case D.C. v. Heller416 spelling out the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms probably points also in the same direction as 
the intensifying practice of the open-carry movement to bring guns to demonstrations and 
protests.  
There does not so far seem to be any concern that guns in the mass might be 
significantly more dangerous than elsewhere, let alone how wearing a gun to a 
demonstration might efficiently silence counter-speech.  
I do think, however, that whatever might be the merits of a constitutional principle 
of possible armed self-defense against the government, it certainly should not apply to 
speakers of opposite view, or to other addressees or targets of a demonstration. In this 
regard, however, the U.S. Supreme Court might have a precedent, as Virginia v. Black417 
allows for restriction of speech which aims at intimidation as falling under the category 
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of true threat. A case-by-case approach, intervening only in cases of intimidating ‘gun 
wearing’ would probably be the most consistent with the rest of the free speech doctrine.  
1.3. United Kingdom: not a thematised separate question 
 
Unlike in Germany and under the ECHR, in the UK the question of peacefulness does not 
arise separately as a preliminary question of scope (at least in traditional, domestic, pre-
HRA understanding).  
As we have seen, the POA 1986 allows for banning in cases of apprehension of 
serious public disorder, serious public disorder is thus certainly the antithesis of 
‘peaceful’. Different forms of mob or street violence (riot, affray, destruction of property, 
other ordinary violent crimes, etc.), as criminalised in many provisions of statutory and 
common law are also clearly beyond any claim to freedom of assembly, just as in the 
other jurisdictions.  
Apart from this, English law shows an increasingly alarming spectrum of other 
criminal or administrative provisions threatening freedom of assembly in anti-terrorist, 
anti-harassment and on anti-social behaviour legislation. These latter ones will be dealt 
with in the relevant sections in the following pages, at least to the extent they were 
interpreted by higher courts. David Mead’s rich 2010 book on the new law of peaceful 
protest,418 as in so many other respects, is recommended for the many details – dangers 
and challenges – involved in these provisions. This book aspires to keep repetitions to a 
minimum, instead providing a broader comparative aspect.   
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1.4. France: attroupement and group violence 
 
Definitely, in France, both manifestation and réunion are only protected in their peaceful 
version. The peacefulness as criterion figured in a few early constitutional documents 
which, however, did not make a lasting impact on French constitutionalism.419  
Hubrecht claims that among all the notions surrounding the law of demonstration, 
the notion of attroupement is defined with most exaction, thus he even suggests deriving 
the notion of manifestation from (the negation of) attroupement. As an attroupement is an 
assembly of individuals with arms or capable (‘susceptible’) of troubling the public 
peace,420 it is certainly true that an assembly is supposed to be peaceful. Wearing guns at 
a manifestation or réunion publique is punished with three years imprisonment or 45000 
euros fine according to Article 431-10 of the Criminal Code, a rather serious punishment.  
The Conseil Constitutionnel affirmed the constitutionality of a law enabling the 
prefectoral authority to prohibit the bringing or wearing of arms and objects capable of 
being used as arms to and at a demonstration, but struck down a provision – basically on 
overbreadth or rule of law grounds – which would enable the imposition of a similar ban 
with regard to objects capable of being used as projectiles.421 
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The 2010 law against ‘group violence’422 was also found constitutional in its 
aspects relevant for our discussion.423 The law inserted the following provision in the 
Criminal Code:  
Art. 222-14-2. – The fact for a person to knowingly participate at a grouping, 
even if formed of a temporary fashion, with a view to prepare, characterised by one or 
more material facts, voluntary violent acts against persons or destruction of goods, is 
punished by one year of imprisonment or a 15 000 € fine.  
The Conseil found the provision does neither violate freedom of assembly 
(réunion or manifestation), is clear and precise, and prescribes a proportionate 
punishment, thus it does not fail to observe the principle of legality and proportionality of 
punishments. Again characteristically for the judicial treatment of freedom of assembly, 
the CC cites that the applicants claimed violation of both liberté de réunion and liberté de 
manifestation, but answers only that the law does not realise any violation of ’the 
freedom of movement or of the collective expression of ideas and opinions’ (considérant 
30.) That’s all the Conseil says about the assembly aspects of the law, clearly considering 
the law unproblematic in this respect. Therefore, it is likely that the Conseil – would it 
explicitly reason in terms of scope first, and limitations second – simply considers the 
activities punished by the group violence law as completely outside the protection of 
freedom of assembly.  
Nonetheless, and importantly, the Conseil interpreted the ’knowing participation’ 
criterion as requiring that it be proven both that the person participates with a view to 
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commit the violence and that this intention is supported by one or more material facts 
(considérant 12). On the one hand, the Conseil has not annulled this preemptive law 
which might in theory be applied against protestors who never committed and will never 
commit any violent acts. On the other hand, it gave a narrowing interpretation which still 
binds penal responsibility to proven individual acts, thereby depriving the law from its 
most dangerous tendency to establish ’guilt by association.’ 
1.5. ECtHR: systematic, intentional violence  
 
Art. 11 protects only the freedom of peaceful assembly. The ECtHR exerts substantive 
review in this regard, at least the Stankov424 decision testifies to such an approach.  
In the case, the Bulgarian government argued that the ban on demonstrations 
organised by the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden is not an interference since the 
planned demonstrations would not have been of a peaceful nature. The ECtHR reiterated 
that Art. 11 only protects peaceful assemblies, but the peaceful character is only foregone 
if the organisers and participants have violent intentions. On the facts of the case the 
Government could not reasonably conclude that the planned demonstrations was to be 
unpeaceful.  
The Stankov decision is one of the examples of substantive review which appears 
to stand in contradiction to several earlier inadmissibility decisions handed down by the 
Commission. Chappell425 and Pendragon,426 for example, both included complete blanket 
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bans around Stonehenge for the period around midsummer solstice. The Commission did 
not find it problematic that the cause of danger of disturbance concededly lied outside the 
sphere of action of the applicants. Therefore, their right to freedom of assembly (and 
religion) was interfered with without any fault on their part. Remarkably, the 
Commission did not adhere to the relevant dicta of Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’427, 
according to which states are required to take reasonable measures to prevent the violent 
behaviour of others threatening an in itself peaceful assembly. The Chappell-Pendragon 
line of inadmissibility cases seems also conflict with earlier decisions of the Commission 
itself: in a 1980 case, CARAF428 it stated that  
The possibility of violent counter-demonstrations or the 
possibility of extremists with violent intentions, not members of 
the organising association, joining the demonstration cannot as 
such take away that right. Even if there is a real risk of a public 
procession resulting in disorder by developments outside the 
control of those organising it, such procession for this reason 
alone does not fall out of the scope of Article 11 (1) of the 
Convention.  
In this case, a planned antifascist procession was caught up by the general ban on 
processions in a certain area of London. The Commission accepted the ban as justified 
because earlier protests by the National Front resulted in serious damage to persons and 
property which even large contingents of police force could not prevent. Here therefore 
the peaceful antifascists were restricted in their assembly rights because of previously 
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unpeaceful others. Unlike in Chappell and Pendragon, the application was not found 
outside the scope of Article 11.  
That such an application would be manifestly ill-founded today is unlikely also 
because of the Ezelin429 jurisprudence: the Court requires that a person be punished only 
if he himself committed some reprehensible act, since reaffirmed eg in Galstyan v. 
Armenia.430 Also Ziliberberg v. Moldova is a case at hand which involved a 
demonstration gradually turning violent, but where there was no indication that the 
applicant participated in violence, and still he was fined for participating. The Court 
emphasised that431  
an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful 
assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts 
committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the 
individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own 
intentions or behaviour.  
 
How sporadic is sporadic is of course open to interpretation, and one should not be 
rushing to conclude, eg, that only such demonstrations can be dispersed where each and 
every participant is violent.  
Furthermore, under Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’432 the possibility of violent 
counter-demonstrations is not a reason to ban the demonstration, thus the Court went 
further than the 1981 CARAF decision. ‘[T]he authorities have a duty to take appropriate 
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measures with regard to lawful demonstrations for in order to ensure their peaceful 
conduct and the safety of all citizens.’433  
It is also settled case law that an unlawful situation does not justify an 
infringement of freedom of assembly,434 certainly there is then no possibility to interpret 
unpeacefulness as simple unlawfulness.  
2. The would-be disorderly: judicial doctrines of risk-assessment 
applied to the right to assembly 
 
The following discussion will include some of the most important decisions on freedom 
of speech or opinion, even though they were actually delivered in the context of an 
assembly.  
They are therefore not only interesting because they display vividly the 
differences among the compared jurisdictions, but also for the similarity of merging 
speech and assembly doctrines even in cases where the plurality of the participants is 
crucial. The following discussion could be structured in different ways; I have chosen a 
division according to the source of the perceived threat because that suits every 
jurisdiction at least in part. Accordingly, first the judicial handling of demonstrators as 
perpetrators or (more commonly) instigators will be examined, and then I will turn to 
doctrines related to hostile audience and counter-demonstration.   
2.1. Differently dangerous demonstrators  
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2.1.1. United States: imminence, likelihood 
 
In the United States, after half a century of hesitation which cannot be dealt with on these 
pages,435 the U.S. Supreme Court ‘finalized’ its doctrine applicable to speech which 
intends or risks a harmful consequence in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio.436 The per 
curiam opinion held that First Amendment protects speech unless it incites to imminent 
lawless action which is very likely to occur, and claimed that this is a reformulation of 
the clear and present danger test as elaborated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. The 
concurring Justices Douglas and Black dismissed the clear and present danger test, and 
advocated a distinction between speech and overt acts.437 Brandenburg was the leader of 
a Ku Klux Klan group, convicted under Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute on the basis 
of films shot at a Ku Klux Klan ‘organisers’ meeting’. The films showed hooded figures 
with firearms, burning a large cross, making derogatory remarks of Blacks and Jews. 
Speeches in the footings included very strong sentences like:438 
 
We’re not a revengent organisation, but if our President, our 
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, 
Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance taken…. We are marching on Congress July the 
Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing 
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into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, 
the other group to march into Mississippi….Personally, I believe 
the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.  
 
The USSC reversed Brandenburg’s conviction, stating that ‘[t]he Constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action or is likely to incite or produce such 
action.’439  
Later cases made clear that imminence and intent must both be present. Eg in 
Hess v. Indiana the Court reversed a conviction because the evidence failed to show that 
the ‘words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.’440 In this 
case, Hess was arrested during an antiwar demonstration on a college campus for loudly 
stating, ‘We’ll take the fucking street later (or again).’ According to the USSC, the 
statement could be understood at best as ‘counsel for present moderation’; at worst, as 
‘advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time’, ie intent might have been 
present, but not immediacy of danger. Also, as Hess – though facing the crowd – was not 
addressing a particular group or a particular person, the utterance cannot be taken as 
advocacy of action proper.441  
It appears impossible to find a case ever where the Brandenburg criteria have been 
found fulfilled by the Supreme Court.442  
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Less on the incitement side, but more on the distinction between violence and 
protected speech, the Court developed in NAACP v. Claiborne443 a doctrine of individual 
liability. In the case, a boycott of white merchants was proclaimed in order to further civil 
rights causes. The boycott was accompanied by speeches and nonviolent picketing, but 
there were sporadic acts and threats of violence. The white merchants sued the NAACP 
and the boycott’s main organiser, Charles Evers for lost income for the period of the 
boycott, 1966-1972. The Supreme Court held that nonviolent elements of the boycott 
were fully protected. A person cannot be held responsible for being a member of the body 
organising the boycott; civil liability arises only in case personal participation in violence 
or threat of violence is proven. 
 Finally, jurisprudence is unclear about whether previous violence might be a 
ground for limiting freedom of assembly of the same group. Kunz v. New York,444 in 
which a prior restraint decision was quashed on grounds of overly broad official 
discretion, clearly indicates that previous violence cannot form the basis of prior restraint. 
However, in an earlier labour picketing case445 Justice Jackson found that a large-scale 
industrial conflict, where violence is neither episodic nor isolated, does provide sufficient 
ground for a preliminary injunction on future assemblies. The abortion clinic protest 
cases decided decades later (and post-Brandenburg) also appear to accept injunctions for 
reasons of previous violent conduct, even injunctions applicable to people who were not 
enjoined.446 
2.1.2. Germany: direct endangerment, but low probability standard 
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In Germany, the threshold for intervention is thematised, but is less elaborated than in the 
US. The GFCC has spelled out some principles, though the ultimate yardsticks remain 
proportionality and deciding each case on its particular circumstances.  
The Brokdorf 447 decision dealt also with the powers of prior ban and dissolution 
as authorised by the federal assembly law. These provisions allow for restriction in case 
circumstances suggest that public security or public order is directly endangered by the 
assembly or procession.  
In the interpretation developed in police law, public security means protection of 
such central legal values (Rechtsgüter) as life, health, freedom, honour, property or 
estates of the individual, integrity of the legal order or of state institutions. For an 
endangerment of public security, there need to occur a danger of a criminally proscribed 
offense against any of these values.448 Public order, on the other hand, in police law, 
equals to the whole of unwritten norms whose observance is – according to prevailing 
social and ethical considerations – indispensable for the ordered living together of 
humans within the confines of a territory.449  
This interpretation has been narrowed down by the GFCC in two ways.  
Firstly, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, a ban or dissolution is 
only constitutional if the less intrusive means of imposing conditions has already been 
tried and exhausted.450 In addition, not only the discretion as to the means, but also the 
decisional discretion of the authority is limited: not any sort of interest might justify a 
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restriction on the right to freedom of assembly. Importantly, burdens flowing from the 
characteristic of assemblies as mass phenomena which cannot be eliminated without 
endangering the aim of the particular assembly itself are to be tolerated by third 
persons.451  
Secondly, ban or dissolution is only allowed in case public security or order is 
directly, immediately endangered. Thus, the requirement is stricter than in general police 
law. It necessitates in every case a probability assessment which should be based on facts, 
circumstances and other details, not on mere suspicion or assumptions.452   
However, the GFCC expressly left the details to the ordinary courts, implying that 
anything more concrete would already intrude upon their competences. Ordinary courts 
would normally check whether police offered sufficiently precise factual evidence which 
would suggest that public order or security would be endangered.453 
Instead of more concrete tests, the Brokdorf decision includes a long 
contemplation on constitutional requirements flowing not so much from the duty to 
protect the exercise of the right, but from procedural and organisational guarantees which 
should facilitate exercising freedom of assembly.  
As mentioned already,454 the GFCC imposes the obligation on both the police and 
demonstrators to adhere to so called tradited expectations, like cooperative and moderate 
behaviour, timely dialogue which presumably helps prevent or calm down potential 
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tensions. This in relation to prevention of violence means that the more cooperative the 
organisers were, the higher the threshold for potential police intervention lies.455  
As it is visible from these formulations, the standards pronounced in Brokdorf are 
very principled, but abstract, and they faithfully mirror all the relativities (or flexibilities) 
of proportionality.  
In relation to mass demonstration specifically, the decision offers some examples 
which would constitutionally occasion police intervention. Such is the case when, eg, a 
demonstrator commits violent acts during the demonstration, or approves someone else 
doing so. A prior ban is justified only if it is predicted by a high probability that the 
organiser or their supporter intends to commit violent acts, or at least approves of such 
conduct.456 This observation, it seems to me, necessitates a soft reading of the directness 
or immediacy requirement mentioned earlier in the decision, because it only requires 
probability of intent of committing or of intent of approving, not also a probability of 
actual violence occurring. This differentiates the German approach from the US 
American standard as pronounced in Brandenburg.   
Nonetheless, one has to bear in mind the very different underlying facts of the 
mentioned cases. Neither in Brandenburg or Hess was there any violence, while in 
Brokdorf it was considered relevant that in previous such demonstrations acts of violence 
did occur. In this regard, the Brokdorf situation is closer to NAACP v. Claiborne, as 
sporadic violence occurred in both cases. However, they are still hardly comparable as in 
Claiborne it was a boycott which lasted years, while in Brokdorf it was a 50 000 strong 
demonstration. Also, the courts were asked to decide on completely different issues: in 
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Brokdorf the issue was the constitutionality of the prior ban and dissolution powers, in 
Claiborne liability for damages resulting from the boycott.  
Later decisions of the GFCC also have not clarified very precisely the level of risk 
necessary for restrictions to be justified. An appearance of ‘readiness to violence’ or a 
‘provocation to create a climate of violent demonstration’ were found to be sufficient for 
restriction at least if coupled with violations of ‘fundamental social and ethical views 
conforming to the Basic Law’, ie a constitutionally strengthened concept of public 
order.457  
In addition, the Court found constitutional the ban on uniforms expressing 
common political attitude as they are capable to excite ‘suggestive-militant effects in the 
direction of intimidating, uniform militancy.’458  
On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional provisions of the new 
Bavarian assembly law which would make organisers liable to pay an administrative fine 
(Bußgeld) if they fail to take ‘appropriate measures’ to ‘prevent’ or ‘stop’ (verhindern) 
‘violent acts’ (Gewalttätigkeiten, an expression by the way used by the GFCC itself) 
arising ‘out of the assembly’ (aus der Versammlung heraus) for rule of law 
considerations analogous to vagueness.459 The Court equally struck down the provisions 
rendering a fine for ‘participating at an assembly in a way which contributes to the fact 
that the assembly appears from the outside to be of paramilitary nature or otherwise 
communicating readiness to violence, and thereby an intimidatory effect arises.’460  
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         A G8 protest case, where German courts affirmed a 6-day preventive detention of 
would-be demonstrators, reached the ECtHR recently which decided that it violated both 
Art. 5 and Art. 11. The GFCC denied intermediary measures, and then also summarily 
declined to examine the complaints on their merit.461 Art. 11 was involved in two regards, 
the demonstrators were prevented in upholding banners with the inscription ‘Free the 
prisoners’, and were prevented in actually going to the place of the demonstration. 
Characteristic of German law – not so much thematised in German assembly literature – 
is the possibility of mass detention for preventive purposes. Those ‘prisoners’ whose 
liberation was at stake on the banners were a 1112 would-be demonstrators, whose 
detention went before courts in 628 cases, out of which only 113 were found lawful ex 
post facto.462 There was some violence at protests on the occasion of previous G8 
summits, and also there was to be on the one which could not be attended by applicants. 
One of the applicants was previously convicted for disturbing rail traffic at the occasion 
of anti-nuclear protests. German authorities in the present case claimed the banners 
would have realized incitement to prisoner liberation (this latter one a crime), while 
applicants claimed they addressed the government, not other demonstrators, to free the 
detained. One applicant refused to identify himself, and later was fined 200 euros. 
Charges of incitement to crime were later dropped for reasons of insignificance. Still 
German courts found their 6-day detention lawful, the GFCC also apparently believing 
public security was directly endangered by them. This is a case showing strong parallels 
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to Laporte463 in the UK, discussed below, and seen in that light calls the rights-protective 
reputation of German law seriously into question. 
Thus, though traditional police law notions of public safety and public order were 
considerably narrowed down by German constitutional law, courts, including the GFCC 
are actually satisfied with a probability standard much lower than constitutional in the 
US, or, as it will be visible below, permissible in UK or ECHR law.  
2.1.3. United Kingdom: unclarity as to imminence  
 
In relation to prevention of violence and disorder, cases related to the common law 
concept of breach of the peace are most characteristic of the judicial approach, 
traditionally oscillating between a very weak and a more rigorous standard. Two central 
cases involved conviction not for breach of the peace itself (which is not an offence in 
English law), but for obstructing an officer in executing his duties related to prevention of 
breach of the peace.  
In the 1882 case Beatty v. Gillbanks464 Salvation Army members were charged 
with unlawful and tumultuous assembly to the disturbance of the peace as Skeleton Army 
members were accompanying their marches shouting and disorderly. The Divisional 
Court ruled the disorder was not ‘the natural consequence of their [ie the Salvation 
Army’s] acts’,465 as it came from the rival group.  
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In contrast, a weak review was applied in the 1936 Duncan v. Jones466 case 
related to a speech to be held in front of a training site for unemployed. The Court 
accepted the police officer’s apprehension of breach of the peace – based on a disorder a 
year before –,  as reasonable, not requiring any weighing of actual probability of ensuing 
disorder, neither providing any clarification as to what counts as disorder.  
Breach of the peace since R v Howell (1981) is understood to occur when ‘harm is 
actually done or likely to be done to a person or, in his presence, his property or is put in 
fear of being harmed through an assault, affray, riot, unlawful assembly or other 
disturbance.’ 467In Steel v. UK the ECtHR accepted that the notion of breach of the peace 
as put forward in Howell fulfilled the requirement of ‘lawful’ for Art. 5 purposes,468 thus 
it also satisfies the prescribed by law requirement in Art. 11 (2).  
More recently, a 2006 House of Lords judgment in Laporte469 on breach of the 
peace examined the concept for its compatibility with Strasbourg jurisprudence in other 
respects, shedding light on the mechanisms of the Human Rights Act, while also 
clarifying to a considerable extent the tensions between freedom of assembly and public 
‘peace’ in English law.  
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What is probably the most peculiar feature of the concept of peace is the duty – 
though imperfect, ie not directly sanctioned per se – of the general public, of every 
citizen to uphold the ‘Queen’s peace’ and, if necessary, to assist the police in maintaining 
it (ie preventing a breach of the peace).  
The Laporte case involved a demonstration planned by anti-war protesters at a 
RAF base also used by the US Air Force at Fairford in Gloucestershire. Ms Laporte 
intended to attend the demonstration against the war in Iraq, and thus started in a coach 
organised for this purpose from London to Fairford. However, as the Fairford police 
officer, Mr Lambert learned also from intelligence sources that members of a violent anti-
war group, the so-called ‘Wombles’ might be present in the coaches, he ordered the three 
coaches to be stopped and searched at a lay-by at Lechlade, some miles away from 
Fairford.470 The police found some objects and instruments (masks, shields, etc.) in the 
coaches which were rather inconsistent with the purpose of a peaceful demonstration, 
these instruments were seized. The police also discovered eight members of the Wombles 
among the 120 passengers, though unable to verify the identity of some other persons 
who, like Ms Laporte – perfectly lawfully – failed to identify themselves. Mr. Lambert 
instructed the police at Lechlade to turn back the coaches to London and not to allow the 
passangers to get off the vehicles. Thus, it happened that Ms. Laporte, together with more 
than one hundred other persons were not only prevented from attending the meeting but 
also forced to stay in the coaches until they again reached London, ie for several hours 
altogether. Certainly, Mr. Lambert did not apprehend an imminent danger of breach of 
the peace, he himself made it clear, that was the reason why he did not order to arrest 
                                                 




anyone at Lechlade. Still, he believed that there might be some disturbance if the coaches 
arrive at Fairford, thus, he ordered sending back as a measure short of arrest.  
The Lords all agreed that there was no power to send the coaches back, and, thus, 
the measure adopted by the police did not have a basis in law, ie it was not prescribed by 
law for the purposes of the ECHR. Also, they similarly agreed that the premature and 
indiscriminate measure was in any event unjustified, because disproportionate 
infringement of the right to freedom of speech and assembly. The correct interpretation of 
the common law is that there has been no power to apply measures short of arrest against 
persons if there is no imminent danger of breach of the peace, though they had 
differences in evaluating the precedents.471 According to Lord Bingham, Howell is 
instructive about the legal concept of a breach of the peace. For the Court of Appeal in 
Howell, and, for Lord Bingham in Laporte, the essence of the concept was to be found in 
‘violence or threatened violence’ (§ 27). ‘It is for this breach of the peace when done in 
his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone 
else, may arrest an offender without warrant.’472 Nonetheless, Lord Bingham observes, 
that a „breach of the peace is not, as such, a criminal offence, but founds an application to 
bind over.’ According to Lord Brown (§ 111), however, this latter statement of Lord 
Bingham refers to the ‘concept of a breach of the peace’ in the sense that the breach itself 
possibly would come from another than the person to be bound over. The leading 
authority on the measures to be adopted in case of a breach of the peace is Lord 
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Diplock’s ruling in Albert v Lavin.473 In that case, which was later applied in numerous 
other cases, Lord Diplock stated  
that every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is 
being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed has the 
right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking 
or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those 
reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him 
against his will. At common law this is not only the right of every 
citizen, it is also his duty, although, except in the case of a citizen 
who is a constable, it is a duty of imperfect obligation. 
 
Lord Bingham (§ 29), however, himself formulated a rule in Laporte which is more clear, 
and it was repeated by Lord Brown (§ 110):  
Every constable, and also every citizen, enjoys the power and is 
subject to the duty to seek to prevent, by arrest or other action 
short of arrest, any breach of the peace occurring in his presence, 
or any breach of the peace which (having occurred) is likely to be 
renewed, or any breach of the peace which is about to occur.  
 
There is quite an agreement, therefore, that there is no way to prevent a breach of the 
peace except if it is either (i) actual, or, (ii) already happened and likely to be renewed, 
or, is (iii) about to occur.  That means in the particular case that there is no power to 
apply against Ms. Laporte and others a measure even short of arrest  since no breach of 
                                                 




the peace was even about to occur. In other words, the police or citizens are neither 
entitled nor obliged to take reasonable steps to prevent a breach of the peace „from 
becoming to occur’ as Lord Brown quite aptly formulated in § 115. Consequently, the 
test is not simple reasonableness even in common law, even without regard to the 
Convention, but a stricter one.  
There is, however, some disagreement as to the question of imminence on the 
ground of another earlier case, Moss v. McLachlan.474 In Moss, brought about in the 
midst of the miners’ strike, the police prevented a group of striking miners to picket 
places where or in the near of which some miners (apparently in opposition to the strike) 
worked. The court considered the situation as one in which a breach of the peace was 
imminent, therefore found the preventive action taken by the police reasonable.  
In the Laporte case, the Lords differed on why they considered imminence was 
not fulfilled compared to the Moss situation. Lord Bingham was of the opinion that the 
facts of the present case differed so much that though Moss is good law, finds no 
application in the Laporte case – in Moss there was an imminent breach of the peace, in 
Laporte there was none. Lord Rodger, however, would have accepted that there was an 
imminent breach of the peace already at Lechlade, had the police, ie Mr. Lambert, been 
of that opinion (as he was not). This might indicate a willingness to defer to police 
discretion as to the existence of imminence. Lord Mance, to the contrary, considered that 
even in the circumstances of Moss there was no imminent breach of the peace, thus, it 
was wrongly decided. Obviously, he would require more concrete and clear evidence.  
                                                 




As the Lords do not agree on the threshold of imminence, the significance of the 
Laporte ruling from the viewpoint of freedom of assembly is considerably reduced: the 
holding might be quite narrow.  
Imminence which was defined as ‘about to happen’ (§§ 49, 100) ‘going to happen 
in the near future’ (§ 67) in Laporte, was understood as ‘likely to happen’ in 2011 by the 
Divisional Court, quite a different question.475 Even that was however further weakened 
on appeal, when the Court of Appeal basically found the courts were not entitled to 
review the existence of an imminence, but have to check only whether police could 
reasonably apprehend that a breach of the peace was imminent.476  
As to the broader constitutional significance of the decision in Laporte, ie ‘the 
constitutional shift’ theory advocated by Sedley LJ in the Divisional Court in Redmond-
Bate v DPP477 as the correct approach after entering into force of the HRA, has been 
repeatedly affirmed by the Lords in Laporte. Nonetheless, some statements in Laporte 
draw attention to the caution the Lords exercise toward parliamentary sovereignty, as it is 
in harmony with their HRA mandate to interpret the law in conformity with the ECHR 
only as long as it is possible, ie no statute can be invalidated if it is contrary to the 
Convention. Thus, for instance, Lord Brown explicitly maintained the possibility that 
primary legislation can confer a power to the police ‘to prevent entirely innocent citizens 
from taking part in demonstrations already afoot’ (§ 132), though this seems to conflict 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. What is more, Lord Rodger even emphasised that the 
common law goes further than ECtHR jurisprudence as of today in making persons 
                                                 
475 R. (on the application of Moos) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 957 (Admin) 
§ 56.  
476 R (on the application of Moos) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2012] EWCA Civ 12  




acting entirely lawfully responsible if a breach of the peace is imminent. The ECtHR 
affirmed the conformity with the Convention of a police power to arrest a protestor if the 
target of the protest (a disrupted grouse hunter) might react violently in Steel v. UK.478 
However, Lord Rodger (§ 78) considered that in common law such a power, or, even a 
duty, exists also in a situation where the demonstrators’ ‘lawful and proper conduct’ 
would naturally result in violent reaction not on the part of the targeted audience, but by 
third parties. The judgment as a whole leaves open whether this is a power of last resort, 
or, it flows rather easily from the duty of every citizen to preserve the peace unbroken.  
UK courts – and by now the ECHR – decided another type of police measure, 
kettling or cordoning under breach of the peace law. Austin et al.,479 a much criticised 
decision involved a 7 hours cordon at Oxford Circus catching up several thousands, 
including applicants, a protestor at a 2001 May Day anti-capitalist demonstration and 
three bystanders. Austin, the demonstrator was throughout peaceful, Saxby, another 
applicant of the case, was on a business trip in London that day, had no intention to 
demonstrate. The House of Lords – to simplify a complicated decision – found there was 
no deprivation of liberty, as that was neither police’s motive nor purpose, and 
circumstances mandated that the cordon was necessary.480 Applying a circumstancial, 
balancing standard already at the scope limb of Article 5 which, according to scholars, 
was hitherto unknown481, the Lords found there was no deprivation of liberty (the Court 
of Appeal found Art. 11 inapplicable as well, a finding questionable in light of Ezelin and 
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other decisions emphasising that disorderliness of others does not preempt a peaceful 
protestor to rely on  Art. 11).482 This was upheld by the ECtHR, as will be discussed later. 
A more recent case483 found another instance of kettling justified on even more 
attenuated grounds. Police and court accepted that the claimant (a Palestinian solidarity 
protestor) did not intend a breach of the peace. Still, his words could – in the view of 
police – be understood by others as suggesting to approach the car of the Israeli president 
(who was not even on the scene yet). Thereby, the court not only further weakened the 
imminence requirement, but also departed from the mentioned 1882 case, Beatty v 
Gillbanks484 which categorically rejected ‘that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful 
act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act.’ 485  
Pre-emptive detention of would be protestors is also becoming more and more a 
way to prevent any disruption of public events by preventing the protest from taking 
place at all.  
The London Olympics drew the arrest of 182 cyclists participating at a monthly 
Critical Mass ride, out of whom only 12 were interviewed at all by police.486 Five were 
later convicted for not following s. 12 conditions487 imposed by police, affirmed by the 
Divisional Court.488 Most spectacularly, a “known anarchist” was pre-emptively detained 
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before the Royal Wedding based on intelligence data unrelated to his person. This was 
found justified by the court.489 
2.1.4. France: proportionality unclarified 
 
The French approach has not been made concrete in too many high court decisions, 
perfectly consistently with the general outlook of the legal system. The main source of 
legal ‘precedent’ is the Benjamin judgment in this regard, too. The reasons for 
intervention are the same: if the officer apprehends troubles to public order then he or she 
can take proportional measures. The concept of public order is understood in quite an 
abstract sense which includes also human dignity, for instance. Therefore, the French 
allow for intervention way before any risk of violence had been assessed, and there is no 
calculus of probability prescribed by higher courts, let alone Conseil d’Etat or Conseil 
Constitutionnel.  
However, as Benjamin is a strict administrative proportionality requirement, there 
can be cases of reversal of police measures if courts find that the measure went beyond 
what was commanded by the situation. Also, in case there is no violation of dignity, 
trouble to public order must mean some disorder, violence, intimidation or threat, and 
then that must be assessed properly, where overreaction of police can be considered 
disproportionate.490 Bans of assemblies (reunions publiques politiques) of the Front 
National were quashed by the Conseil d’État for no such troubles to public order were 
expected, which could not have been averted by adequate policing.491 The CÉ only 
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mentions that the record does not show a high risk of troubles to public order, but it does 
not go into any details. 
French jurisprudence is not explicitly split according to the standard of justifiable 
limits between prior and posterior restraint, despite the aversion towards ‘preventive 
regimes.’ Thus, much what has been found as to prior ban and conditions displays these 
same substantive values – public order, including human dignity, previous intimidation or 
threats by an association etc. – and procedural standard (proportionality), just from 
another angle, still useful here for the sake of comparison.  
French cases which reached the ECHR provide some room for additional 
speculation. In Ezelin,492 posterior disciplinary sanction of a lawyer peacefully 
participating at an originally peaceful demonstration which turned somewhat violent was 
considered legal by French courts while impermissible by the ECtHR.  
In Cisse, French courts found the evacuation of a church – occupied by protesters 
and hunger strikers with the consent of church authorities – was lawful as it was not an 
assembly and threatened public order for reasons of deteriorating sanitary and health 
conditions, but also because some of the barriers erected blocked traffic.  
Thus, all these might qualify as components of public order,493 and French courts 
do not differentiate more closely their relations to each other, or the importance of any of 
these components. This less concrete, less scrutinising approach might be a result of the 
fact that the occupiers has already spent two months in the church, and the measure at 
hand was not a prior, ‘preventive’ measure, but a repressive one, just as in Ezelin the 
demonstration actually turned unpeaceful, and that is what French authorities understood 
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compelled the disciplinary sanction. In both of these cases tangible harm, even if averted 
out of partially paternalistic or reprimanded for sheer ‘reputational’ reasons, has indeed 
occurred.   
2.1.5. ECtHR: disorder concept in flux, probability unclarified 
 
 
As to the ECHR, a good starting point is that freedom of expression jurisprudence is 
applicable also as to the protection of annoying or offensive assemblies. The Court 
reiterated several times, recently in Öllinger v. Austria, para. 36,494  that: 
[Freedom of assembly] also extends to a demonstration that 
may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or 
claims that it is seeking to promote […] If every probability of 
tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a 
demonstration was to warrant its prohibition, society would be 
faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing 
views. 
 
However, it is less clear where a danger starts which would justify intervention, 
just as the exact content of that danger. In the mentioned Steel v. UK the ECtHR actually 
has accepted a concept of breach of the peace by omitting any immediacy or imminence 
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requirement,495 ie it basically lowered the threshold of national law, certainly then 
positioning the European standard below the English.  
Earlier, the Commission regularly rubber-stamped government allegations on 
public disorder without requiring any standard of probability, in one case basing 
inadmissibility on that ground when it was not even thought so by domestic police.496 
Unhindered flow of traffic (in a pedestrian area!),497 or avoiding excessive noise498 
exemplify the breadth of the traditional interpretation of prevention of disorder.  
The Court used to take a similar stance, eg in Cisse the forcible evacuation of a 
church occupied by protestors with the consent of religious authorities was considered a 
measure pursuing the legitimate aim of preventing disorder.499 Steel v. UK, though an 
Art. 5 case, found the arrest of a protestor lawful who – in protest against a grouse shoot 
– ‘walked in front of a person who was armed with a gun, thus preventing him from 
firing’, as such behaviour ‘might provoke others to violence.’500  
Prevention of disorder is often referred to instead of prevention of crime, another 
mentioned limit in Art. 11 (2), without any discussion on the difference. 501 In Ziliberberg 
(2004) the application under Art. 11 was found inadmissible for the simple reason that 
the criminal provision relied on by the government claimed to protect public order.502 
Thereby the Court avoids taking a stance both on the serious issue of defining the limits 
of a fundamental right out of a criminal law, and on the estimation of danger. 
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Necessarily, this stance also prevents the Court from actually reviewing whether the 
measure taken was capable of furthering the legitimate aim. In Ezelin v. France,503 a 
posterior disciplinary sanction, imposed after the assembly was long over, was 
considered furthering the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder.  
The problems created by the constant practice of accepting whatever 
governmental allegations about the pursued legitimate aim were curiously side-stepped in 
Alekseyev. In this recent Moscow gay pride case the Court has explicitly not decided on 
the issue whether there was a legitimate aim, by finding that the ban was in any case 
disproportionate.504  In a similar vein, in another decision involving Russia, where a 
peaceful opposition speaker was arrested after a demonstration, the Court left the 
question of legitimate aim undecided. Instead, it claimed that ‘the questions of lawfulness 
and of the existence of a legitimate aim are indissociable from the question whether the 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society”’, which clearly it was not.505  
In Oya Ataman (2006), the dispersal of an unnotified demonstration was found – 
though in pursuance of the legitimate aim of prevention of disorder – unjustified, as 
‘there [was] no evidence to suggest that the group in question represented a danger to 
public order, apart from possibly disrupting traffic’.506 Also, since Oya Ataman, it 
reoccurs in assembly jurisprudence that ‘where demonstrators do not engage in acts of 
violence, it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance 
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towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 is not to 
be deprived of all substance.’507  
Soon after, in Bukta,508 the ECtHR has not accepted that the sound of a detonation 
might be sufficient reason to disperse an unnotified (spontaneous or urgent) 
demonstration, though largely because national courts have not relied on this argument, 
and not because the ECtHR found such a danger to be vague or immaterial.  In Patyi (No. 
1) – where a 20-strong demonstration on a five-meter-wide pavement was banned in 
advance – the ECtHR first nominally accepted that the measure pursued the legitimate 
aims of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others, but found it was 
unnecessary for absence of any showing of potential disruption.509 This does not mean 
however that any intensity of potential disruption would surely justify restrictions, 
because the Court – at least lately – regularly emphasises that a certain amount of 
disruption inheres in basically every assembly.  
Especially in a number of Turkish and other Eastern European cases the Court 
would go as far as to review substantially if there was any danger to public order, and 
delineates simple disruption from disorder.  
Stankov as discussed above510 uses especially strong language, when arguing for 
the permissibility of even secessionist speech. a type of expression, characteristically, 
either solely or in pair with assembly. The Court basically rules that a prior ban is only 
permissible if incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles would occur. 
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What amounts to rejection of democratic principles is not exactly clarified, but it does 
include for instance advocating ethnic segregation, but not advocating secession.  
In any case, these two, for an international court relatively narrow Stankov-criteria 
might not be the only ones justifying restrictions other than prior bans. If one compares 
the loose concept of disorder with the strong language in Stankov, the contrast might be 
explicable by an untheorised perceived difference between prior ban and other sanctions. 
ECtHR proportionality jurisprudence is in general especially marked by consideration of 
the severity of the imposed sanction, thus it is possible that eg an administrative sanction 
might be permissible while criminal punishment for the same deeds which led to the 
administrative sanction is not. Seeing the danger in such an approach the Court has 
emphasised that a mild sanction does not justify an interference otherwise deemed not 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.511  
Dispersal, especially violent or speedy dispersal by the police is another issue 
where ECtHR appears to have strengthened the protection: lack of prior notice is not 
sufficient to justify dispersion (Bukta), and forceful or even violent dispersion of a 
peaceful but unlawful assembly is also regularly held disproportionate since the mid-
2000s. Oya Ataman and Balçik both found no reason for the speedy dispersal of 
unnotified, but peaceful assemblies, within half an hour after the start.512 In Aldemir (No. 
2.) v. Turkey513, an unnotified trade union meeting in an area where it was not permitted 
to demonstrate was dispersed by tear gas and truncheons. Initially the meeting was 
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peaceful, though blocking Atatürk Avenue, where demonstrators attempted to walk to the 
Prime minister’s residence. Police forcibly dispersed the assembly for being unlawful. 
During the course of the dispersal, some protestors became violent, several police officers 
and protestors ended up injured. The ECtHR found police intervention ‘caused tensions 
to rise, followed by clashes’, and thus was disproportionate. From the formulation ‘there 
is no evidence to suggest that the group in question initially presented a serious danger to 
public order’514 one could conclude that a serious danger to public order is at minimum 
required for a dispersal to be found justified. Though seriousness is certainly below a 
Brandenburg-type imminence, but it still shows an increased willingness to actually 
require some probability of harm. Vajnai‘s requirement of a ‘clear, pressing and specific 
social need’ (§ 51) might be also referred here to the same effect, at least in the context of 
political protests, where ‘the containment of a mere speculative danger, as a preventive 
measure for the protection of democracy, cannot be seen as a ‘pressing social need’ (§ 
55).  
As to prevention of crime, Schwabe v. Germany, the preventive detention case 
confirms the Vajnai approach. The ECtHR found the offence feared to be committed was 
not ‘sufficiently concrete and specific’, as domestic courts diverged about it. Also, the 
banners could be understood to request authorities, and not fellow citizens to free 
prisoners by force (referring to Vajnai on symbols with multiple meanings). The 6 days 
detention imposed on this basis, instead of, eg, seizing the banners, was found not 
                                                 




necessary to prevent the offence – understood thus at most as a negligent incitement to 
violence by the ECtHR – to occur.515  
Austin v. UK,516 the discussed kettling case turned out contrary at Strasbourg than 
the preventive detention, the ECHR basically sliding with the House of Lords decision 
discussed above, which was (and the ECtHR majority decision already is) considered 
inconsistent with earlier case law.517 Especially criticised is that the ECtHR added 
‘context’ to the threshold considerations which engage Art. 5, ie whether there was a 
deprivation of liberty at all.518 Strictly an Art. 5 decision on which there certainly will be 
much more comment to come, from my focus here it perhaps shows ECtHR more 
restrained with regard to actual crowd control than to longer run preventive efforts.519 
There clearly were disturbances in London that day, and some of the protesters in and 
outside the cordon were clearly intent on causing disorder. A similar approach perhaps is 
found in the Giuliani and Gaggio case520 – much cited in Austin v. UK –  which found 
the shooting and killing of protestors on the violent Genoa G8 protest proportionate under 
Art. 5. What distinguishes these cases from the others discussed is actual disorder taking 
place on the spot or its close proximity.  
                                                 
515 Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany, Application nos. 8080/08, 8577/08, Judgment of 1 December 2011 at 
§§ 77-78 and §§ 115-118. 
516 Austin and others v. UK, Applications nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09 [GC] Judgment of 15 
March 2012.  
517 David Mead, ‘The Right To Protest Contained By Strasbourg: An Analysis of Austin v. UK & The 
Constitutional Pluralist Issues it Throws Up’ at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/03/16/david-mead-the-
right-to-protest-contained-by-strasbourg-an-analysis-of-austin-v-uk-the-constitutional-pluralist-issues-it-
throws-up/. 
518 Michael Hamilton, ‘Guest Post on Austin and Others Grand Chamber Judgment on “Kettling”’, 23 
March 2012, http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/guest-post-on-austin-and-others-grand.html.  
519 Or, feels more threatened by UK resistance and a general attack on the Court, see David Mead, ‘The 
Right To Protest Contained By Strasbourg: An Analysis of Austin v. UK & The Constitutional Pluralist 
Issues it Throws Up’ at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/03/16/david-mead-the-right-to-protest-
contained-by-strasbourg-an-analysis-of-austin-v-uk-the-constitutional-pluralist-issues-it-throws-up/. 




As to what else than serious danger of disorder can found dispersal and other 
sanctioning powers, certainly the Stankov-conditions justifying advance ban, ie 
incitement to violence and rejection of democratic principles are equally applicable. 
Vajnai explicitly adds or includes in this list actual totalitarian propaganda (§ 56), a 
level of harm significantly below the American standard, but still possibly higher than 
some European standards. 521   
2.2. Hostile audience, counterdemonstration  
 
The following inquiry aims to unveil the different emphases on different aspects of 
reactive violence by the jurisdictions. I will not discuss jurisdictions separately, 
especially that the previous subchapter provides the general background country by 
country, but this time issue-like. In the United States, the jurisprudence related to the 
questions in the current subtitle abounds, while elsewhere it is less in the focus. I first 
discuss the fighting words doctrine as that is particular to the USSC, and then continue 
with the other, doctrinally more commonly shared themes.   
2.2.1. Fighting words  
 
Fighting words means speech which ‘by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.’522 This has been part of the early list of low 
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value speech, excluded from First Amendment protection in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire (1942).  
Chaplinsky distributed Jehovah’s Witnesses literature in the streets of Rochester, 
while denouncing all religions as ‘rackets’. Citizens complained to the city marshal, who 
said that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, but warned Chaplinsky about the crowd’s 
beginning unrest. Later, a police officer led Chaplinsky away from the scene. On the way 
to the police station they have met the city marshal who was hurrying to the scene as he 
was informed that a riot was unfolding. It was at this point of crossing each other’s way 
when Chaplinsky told the city marshal he was a ‘God damned racketeer’ and a ‘damned 
Fascist’.  These latter two utterances were the only issue the Court decided on, accepting 
that they are not protected by the First Amendment. ‘Resort to epithets or personal abuse 
is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that 
instrument.’523  
Fighting words are deprived of constitutional protection if a ‘man of common 
intelligence’ who is addressed in the concrete situation understood them as being an 
injury or would react to them violently. As can be seen from this formulation, the fighting 
words doctrine originally set a lower standard than (the later accepted) Brandenburg-test 
in two regards. The first condition does not explain what speech inflicts injury in itself, 
and from the second one, tendency to incite immediate breach of the peace, it is clear that 
the first was not meant to be about violent reaction. Secondly, what the average person 
                                                 





might consider fighting words, the actual person might not, ie actual harm is not 
necessary. Therefore, some authors argue that the fighting words doctrine is incorrect.524  
In my view, however, the Supreme Court later narrowed down the doctrine 
approximating the Brandenburg standard. Already in 1949, in Terminiello v. Chicago the 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on a jury instruction saying that ‘breach of 
the peace consists of any misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum’, and 
that the ‘misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, 
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests 
the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.’525 The Court has 
not reached the question whether Terminiello’s speech – in a meeting which occasioned a 
turbulent protest of one thousand persons outside the building – indeed constituted 
fighting words, but struck down the lower decisions for reasons of overbreadth of the 
instruction.  
Later, in Street v. New York526, the early flag burning case, the Court invalidated a 
conviction on the basis that the First Amendment protects uttering whatever derogatory 
opinion on the American flag; holding thus that such speech does not constitute fighting 
words.527 Here the Court already only quoted from Chaplinsky that ‘fighting words’ are 
those which are ‘likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a 
breach of the peace,’528 ie it left out the reference for speech ‘inflicting injury in itself.’  
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Probably the most important case, bringing fighting words and advocacy to near-
equal footing is Cohen v. California from 1971. Cohen was observed in a courthouse 
wearing a jacket which said ‘Fuck the draft’ as a protest against the Vietnam War, and 
convicted for ‘behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to 
in turn disturb the peace.’529 The Supreme Court reversed, stating inter alia that the jacket 
inscription did not constituted fighting words ‘those personally abusive epithets which, 
when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently 
likely to provoke violent reaction.’530 Note the narrowing language compared with 
Chaplinsky. Also, Justice Harlan made clear that Cohen’s communication is not fighting 
words because obviously it was not directed against the person of the hearer.  
In a following decision, Gooding v. Wilson531 the Supreme Court read 
conjunctively the infliction of injury and/or incitement to an immediate breach of the 
peace conditions as apparently stated disjunctively in Chaplinsky. In Gooding, a state law 
banning ‘opprobrious words or abusive language’ was found to be unconstitutional, 
because it did not require the probability of immediate violent reaction, neither in the text 
of the statute, nor as applied.  
Also on overbreadth grounds, the Court invalidated a statute in Lewis v. City of 
New Orleans532 which criminalized as breach of the peace ‘to curse or revile or to use 
obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to a police officer while in 
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actual performance of his duties’533 irrespective of whether in the instant case Lewis’ 
speech indeed consisted of fighting words.534  
All in all, the fighting words doctrine requires a personal insult which is likely to 
lead to immediate violent reaction. Thus, it basically applies the same threshold as to the 
harmfulness of the speech as the Brandenburg test. The difference is that the 
Brandenburg test takes into account the actual audience’s reaction, while the standard of 
Chaplinsky on the man of common intelligence has not been modified. Similarly to 
Brandenburg, there has been no Supreme Court case (except for Chaplinsky) which 
found that the criteria of fighting words had been fulfilled. In this regard, it might not be 
too far to conclude that fighting words are extremely hard to regulate in a manner that the 
Supreme Court would not find overbroad, vague, or content-discriminatory. 
2.2.2. Heckler’s veto and heckler’s speech 
 
Heckler’s veto refers to a situation when the speaker – typically at a demonstration – is 
prevented from talking, conveying his or her message by another person or persons, the 
heckler(s) by extreme noise or other disorderly or violent conduct or threat of it. What 
counts as heckler’s veto is not obvious, I think the best way is to define it narrowly, for 
example, throwing eggs shall not in itself considered heckler’s veto. I will only deal with 
heckler’s veto in relation to the right of assembly and protest, but will not specifically 
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discuss the status of heckler’s veto in public schools which became an intense, highly 
controversial subject of much of American jurisprudence and writing.535  
Harry Kalven who popularised the term ‘heckler’s veto’, describes the harm done 
in this way: ‘If the police can silence the speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto 
power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough, get the law to silence any speaker of 
whom they do not approve.’536 Two main concerns, however, complicate the picture. 
First, though it seems quite clear that government is there to protect the speaker from 
heckler’s veto, it is also quite clear that there might be cases when disruption and 
violence cannot be prevented or stopped in any other way than by both restricting the 
speaker and the heckler at least for the moment. Freedom of assembly is especially an 
area where it is well imaginable that a heckler causes violence which endangers the 
speaker and/or the audience, and police do not have any other possibility than to remove 
(also) the speaker from the scene, disperse the meeting, etc. Secondly, a more principled 
concern is the extent of the free speech rights of the hecklers themselves.  
In the United States, Feiner is the first decision on heckler’s veto, largely 
rewritten, but never overruled in later jurisprudence. Feiner held a speech in front of a 
‘mixed’, ie both Black and White crowd, making derogatory statements of several public 
figures, and urging the Blacks to ‘rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.’537 The crowd 
reacted with some excitement, there was some shoving and pushing, and milling, and one 
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member of the audience threatened with violence if the police did not step in. Thus, the 
police approached Feiner, and tried to persuade him to stop talking and help breaking up 
the crowd. When he ignored these requests, he got arrested, and later convicted for 
breach of the peace. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction, by applying the ‘clear and 
present danger’ test. The Court accepted lower courts’ factual findings that indeed there 
was a danger of erupting violence in the crowd unless the police intervened. As Chief 
Justice Vinson, apparently unaware of any possible problem has put it: ‘Petitioner was 
thus neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it 
was the reaction which it actually engendered.’538 Justice Black, in a famous dissent both 
does not see from the record that the danger of erupting violence was really clear and 
present, and, more importantly, criticises the majority for putting the consequences on the 
speaker, instead of, evidently, arresting the one who threatened violence, if really this is 
the way to prevent violence. This is a quite straightforward argumentation, which now, 
especially since Brandenburg can be taken to be accepted by the USSC.  
Nonetheless, Justice Black in Feiner hints that there might be cases when the 
police cannot but restrict also lawful speech for the protection of the speaker and others. 
He says: ‘The police of course have power to prevent breaches of the peace. But if, in the 
name of preserving order, they ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first 
must make all reasonable efforts to protect him.’539 It is thus implied, that when, but only 
when, every other means fail, interference with ‘lawful speaking’ might be constitutional.  
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A few important cases testify what the USSC perceives as not being such ultimate 
situations. Edwards v. South Carolina540 is a classic civil rights protest case where 187 
peaceful protestors were arrested and convicted for breach of the peace after not obeying 
an order to disperse. The dispersal order was made while 300 onlookers were watching, 
some of them recognised by the officer as potential troublemakers, but none threatened 
violence. When police ordered the dispersal, protesters started singing religious and 
patriotic songs while stamping their feet and clapping their hands.541 The USSC reversed, 
saying the record only shows ‘that the opinions which they were peaceably expressing 
were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to attract a 
crowd and necessitate police protection.’542 In the concrete case, there was ‘ample’ police 
protection on the scene according to the testimony of a police officer, thus the Court 
again did not have opportunity to specify what the limits of constitutionally mandated 
police protection are in case of a hostile audience. In Gregory v. Chicago543, a case 
decided the same year as Brandenburg, the Court reversed the conviction for disorderly 
conduct of peaceful civil rights demonstrators who disobeyed dispersal orders issued 
because onlookers behaved unruly, and police feared they were not able to prevent 
impending civil disorder. The Justices agreed that unruliness of onlookers is not a proper 
ground for restricting the right to assembly, but resolved the case on overbreadth 
grounds,544 and again did not specify the extent of the obligation of the police to first deal 
with the hostile audience. In a more recent case, Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
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Movement, the Supreme Court ruled explicitly that the reaction of listeners is not a 
content-neutral basis for regulation of speech.545 In the case, a county ordinance on use of 
public property vested discretion in the county administrator to impose a fee ‘incident to 
the ordinance's administration and to the maintenance of public order.’546 The Nationalist 
Movement was imposed a $100 fee for a demonstration organised against the Martin 
Luther King Jr. federal holiday. The Supreme Court held the ordinance facially invalid 
because its administration implied taking into consideration the audience’s reaction to a 
demonstration, which necessarily includes content inquiry. Again this decision solidifies 
the principle that the burdens stemming from a heckler’s veto cannot be imposed on the 
speaker. The stretch of the principle is not qualified by the Supreme Court, though quite 
some district court decisions can be cited to the effect that police/local government are 
liable in civil suit for not protecting demonstrators against hostile audiences.547  
USSC cases dealt much less with the possible free speech protection granted to 
hecklers, onlookers, though the question itself has been on the table for quite a while.548 
Numerous 19th century lower court cases can be found interpreting limits to ‘disturbance 
to assemblages’,549 of course, not necessarily with a constitutional focus. In re Kay550, a 
1970 case ended at the California Supreme Court was about clapping and shouting 5-10 
minutes during the speech of a Congressman candidate. The clapping and shouting did 
                                                 
545 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). 
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547 See, eg, Dunlap v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 
252 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Ala. 1966), Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1975) 
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548 For a relatively early commentary see Eve H. Lewin Wagner, ‘Heckling: A Protected Right or 
Disorderly Conduct?’ 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 215 (1986). 
549 A custom digest search performed in Westlaw for citing references to 133 DISTURBANCE OF 
PUBLIC ASSEMBLAGE 133k1 k. Nature and elements of offenses brought up a 1682 lines long 
document with case references, earliest being Bell ads. Graham, 1 Nott & McC. 278, S.C.Const., 1818 
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not stop the speaker in finishing his speech, and later he even testified that he was not 
disturbed by the protest. Still, a few testimonies pointed that around the protestors the 
speech of the candidate could not have been heard clearly, though you could walk away 
to other parts of the park where it could. The Supreme Court of California held that the 
state can constitutionally proscribe hecklers’ or counter-speakers’ conduct only if it 
‘substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in 
violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, 
of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known.’551 This, what might be 
called, ‘substantial impairment test’ has never been tested at the USSC, neither anything 
else on speech rights of hecklers. Justice Douglas alone would have granted certiorari in a 
case where there was a non-disruptive protest against Richard Nixon’s talk at a religious 
meeting, and the organiser of the protest was convicted for disturbing a religious 
meeting.552  
In my view, in cases where the heckler does not make it impossible for the 
primary speaker to convey his or her message, a heckler’s speech should also be 
constitutionally protected. All the more so if the primary speaker is a politician, or is 
backed by the state in one way or another, eg as in Reynolds the speaker who was 
‘heckled’ was Richard Nixon, or In re Kay where the town has invited to a celebration 
the candidate of one party, but not the other. Nobody has a right to speak and be spared 
from (nonviolent) reactions. Parallel to this, of course, if the heckler makes impossible 
for the primary speaker to convey his or her message then that would mean that one’s 
right to speech is privileged against another’s. Rightly understood, in my view, it is only 
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for this ‘absolute silencing’ situations where the Supreme Court has developed the 
principle of ‘no heckler’s veto’ as described above. 
In Germany, the question arises as to who counts as participator and who as 
heckler. The Constitutional Court stated that not only sympathisers, but also those with 
opposing views are constitutionally entitled to participate at a demonstration, and 
exercise criticism.553  
However, there is no right to participate at a demonstration with the sole purpose 
to coercively prevent or hinder it.554 This latter case is then the closest to heckler’s veto. 
In a case where a party called ‘Republicans’ held a public meeting in a restaurant in 
Freiburg, people, who tried to enter the meeting while shouting ‘This old Nazi S… 
masked as Republican should be interdicted here’ or, ‘Let us inside, and then the 
assembly is over’, etc., were lawfully prevented from accessing the place.555 A 
piquanterie of the case – that the incriminating sentences were only said after the police 
had already closed the entry to the assembly – was not considered problematic by the 
Court because the issue was not the police blocking the entry, but the police’s prohibition 
of the petitioner from entering the meeting which was issued after petitioner had shouted 
the mentioned phrases. The GFCC rejected the argument that behaviour aiming to 
prevent an assembly would be at all covered by the scope of the right; only other rights 
and the prohibition of arbitrariness of official behaviour apply. Constitutionally protected 
participation necessitates a willingness to accept the assembly as it is, and to limit the 
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pursuit of diverging goals to communicative means only. Those who seek intentionally to 
hinder an assembly cannot rely on Art. 8 GG even if they are numerous.556  
Unclarified remained the extent to which communicative means can be used for 
disturbance, ie the difference between criticism, protest and disturbance. The logic of the 
mentioned decision would probably suggest that the decisive element is intent: if the 
person shouts in order to be heard, then he is a participant, if he shouts in order to make 
impossible for the primary speaker to be heard, he is a disturber, a ‘heckler’. Similarly to 
the US jurisprudence, German courts also have come to the conclusion that one cannot be 
burdened for other’s hostile speech. Thus, in a case where the demonstration’s location 
was changed because a counter-demonstration was to be expected, the added 
administrative costs could not constitutionally be imposed on the organisers of the 
primary demonstration.557  
The ECtHR has not specifically dealt with heckler’s speech cases, only sporadic 
references to heckler-like situations were discussed. Chorherr v. Austria involved a 
military parade where applicants went in with placard to protest against Austria’s 
acquisition of interceptor fighter planes. Questionable is whether this can be qualified as 
heckler’s veto, as the pacifists interfered with the view of a few parade-watchers only 
slightly, and if they moved away, they could see fully. The ECtHR nonetheless accepted 
that Austrian authorities acted within the Convention when removing the pacifists from 
the scene and sanctioning them. The restriction fell within the margin of appreciation, 
and was considered non-excessive to the potential disturbances Mr Chorherr ‘must have 
realised’, and also because the measures were imposed ‘to prevent breaches of the peace 
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and not to frustrate the expression of an opinion.’558 This very deferential decision has 
not relied on the idea that Mr. Chorherr allegedly blocked the view of the public, this way 
‘heckling’ the participation in an assembly.   
The more recent Vajnai v. Hungary is the only decision where the expression heckler’s 
veto comes up at all at the ECtHR:559  
 
[R]estrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of 
public feeling--real or imaginary--cannot be regarded as meeting 
the pressing social needs recognised in a democratic society, since 
that society must remain reasonable in its judgement. To hold 
otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is 
subjected to the heckler's veto. 
Here the hecklers are the ‘public’ whose feelings – in the case towards the mere display 
of the red star – got recognised in the Criminal Code, thereby sanctioning irrationality. 
This also might point in the direction that heckling is what goes beyond the frames of 
rationality, probably rational discourse in the sense that it shuts down other’s rational 
contribution to an ongoing debate without engaging it.  
2.2.3. Counter-demonstration  
 
I employ the notion of counter-demonstration – as distinguished from heckling which can 
be the performance of a single individual – to cover situations where two opposing 
groups are present next to each other, both wishing to communicate their own message. 
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Normally, the counter-demonstration refers to the group which came to protest the 
primary demonstration or primary event. Though some claim counter-demonstration to 
be organised,560 I see no reason to exclude the frequent case of spontaneous 
counterdemonstrations from the discussion.  
Counter-demonstrations are often assumed to be first of all a source of tensions.  
Still, courts do accord protection to counterdemonstrations, too, and, in my view, rightly 
so.  The following discussion will concentrate on two separate issues which nonetheless 
often intermingle: (i) whether there is a right to counter-demonstration; and (ii) how the 
risk of erupting violence as a potential result of clashing demonstrators and counter-
demonstrators is handled by the courts.   
2.2.3.1. United States  
 
The USSC has – similarly to speech protection of heckling – not explicitly stated the 
constitutional right of counterdemonstration. Nonetheless, under any principled 
assessment of American jurisprudence, counterdemonstration should be as protected as 
the primary demonstration or event. All the rationales of protection apply equally to 
counter-demonstrators, just as the principle of content neutrality, the duty of the police to 
protect the unpopular speaker, the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth etc. are equally 
valid.561  
As to the anticipation of violence, the Skokie controversy could have offered the 
most famous example of constitutional risk-taking in situations of clashing groups; 
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nonetheless, the courts for procedural reasons avoided (probably had to avoid) exactly 
this issue. In a sequence of denied permit applications, $350.000 permit fees, and court 
proceedings the Village of Skokie tried to prevent the National Socialist Party of America 
from rallying in full Nazi paraphernalia wearing swastika in a mostly Jewish 
neighborhood of a Chicago suburb, where also Holocaust-survivors lived. There was 
ample evidence that various Jewish and other anti-Nazi organisations had planned a 
twelve- to fifteen-thousand strong counter-demonstration. People testified that they 
would be extremely hurt by the Nazi march, one witness claiming that though he did not 
intend to use violence, he was not sure if he could control himself. Opinion of the mayor 
– formed after discussion with leaders of community and religious group – that 
bloodshed would occur if the march took place had also been introduced.562 Thus, the 
Village of Skokie sought to enjoin the Nazi marchers from wearing and displaying the 
Nazi symbols, and other material which ‘incites or promotes hatred’ against religious or 
ethnic groups, clearly a European sort of argument which would already restrict 
incitement to hatred, not first to violence. An injunction was granted, and the appellate 
courts were unwilling to stay the injunction pending appeal on the merits. This refusal of 
a stay was reversed by a divided USSC.563 On remand, the Illinois appellate court 
modified the injunction so as only to enjoin displaying the swastika.564 The appellate 
court held that a march cannot be prevented though ‘there was and is a virtual certainty 
that thousands of irate Jewish citizens would physically attack the defendants.’565 
Underlying precedents were hostile audience cases discussed above from Terminiello to 
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Edwards and Gregory. As there was no suit against or initiated by the organisations 
wishing to protest the Nazi march, there is no decision on the issue whether the ‘virtual 
certainty of violence’ arising from their (the counterdemonstrators’) presence would 
deprive them of right to assembly. Further in the Nazi suit, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held also the rest of the injunction invalid under symbolic conduct doctrine.566  
Meanwhile, a parallel suit was launched as the Village had enacted ordinances 
requiring an extraordinary permit fee, banning military uniforms and incitement to hatred 
against religious and ethnic groups on public assembly. The 7th Circuit567 struck down the 
ordinances, and the USSC denied certiorari.568 Circuit Judge Pell found that the case was 
not governed by Brandenburg v. Ohio because the Village – despite that it ‘introduced 
evidence in the district court tending to prove that some individuals, at least, might have 
difficulty restraining their reactions to the Nazi demonstration’569 —, before the Circuit 
did not rely on a possibility of responsive violence.570 Compare this with the ‘virtual 
certainty’ evidence in the injunction proceedings. Thus, the 7th Circuit did not reach the 
question of protection of counter-speech either.  
The Supreme Court mentioned ‘counter-demonstration’ in one single decision, 
and even there it is just an example.571  
Lower courts have dealt with the protection granted to counter-demonstration, and 
some accept that counter-demonstration can be segregated from the demonstration, as 
‘time, manner and place’ restriction.572  
                                                 
566 Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).  
567 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978). 
568 Smith v. Collin , 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
569 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203. 
570 The rest of the reasoning relies on symbolic speech and captive audience doctrines which will be 
discussed below in Chapter 8.  




In one case, though, the Ohio Supreme Court very clearly upheld the right to 
simultaneous counter-demonstration as applied to a Jewish organisation and Ku Klux 
Klan demonstrating in front of John Demjanjuk’s house.573 The limits of the right to 
counter-demonstration are not clarified by this holding though as there was clearly no 
probability of violence either on the present enjoined demonstrations or in the past on the 
part of the particular Ohio branch of the KKK. Both sides of the would-be demonstrators 
testified that they could contain themselves if the other side does not incite violence.574 
This testimony was fully accepted by the Ohio Supreme Court. That court thus relied on 
the principle that Brandenburg applied without alteration to simultaneous demonstrations 
of diametrically opposed groups, ie without intent, imminence and likelihood proven, 
restrictions were deemed unjustified. I think this is quite a consistent application of the 
general principles of First Amendment jurisprudence of the federal Supreme Court. 
2.2.3.2. Germany  
 
Germany’s twentieth century has been manifestly full with both violent and peaceful 
counter-demonstrations. Ever since the Weimar era, opposing groups from the political 
far right and the left have been in constant clash. The reunification of Germany has 
brought a new wave of Neo-Nazi marches especially in the Eastern Länder which again 
                                                                                                                                                 
572 Eg Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ku Klux Klan rally on courthouse steps and 
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drew a sometimes violent reaction from the centre or far left circles of German civil 
society.   
Unlike for instance in the U.S., the protection accorded to counter-demonstration 
is an ever present, hotly debated topic.575 The principles of the German constitutional 
jurisprudence look pretty straightforward. As there is a right to participate critically or 
even opposing at a demonstration,576 there is clearly a right to counter-demonstration. 
The dividing line between critical participation and counterdemonstration remain 
disputed. As already mentioned with regard to heckler’s veto, there is no right to 
participate at a demonstration with the sole purpose to coercively prevent or hinder it.577  
There is no right to prevent a demonstration, but there always is a right to 
organise a counterdemonstration, adhering to the regular notice requirement, duty to 
cooperate and so on. Clearly, police are obliged to protect demonstrators against violent 
counterdemonstrators, 578 and here it should not be of relevance which group counts as 
counter and which as primary.  
As a default, a demonstration cannot be restricted because of a 
counterdemonstration, but ‘if it is sufficiently likely that the authority– because of 
fulfilling paramount state duties and eventually despite involving additional external 
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for Neo-Nazi ‘‘Mourning March’’ – commemorating the mistreatment of detainees in the interrogation 
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police force – is not capable to protect the notified assembly’,579 then restrictions on the 
duly notified primary assembly might be possible, and to countergo restrictions might 
give rise to liability in police law (so-called Nichtstörerhaftung in case of Polizeinotstand, 
policing emergency). German police law also knows another concept, 
‘Zweckveranlasser’, meaning someone who occasions a law breaking even though she 
herself is not behaving unlawfully. The GFCC has left open the applicability of this 
certainly problematic concept to (opposing) assemblies, but in any case strongly limited 
its potential scope: beyond the sheer content of the message (ie Neo-Nazis and their 
counter-demonstrators expressing opposing views and even maybe wishing the outgroup 
to become violent) it requires specific accompanying elements of provocation.580 
Considering the generally more cautious stance German law takes on prevention of 
violence, the threshold for intervention would in any case likely remain below the 
threshold of U.S.-style fighting words.  
2.2.3.3. United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the 1882 case Beatty v. Gillbanks581 discussed above was about Salvation 
Army members being charged with unlawful and tumultuous assembly to the disturbance 
of the peace because Skeleton Army members were accompanying their marches 
shouting and disorderly. The Divisional Court ruled the disorder was not ‘the natural 
consequence of their [ie the Salvation Army’s] acts’, as it came from the rival group, and 
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rejected ‘that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it 
may cause another to do an unlawful act.’  
Thus, as a general principle, a demonstrator cannot be punished for a disorder 
caused by counterdemonstrators either. Any further than that, however, the issue of 
counterdemonstration has not merited specific legal regulation or has not become object 
of specific judicial doctrines. 
Nonetheless, the very characteristic British regulation of protest starting in the 
1936 Public Order Act actually was essentially shaped by an instance of clashes between 
a march and a massive counter-march. In the so-called Battle of Cable Street, a Fascist 
(Mosleyan) march was prevented by counter-protestors to walk through a Jewish 
neighbourhood as planned. Police tried to protect the Fascists – who themselves became 
disorderly – but finally gave up. English collective memory appears to proudly cherish 
the event as one where people stood up against fascism and anti-Semitism, and there is no 
reason to doubt it.582  
Legally however it has not unequivocally reinforced the protection accorded to 
assemblies, as the 1936 POA introduced not only the ban on uniforms, but also the 
possibility of banning processions in a given area for three months long (renewable) – 
and that made possible that basically no processions took place in inner London for years 
before the Second World War.583   
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/1936/oct/05/fromthearchive.  
583 Rachel Vorspan, ‘”Freedom of Assembly” and the Right to Passage in Modern English Legal History’, 
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Thus it might well be that banning orders are regularly used to prevent clashes 
between opposing groups, within the general framework, and thus no separate discussion 
arises.    
2.2.3.4. France 
 
In the mentioned Association SOS Tout Petits decision on ban of anti-abortion 
demonstration in front of Notre Dame, next to a hospital, the CÉ also found that the 
Administrative Tribunal lawfully disregarded the objection that ‘the risk of 
counterdemonstration could not justify the ban as it has not materialized, because it 
referred to a circumstance posterior to the decision.’584 With regard to another ban of 
protest of same association in front of an abortion clinic, the Administrative Court of 
Appeal affirmed that the sole fact of a counterdemonstration does not justify a prior ban, 
but previous violence of demonstrators can, provided that it does not amount to a general 
ban on demonstrations by the association.585   
Another ban was found lawful because previously at the same place, an assembly 
organised by the same association ‘gave occasion [donné lieu aux affrontements violents 
– note that it is unclear who actually was violent] to violent clashes during which several 
persons were injured’, and the ban was not simply based on the fear of a potential 
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counterdemonstration.586 This is the closest to a substantive review to be found on 
Légifrance on contre-manifestation.587  
Though French courts do not theorise much on counterdemonstration, it appears 
de facto protected and in principle two opposing demonstrations are to be freely held 
parallel, and police are obliged to protect against possible violence, from whichever side 
it might come. Nonetheless, there is no anti-heckler’s veto principle pronounced so far in 
jurisprudence, neither is the extent of police protection clarified precisely.  
2.2.3.5. ECtHR  
 
ECtHR jurisprudence on counterdemonstration shows a similar trend as seen above in 
general with regard to disorder and probability. Earlier, challenges to blanket bans were 
found inadmissible,588 intergroup tensions and previous violence justifying a general ban. 
Though in CARAF the Commission specifically argued that the possibility of violent 
counterdemonstration does not take out the demonstration automatically of the scope of 
Art. 11, it still found the ban justified.589 Stankov 590 broke with this general caution 
towards interethnic and separatist contexts, while other cases closer to 
counterdemonstration proper have also redefined the jurisprudence. Plattform Ärzte für 
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das Leben – again about events of an anti-abortion organisation and 
counterdemonstrations – though about Art. 13, has in effect affirmed a right to 
counterdemonstration, and the obligation of police to accommodate and protect both 
opposing events.591 In Öllinger, Austrian authorities banned a protest demonstration 
against Comradeship IV, an organisation mainly of former SS-members commemorating 
the death of SS soldiers in WW2 on All Saints’ Day at the Salzburg Municipal Cemetery. 
The commemoration counted as popular celebration and as such was exempted from the 
authorisation requirement.592 Domestic authorities partly argued that the ban was 
necessary to protect Comradeship IV’s event, while at the ECHR the government mainly 
relied on the justification that Öllinger’s protest would disturb cemetery-goers other than 
Comradeship IV, and thus the restriction served their rights. As the Constitutional Court 
already added, even freedom of religion of others was involved. Austrian courts also 
accepted as sufficiently weighty the prevention of disturbances as in previous years there 
have been protest against Comradeship IV’s commemoration, and those protests have 
caused ‘considerable nuisance’ to other cemetery-goers on this important religious 
holiday.593  As the Government at the ECHR argued in § 29: 
 the authorities had also been able to rely on experiences from 
previous years in which assemblies like the one planned by the 
applicant had annoyed visitors, had led to heated discussions and 
had required police intervention. 
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Though the Government conceded that not any chance of disturbance suffices to restrict 
freedom of assembly, it maintained that to allow and protect both events (a 
commemoration and a counterdemonstration) would require such policing which on its 
own would disturb ‘the peace required for a cemetery on All Saints’ Day.’ (§ 31) The 
ECHR did not accept these arguments. Clearly Austrian law privileged one 
demonstration over the other, both by the exception for ‘public celebration’, an awkward 
label for an SS commemoration, and consequently also by the sheer acceptance that the 
SS commemoration would be happening anyway, and it was only Öllinger’s protest 
which could have been prevented. ECHR faults Austria for not taking into account that 
Öllinger was an MP who wanted to protest against the commemoration taking place, ie 
his would have been core political speech. Also, the ECHR noted that there was no 
previous violence, neither would the protest have been noisy or in other ways directed 
against cemetery-goers’ beliefs. Citing Stankov, Öllinger affirmed: ‘If every probability 
of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a demonstration was to 
warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of 
hearing differing views.’ (§ 36). Thus, the rights of cemeterygoers, Comradeship IV and 
Öllinger should all be accorded proper weight in the balance, because especially positive 










In relation to freedom of assembly, coercion-related concerns have always enjoyed a 
special status.  
Importantly, both early psychology and legal history have assumed that 
assembling people tend to become mobs. Picketing, for a long time, was considered 
intolerable coercion, and so-called direct action protests still raise this question. The 
doctrine of captive audience also pops up from time to time in relation to marches and 
rallies.  
One of post-war Germany’s most spectacular identity struggles has been fought 
for decades within the legal framework of coercion or duress (Nötigung), about which 
Peter Quint wrote a whole monograph the detail and quality of which certainly is not 
possible to reproduce here.594  
In the US, courts have issued injunctions and affirmed restricted ‘protest zones’ 
next to abortion clinics pursuing interests akin to prevention of coercion.  
Other types of zoning, in and around parliaments, courts, prisons, and military 
areas might be justified with reference to preventing coercing the state which would 
undermine the anyway weak legitimacy chain of representation.  
In this chapter I will examine those situations where the state intervenes in order 
to prevent protestors in coercing others, non-state actors, individuals, companies, and so 
on. Zoning proper (state buildings, cemeteries, and residential areas) will be examined 
under time, manner and place restrictions, partly because of the difference between 
coercing your fellow and the state, partly because these restrictions are typically framed 
as TMPs.  
It has to be noted that much of what follows could be reinterpreted – and 
accordingly vastly supplemented – from the broader angle of civil disobedience, an 
undertaking painfully given up for reasons of limited space. 
1. Nötigung in Germany  
 
                                                 
594 Peter E. Quint, Civil Disobedience and the German Courts. The Pershing Missile Protests in 




In Germany there has been a long debate about the constitutionality of sit-down 
demonstrations or sitting blockades. The issue arose out of protests against nuclear 
missiles, stationed in Germany by the US during the Cold War era.  
Reaching through two decades, three diverging decisions of the GFCC were 
handed down regarding a criminal offense for which demonstrators were usually 
prosecuted.  
According to section 240 para. I Criminal Code, coercion (Nötigung) is realised if 
someone illegally coerces another to an act, a default or an omission by way of force or 
threat with a palpable harm (mit einem empfindlichen Übel). According to para. II, illegal 
is the act if the use of force or the threat by the harm is considered ‘reprehensible’ (an 
expression which had replaced its Nazi-era variant: ‘contrary to the healthy feelings of 
the people’).  
Ordinary courts, including the Federal Court of Justice gradually developed an 
interpretation of force which revolves not so much around the perpetrator’s actions as on 
the psychological state of the victim – as the purpose of the criminalisation is understood 
to be the protection of freedom of will. Accordingly, force need not be a ‘direct exertion 
of bodily forces’, rather it suffices if the perpetrator actuates ‘even with only little bodily 
effort a psychologically determined process’ in the victim.595  
As applied to demonstrations, this meant that the mere presence of the 
demonstrator at a place which another wanted to occupy or cross amounted to coercion if 
the presence of the demonstrator psychologically inhibited the other to realise his or her 
will.  
In its first decision on Nötigung596 (1986), the GFCC split four-to-four on several 
issues, but was unanimous on the question of vagueness. Accordingly, neither the notion 
of force in para I , nor the criterion of reprehensibility in para II is unconstitutionally 
vague. Though para II grants discretion to the interpreting court, it does so in a way that 
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restricts the application of para I.597 A vague limitation on a not vague determination of 
criminal conduct does not violate nullum crimen principles.  
Though the judges thus agreed on the constitutionality of the text of the statute 
itself,598 they disagreed on the constitutionality of its application. Four judges accepted 
the wide understanding of force (where psychological inhibition is enough as long as 
there is physical presence), while four other judges rejected it as violating the prohibition 
of analogy in criminal law.  
In general, the Court found that the scope of Art. 8 GG extends to sit-down 
blockades. However, administrative or even criminal sanction is justifiable under Art. 8. 
II. In particular, as the sit-down blockade’s purpose is to obstruct third persons, and the 
obstruction goes beyond the incidental by-product necessarily accompanying every 
demonstration, the conduct is proscribable.599  
In the second (1995) decision, in reverse, the majority found the 
‘immaterialisation’ of the notion of force unconstitutionally vague thus violating the 
principle of nullum crimen.600 The Federal Court of Justice attempted to restrict the 
interpretation of force by requiring that it be of significant weight in order to qualify as 
‘reprehensible’. According to the GFCC this created more uncertainty than it resolved, 
because the notion of weight or significance of inhibition of will is not less vague than 
the notion of inhibition of will.601 A strong dissent argued firstly that to block a road by 
one’s body does indeed amount to physical force, as the body is a physical object, 
physically obstructing the way.602 Furthermore, the interpretation of the ordinary courts 
was foreseeable as it has been followed by the courts for more than hundred years.603  
In the lead opinion there is no reply to the dissent’s argument that the human body 
as a physical object does actually hinder the movement of the car, and any sort of 
psychological inhibition is only the consequence of the physical obstruction, ie dependent 
on it. If there is no demonstrator sitting on the road, the drivers would not think they 
might kill the demonstrator unless they stop. Thus, the dissent apparently means that the 
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interpretation is not extensive as the courts require the use of physical force, thus it is not 
‘immaterialised’. On the other hand, the dissent does not react to the main argument of 
the majority about vagueness and inconsistent judicial understanding of the notion of 
force through time and through different crimes.  
The question to my mind is which is more relevant: the difference between bodily 
effort and its effects as the majority sees it; or the dependency of the effects on the bodily 
effort as the dissent emphasises it. The majority could be read to imply that sitting on a 
road cannot be criminalized, because the demonstrator is obviously weaker than the car, 
so the demonstrator does not coerce the driver. Note though that the majority explicitly 
dismisses attempts to differentiate as to the weight of the pressure. The dissent explicitly 
finds the demonstrator’s body on the road as an object which needs to be countered by 
physical effort, so the demonstrator is coercive.  
Both opinions reflect categorical thinking, where either there is or there is no 
coercion. Meanwhile it is clear both that in reality there is no clear-cut boundary, and that 
in criminal law there ought to be one.  
A way out of this has come in the third604 decision to sitting blockades in 2001. 
Here the GFCC maintains that solely psychological coercion (psyhologischer Zwang) 
does not amount to force (Gewalt). Nonetheless, in case the psychological coercive effect 
(Zwangswirkung) results from arranging a physical obstacle or impediment, it amounts 
to force.605 Such is the case when protestors chain themselves by locks and metal chains 
to the entrance gates of a nuclear waste facility, as the chaining is the physical 
obstacle,606 going beyond a simple psychological pressure present in case the protestors 
would only be standing there freely. More easily then, to park different vehicles on both 
lanes and the side-lane of a highway, making it impossible without risk of self-injury to 
drive through it, is a physical obstacle resulting in psychological force.607  
Still, according to the GFCC, the scope of Art. 8 GG extends to such ‘forcible’ 
actions as long as their aim is participation in formation of opinion and raising attention 
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to public matters, and not ‘the coercive or otherwise self-helplike [probably more as 
vigilantes] assertion [Durchsetzung: assertion or implementation] of own claims.’608  
Thus, ordinary courts have to decide whether an event (sitting blockade or 
blockade of the highway in these cases) aims to raise attention and participate in the 
formation of opinion on public matters, or rather aims at ‘enforcing [or extorting – 
Erzwingen]’609 one’s own [one is tempted to read it as individual, or, even, ‘private’] 
plans, preferences, wishes.610 This latter one does not fall under Art. 8.  
This is however not the end of the story: forcible actions with the aim of raising 
awareness to a public issue are though covered by the scope of Art. 8, an intervention still 
might be justified, if it fulfills requirements of proportionality. During this latter 
balancing exercise, the significance of contribution to debate on public matters must be 
assessed against the burden imposed on others by the action, and also in light of the 
potential sanction. This happens by interpreting the criterion of reprehensibility (recall, 
that makes the conduct unlawful according to section 240 para II Criminal Code) in a 
way conform to the constitution, where it might matter eg if the public issue at hand also 
affects those burdened by the action. (In the concrete cases, the convictions finally were 
not unsettled by the GFCC.) 
This new compromise concept of Nötigung has not remained without critique: as 
a commentary argues, the physical force is hypothetical: the forcing effect comes not 
from the impossibility to physically get through the blockade, but from the ‘(ab)use of the 
principle of solidarity’ which – clearly psychically and not physically – disapproves 
getting through by driving over others.611 Certainly the GFCC tries here to accommodate 
the BGH’s broader understanding of coercion after the scandal the 1995 second GFCC 
decision evoked.612 In the end of the day, direct action without using any tools – chains, 
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cars, etc. – does not qualify as coercion, and even those which do might be so important 
for debate on public matters that a restriction cannot be justified.  
2. United Kingdom: disruption, obstruction and many more 
 
In the UK there are many common law and statutory provisions which aim to avert direct 
action, disruption or obstruction, from harassment laws, to anti-social behaviour to 
aggravated trespass and further to anti-terrorism legislation and so on, clearly impossible 
to discuss each of them in detail.613 Thus, this discussion aims only at clarifying where 
English law draws the line between permissible pressure and impermissible coercion on 
the example of aggravated trespass and obstruction of the highway, as the two being 
characteristic of the English approach.  
Section 68 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA), as 
amended by section 59 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act (ASBA) 2003, criminalizes 
aggravated trespass. Originally, it applied only to activities taking place in the open air 
until the ASBA cancelled the reference to open air from the provisions. It is an arrestable 
offense (s. 68, para. 4), nonetheless arrest can only be made in case the police reasonably 
suspects that the person is committing the trespass, ie there is no preventive power of 
arrest, unlike eg by breach of the peace. Aggravated trespass is committed by anyone 
who ’trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging 
in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is 
intended by him to have the effect (i) of intimidating those persons or any of them so as 
to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity; (ii) of obstructing that 
activity, or (iii) of disrupting that activity.’ Lawful activity means anything which does 
not constitute an offense or a trespass. Thus, there must be a trespass, and an intention to 
achieve the result; nonetheless no occurrence of the intimidation/obstruction/disruption of 
the lawful activity is necessary. At the end of the day, everything turns on the 
interpretation of the terms ‘intimidation, obstruction, and disruption’. 
                                                 





Aggravated trespass as a complex offense requires therefore (i) trespass on land 
and doing there anything (ii) intended to have (iii) intimidating, obstructing or disrupting 
effect on a (iv) lawful activity in which others are engaged or are about to engage. It was 
originally meant against hunt saboteurs, but is also applied to anti-war demonstrators. 614 
The already quite broad provision (eg simple disruption) is not interpreted narrowly by 
courts.615  
Pre-HRA Winder v. DPP616 dealt with a hunting ‘sabotage’ where appellants were 
running after the hunt, but where it was proven that by running they did not intend to 
disrupt the hunt. The court found sufficient that the protesters originally intended to 
disrupt the hunt, and they would have intended concretely disrupt the hunt had they had 
the opportunity to get closer to the hunt. This was prevented by the police arresting them. 
Thus, for the court, though they did not intend to disrupt at the point when they were 
running and caught, but they were already ‘intending to intend’ to disrupt in the future. 
Being a (i) trespasser with an (ii) intention of disrupting and (iii) doing an act towards 
that end were sufficient, if proven, to establish liability under section 68 CJPOA. For the 
court, the intention could be a general one, a future one, and in the present case, running 
was ‘more than a merely preparatory act’ to disruption, thus it was close enough to the 
offense in the ‘wide interpretation’ of the court.  
The ‘more than mere preparation’ is the statutory test for attempts.617 Its 
application is problematic as there is no liability for attempt in the case of summary 
offenses like aggravated trespass, unless liability is specifically provided for in the 
criminalizing statute.618 The CJPOA does not provide for criminalizing the attempt of 
aggravated trespass. Despite, the court in Winder v. DPP in effect criminalized an act 
where the most important element of an attempt, namely, actual specific intent was 
lacking. In other words, even if the attempt of aggravated trespass incurred liability under 
the CJPOA, there would be no way to punish the appellants since usually there is no 
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attempt in lack of intent. The court, however, using the statutory test for attempts, made 
appellants liable for committing the offense itself. This remarkable legal legerdemain is 
facilitated mostly by deference to the Magistrate’s fact finding as to the remoteness or, 
more precisely, the sufficient connection between running and disrupting. General 
intention suffices, thus, and most probably, if general intention to disrupt etc. is 
established, then even mere presence will qualify to be an act towards the end of 
disruption.619 Winder also renders basically moot the next section (s. 69), empowering 
police to remove a person who – according to the reasonable apprehension of the officer 
– ‘is committing, has committed or intends to commit the offence of aggravated trespass 
on land.’ The judgment leaves no room for a phase where the person is only intending to 
commit aggravated trespass, ie where he or she is intending to intend to disrupt, obstruct, 
or intimidate, which is exactly the case in section 69.620  
Another case shows the further blurring of ss 68 and 69 in judicial interpretation. 
In Capon v. DPP,621 foxhunt protesters who trespassed to a land where a fox was chased 
into a hole were prosecuted. The protestors planned to observe and record the digging out 
of the fox with a video recorder in order to see if any separate crimes were committed. 
They were entirely peaceful and they intended to avoid disruption of the hunt. 
Nonetheless, the police officer arrested them following a rather ambiguous 
conversation.622 The officer told them to leave and threatened arrest for aggravated 
trespass. As the protesters knew that the trespass requires an intention to disrupt, they 
remained completely peaceful and stated their intention not to disrupt. As they tried to 
figure out why the police want to arrest them, or where could be the legal problem in 
their conduct, they were arrested. In the later proceedings the police consistently referred 
to section 69, and there was no say about aggravated trespass (section 68) any longer. 
The court, unfortunately, did not consider this to be a major flaw. The court of course 
realised that the appellants neither intended nor committed an offense under section 68, 
nonetheless, affirmed that the officer could reasonably believe they are intending to 
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commit aggravated trespass, thus, he was entitled to remove, and, if failing, to arrest them 
under section 69. It is to be emphasised that section 69 (3) (power to arrest) only applies 
if a person knows a direction under subsection (1) above has been given which applies to 
him. In the Capon case it is quite apparent that the protestors did not know that a 
direction under s. 69 was given to them since the officer threatened to arrest them for 
aggravated trespass (s. 68 – ie, no direction under s. 69 was given) which they knew they 
did not commit; that’s why they repeatedly explained their non-disruptive intention. 
Section 69 and the decision in Capon is a plain realisation of the fears of Phil Scraton and 
others before the introduction of the POA 1986 which applies a regulatory technique 
similar to the 1994 CJPOA. Scholars have early prophesised that by penalising not only 
the harmful act, but the resistance to a police officer falsely apprehending the danger of 
the harm, the government will effectively circumvent judicial review.623 This is one 
instance which clearly shows the vulnerability of reasonableness standard coupled with 
police discretion.  
More recent aggravated trespass cases dealing with anti-war protestors show 
similar tendencies, nonetheless the reasoning of the defendants is usually much weaker. 
There has been a considerable stream of protest and civil disobedience in the months 
preceding the outbreak of the Iraq war. Quite a few protestors were charged with 
aggravated trespass (s. 68 CJPOA) for entering a military base by putting a hole in the 
perimeter fence, chaining themselves to gates, and for criminal damage (s. 1 Criminal 
Damage Act 1971) for proper destruction of fuel tankers and bombers. Defendants 
mainly argued that they have a defence because they intended to disrupt an unlawful 
activity, namely, the Iraq war, to their mind a crime of aggression. The House of Lords 
jointly decided in R. v. Jones et al., [2006] UKHL 16, that appellants cannot rely on the 
defence that they wanted to prevent the commission of a crime of aggression, and that’s 
why they committed aggravated trespass and criminal damage. The disrupters and those 
who damaged military objects claimed that their conduct fits within section 68 (2) 
CJPOA (prevention of offense by trespassing on land where unlawful activity is going on 
                                                 
623 Phil Scraton, ‘If You Want a Riot, Change the Law’: The Implications of the 1985 White Paper on 




and disrupting etc. that activity), and section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967 (reasonable use of 
force for the prevention of crime), respectively.  
Perhaps to no surprise, the House of Lords was unwilling to rule that the defence 
under section 3 is applicable to this international law crime.624 The court only marginally 
dealt with the aspect of the case that it was about a protest, even on a core political 
matter. Lord Bingham pointed out that as hindering the military activities of the 
government can ground charges of treason in some cases, it would be ‘strange if the same 
conduct could be both a crime and a defence’ [31]. This argument, while evident, is still 
formulated in an unsatisfactory manner: the question is, of course, how to discover the 
boundary where the right to protest ends and treason begins. Here, again, it would have 
been useful to consider the differences between disruption (or, as we have seen, 
‘reasonable’ belief of a police officer about the [general] intention to disrupt an activity) 
and active destruction of property, since it is doubtful that the first could ever ground 
charges of treason.  
Lord Hoffmann conceptualises the issues within the framework of self-help and 
use of force, no mention of protest and passive disruption occurs in the whole opinion. 
Again, the rather different defences to different offenses were all dealt with uniformly as 
if there were no difference between intention to disrupt, and active damaging. That’s why 
the reasoning is fixated on section 3 of the Criminal Law Act and not on the underlying 
provision: section 68 (2) of the CJPOA. Drawing on a Court of Appeal precedent, Lord 
Hoffmann was willing to accept that in the construction of section 3 of the 1967 Act 
defence, the belief as to the existence of a crime being about to be committed should only 
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be honest, but not necessarily reasonable. However, according to him, this does not mean 
that the defendant can use force which he deems reasonable though objectively it is 
unreasonable. Translated to the facts of the case this would mean: since defendants 
honestly believed that the UK is about to commit the crime of aggression, there is no 
need to examine whether this belief of theirs was reasonable or not. Nonetheless, it needs 
to be examined further if the force they used was reasonable in the light of objective 
standards.  
The crucial question, …., is whether one judges the 
reasonableness of the defendant's actions as if he was the sheriff 
in a Western, the only law man in town, or whether it should be 
judged in its actual social setting, in a democratic society with its 
own appointed agents for the enforcement of the law. (§ 74) 
Lord Hoffmann cites Max Weber in support of the view that the state claims monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force and individuals can only use force to the extent the state 
permits it [76]. He even cites the famous passage on the state of nature from the 
Leviathan [77].  Certainly, there is not much to object to such an argument in relation to 
active destruction of property of military forces, but aggravated trespass might need to be 
handled differently. After having envisioned the disasters of returning into a Hobbesian 
state of nature, Lord Hoffmann moves on to draw the conclusion about use of force not in 
the interests of the acting person, but in the interest of the community. If self-help is 
already limited in case of imminent personal danger, then its use is even more 
circumscribed for the save of the community. Note this is the opposite of what the 
German court argued in relation to sitting blockades. One commentator put it this way: 
‘public policies are for public forums or officials to settle’625, in the words of Lord 
Hoffman in § 83: 
The right of the citizen to use force on his own initiative is even 
more circumscribed when he is not defending his own person or 
property but simply wishes to see the law enforced in the interests 
of the community at large. The law will not tolerate vigilantes. If 
the citizen cannot get the courts to order the law enforcement 
                                                 




authorities to act … then he must use democratic methods to 
persuade the government or legislature to intervene. 
 
What is meant by ‘force’, and, ‘democratic methods’, however, have to be defined within 
the legal system. There is some room for the use of force; there are some cases when 
people are entitled to resort to force, a fortiori to protest. What form that protest might 
take should not be disposed of by an across-the-board Hobbesian reference, but is a 
question which requires further consideration. In the present case, it is obvious from the 
opinions of the Lords that the first recommended remedy, ie judicial way is moot, since 
courts are simply not willing to interfere with questions of legality of warfare. The Lords, 
inclusively Lord Hoffmann, just in the same judgment made quite an effort to prove that 
they are not willing. This argument appears almost hypocritical if read in connection with 
further paragraphs of the judgment.  
Under the part on ‘Civil disobedience’ Lord Hoffmann condemns in strong terms 
the new phenomenon ‘litigation as continuation of protest’, in a way somewhat 
irreconcilable with his previous view about the role of courts. As to the democratic 
process, it can react quite belatedly, just as we might observe in relation to the Iraq war. 
In every other jurisdiction the protestors would have argued that that’s what they actually 
tried to do: to influence the democratic process; in accordance with the prime function of 
the right to protest and assembly. The Lords have not had any thought on freedom of 
assembly or even expression in general, and missed the opportunity of delineating more 
thoroughly disruption that has to be tolerated as exercise of freedom of expression, and 
force which might not be.   
All in all, English courts so far do not see a reason to differentiate permissible 
from impermissible disruption. The broadening of aggravated trespass in Winder and 
Capon might even diminish the progress brought about by Jones and Lloyd626 – the 
trespassory assembly case declaring that assembly might be a reasonable user of the 
                                                 




highway – because the unlawfulness of ‘more than mere preparation’ via aggravated 
trespass then turns the assembly into an unreasonable use of the highway.627  
The other provision applied to direct action protestors which gave rise to a 
jurisprudence showing the characteristics of English protest law in operation is 
obstruction of the highway. Here again protestors can go unpunished only if they show 
they somehow fit within the exceptions of the norm: a clash frozen halfway between a 
privilege and a right. The norm, section 137 of the 1980 Highways Act – similarly to 
previous statutes – reads: ‘if a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way 
wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he shall be guilty of an offence.’  
Lawful authority means for example a permission to hold a market, and so on. 
Lawful excuse is more vague, thus it was the main object of litigation related to freedom 
of assembly. Most important appears to be Hirst and Agu628 from 1986. Hirst and Agu 
were animal rights activists, participating at a protest in front of a shop selling furs. The 
protesters gathered in groups, handed out leaflets, held banners, etc. They were charged 
with wilful obstruction of the highway, convicted, and their appeal dismissed by the 
Crown Court. The Crown Court’s main reason was that their use of the highway was 
unreasonable, thus, lacking lawful excuse, since it was not incidental to the right to 
passage. The Divisional Court, on appeal, rejected the incidental-to-passage reasoning, 
and held relying on Nagy v. Weston,629 that the correct approach was to check the 
following:  
    (1) whether there was an obstruction of the highway, which 
included any occupation, unless de minimis, of part of a road thus 
interfering with people having the use of the whole road;  
    (2) whether the obstruction was wilful in the sense of 
deliberate; and  
                                                 
627 Similarly David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and Regulations in the Human Rights 
Act Era (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) at 261. 
628 Hirst and Agu, (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 143. 
629 Nagy v. Weston, [1965] 1 All E.R. 78. In Nagy, the defendant was parking a van in a bus stop with a 
purpose of selling hot dogs, and was charged and convicted. The Divisional Court upheld the conviction, 
though it stated that ‘excuse and reasonableness were really the same and, while there must always be proof 
of unreasonable user of the highway, such user was a question of fact in each case, depending upon all the 
circumstances including the length of time the obstruction continued, the place where it occurred, the 




    (3) whether the obstruction was without lawful authority or 
excuse, which covered activities otherwise lawful in themselves 
which might or might not be reasonable depending on all the 
circumstances.      
 
Magistrates’ court is required to check, and, more importantly, the prosecution to prove, 
whether a deliberate obstruction – with regard to its time, place, purpose and 
actuality/potentiality – amounted to an unreasonable use of the highway. The activity of 
which the obstruction consists should be inherently lawful. Thus, Hirst and Agu makes 
clear that protest and assembly which ‘obstruct’ the free passage might still be reasonable 
in all the circumstances if it is otherwise lawful. Otton J. remarked in dicta that freedom 
of protest on issues of public concern should be given the recognition it deserves.  
In Stephen Birch v. DPP630 the Divisional Court had to examine whether sitting 
on a road as part of a demonstration has a lawful excuse.631 The sitting caused traffic 
blockage, obstructing also vehicles unrelated to the business going on on the protested 
premises. The Divisional Court distinguished out the facts from Hirst and Agu, and stated 
that handing out leaflets (the case in Hirst and Agu) is lawful while lying down in the 
road so as to obstruct the highway, is not on its face, a lawful activity [8]. This is a 
circular reasoning: lying down in the road is only made unlawful by section 137 
Highways Act if other conditions are also fulfilled. Among those other conditions the 
‘otherwise’ unlawfulness is explicitly stated in Hirst and Agu. The court in Birch v. DPP 
apparently mistakes the result for the ground of the result. Thereby, the court does not 
feel forced to engage in serious discussion of the argument of defendant, according to 
which protest and assembly can be reasonable lawful excuse. In rejecting that argument 
on its surface, the court has ample material to cite from the trespassory assembly case of 
the House of Lords, DPP v. Jones and Lloyd.632 In Birch the weaknesses of Jones have 
become obvious: the primary right is travelling; the assembly cannot in any way obstruct 
that right. The other escape the court finds from dealing with the assembly aspect is again 
                                                 
630 Birch v DPP, [2000] Crim. L.R. 301, The Independent, January 13, 2000. 
631 Mr. Birch participated at a demonstration in front of the premises of SARP UK, near a busy main road. 
Together with other demonstrators he sat down on the road in order to obstruct the access of vehicles to the 
SARP premises. 




a recurring tool in UK jurisprudence. Just like in the recent 2006 House of Lords case on 
aggravated trespass, R. v. Jones et al., (see above),633 the court in Birch also tends to blur 
two defences: it applies the same reasoning to lawful excuse in case of obstruction of the 
highway on the one hand, and, to the logically more demanding general defence for use 
of force in case of prevention of (serious and imminent) crime, on the other. 
In each of these cases UK law is structured in a way which disadvantages protest 
and demonstration, and only allows for accommodating that in the form of specifically 
justified exceptions in a given case. Thus, the level of criminalised (often only potential) 
disruption and obstruction, and, within my categories, the threshold of what counts as 
impermissible coercion is in result quite low in UK law.  
 
3. United States: inconsistency masked by content-neutrality 
 
Cases touching upon coercive expression by the USSC can usefully studied in three 
groups. A bulk of the relevant jurisprudence relates to labor picketing, another one to 
civil rights movement and Black-White tensions, and a third one to abortion clinic 
protests. The three topics are also three time periods, and social movement literature 
would roughly affirm that relevant jurisprudence came out coinciding with or right after 
the heyday of each topical movement.  
Labor protests and picket cases started to come to courts in the 19th century,634 but 
it was only in the first decades of the 20th century that picketing came to be seen as 
coercion by most courts and commentators.635 It took till 1940 for the USSC to find in 
Thornhill v. Alabama that picketing is protected by the First Amendment,636 and even 
after this decision literature and courts remained divided on the issue.637 It seems quite 
                                                 
633 See above, text accompanying nn 614-625. 
634 See, eg Commonwealth v. Hunt, Metcalf 111, 45 Mass. 111, 1842 WL 4012 (Mass.), 38 Am.Dec. 346  
(1842) or Vegelahn v. Guntner, 35 L.R.A. 722, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 57 Am.St.Rep. 443 (1896) as 
cited by Mark D. Schneider, ‘Peaceful Labor Picketing and The First Amendment’ 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1469, 
1477 (1982). 
635 Or, maybe more precisely, ‘an act of coercion in its tendencies’. See the numerous references in Edgar 
A. Jones, ‘Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets’, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (1953). 
636 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
637 The Harvard Law Review published several articles in 1943, the Virginia Law Review in 1953 




clear that after all the Supreme Court more or less settled on (i) rejecting that picketing as 
such amounts to coercion, but on (ii) recognizing that specific circumstances can amount 
to it, and for those cases the legislator has the power to regulate undisturbed by the First 
Amendment.  
In more recent decades the picketing-coercion issue took another turn related to 
the so-called secondary picketing. Secondary picketing means that the employees picket 
not their own employer, but another who is in contractual relationship with their 
employer. There has been a wave of legislation restricting secondary picketing which 
gave rise to considerable litigation. The Supreme Court decided that statutory text 
prohibiting secondary protests that would ‘threaten, coerce, or restrain’ any person is 
vague and not specific enough.638 
As to the civil rights movement, interestingly, sit-in cases are not so much 
shaping the law as one would expect, probably because the demonstrators were either 
completely peaceful or they deliberately engaged in civil disobedience. Typical of the 
handling of the sit-in cases is Barr v. City of Columbia. A restaurant served Blacks also to 
take out food, but disallowed them to sit at the lunch counter. When they refused to leave, 
got arrested, and convicted for breach of the peace. The USSC reversed for lack of 
evidence: as demonstrators were entirely peaceful, quiet and polite, and ‘the only 
evidence … is a suggestion that petitioners’ mere presence seated at the counter might 
possibly have tended to move onlookers to commit acts of violence.’639 Note however, 
that three justices would have upheld trespass conviction for the same act,640 as in so 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Picketing and Free Speech’, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180 (1943), E. Merrick Dodd, ‘Picketing and Free Speech: A 
Dissent’, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1943), Ludwig Teller, ‘Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply’, 56 Harv. L. 
Rev. 532 (1943). Edgar A. Jones, ‘Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets’, 39 Va. L. Rev. 
1023 (1953); Charles O. Gregory, ‘Picketing and Coercion: A Reply’, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1953); Edgar 
A. Jones, ‘Picketing and Coercion: A Reply’, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1063 (1953), Charles O. Gregory, ‘Picketing 
and Coercion: A Conclusion’, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1067 (1953). 
638 NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960) as cited by Kate 
L. Rakoczy, ‘On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 
8(B)(4)(Ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech’, 56 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1621 (2007) 1628.  
639 Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 150 (1964). 
640 Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITE join, dissenting from 




many other cases pointing out the difficulties in finding ‘state action’, thus the equal 
protection clause applicable to ‘privately owned places of public accommodation’.641  
The idea that a sit-in might be ‘coercion’ has not even come up, sit-ins considered 
a property-discrimination clash, but disposed of on procedural and other grounds. Indeed, 
sit-in demonstrations in courts were not even conceptualised as involving the First 
Amendment, let alone freedom of assembly. In effect, it was implied that sit-ins are as 
such illegal; nonetheless, only mild sanctions were found acceptable.642  
As to leafleting and coercion – just as in the UK in Hirst and Agu – however, 
there was an important case in the sixties: in Keefe643 leaflets were distributed against a 
real estate broker who apparently persuaded White people to sell their flats in 
neighborhoods which he managed to portray as becoming ‘Black.’ The Court does not 
make clear if it accepts lower court’s characterization of the leaflets as having a coercive 
impact, but it makes a generous speech protective statement644:  
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a 
coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the 
reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to 
influence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not 
fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper. 
 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the famous boycott case reaching USSC in 1982 only is 
also a case in point. There the boycott of white, pro-segregationist merchants, supervised 
by civil rights activists was considered constitutionally protected. The Court, however, 
relied more on the substance of the boycott (to realise constitutionally mandated equality) 
than on questions of coercion. ‘[A] nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to 
force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution itself’645 cannot be restricted. The Court reminded that though fragmented 
                                                 
641 Webster McKenzie, Note, ‘The Warren Court's Struggle with the Sit-in Cases and the Constitutionality 
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Klarman, ‘An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection’, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1991), Brad Ervin, 
‘Result or Reason: the Supreme Court and the Sit-in Cases’, 93 Va. L. Rev. 181 (2007). 
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acts of violence and threats of violence occurred, this was no sound basis to impose 
liability for all damages and losses occurred. A contrario, damages and losses 
proximately resulting from violence, intimidation and coercion could be constitutionally 
awarded. The Court did not have the occasion to clearly state what counts as coercion, 
because it found proven that (a significant parcel of) damages were awarded for 
constitutionally protected activity.646 In any case, the possibility for regulating coercive 
expression was left open in these cases; but the strong language in both Keefe and 
Claiborne Hardware suggests that the threshold for intervention is quite high.  
Another, but rarely applied doctrine in U.S. law would be captive audience. To 
recall, in the landmark Skokie case from the end of the seventies, the 7th Circuit647 struck 
down a Village of Skokie Racial Slur Ordinance which made it a misdemeanour to 
promote or incite racial or religious hatred. Skokie intended to apply the ordinance to a 
Nazi march with swastikas and in military uniform planned by the National Socialist 
Party of America in a mostly Jewish neighbourhood with Holocaust survivors. The USSC 
denied certiorari.648 Circuit Judge Pell’s reasoning relied mostly on the content-
discriminatory nature of the ordinance and the lack of clear and present danger in the 
sense of Brandenburg v. Ohio. The alleged infliction of psychic trauma, on the other 
hand, is insufficient to prohibit speech since there is no way to distinguish in principle 
such a harm from speech that is highly protected under the First Amendment, namely 
speech which ‘invite[s] dispute ... induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction 
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.’649 Offensiveness – including 
thus infliction of psychic trauma – is not a reason for restricting speech but rather a 
reason to protect it.  
Skokie also argued that the planned march would invade residents’ privacy, thus 
the march would produce a regulable captive audience situation.650 Judge Pell responded 
                                                 
646 An earlier case, Meadowmoor was distinguished out by saying that there violence was pervasive. To 
that decision Justice Black attached a dissent, opining that the injunction was overbroad because it not only 
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Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
647 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978). 
648 Smith v. Collin , 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
649 Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206, citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
650 The referred cases are Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Rowan v. Post 




that there need be no captive audience since residents can avoid the Village Hall for the 
thirty minutes of the march if they wish. Skokie thus seems to stand for the doctrinal 
stance that if one can avert his eyes from viewing a message, then he is not captive, and 
the speaker can rely on the First Amendment. Earlier cases also support this stance, and it 
has been strongly reinforced recently in Snyder v. Phelps, in which a father of a soldier 
killed in Iraq could not claim torts against Westboro church picketing during the funeral 
as it was 1000 feet away out of sight of the mourners, even assuming that the protest was 
tortious.651  
An example of the situation when the eye cannot be averted came in Virginia v. 
Black (2003),652 a good contrast to Skokie to emphasise delineation between coercion and 
free speech. In this case the Court accepted that cross-burning can be prosecuted if 
committed with the intent to intimidate, as an instance of true threat.  
Captivity was found – unlike in Snyder – sufficiently severe to justify restriction 
in Frisby v. Schultz, where the USSC upheld that offensive and disturbing picketing 
focused on a ‘captive’ home audience can be restricted.653 This decision is among the first 
relating to the abortion protest controversy, which radically changed the legal 
environment of protest in the US.  
The main cases on protest next to abortion clinics (not to doctor’s homes as in 
Frisby) is Madsen,654 Schenck,655 and Hill,656 discussed also above under prior restraint657 
and below under place restrictions.658 In these strongly criticised cases the USSC upheld 
restrictions on protest and counselling activities in 36 and 15 feet buffer zones around 
clinics and restrictions on noise as content-neutral, a view really hard to share at closer 
look.659 Captive audience was referred to as justifying the noise restrictions, 660 in my 
view in harmony with general First Amendment logic.  
                                                 
651 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011), more on the circumstances and the arguments see below 
in Chapter 9, text accompanying nn 1125-1130. 
652 Virginia v. Black, above n 417. 
653 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), 484-488. 
654 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
655 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
656 Hill v. Colorado, 503 U.S. 703 (2000). 
657 See above in Chapter 2. 
658 See below Chapter 9. 
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The abortion protest jurisprudence is more surprising in the aspect that it allows 
restrictions on conduct way less than obstruction, intimidation, or threat, in a 
quintessential forum (public street), in fact it allows for restricting simply entering an 
area. As to the content-neutrality, Justice Scalia in Madsen quotes the judge who issued 
the injunction making very clear that the injunction should apply – indeed it was applied 
– to persons who are not aware of the injunction, who have come to the area the first 
time, as they are acting ‘in concert’ with organizations (cited in the injunction, like the 
violent Operation Rescue) in case they express an anti-abortion view.661  
All in all, the relatively consistent and generous jurisprudence towards sit-ins and 
coercive speech clearly breaks in the abortion protest cases, hardly masked by claims of 
content-neutrality. A similar,662 or even worse663 trend might be in the make with regard 
to ‘animal rights’ or environmental protests, facilitated by this jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Choice Network and the Right to ”Approach and Offer” in Abortion Clinic Protests’, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 179 
(1997). 
660 Madsen, 512 U.S. 767 ff.  
661 ‘At an April 12, 1993, hearing before the trial judge who issued the injunction, the following exchanges 
occurred: Mr. Lacy: ‘I was wondering how we can—why we were arrested and confined as being in 
concert with these people that we don't know, when other people weren't, that were in that same buffer 
zone, and it was kind of selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and who was obtained for the 
same buffer zone in the same public injunction.’ The Court: ‘Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on the other 
side of the issue [abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area. If you are referring to them, the 
Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side of the issue, because the word in concert with means in 
concert with those who had taken a certain position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic. If you are 
saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice were not arrested when pro-life was arrested, that's the 
basis of that selection....’ Tr. 104–105 (Appearance Hearings Held Before Judge McGregor, Eighteenth 
Judicial Circuit, Seminole County, Florida (emphasis added)). And: John Doe No. 16: ‘This was the first 
time that I was in this area myself and I had not attempted to block an entrance to a clinic in that town or 
anywhere else in the State of Florida in the last year or ever. ‘I also understand that the reason why I was 
arrested was because I acted in concert with those who were demonstrating pro-life. I guess the question 
that I'm asking is were the beliefs in ideologies of the people that were present, were those taken into 
consideration when we were arrested? 
. . . . .’... When you issued the Injunction did you determine that it would only apply to—that it would apply 
only to people that were demonstrating that were pro-life?’ The Court: ‘ In effect, yes.’ Ibid, at 113–116 
(emphasis added). And finally: John Doe No. 31: ‘... How did the police determine that I was acting in 
concert with some organization that was named on this injunction? I again am a person who haven't seen 
this injunction. So how did the police determine that I was acting in concert?’The Court: ‘They observed 
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the—I gather the pro-life position of the other, of the named Defendants.’ Ibid, at 148 (emphasis added). 
These colloquies leave no doubt that the revised injunction here is tailored to restrain persons distinguished, 
not by proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views.’ Madsen, 512 U.S. 795-797, Scalia J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part. 
662 Michael Hill, Note, ‘United States v. Fullmer and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: ”True Threats” 
to Advocacy’, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 981 (2011). 
663 Dane E. Johnson, ‘Cages, Clinics, and Consequences: the Chilling Problems of Controlling Special-




4. France: pressure inherent in strike    
 
French law accords strong protection to the right to strike,664 a consideration of a certain 
importance to the relation between freedom of assembly (in the broad sense) and 
‘coercion’. Though the right to strike is the right of the salaried, and ‘political strikes’ are 
explicitly not included in the concept of strike,665 the limits of the right to strike probably 
would equally if not even more strictly apply to demonstrations, or any direct action type 
protest.  
The Conseil Constitutionnel specifically accepted that to prevent or disturb rail 
traffic by a positive action, going beyond sheer stoppage of work, like putting an object 
on the railroad is not protected by the right to strike.666 The positive action outside 
constitutional protection would thus presumably include eg lying down on the rails, or 
other similar, nonviolent action where the body itself is obstructing some lawful activity. 
Though no detailed theorisation on the question was possible to find, this seems to be 
somewhat below the German standard.  
Besides, the right to strike includes picketing, but the Penal code prohibits 
interference with the freedom of work by concerted and menacing behaviour,667 including 
blocking the entrance,668 but strictly only against co-workers.669  
A classic form of direct action, blockade of the highway has come before the 
ECHR. In that case, French courts – though not all of them – found that halting the traffic 
by halting the vehicles was unlawful, while driving at a very low speed (10 km/hr) 
                                                 
664 § 7 of the Preamble to the Constitution 1946, incorporated in the block of constitutionality by 
Décision n° 71-44 DC du 16 juillet 1971, affirmed specifically as to the right to strike by 79-105 DC du 25 
juillet 1979 by the Constitutional Council.  
665  Louis Favoreu, Patrick Gaïa, Richard Ghevontian, Jean-Louis Mestre, Otto Pfersmann, André Roux & 
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667 Article 431-1 Code Pénal. This same provision prohibits also the interference with freedom of 
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668 Cour de Cassation, Chambre sociale, Audience publique du 16 mai 1989, N° de pourvoi : 87-42300  
Publié au bulletin. 
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appears still within the right to strike (more precisely, within industrial action as voted by 
the trade union).670    
5. ECHR: no violation  
 
The Commission declared the German anti-missile sit-down cases inadmissible in earlier 
cases,671 embracing some sort of a speech-action theory in emphasising that  
the applicant had not been punished for her participation in any 
demonstration as such, but for particular behaviour in the course 
of the demonstration, namely the blocking of a public road, 
thereby causing more obstruction than would normally arise from 
the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly. 
 
This argument is still cited by the Court.672 Thus, though some level of disruption (eg to 
traffic) has to be tolerated according to the ECHR, but purposeful blocking, especially for 
several hours, is certainly not required to be tolerated under Art. 11.  
Recently, the demonstration blocking a central bridge in Budapest for several 
hours was understood (not decided, as that was not the issue) clearly illegal by the 
ECtHR. 673 The issue to be decided was the dispersal of a later demonstration – in support 
of the dispersed bridge blockade – halting vehicular traffic and public transport in and 
around a main square. The Court found that proportionate, especially as the 
demonstrators could express their solidarity with the illegal bridge blockade as their 
demonstration was only dispersed after several hours (§ 42), despite the fact that it 
seriously disrupted traffic and was not notified.  
Similarly, a suspended jail and fine was found not violating Art. 11 for at least 
sporadically blocking and entirely slowing down a French highway for five hours, 
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même une obstruction plus importante que n’en comporte généralement l’exercice du droit de réunion 
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causing traffic jam for ten hours. In Barraco the fact that the applicant had several times 
halted his vehicle was the main consideration to find that the burden caused ‘went beyond 
the simple inconvenience occasioned by every demonstration on the public route.’674 
Thus, it is left open to what extent slowing down, but not halting, vehicular traffic would 
be protected under the Convention. The Court in both the Hungarian and the French case 
emphasises the relevance of police tolerating the disturbance for several hours.  
Sometimes, however, not even actual blockade is required for the permissibility 
of restrictions. In a 2003 case, removal (dispersal probably), a four-hour detention and a 
150 GBP fine were found proportionate restrictions in a case where the applicant 
demonstrated at the entrance at a naval base in protest against the UK retaining a nuclear 
submarine. Testimonies diverged about whether there was any vehicular traffic blocked 
by the applicant, the arresting officer saying there was none. Still, the ECtHR declared it 
inadmissible.675 Thus, the actual threshold for proscribable direct action protests under 
the ECHR might be quite low.  
The ECtHR’s cautious stance might well be due to the fact that European states – 
certainly the ones examined here – are also not clear and consistent about where coercion 
starts and freedom of assembly ends, but provide a very fragmented picture. The German 
compromise appears though quite clear, it is anything but principled. The USSC, at least 
in the last few decades, does not fare any better either, protecting interests way below 
coercion or intimidation, even obstruction. This must mean at the same time that my 
focus on coercion is inadequate to the structure – if there is any – of law in this field. But 
what else should make out human rights law than an effort to find the boundary between 
freedom and coercion? Some would say it is dignity; thus that is where I now turn. 
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DIGNITY AS PUBLIC ORDER – FROM THE INDIVIDUAL 




To what extent an assembly – intuitively, but by far not exclusively, rather a 
demonstration – is capable of violating human dignity is a very abstract question, 
nonetheless a question some courts aspire to answer. The concept of dignity, especially in 
law, is very controversial, but might sound more important or more precise than for 
instance public order. Dignity in comparative constitutional law is a genuinely German 
concept, which is nonetheless conquering the world of global constitutionalism ever since 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht started its operation. The following pages inquire whether 
the protection of human dignity can form a reasonable, tangible basis for restricting 
assembly and protest rights.  
1. Dignity and its substitute ‘public peace’ in German law 
 
As it is well known, the German Basic law recognises as its highest (and inviolable) 
value676 human dignity in its very first article, and makes respect for and protection of it 
the duty of all state organs. It is unconditionally protected, cannot even be waived, and 
cannot be limited, ie every interference within the scope of the right to human dignity is 
in itself a violation. There is thus no possibility to find a balance or compromise 
whenever human dignity is at stake. Human dignity is likely the most frequent among so-
called verfassungsimmanenten Schranken, ie constitutional limits not named as such in 
the provision of a particular basic right. For example, the seemingly illimitable 
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assemblies which are not under the open sky are still subject to the limit of human 
dignity. Human dignity is also the ultimate candidate to anchor the protective duty of the 
state and the radiating indirect horizontal effect of other basic rights – both can be used to 
constitutionalise the interest that is counterbalanced against freedom of assembly. What is 
more, human dignity itself appears to be directly binding even among private persons, in 
horizontal relations677 but even if not, the highly respected German Civil Code has in any 
case been transposing to private law most of what would follow from the direct effect of 
Art 1 I,678 especially in relation to expressive activities. Thus, rightly or wrongly, human 
dignity can pose a ‘real threat’ to freedom of assembly from various angles.  
It is useful to follow the court’s division of dignity arguments in German freedom 
of expression law into those related to either assertions of facts or expression of opinions. 
Opinion involves an evaluation, taking a stance, a value judgment, and as such it enjoys 
definitely more protection than factual statements. These latter ones are either true or 
false, and no personal stance is seen in their utterance, ie factual assertions are not so 
close to an individual’s personality as are opinions. I will start out the discussion with 
factual statements, and then continue with opinions.  
The most important decision regarding a factual statement’s potential to violate 
dignity is still the Holocaust denial decision from 1994,679 where the Court found a prior 
ban justified by a future likely violation by human dignity. The occasion was a meeting 
(ie not an open-air assembly) on the ‘blackmailability’ of German politicians, organised 
by the Bavarian branch of the National-democratic (sic!) Party of Germany (NPD) in 
Munich. David Irving was also invited as a speaker, and it was likely that Holocaust 
denial would occur. The local authority in Munich imposed a condition on the organiser 
to guarantee that no denial of the Holocaust would happen at the meeting, or in such a 
case to dissolve the meeting. The imposition of the condition was meant as a less 
restrictive means than outright ban, because the law allows for prior ban if the 
commission of criminal acts is to be expected with high probability. Denying the 
Holocaust involved the crimes of incitement of the people (Art 130 StGB, 
Volksverhetzung), defamation (Art 185 StGB, Beleidigung), and disparagement of the 
                                                 
677 Kunig, Ibid Rn. 27 zu Art 1. 
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memory of the dead (Art 189, StGB, Verunglimpfung des Andenkens Verstorbener) in 
the interpretation of ordinary courts.  
The main issue before the GFCC was whether that interpretation is constitutional, 
or, more precisely, whether denying the Holocaust is outside the protection of the 
constitution. First, the Court had to decide which right is applicable here at all. As 
explained above,680 as is typically the fate of freedom of assembly, the Court 
distinguished Art 8 out, and relied solely on freedom of opinion. That this really is a 
strained view of the constitution is intensified by the fact that Art 5 does not appear to 
protect factual statements, and what is more, it is interpreted not to really cover them, 
unless they form the basis of an opinion. If that is not enough, before the Holocaust 
denial decision, factual statements proven false were considered clearly outside the scope 
of Art 5 because,681 false factual assertions cannot form the basis of opinions. However, 
the Holocaust denial decision says that though such lies on their own are not protected, 
when they are ’inextricably connected to opinions,’682 Art 5 I will cover the expression. 
While Holocaust denial – as knowingly proven false factual statement – is in itself 
outside constitutional protection as many commentators emphasise,683 I think it is 
unrealistic for it ever to happen without being connected to opinions.  
In any case, the imposition of the condition interfered with an exercise of a 
constitutional right in the Munich meeting with David Irving. The interference is 
however justified because denying the Holocaust would violate the dignity of Jews living 
in Germany, especially of survivors of the Holocaust or their descendents. It violates their 
dignity, because, as the BGH stated and GFCC quotes with affirmation:684 
                                                 
680 See under Demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom of opinion, above 
Chapter 1. 
681 BVerfG ( 3. Kammer des 1. Senats ), Beschluß vom 09-06-1992 - 1 BvR 824/90, BVerfG: 
Strafrechtliche Bewertung der Leugnung der Judenvernichtung, NJW 1993, 916. 
682 BVerfGE 90, 241, 253: Verbinden sie sich untrennbar mit Meinungen, so kommt ihnen zwar der Schutz 
von Art 5 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG zugute, doch wiegt ein Eingriff von vornherein weniger schwer als im Fall 
nicht erwiesen unwahrer Tatsachenangaben.  
683 Eg Giso Hellhammer-Hawig, Neonazistische Versammlungen. Grundrechtsschutz und Grenzen, 
(Aachen, Shaker, 2005) at 31 ffff with further notes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
684 BVerfGE 90, 241, 251 ffff., (Engl. translation) in the web site of The University of Texas School of 
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The historical fact that human beings were separated in 
accordance with the descent criteria of the so-called Nuremberg 
laws and were robbed of their individuality with the objective of 
their extermination gives to the Jews living in the Federal 
Republic a special personal relationship to their fellow citizens; in 
this relationship the past is still present today. It is part of their 
personal self-image that they are seen as attached to a group of 
persons marked out by their fate, against which group there exists 
a special moral responsibility on the part of everyone else and 
which is a part of their dignity. Respect for this personal self-
image is for each of them really one of the guarantees against a 
repetition of such discrimination and a basic condition for their 
life in the Federal Republic. Whoever seeks to deny those events 
denies to each of them individually this personal worth to which 
they have a claim. For those affected, this means the continuation 
of discrimination against the group of human beings to which he 
belongs, and with it against his own person” (BGHZ 75, 160 [162 
f.]..   
Some might find the suggestion that the Shoah (the decision only talks about persecution 
of Jews) is part of the identity of Jews living in Germany somewhat stigmatising, but I 
take that there has been an overwhelming political – or moral even – consensus in 
Germany that mandates such a label. After all, no critique of this identity denial theory 
could be found, neither asking how courts are entitled to such construction, nor actually 
about why only Jews living in Germany appear to be the victims. Doctrinally, to limit the 
circle of defamable persons is important from both a criminal law and a constitutional 
law viewpoint. In criminal law, for a defamation charge to stand, there needs to be a 
particular, clearly definable circle of persons. Women, Christians, etc. would surely not 
be sufficient.685 The GFCC in the Tucholsky or Soldiers are murderers ruling686 – of 
which there will be more discussion below – made also clear that though a certain 
                                                 
685 Valerius, BeckOK StGB § 185, Rn 8 - 10.1, in Beck'scher Online-Kommentar StGB (von Heintschel-
Heinegg ed, 15th edn, Beck online, 2011) with references to several decisions of the BGH and other courts. 




concept of group libel is not inconceivable under the Basic Law, it is not any vague or 
general group about which a negative statement can form the basis of restriction on 
expression.  
The Holocaust denial case left some doubts about whether it relies on the personal 
honor clause in Art 5 II, which would mean that the dignity rationale is a value argument 
underpinning the personal honor restriction, or it takes the dignity right of Art 1 I as a 
separate restriction inherent in the constitution. The question is important because of 
content neutrality issues. The prohibition of Holocaust denial is clearly a viewpoint-based 
restriction. Art 5 II lists as limits of the right first ’general laws’, and thus the question 
arises as to whether laws protecting personal honor are to be general laws as well. This 
question was not unequivocally decided in my view until the 2009 Wunsiedel-Rudolf 
Hess march decision, which clarified that protection of personal honor can also only be 
pursued in general laws.687  
The requirement of a general law was already included in the Weimar 
constitution, and the GFCC still appears to combine the somewhat conflicting scholarly 
views of the time. General law thus firstly cannot be a Sonderrecht against freedom of 
opinion, ie the law ought not differentiate between opinions ‘solely because of their 
intellectual direction.’688 Secondly, a general law regulates ’regardless of a specific 
opinion,’689 and, thirdly, the social good protected by the general law is one which ranks 
higher than freedom of opinion.690  
All these three appear in the Lüth decision of the GFCC in one sentence divided 
by commas,691 complemented by the so-called interdependency or mutual reaction 
doctrine [Wechselwirkungslehre]. This latter one prescribes that the limit of ’general law’ 
itself is to be interpreted in the light of the significance of the right to freedom of opinion. 
Furthermore, Lüth reinforced the imperative of ad hoc balancing, ie a fine-tuning of 
restrictions according to the particular facts of the case.692  
                                                 
687 BVerfGE 124, 300, 326 (2009) - Rudolf Heß Gedenkfeier or Wunsiedel. 
688 Häntschel, HdbDStR II, 659 as quoted by Rudolf Wendt, ‘Kommentar zu Art 5’, Rn. 69 in Grundgesetz-
Kommentar I. (Ingo von Münch & Philip Kunig eds., 5th edn, München, Beck, 2000). 
689 Rothenbücher, VVDStRL 4, 20 (1928) as quoted by Wendt, ibid 
690 Smend, VVDStRL 4, 52 (1928) as quoted by Wendt, ibid 
691 BVerfGE 7, 198, 209 ffff (1958). 




On this basis, one can take the Holocaust denial decision as saying either that the 
limit on freedom of opinion here is the higher-ranking human dignity (ie, the prohibition 
of Holocaust denial is a general law in the third sense above), or that in terms of the 
Wechselwirkungslehre, the value of the expression of a statement made with knowledge 
of its falsehood is so little that it cannot exert a significant countereffect on the limit of 
personal honour itself.   
What is sure is that the Holocaust denial judgment decided on the constitutionality 
of Holocaust denial as defamation, subsumed under Art 185 of the German Penal Code, 
an offense against the person, not against public order. The GFCC explicitly declined to 
address the rest of the grounds on which the condition was based (including Art 130, 
incitement of the people). However, after the decision of the GFCC, the legislature added 
a new offense, Art 130 III, to the Penal Code,693 penalising approval, denial or 
belittlement of the genocide committed under the Nazi rule if it is committed in a manner 
capable of disturbing the public peace. Note that Art 130 III does not refer to human 
dignity, and the crime is placed among offenses against public order. 
The GFCC has not scrutinised Art 130 III, i.e. the Holocaust denial provision, but 
again everybody appears to take it for constitutional. If so, then the implied reasoning 
must be the following: expressing approval, denial or belittlement of the genocide 
committed under Nazi rule is in itself a violation of human dignity or personal honour of 
Jews living in Germany, and thus, no other condition is constitutionally required. That the 
legislature included in Art 130 III the requirement that the manner of the expression be 
also capable of disturbing the public peace is fully within its power, as the provision is 
thus a less extensive restriction than would be constitutionally permissible.694 Therefore, 
human dignity appears here as a self-standing limit on expression (and, thus, assembly).  
                                                 
693 Verbrechensbekämpfungsgesetz v. 28. 10. 1994. A commentator explains that the new provision was 
added – redundantly, as Holocaust denial has been subsumed (and prosecutable without private motion) 
under defamation since 1985 – after the Federal High Court (the BGH) has overturned a decision because 
the lower court erred in classifying an incident of Holocaust denial under incitement of the people by 
callumnious agitation instead of defamation. See Günter Bertram, ‘Der Rechtsstaat und seine 
Volksverhetzungsnovelle’, NJW 2005, 1476, 1476  and n 4. Still I think it is fair to be noted that the clear 
benefit of the provision of incitement of people over defamation is the more severe sanction, but also that 
there is no defense of proof, ie the deniers cannot abuse the court system to actually further promote their 
agenda. 
694 Cf. also the BGH’s decision affirming the condemnation of an Australian for putting online in Australia 




Denying the Holocaust is not the only way dignity arguments find their way into 
discussions on assemblies and demonstrations. As I said above, value judgments and 
opinions can also sometimes amount to a violation of dignity, or personal honour. Earlier 
case law on freedom of opinion would be applicable against symbolic displays at 
assemblies which aim at vilification [Schmähkritik] of a particular person. For instance, a 
placard showing a person – even a politician – as a copulating pig would be violating 
human dignity for its ‘bestial’ nature and ’depersonalization’.695 However, this does not 
go as far as to prohibit calling a politician a ‘coerced democrat’ and a ’strongman’ whom 
some Germans admire just as they embraced the Führer.696 In a different political setting, 
an NPD election campaign placard with the slogan ‘Stop the Polish invasion!’ displaying 
two crows extending a leg towards Euro banknotes was found constitutionally 
proscribable as a violation of dignity, it appears, again because of the equation of humans 
with animals.  
In contrast, the Court found the slogan ‘Send foreigners back home – for a 
German Augsburg worth living in’ (Aktion Ausländer-rückführung – Für ein 
lebenswertes deutsches Augsburg) as not violating human dignity.697 The slogan could 
not only be interpreted as expressing an opinion of the worthlessness of foreigners 
because a city with foreigners is not worth living in. Rather, the sentence can – and then 
constitutionally is required to – be understood also as part of a more general agenda of 
creating a German city worth living in. Though even understood this way, foreigners are 
certainly portrayed as a problem, but they are not denied their right to life and equal 
worth in the community. The Court was criticised for reconstructing the meaning this 
way (as very often happens698), but praised for keeping the scope of ‘killer argument’ 
human dignity narrow.699 
                                                                                                                                                 
public peace can be disturbed via internet. The Court declared that the internet posting posed a ‘threat 
suitable to disturb severely the thriving coexistence of Jews and other population groups and to prejudice 
their reliance on legal certainty.’ (my translation) BGHSt 46, 212, 220. 
695 See BVerfGE 75, 369 (Political Satire case). 
696 See  BVerfGE 82, 272 (1990) (Stern-Strauss or Zwangsdemokrat). 
697 BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 4. 2. 2010 - 1 BvR 369/04 u.a., NJW 2010, 
2193. 
698 See the many references in Kirsten Teubel, ‘Deutung einer Äußerung - willkürliche 
Rechtsanwendung?’,  NJW 2005, 3245.  
699 See eg Friedhelm Hufen, ‘Meinungsfreiheit für rechtsextremistische Parolen? – Verfassungswidrige 




Another aspect of the problem of statements disparaging groups is the definition 
of a group. The most important case in this regard remains the already mentioned 
Tucholsky or Soldiers are murderers cases700, related and joined cases about different 
persons claiming at different occasions in pamphlets, on armbands and banners, in a 
newspaper, etc. that soldiers are murderers or trained or potential murderers.701 The 
GFCC found the expressions protected by Art 5, but maintained both the fact/opinion 
distinction and the possibility of group rights prevailing over expression. In contrast to 
the Holocaust Denial case, it earned less agreement among the German judiciary and 
academia.702  
Having remanded the case for lack of sufficient weight accorded to freedom of 
expression in the balance, the GFCC did not strike down the norm itself, Art 185 of the 
Criminal Code criminalising Beleidigung (insult, libel, defamation) eg for vagueness. 
Also, the Court expressly approved the applicability of libel provisions to defamation 
against state authorities, because ’without a minimum social acceptance, state institutions 
cannot carry out their duties.’703 This protection however does not go as far as to shield 
institutions from public criticism,704 which is ’especially guaranteed’ by Art 5. The Court 
emphasises the importance of ad hoc balancing, fine-tuned to the interests at stake in the 
given case, but laid down guding principles. Firstly, human dignity always prevails over 
freedom of opinion, and the weighing also must ensure that due weight is given to human 
dignity as the underlying, ultimate value for every fundamental right and the whole 
                                                 
700 BVerfG ( 3. Kammer des Ersten Senats ), Beschluß vom 25-08-1994 - 1 BvR 1423/92, BVerfG: 
Mehrdeutigkeit einer Meinungsäußerung und Anknüpfung strafrechtlicher Sanktionen (‘Soldaten sind 
Mörder’), NJW 1994, 2943, and BVerfGE 93, 266 (1995), BVerfG, Beschluß vom 10-10-1995 - 1 BvR 
1476/91, 1 BvR 1980/91, 1 BvR 102/92 u. 1 BvR 221/92, BVerfG: Ehrenschutz und Meinungsfreiheit 
(hier: ‘Soldaten sind Mörder’) NJW 1995, 3303. 
701 The discussion of the Tucholsky rulings draws on, Orsolya Salát, Interpretative Approaches to Freedom 
of Expression in Germany, the United States and Canada: The Impact of Free Speech Theories on 
Adjudication, (unpublished LL.M thesis, Central European University, 2006) 68-71. 
702 For critique of being overly speech protective see Herdegen, NJW 1994, NJW Jahr 1994 Seite 2933f.; 
Sendler, ZRP 1994, ZRP Jahr 1994 Seite 343ff.; Steinkamm, NZWehrR 1994, 45ff.; Stark, JuS 1995, JUS 
Jahr 1995 Seite 689ff.; Dreher/Tröndle, o. Fußn. 6), § 193 Anm. 14c, dd., for being underprotective of 
speech, see Gounalakis, NJW 1996, NJW Jahr 1996 Seite 481, all as cited by Walter Schmitt Glaeser, 
‘Meinungsfreiheit, Ehrenschutz und Toleranzgebot,’  NJW 1996, 873, 874, notes 11 and 12.  
703 BVerfGE 93, 266, 290. 
704 Eg the GFCC overturned a condemnation for disparagement of the state when a person in strong words 
recalled the 1980 Oktoberfest attacks (13 deaths and 200 injuries), intimating that the criminals were a Nazi 
group, and the state deliberately omitted prosecution because of still existing sympathies with Nazism, 





constitutional system. Further, freedom of opinion also has to yield to honour protection 
in the case of vilifying insults or formal defamation (eg the case with the copulating 
pigs), which nevertheless has to be interpreted quite narrowly, and has almost no 
applicability in discourse which essentially affects the public. Thirdly, the Court recites 
the obligation to assign an objective meaning to the utterance, taking into account the 
context in which it was made. As to the ‘Soldiers are murderers’ statements, the Court 
emphasises the difficulty of line-drawing between violation of the personal honour of 
members of a collective on the one hand, and legitimate and highly protected criticism of 
social institutions, like the military, on the other. Therefore, it is not enough that the 
defamatory statement refer to an identifiable group, but it is also necessary that the group 
be ‘conceivable,’ ie not so large or otherwise indefinite that the defamation cannot be 
seen as directed at an individual member of the group. The mentioned examples of a 
group unsuitable to be victims of libel are Catholics, Protestants, trade-union members 
and women. This much is an affirmation of the criminal law jurisprudence of the Federal 
Court of Justice (BGH). The GFCC adds that705  
in the case of accusations addressed to large collectivities, it is 
mostly not individual misbehaviour or individual traits of group 
members that are concerned, but the unworthiness of the 
collectivity and of its social function from the point of view of the 
speaker.  
Note that at the same time the Court also implies that group libel can be asserted in case 
of vilification or formal defamation. This, however, will be a rather rare case, since it 
requires personal insult pushing the issue of discussion completely to the background. 
This might occur especially if the disparaging assertions relate to ’ethnic, racial, physical 
or mental characteristics from which thus the inferiority of a group supposedly 
derives.’706 This thought clearly underlies the Polish invasion and other cases which I 
discussed before the Tucholsky rulings.  
The German court thus very clearly sees the problem that dignity arguments 
might spill-over to discussions of matters of public interest or core political speech, but 
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instead of directly declaring that public persons and collectivities do not have much 
personality rights, or that the state has no protectable honour in any sense – as the USSC 
basically declared – it tries to find a more sophisticated distinction between public 
matters and attacks against a person. I am somewhat hesitant of whether that is possible, 
but clearly here one faces a perimeter issue, as some would claim in the U.S. such 
statements are controlled by general social norms of decency, while in Germany they are 
controlled by law. Also, it is remarkable that the German court explicitly upholds the 
honour of state institutions as a possible interest worthy of protection. One might 
speculate that the German court fears leaving the state unable to protect itself against 
subversion, or even perhaps expresses some sort of militant-democratic fears. Similarly 
to the stance of the GFCC on flag disparagement,707 here a window is left open for even 
worse times, when law might need to be used more openly for holding together the state 
itself. This is both very unprincipled and risks being misused, also because the Basic Law 
provides other means for militant democracy, but I see no other reason why the Court 
would explicitly stress the ‘defamability’ of state institutions. Note also that the Court 
explicitly reconstructs the contested expression as referring to soldiers of the world, and 
not only to soldiers of the Bundeswehr – the latter would be conceivable enough to be 
protected against defamation,708 notwithstanding the fact that the army is a state 
institution par excellence, and there is no world military. The Tucholsky rulings also 
suffer from an artificial reconstruction of whether ‘soldiers are murderers’ is a factual 
statement or an opinion. I think it clearly is both (as basically most controversial 
statements are), but the GFCC struggles to explain that the murder is not meant in the 
way criminal law understands it,709 and also, that it cannot be a factual statement, as 
everybody knows that the Bundeswehr (ie the post-WWII West-German army banned 
from actively participating in armed hostilities) has not killed anyone.710 Clearly, this in 
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710 BVerfG ( 3. Kammer des Ersten Senats ), Beschluß vom 25-08-1994 - 1 BvR 1423/92, BVerfG: 
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no way excludes the meaning that soldiers – on occasion711 – necessarily (would) kill as 
that is the nature of the job: a factual statement.  
This complicated and rich jurisprudence discussed so far is still not the end of the 
constitutional story of expression and dignity-like arguments in Germany. Or, one might 
say, because many considered the reach of the dignity argument to be seriously restricted 
by the GFCC, other types of arguments were brought up, first by other courts, and most 
recently, in the Hess memorial march decision, by the GFCC itself.  
With regard to Neo-Nazi demonstrations, there was a long and unusually stern 
controversy between the High Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia (OVG 
NRW) and the GFCC. The OVG stubbornly held that Neo-Nazi demonstrations as such 
are either not protected by the constitution at all, or can be constitutionally banned.712 It 
claimed that the constitution includes inherent limits that ex ante prohibit the promotion 
of National Socialism and thus permit a prior ban on Neo-Nazi marches. These limits 
include not only human dignity, but also structural principles713 of democracy, 
federalism, and the rule of law, the right to resist (all these permanently entrenched by the 
eternity clause of Art 79 III). Furthermore, the de-Nazification provision of Art 139, and 
Art 26 I 1714 which proclaim that actions capable of disturbing and intended to disturb the 
peaceful coexistence of peoples, in particular the waging of a war of aggression, are 
unconstitutional, also bear relevance to the Neo-Nazi marches. All these limits were 
rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court in several decisions,715 and in this sense the 
controversy is only politically interesting. Two ramifications which might relate to it still 
need to be noted. The first one is the federalism reform which transferred the competence 
to regulate freedom of assembly to the Länder in Germany, and second, the Hess 
memorial march decision of the GFCC from 2009.   
                                                 
711 Georgios Gounalakis, ‘Soldaten sind Mörder’, NJW 1996, 481, 485. 
712 Which one of the two is not clear even to an author who wrote a whole doctoral dissertation on this 
subject: Giso Hellhammer-Hawig, Neonazistische Versammlungen. Grundrechtsschutz und Grenzen, 
(Aachen, Shaker, 2005) at 48 ffff. 
713 Art 20 I talks about the federal state (Bundesstaat), not exactly federalism, as implied by the OVG. 
714 Art 26 (1) Handlungen, die geeignet sind und in der Absicht vorgenommen werden, das friedliche 
Zusammenleben der Völker zu stören, insbesondere die Führung eines Angriffskrieges vorzubereiten, sind 
verfassungswidrig. Sie sind unter Strafe zu stellen. 




The federalism reform from 2006 resulted in the possibility for each Land to adopt a fully 
new regulation on assemblies, or a partial one where the Federal Assembly Law remains 
valid in the unaffected provisions, or not to adopt any Land law at all. In this latter case, 
the Federal Assembly Law remains effective in its entirety. A few Länder had already 
introduced regulations of both sorts,716 and the Federal Constitutional Court has even 
already decided on the constitutionality of the Bavarian assembly law.717 Most of the 
changes relate in one way or another to extreme right wing activities, which have been on 
the rise ever since German reunification especially, but by far not exclusively, in the 
Eastern Länder. Legislative reactions can be understood as attempts to find new ways of 
fighting ‘extremism’. The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence has been thus presumably 
found to be of little help not only by the OVG NRW.   
The federal legislator also tried to enhance protection against Neo-Nazi marches. 
In anticipation of Neo-Nazi marches around the Brandenburg Gate and the Holocaust 
Memorial for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II for Germany on May 8, 
2005, a new paragraph IV on incitement of others was added to Art 130 of the criminal 
code. The new provision renders punishable by a fine or up to three years of 
imprisonment anybody who publicly or in an assembly disturbs the public peace by 
approving, glorifying or justifying the tyrannical and despotic National-Socialist rule 
[nazionalsozialistische Gewalt- und Willkürherschaft] in a way which violates the dignity 
of the victims.718  
The Constitutional Court found the provision constitutional, albeit not on grounds 
of dignity, despite the fact that the text itself includes the requirement of violation of 
human dignity. The occasion for the Court’s judgment was a series of banned marches in 
memory of Rudolf Heß in Wunsiedel with mottos like ‘He chose honour over freedom’. 
The prior bans were based on the likelihood that criminal offences under Art 130 IV 
would occur, which then can be prevented by applying Art 15 of the Assembly Law. The 
                                                 
716 For an overview see Johannes Lux, Die Bekämpfung rechtsextremistischer Versammlungen nach der 
Föderalismusreform, LKV 2009, 491.  
717 BVerfG, Beschl. v. 17. 2. 2009 – 1 BvR 2492/08, NVwZ 2009, 441, see also above text accompanying 
notes 459 – 460. For an overview of the Bavarian law see Khwaja Mares Askaryar, ‘Das bayerische 
Versammlungsgesetz – Überblick über wesentliche Änderungen gegenüber dem 
Bundesversammlungsgesetz’, KommJur 2009, Heft 4, 126. 
718 New para. 4 to Art 130. Abs. 4 eingef., bish. Abs. 4 und 5 werden Abs. 5 und 6 und geänd. mWv 1. 4. 




Constitutional Court issued preliminary decisions not to suspend the ban on the marches 
before substantive review. The decision on the merits came out in 2009, after the 
applicant had eventually died. The Court decided the case for reasons of general 
constitutional significance despite the death of the applicant, and I think quite rightly so, 
as it found a whole new basis for dealing with recurring shadows of the past.   
The Court found that the provision is in none of the above senses a general law, 
and, thus it cannot be justified under Art 5 II. It also made clear that the personal honor as 
limit to freedom of opinion can only be interpreted in connection with the requirement of 
a general law. It then follows that human dignity can also only be protected by general 
laws according to Art 5 II.719 In the discussion of what counts as general law, the Court 
introduces – or reaffirms as it claims 720 – a version of content-neutrality where viewpoint 
discrimination is not permitted. Laws which refer to the content of an expression of an 
opinion have to be phrased in a sufficiently abstract and open way to be capable of 
subsuming different ideological views on the subject,721 in order to qualify as general 
laws. I think this more or less coincides with the differentiation in U.S. law between 
subject-matter restriction and viewpoint-based restriction. Clearly then Art 130 IV does 
not qualify as a general law under Art 5 II, as it only penalizes glorification of the 
National-Socialist tyranny.722 That would explain why it is to no avail that the provision 
also requires a violation of human dignity, the highest value in German constitutional 
law. Human dignity thus does not authorize Sonderrecht (at least in cases of opinion, as 
opposed to false factual statements), which is, I think, a normatively correct clarification 
by the Constitutional Court. In this regard, it still has to be noted that the Court in the last 
part of the opinion basically reads the element of a violation of human dignity out of the 
statute. Possibly, this serves twin purposes – not only to avoid overburdening authorities 
with the duty to repeatedly prove that the very stringent requirement is fulfilled (as the 
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Court finds the restriction constitutionally justified for other reasons), but also to avoid 
dangerously watering down the concept of human dignity.723   
If not human dignity, then what would justify such a non-general, viewpoint-
discriminatory law, which clearly also goes against the prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of political conviction spelled out in Art 3 GG? The Court explains that the 
Unrecht and horrors what the National-Socialist rule brought over Europe and large parts 
of the world ‘elude general categories’, and the creation of the FRG is to be understood 
as a counter-plan (Gegenentwurf) to that. Therefore, an exception from the requirement 
of general law for provisions is inherent in Art 5 which aims at preventing a 
propagandistic affirmation of the National-Socialist tyranny between 1933 and 1945.724 It 
is as though the Court finds that the uniqueness of the ‘radical evil’ of the NS regime is 
not graspable under the general rules of reason. More pragmatically, it adds that ‘the 
advocacy of this rule in Germany is an attack on the identity of the polity with a potential 
to threaten the peace inside. To this extent it [the advocacy] is incomparable with other 
expressions of opinion, and last but not least is capable of causing profound disquiet also 
abroad.’725 Still, it does not mean that the GG would contain a general fundamental 
principle against National-Socialism. The militant democracy provisions of the GG726 
first kick in when an ‘active fighting-aggressive stance against the free democratic basic 
order’ is taken. Consequently also in the realm of freedom of opinion, a merely 
intellectual endorsement will not suffice, but the violation of a concrete legal value 
(Rechtsgutverletzung) or a recognisable endangering situation is necessary for expression 
to be restrictable.727 This is true even for the current exception of propagandistic 
affirmation of NS rule from 1933-1945, and thus, even though the requirement of general 
law is suspended, the law and its application still have to pass the normal proportionality 
review, i.e the regulation has to be capable and necessary of achieving a legitimate aim, 
and the restriction has to be necessary to the aim pursued, and proportionately balanced 
with freedom of opinion.  
                                                 
723 The technique applied is a textual distinction between human dignity in Art 1 GG and dignity of the 
victims in Art 130 IV StGB, a somewhat surprising differentiation. BVerfGE 124, 300, 344. 
724 BVerfGE 124, 300, 327. 
725 BVerfGE 124, 300, 329.  
726 Arts 9 II, 18, 21 II. (criminal associations, abuse and forfeiture of rights, party ban) 




Art 130 IV StGB protects the legitimate aim of public peace, which is however to 
be interpreted narrowly. Public peace is too broadly conceived if it is to grant protection 
‘against subjective disquiet of the citizens resulting from confrontation of provocative 
opinions and ideologies’, and it is intended to preserve only ‘social and ethical views 
considered fundamental.’728 Note that the similarly defined public order is not accepted to 
justify content restrictions, only modalities according to a different strain of case law.729 
Disquiet caused by the content of an opinion is the ‘other side of freedom of opinion’, 
and its protection would eliminate the ‘principle of freedom itself.’730 Public peace 
however can be constitutionally interpreted to mean only the prevention of 
‘unpeacefulness.’ Those opinions whose ‘content is recognisably animated toward acts 
endangering legal values [rechtsgutgefährdende Handlungen], i.e. they are a transition to 
aggression and breach of law’, are a violation of public peace. The preservation of public 
peace refers to the external effects of expressions of opinion, eg by emotionalized appeals 
which evoke in the addressed audience ‘a willingness to act’ or which ‘reduce 
inhibitions’ or ‘intimidate any third party directly’, or so the Court asserts with 
illustrations.731 Art 130 IV properly (geeignet) protects public peace when it criminalises 
the approval, glorification etc. not of ideas, but of the historically concrete National-
Socialist tyranny, with its real crimes (which are singular in history, and whose 
inhumanity [Menschenverachtung] is not to be outdone732). Approval, glorification and 
justification are intense enough to typically result in a danger to public peace. The Court 
goes on to find the restriction both necessary (no less intrusive means) and proportionate 
in the narrow sense, meaning it realizes a ‘careful balance’ between freedom of opinion 
and public peace, and especially that the restriction does not penalize pure expression of 
right wing radicalism or ideas related to National-Socialism.733 The Court similarly 
upheld as constitutional the application of Art 130 IV to the present case of a memorial 
march for Rudolf Heß, the ‘substitute of the Führer’, who was co-responsible for the 
                                                 
728 BVerfGE 124, 300, 333.  
729 See below in Chapter 7. 
730 BVerfGE 124, 300, 333.  
731 BVerfGE 124, 300, 334.  
732 BVerfGE 124, 300, 336. 




massive human rights violations of the regime; thus, the glorification of his person is a 
glorification of the historical National-Socialist tyranny. 734   
The decision was mildly criticised for the tension between the justification of the 
provision as non-general law, and the rejection of the existence of an anti-National 
Socialist founding principle.735 Another author argues that finding a new ‘inherent 
constitutional limit’, outside Art 5 II, is both doctrinally and politically wrong.736 Also, 
the difference, if any, between the stance of the OVG NRW and the GFCC appears to be 
blurred after the Wunsiedel decision,737 even though the GFCC explicitly refers to the 
OVG NRW as being in error. The OVG NRW would exclude from constitutional 
protection the expression of a commitment to National Socialism, while the GFCC 
appears to carve out an exception ‘only’ for positive evaluation of the historical National 
Socialist tyranny, provided that it threatens to violate legal values covered by the concept 
of a narrowly understood public peace. Time will tell if in practice the purported or 
alleged narrowness of public peace indeed makes a difference, or if expressing a 
commitment to National Socialism necessarily requires (will be interpreted to require) 
intimidation, emotional appeal, transition to aggression, or any such allegedly concrete 
violation of public peace. These questions will sort themselves out in time.  
Long-term questions arise though by the juridification of the claim that there are 
facts which go beyond generalisable categories of human comprehension. If human 
dignity is already an activist concept worth keeping narrow, then this overcompensates in 
the other direction – law is taking over in an area where law’s logic is said not to operate. 
How can legal coercion be based on an argument out of incomprehension or 
inconceivability? Can the radical evil be consistently countered by a violation of the 
                                                 
734 Thus, it was correct for the Federal Administrative Court to conclude that a march in his memory would 
realize approval of the nationalsocialist tyranny. It raises neither questions under Art 5, Art 8, or under Art 
103 II, the nullum crimen sine lege guarantee. BVerfGE 124, 300, 342 and 345.  
735 Uwe Volkmann, ‘Die Geistesfreiheit und der Ungeist – Der Wunsiedel-Beschluss des BVerfG’, NJW 
2010, 417. Similarly Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The Limits of Freedom of Expression in the Wunsiedel Decision 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court’, Vol. 11 No. 08, German Law Journal, 929, 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol11-No8/PDF_Vol_11_No_08_929-
942_Developments_Payandeh%20FINAL.pdf.  
736 Mares Askaryar, ‘Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu § 130 IV StGB. Zugleich ein 
Beitrag zur Anwendbarkeit verfassungsimmanenter Schranken auf Grundrechte mit qualifizierten 
Gesetzesvorbehalt’ KommJur 2010, 405. 





categorical imperative? At the practical level, the GFCC clearly tries to narrow the scope 
of Art 130 IV. But is there really a difference between advocating National Socialist 
principles and advocating them with reference to the historically realised practice of 
National Socialism? A balance so strenuously sought here appears to be sought just for 
the sake of balance, so that it can be said that there is yet a more intrusive means, ie also 
banning the simple distribution of ideas, and if there is a more intrusive means, then the 
present solution is one where there is no less intrusive means.  
2. France: dignity as public order and officially declared truth 
 
In France, free speech in general is even more restricted than in Germany, and those 
restrictions equally apply to assemblies. For lack of a human rights conscious case law, it 
is very hard to decipher what constitutional value justifies the far-going and very diverse 
restrictions, which cannot all be described in this book.  
In any case, an illustrative example is the remarkable combination of human dignity and 
public order as grounds of justification (where public order is the legitimate aim, and the 
proportionality of the restriction is enhanced because it protects human dignity). At least, 
this mixed argument appears both in a few decisions of the Conseil d’État, discussed 
below,738 and, independently, in a scholarly analysis739 contrasting French and American 
perspectives on Holocaust denial and officially declared truth.  
Defamation on the basis of race or religion was criminalised in France in 1939, 
suspended by the Vichy regime, and then reinstated in 1946. Since 1972, provocation to 
discrimination, hatred, or violence against another person for reason of their origin, 
belonging or non-belonging to an ethnic, national, racial or religious group, has been 
punishable under the law on the press, for the same reason as defamation.740 In addition 
to public prosecutor and/or victim, the minister of justice and non-governmental 
                                                 
738 The Gallic soup case, Conseil d'État, réf., 5 janvier 2007, no. 300311, the Dieudonné case, Conseil 
d'Etat, ord. réf. 9 janvier 2014, n° 374508..  
739 Russell L. Weaver, Nicolas Delpierre & Laurence Boissier, ‘Holocaust Denial and Governmentally 
Declared ‘’Truth’’: French and American Perspectives,’ 41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 495 (2009). 






organisations are also entitled to initiate proceedings. Also, the defence of truth was 
abolished with regard to such defamation.  
More prominently, the loi Gayssot from 1990 penalizes ‘any racist, anti-Semitic 
or xenophobic act’ and ‘any discrimination based on someone's belonging or not 
belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a religion’, and makes it a crime to 
‘contest or call into question the existence of one or several crimes against humanity as 
defined in Article 6 of the statutory regulations of the International Military Tribunal 
annexed to the August 8, 1945 London Agreement, and involving crimes committed 
either by members of an organisation declared criminal pursuant to Article 9 of the 
regulations or by a person convicted for such crimes by a French court or an international 
court.’741  
The Conseil d’État confirmed the dissolution of the associations ‘Jeunesses 
nationalistes’742  and  ’L'Oeuvre française’743 which organise assemblies inciting to 
hatred, discrimination and violence of persons for reasons of their foreign nationality, 
origin, or their Muslim or Jewish religion. 
 ‘Public abuse’, ‘incitement to racial hatred’, ‘praising war crimes’, ‘trivializing 
crimes against humanity’ etc. are all criminalised in French law, and sentences are 
normally accompanied by heavy criminal fines.  
French prosecutors often appear to use criminal provisions against political 
opponents of the government. For instance, two leaders of the extreme right wing party 
Front National have already been convicted under the Gayssot law, and Jean-Marie Le 
Pen was also sentenced for other crimes such as ‘public abuse’, ‘incitement to racial 
hatred’, ‘praising war crimes’, etc.744 These provisions could not give rise to any 
constitutional litigation (as the QPC procedure was not set up yet, and preliminary review 
was not initiated by either MPs or government, even though the loi Gayssot was very 
much debated among French intelligentsia), but international human rights forums like 
                                                 
741 Loi No. 90-615 de 13 juillet, 1990, art 9, as translated and quoted by Weaver et al., Holocaust denial, 
above n 739 at 497 and notes 18 and 19. 
742 CÉ, réf., decision du 25 October 2013, n° 372319.  
743 CÉ, réf., decision du 25 October 2013, n° 372321. 




the Human Rights Committee (Faurisson) and the ECtHR (Garaudy,  Le Pen,745 
Gollnisch in a different case than discussed below) found no violation of their right to 
freedom of opinion or even research (with Gollnisch and Faurisson). At the ECtHR, most 
of these cases are declared inadmissible, relying often on Art 17 ECHR (abuse of rights), 
or just simply manifest ill-foundedness.  
The Cour de Cassation, in 2010, decided, – for lack of a serious question of 
constitutionality (!) –  not to submit to the Constitutional Council a newer case involving 
loi Gayssot in its very first decisions handed out in the QPC procedure. In a one-
paragraph reasoning (half of which is the description of the delict), the highest French 
court sitting in civil and criminal matters simply declares that the law refers to texts 
orderly introduced to French law, is clear and precise, and thus is not in conflict with 
constitutional principles of freedom of expression and opinion.746 Thus, there was 
absolutely no discussion in any sense of constitutional or human rights, no discussion of 
means and ends, proportionality, etc. What is more, any future assessment would be 
blocked as QPC may be initiated only once on any given provision.  
                                                 
745 Le Pen, eg was condemned under Art  23 of the law of 28 July 1881 on freedom of the press:   
Article 23 
« Seront punis comme complices d'une action qualifiée crime ou délit ceux qui, soit par des discours, cris 
ou menaces proférés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des écrits, imprimés, dessins, gravures, 
peintures, emblèmes, images ou tout autre support de l'écrit, de la parole ou de l'image vendus ou 
distribués, mis en vente ou exposés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des placards ou des affiches 
exposés au regard du public, soit par tout moyen de communication audiovisuelle, auront directement 
provoqué l'auteur ou les auteurs à commettre ladite action, si la provocation a été suivie d'effet. 
Cette disposition sera également applicable lorsque la provocation n'aura été suivie que d'une tentative de 
crime prévue par l'article 2 du code pénal. » 
Le Pen said (in an interview, but it does not make a difference neither under the ECHR nor under Art 23, it 
would be the same had he said that on an assembly) that  ‘The day when we will have, in France, not 5 
million but 25 million Muslims, they will be the ones who will command. And the French will hug the 
wall, go down the sidewalk, looking down. When they do not, they are said, ‘What are you looking at me 
like that? Looking for a fight? ‘And you just have to run away otherwise you take a fight.’ And later: 
‘Especially since when I say that with 25 million Muslims here, the French will hug the walls, people in the 
room tell me not without reason: ‘But Mr. Le Pen, it is already the case now!’’ Le Pen v. France, 
Application no. 18788/09, Decision on the admissibility of 20 April 2010. 
746 Arrêt n° 12008 du 7 mai 2010 (09-80.774) - Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité - Cour de 
cassation. This is the reasoning: ‘la question posée ne présente pas un caractère sérieux dans la mesure où 
l’incrimination critiquée se réfère à des textes régulièrement introduits en droit interne, définissant de façon 
claire et précise l’infraction de contestation de l’existence d’un ou plusieurs crimes contre l’humanité tels 
qu’ils sont définis par l’article 6 du statut du tribunal militaire international annexé à l’accord de Londres 
du 8 août 1945 et qui ont été commis soit par des membres d’une organisation déclarée criminelle en 
application de l’article 9 dudit statut, soit par une personne reconnue coupable de tels crimes par une 
juridiction française ou internationale, infraction dont la répression, dès lors, ne porte pas atteinte aux 




This is all the more troubling because of the following. While some of the 
convictions under the loi Gayssot were handed down in clear cases of denying the 
existence of death camps or gas chambers,747 other statements can hardly be qualified as 
denial. Gollnisch, the second most important figure in the Front National at the time, and 
a professor the University of Lyon, was sentenced under the Loi Gayssot because (i) he 
claimed another professor of history was, though respectable, not impartial in preparing a 
report on racism and Holocaust denial at the University of Lyon as he was Jewish (a 
statement which in general falls under discrimination in French law), and (ii) because of a 
– later withdrawn – statement that the number of persons killed in the Holocaust should 
be an issue left for historians to freely discuss. This latter remark was the main catalyst of 
the controversy. He explicitly said he did not deny the existence of deaths in gas 
chambers.748 He received a three-month suspended sentence, was fined 5000 euros, and 
was ordered to pay 55,000 euros in damages and also for the publication of the decision 
in newspapers. However, finally the Cour de Cassation annulled the sentence,749 a move 
apparently unexpected in the so predictable French legal system where the judge is 
merely the mouthpiece of the law.750 In the light of this annulment in 2009, it is really 
surprising that a year or so later this very same Court blocked the way to constitutional 
review in QPC. Lower courts themselves showed they were willing to construct a 
‘contestation of crimes against humanity’ from statements explicitly ‘denying’ denying 
those crimes, on the one hand, and other statements which are critical of the law’s reach 
in declaring an official truth, on the other. Still, the Cour de Cassation found the law was 
clear and precise and not in need of constitutional check.  
A less questionable, but still characteristic conviction under the loi Gayssot relates 
to Le Pen’s so-called ‘detail’ remark. He said that in books on World War II, the 
                                                 
747 This is the case with Faurisson, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 9, 1992 (Fr.), 
U.N. CCPR, 58th Sess., Commc'n No. 550/1993, available at http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/4c47b59ea48f7343802566f200352fea?Opendocument,  and Marais, Pierre 
Marais v. France, No. 31159, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996) all as cited by Weaver et al.,Holocaust denial, above n 
739 at 499 and notes 31, 32 and 36.  
748 See Weaver et al. above n 739 at 499-504. 








Holocaust takes up a few pages and gas chambers a few lines, and ‘that’s what one calls a 
detail’. Disgusting as it might be, he did not deny the existence of either the Holocaust or 
the gas chambers, nor even said they were understandable or explicable events (no 
justification). Still, his words can be interpreted – and I suppose were meant to be – a 
belittlement (Verharmlosen – trivialisation), ie something German law would also find 
reprehensible, though that is exactly where one can be doubtful if it were in line with the 
reasoning of the GFCC’s Holocaust Denial decision. It is one thing to deny a part of 
one’s identity, and another to say it was a small element during the war, the latter being 
clearly an opinion. In any case, these are of no concern to French courts, and it is not so 
easy to unequivocally establish what is. 
As most of the decisions are not publicly available, and the ones that are have 
very sparse reasoning, here I turn to scholars (who also often rely on the press, even in 
cases where the decision was not ordered to appear in the press). Scholars think that such 
far-going restrictions are necessary firstly to protect the dignity of the victims,751 and 
secondly because of public order fears752 – a clear heckler’s veto, as the French normally 
start disruptive protests when public persons, especially university professors, are saying 
such kinds of things. Finally, restrictions like the loi Gayssot are said to be necessary to 
prevent French people from forgetting the Holocaust, and that fear is increasingly 
justified as survivors are aging and passing away. 753 Human dignity seems strongest 
here, or it is closest to what can be conceived of as a right of another person in terms of 
the general limit in Article 4 of the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. 
Bertrand de Lamy contemplates the refusal of the Cour de Cassation to transfer the loi 
Gayssot to the Conseil Constitutionnel and notes that human dignity is also embedded in 
the preamble to the 1946 constitution.754 Public order also clearly acts as a limit to 
freedom of opinion in Art 10. Most problematic is certainly the legally enforced official 
history in the third explanation. This is, however, widely practiced in France through lois 
                                                 
751 Weaver et al.Holocaust denial, above n 739 at 508. 
752 Ibid  
753 Weaver et al.Holocaust denial., above n 739 at 509. 
754 Bertrand de Lamy, ‘QPC: refus de transmission’, Revue de science criminelle 2011 p. 178. The 
preamble to the 1946 constitution, referred to in the preamble to 1958 constitution, and thus having 
constitutional value: ‘Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont 
tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être 




mémorielles, largely without normative content apart from the Gayssot law755 and might 
in anyway be in harmony with the strong role of the state in framing the proper 
‘consciousness of the French’ as has been visible eg in the Islamic veil debate, and lately 
in the burqa controversies.756  
The Conseil d’État also makes use of the first two arguments, although it 
combines human dignity and public order in such a way that the latter includes the 
former. This kind of combination has been accepted in French law since the dwarf 
throwing (exact translation of the French lancer de nains)757 decision. Accordingly, one 
cannot waive their human dignity, because it is part of public order, and even if one 
freely, in all liberty, wants to be the thrown person in a show of that kind, it is necessary 
and proportionate for the local authority to prohibit it because of troubles to public 
order.758 In relation to freedom of demonstration, the Conseil d’État held that it can have 
its limits in the interest in antidiscrimination and human dignity, this latter being part of 
‘public order’. Recall that in the famous ‘soupe gauloise’ or ‘soupe au cochon’ 
decision759 the Conseil d’État decided that the ban on food distribution organised by an 
extreme right-wing group (SDF – Solidarité des Français, SDF is otherwise a common 
acronym for ‘Sans domicile fixe’, ie homeless) with a probable racist animus does not 
                                                 
755 Loi n°83-550 du 30 juin 1983 relative à la commémoration de l'abolition de l'esclavage, loi n° 2005-158 
du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français 
rapatriés. i.e. the law on colonisation, Loi n°2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la reconnaissance du 
génocide arménien de 1915, devoid of any normativity. The planned law criminalising denying the 
Armenian genocide was quashed as unconstitutional. Décision n° 2012-647 DC du 28 février 2012, but that 
does not affect the validity of the Gayssot law.  
756 For my view that laicité starts overpouring to the private sphere in a way not true to its traditions see 
below Chapter 9. 
757 CÉ, 27 octobre 1995 - Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge - Rec. Lebon p. 372.  
758 The reasoning is basically these two paragraphs:  
Considérant qu'il appartient à l'autorité investie du pouvoir de police municipale de prendre toute mesure 
pour prévenir une atteinte à l'ordre public ; que le respect de la dignité de la personne humaine est une des 
composantes de l'ordre public ; que l'autorité investie du pouvoir de police municipale peut, même en 
l'absence de circonstances locales particulières, interdire une attraction qui porte atteinte au respect de la 
dignité de la personne humaine ; 
Considérant que l'attraction de ‘lancer de nain’ consistant à faire lancer un nain par des spectateurs conduit 
à utiliser comme un projectile une personne affectée d'un handicap physique et présentée comme telle ; que, 
par son objet même, une telle attraction porte atteinte à la dignité de la personne humaine ; que l'autorité 
investie du pouvoir de police municipale pouvait, dès lors, l'interdire même en l'absence de circonstances 
locales particulières et alors même que des mesures de protection avaient été prises pour assurer la sécurité 
de la personne en cause et que celle-ci se prêtait librement à cette exhibition, contre rémunération. 





violate freedom of assembly.760 The 2014 ban of a show of a comedian (Dieudonné) with 
anti-Semitic messages was found justified by the same mixture of dignity and public 
order reasons by the Conseil d’État.761  
As both the Gallic soup and the Dieudonné cases and the numerous memorial 
laws testify, the threshold for expression to violate human dignity and equality is both 
lower in France and has a wider application to groups than in Germany. In addition, the 
Conseil d’État is not preoccupied at all with the problematic of horizontal application of 
human rights, since it includes human dignity and antidiscrimination in the concept of 
public order without any further ado. The reference to public order appears to ‘etatise’ or 
‘verticalise’ the balancing, but it is nonetheless a fiat of will to say that public order 
includes this kind of protection against offensive speech, even without any further 
showing that actual disturbances to public order would otherwise occur. The lack of any 
showing of material harm contrasts nicely with the U.S. American approach, to which I 
now turn.   
3. United States 
 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, dignity does not have such a privileged status as in 
Germany or France, or, to be precise, dignity does not figure as a legal value in relation to 
speech, especially political speech in public assemblies.  
In comparisons of U.S. and German free speech law, it is a well-known assertion 
– basically the only one, reiterated and restudied ad nauseam – that all the above-
mentioned German cases which rely on dignity would fall under New York Times v. 
Sullivan or Hustler v. Falwell, including Holocaust denial or bestialising depiction of 
politicians or public persons, or claiming that soldiers are murderers, or offering Gallic 
soup (or, let’s say, steak) to the homeless. Campus hate speech codes are a special, and 
extremely controversial, field of regulation whose analysis goes beyond the scope of this 
project. Situations similar to those conceived as involving speech-dignity clashes 
                                                 
760 See the discussion above text accompanying notes 330--335. 




elsewhere are partly conceived under the fighting words doctrine, but largely are not seen 
at all as situations giving rise to restrictions on speech.  
Regarding the proscribability of group libel, the USSC’s jurisprudence consists of 
at most two cases, one of them likely obsolete. After the Second World War, the Court 
upheld a kind of group libel statute in an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter. In 
Beauharnais v. Illinois762 (1952) there was a call for ‘Whites to unite’ in order to stop 
murder, rape etc. committed by Blacks against Whites and similar allegations. The statute 
as construed by state courts allegedly only limited fighting words, but not completely in 
the sense of Chaplinsky. The most important characteristic of the Chaplinsky doctrine, i.e. 
the direct personal attack against an individual, was notably missing. The USSC, in a 
five-to-four decision, nonetheless upheld Beauharnais’s conviction under the group libel 
statute. Justice Frankfurter’s opinion stresses both the need for deference to the 
legislature in questions of scientific evidence about harmful effects of racial hatred and 
the need to protect both individuals and groups against libel. The relevance of the ruling 
is questionable, since both Brandenburg v. Ohio and the Skokie cases rely on opposite 
premises and resulted in opposite outcomes. 763 Though Beauharnais was never 
overruled, its relevance seems to have eroded.  
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul764 from 1992 is the next case where the USSC struck 
down a group libel or hate speech statute, albeit on content neutrality grounds which I 
will then examine below in Chapter 8.  
Here it suffices to emphasise the very characteristic feature of First Amendment 
doctrine, whose default reflex leads it to discuss cross burning as fighting words, ie in 
terms of reaction of the target of the cross burning, and with absolutely no hint of human 
dignity. In Virginia v. Black, the cross-burning case from 2003, the question of 
‘intimidation’ arose, which was largely translated by the Court as true threat.765 Again, 
human dignity just does not figure in the discussion at all, clearly because it is considered 
so vague, devoid of any requirement of material harm that no justified restriction on the 
right to free speech can be constitutionally based upon it.   
                                                 
762 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
763 See above Chapter 2. 
764 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 




4. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, dignity – as an explicit legal value, let alone a right – does not 
shape the law on protest either. Though free speech law in general is more restrictive than 
in the US, – eg stirring up racial and religious766 hatred have been criminalised, not only 
incitement to unlawful action – UK law is focused on consequential harm.  
However, (in part only until 2013), section 5 POA proscribed the use of 
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior likely causing harassment, alarm, or 
distress’, which was often applied to situations where German or French law would 
operate with the mixture of dignity and public order/peace.  
Hammond v DPP767 involved an evangelical Christian holding a sign inscripted 
with ‘Stop immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’ and ‘Stop Lesbianism’. The message was 
unwelcome by the audience who then threw mud and poured water on Hammond. 
Hammond’s conviction was affirmed by the Divisional Court, which sought to test 
whether the expression was ‘legitimate’, and finding it was not.768  
Norwood v. DPP769 was about a BNP politician displaying a poster from his own 
window stating that ‘Islam out of Britain’ and ‘Protect the British people’ next to a photo 
of 9/11 twin towers in flame, and a crescent and star surrounded by a prohibition sign. 
Art 10 was found to be overstepped as the display was not an intemperate criticism of the 
tenets of Islam, but an ‘insulting attack’ on its followers. Again, Norwood was supposed 
to prove that his conviction was unreasonable or disproportionate, an undertaking which 
remained unsuccessful.  
In these cases remarkably deprived of any sense of the human rights approach, the 
audience (the ‘victim’ of insult) suffices to be a hypothetical onlooker.770 In Hammond no 
concern of heckler’s veto played a role either, and hostile audience reaction was rather 
seen as confirmation of the insulting character of Hammond’s speech.  
                                                 
766 For an argument that the new offense introduced in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is 
redundant see Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred’, 
P.L. 2006, Aut, 521-538.  
767 Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin). 
768 For more discussion see David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and Regulations in the 
Human Rights Act Era (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) at 226-227. 
769 Norwood v DPP  [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin).  




In Abdul v DPP771 , the English Tucholsky case,772 protestors against soldiers 
returning home from Iraq shouted ‘murderers,’ ‘burn in hell’, ‘rapists’, ‘baby killers’ and 
‘terrorists’, and were convicted under section 5 POA, for using insulting and abusive 
language. These utterances constituted ‘a very clear threat to public order’ according to 
the Court (Art 52 i), despite the fact that neither arrest, nor any other police measure was 
taken at the demonstration, but only later, after having watched a film shootage of the 
event.773 It was considered relevant that the incriminated sentences were uttered in a 
crowd situation: during a military parade which was watched by protestors. Though there 
occurred no violence on the part of well-wishing parade watchers against protestors, the 
Court imputed this to skilful policing (and not to the normal operation of a democratic 
society).  
In light of Norwood, Hammond and Abdul, without relying on a specific interest 
or value of human dignity, UK law restricted hostile expression related to group identity 
to a greater extent than German, and perhaps even French law.  
Since these cases were decided, however, the legislator changed the law, and 
deleted the ‘insulting’ part of section 5 POA.774 Thus, in this segment, the democratic 
process ended up providing a higher protection to freedom of assembly than domestic 
courts, or, as it will be seen below, the ECtHR.  
This legislative improvement left the ‘abusive’ part of the harassment provision in 
s. 5 POA unaltered though, thus Abdul v DPP-like scenarios will continue to be 
prosecuted.  
In addition, the 2014 ‘anti-social behaviour’ act allows for injunction in case of 
conduct likely causing nuisance or annoyance, a material standard cutting even below the 
abolished ‘insulting’ standard in s. 5 POA, coupled with a weakened standard of proof 
(‘balance of probabilities’). No wonder scholars775 and NGOs776 urged no to introduce 
this unusually vague provision, nonetheless, their voices remained unheard. 
                                                 
771 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin); [2011] Crim. L.R. 553. 
772 See above in relation to German law, text accompanying nn 700-706.  
773 For more detailed comment see Alex Bailin, Criminalising free speech? CRIM. L.R. 2011, 9, 705-711 
774 Section 57 (2) of Crime and Courts Act 2013.  
775 In general: Kevin Brown, ’Replacing the ASBO with the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance: 
a plea for legislative scrutiny and amendment’ Crim. L.R. 2013, 8, 623-639, Specifically related to freedom 





In sum, English law, despite abolishing the punishment of ‘insulting’ behaviour’ 
(and the here not discussed anti-social behaviour orders or ASBOs), continues to limit 
freedom of assembly in pursuance of unclarified, vague public order interests. These 
interests sometimes overlap with concerns elsewhere understood as dignity concerns or 
group identity concerns, but are all caught up within a comfortably cloudy understanding 
of public order which does not compel courts to seriously engage with arguments from 
human rights. More precisely, English courts do not even have to make the argumentative 
moves between dignity, group identity and public order, but are contented with cursory 
references to ‘threats to public order.’ 
5. ECtHR  
 
In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, dignity does not figure explicitly as an important 
concept either, which is partly due to the fact the Convention does not contain a right to 
human dignity. This does not mean that dignity-like interests are not very much protected 
in other areas of the jurisprudence, especially under article 8, sometimes in conjunction 
with article 14.  
Nonetheless, quite clearly, the cases argued under dignity and public order-public 
peace in Germany and France would largely be inadmissible under the ECHR, for 
reasons of article 17,777 prohibition of abuse of rights, or for simply being unfounded. Eg 
the request of Solidarité des Francais, the organisation distributing the pork soup was 
declared inadmissible.778 Norwood was also declared inadmissible.779 In general, 
‘gratuitously offensive speech’ does not merit protection in Strasbourg.780  
Lehideux et Isorni is however a case which suggests that the ECtHR accords 
greater protection to offensive speech than France. In that case, representatives of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
776 Liberty, Liberty’s Response to the Home Office’s Proposals on More Effective Responses to Anti-
Social Behaviour (London: Liberty, 2011), p.15. as cited by Brown, ibIbid  
777 On Holocaust denial see Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65381/01, Inadmissibility decision 24 June 
2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-I. 
778 ‘…un rassemblement en vue de la distribution sur la voie publique d’aliments contenant du porc, vu son 
message clairement discriminatoire et attentatoire aux convictions des personnes privées du secours 
proposé, risquait de causer des troubles à l’ordre public que seule son interdiction pouvait éviter.’ 
Association Solidarité des Francais c. France, no 26787/07, décision de 16 juin 2011 (irrecevable).  
779 Norwood v. UK, Application no. 23131/03, Decision on the admissibility of 16 November 2004. 




association cultivating the memory of Maréchal Pétain were found guilty of apology of 
the crimes of the collaboration, a criminal offense. The applicant endorsed the so-called 
double game theory by praising Pétain as ‘supremely skilful’, while condemning ‘Nazi 
atrocities and persecutions’ or ‘German omnipotence and barbarism’.781 The ECtHR 
found a violation of Art 10 as there was no Holocaust denial, and the applicants’ 
statements were rather to be interpreted as part of an ongoing debate in history and 
historical identity of the French, considering also that the prosecution withdrew from the 
proceedings. 
The ECtHR, similarly to the Conseil d’État, confirmed in Vona v. Hungary that 
associations intimidating ethnic minorities can be dissolved without violating Art. 11.782 
The Hungarian Guard certainly staged paramilitary-like threatening marches, which even 
in the US would qualify as ‘true threat’. It has to be noted though that the dissolution has 
not prevented newer versions of the Guard from reappearing and continue intimidation in 
the form of demonstrations.783 This happens when the state fights against abuses of 
freedom of assembly within the framework of freedom of association, which reinforces 
my argument that the two rights must be properly delineated. Though the ECtHR 
mentions this problem, due to its international nature, it clearly is unable to solve it. 
Other recent hate speech cases – not in the context of an assembly, but principally 
applicable because of the fall-back nature of Art 10 – in Strasbourg show a more 
alarming trend. Féret v. Belgium,784 Le Pen v. France,785 or Vejdeland v. Sweden786 are 
perhaps most notorious for a weakened standard which allow for limiting speech which is 
simply offensive or abhorrent, but does not specifically incite to hatred.787 In this regard, 
                                                 
781 § 47, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, Application no. 55/1997/839/1045, Judgment of 23 September 
1998.  
782 Vona v. Hungary, application no. 35943/10, judgment of 9 July 2013. 
783 See Orsolya Salát, ‘Report on freedom of assembly in Hungary’, 113-126 in Comparative Study: 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Europe Study requested by the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law – Venice Commission, ed. Prof. Dr. Anne Peters & Dr. Isabelle Ley, Max Planck Institute for  
Comparative Public and International Law, 2014, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/files/Assemblies_Report_12March2014.pdf 
784 Féret v Belgium, Application no 15615/07, Judgment of 16 July 2009. 
785 Le Pen c. France, Application no. 18788/09, decision de recevabilité de 20 avril 2010 (inadmissible).  
786 Vejdeland v. Sweden, Application no. 1813/07, Judgment of 9 February 2012. 
787 See Stefan Sottiaux. ‘”Bad Tendencies” in the ECtHR’s “Hate Speech” Jurisprudence, 7 European 
Constitutional Law Review, 40 (2011), Kiska Roger ‘Hate Speech: A Comparison Between The European 
Court Of Human Rights And The United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence’, 25 Regent University Law 




there is notable tension within Convention jurisprudence between these cases (against 
ethnic or sexual minorities), and the Red Star case, where it was declared that ‘dictates of 
public feeling – real or imaginery –‘ do not authorise the state to restrict human rights, as 
‘society must remain reasonable in its judgement’ for to count as democratic.788  
To sum up: dignity-type arguments arise especially in Germany and France, in 
relation to the Holocaust, Jews, people of colour, immigrants, and so on, ie what is 
commonly called hate speech. Therefore, dignity in this part of human rights law acts like 
a buffer between different groups, it basically functions as protecting social identity, as a 
perimeter (and not, eg, as an autonomy-enhancing argument). That’s why in some 
jurisdictions, dignity appears to mingle with public order, also a dubious concept with at 
times identity, at times authoritarian, and again other times militant democracy overtones. 
German legal language here focuses on the individual, while in French law the focus on 
discrimination might signal a more collective identity-based approach.  
Though English law is exempt from a specifically dignitarian argument, this 
chapter showed it embraces restrictions for similar scenarios often to a larger extent than 
German or perhaps even French law. The ECtHR’s somewhat chaotic hate speech 
jurisprudence increasingly rubberstamps national restrictions in pursuance of interests 
way below the German standard. The US Supreme Court has unsurprisingly proved most 
resistant to explicit or implicit dignity like restrictions.  
In the last three chapters, American jurisprudence will appear in a significantly 
worse light due to the distortious effects of content neutrality on assemblies. But before 
that I quickly sketch another possible limit, property, explaining also why most of the 
potential issues are discussed elsewhere in the book.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
incoherence in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on freedom of expression and freedom of 
association’, 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 106 (2012). 







1. Special days of the year: the notion of public order in Germany 
 
Germany is the prime example where assemblies may not take place on special days of 
the year if additional conditions are fulfilled.  
The Constitutional Court has accepted a postponing condition imposed on a Neo-
Nazi march which was scheduled for the 27th of January (the Holocaust Memorial Day in 
Germany). The justification accepted was that an extreme right wing march on that very 
day would disturb public order.  
Public order is a concept normally less adequate for restricting basic rights than 
its related concept of public safety since Brokdorf.  It includes those ‘unwritten rules that 
the currently predominate social and ethical views consider must be followed as an 
indispensable condition of an ordered human coexistence within a particular territory.’ As 
such, it is not normally sufficient to justify a ban on an assembly.789  
In the present case, however, the Court found that it is possible to rely on public 
order considerations if the restriction resulting is only a delay by one day of the planned 
demonstration. Such delays are constitutional as ‘public order is affected if a particular 
day has such an unequivocal meaning in society with a significant symbolic force and the 
planned march would attack upon that very meaning in a way which at the same time 
                                                 




significantly violates fundamental social or ethical views.’790 Such is the case with an 
‘extreme right wing’ march on the day of remembrance of the liberation of the Auschwitz 
concentration camp on January 27, 1945, proclaimed the official day of remembrance to 
the victims of National Socialism.  
The decision, however, did not discuss in detail competing interests of the 
speaker, as the organiser of the march explicitly claimed he was not aware of the day’s 
significance, and on his own also ‘booked’ the next day, January 28th, when it became 
likely that the march would not be allowed to go on on the 27th. Thus, the Court declared 
that the organizer did not show ‘an interest in need of particular protection’ to march 
exactly on the 27th of January. Furthermore, the case went to the Constitutional Court for 
preliminary suspension of the ban (‘condition’), and this expedited procedure only allows 
for correcting the most obvious mistakes committed by ordinary courts and authorities.  
Thus, significantly, in the procedure before the GFCC the argument was not 
raised and discussed that the date should be available for ‘protest’ exactly because the 
date means something. Still, the GFCC would probably find a ‘delaying condition’ 
constitutional even if the very purpose of a march would be (explicitly) to protest 
Holocaust Memorial Day itself, or any related topic.  
At least in another decision the Court even declares that to avert endangering of 
public order, it is possible to restrict freedom of assembly if it is the Art und Weise, ie the 
manner or modality of the realisation of an assembly, and not the content which gives rise 
                                                 
790 „Die öffentliche Ordnung kann betroffen sein, wenn einem bestimmten Tag ein in der Gesellschaft 
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diesem Tag in einer Weise angegriffen wird, dass dadurch zugleich grundlegende soziale oder ethische 
Anschauungen in erheblicher Weise verletzt werden.“ BVerfG ( 1. Kammer des Ersten Senats ), Beschluß 




to concerns.791 The Court sketches three examples. Accordingly, it is permissible to 
restrict ‘aggressive and provocative conduct of participants which intimidate the citizens, 
through which demonstrators create a climate of violent demonstration and a climate of 
potential readiness to violence.’792 The next example of the Court of more interest to us 
here is exactly the extreme right wing march on Holocaust Memorial Day, provided in 
addition that ‘from the manner and modalities of the realisation of the assembly 
provocations arise which significantly encroach upon the ethical sentiments of 
citizens.’793 Note that the expression ‘ethical sentiments’ (or maybe ethical sensitivity: 
sittliches Empfinden) conspicuously diverges from the usual one in the definition of 
public order: ‘grundlegende soziale und ethische Anschauungen.’ Here, the modality of 
the realisation of the assembly is not (solely) the time (ie Holocaust Memorial Day), but 
also the ‘provocative way’ of behaviour of the protestors.  
The same applies, thirdly, so the Court adds, ‘when a procession in its overall 
outlook identifies with the rites and symbols of the Nazi tyranny, and intimidates other 
citizens through evocation of the horrors of the past totalitarian and inhuman regime.’794  
Note that in the German understanding modality differs from content-neutrality as 
normally understood eg in U.S. free speech law. Here the reason for restriction clearly 
relates to the content of the message of the demonstrators, as only a pro-Nazi viewpoint 
gives rise to the need for restriction. Still, if the restriction only affects the time of the 
demonstration, then it is still found to be a restriction on modality, and thus, there is no 
                                                 
791 BVerfG, Beschluß vom 23. 6. 2004 – 1 BvQ 19/04. NJW 2004, 2814. (“Stoppt den Synagogenbau!”) 
792 NJW 2004, 2814, 2815, citing BVerfG [1. Kammer des Ersten Senats], NJW 2001, NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 
2069 [NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 2071]; NJW 2001, NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 2072 [NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 2074]; 
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need to defend it on the basis of Art. 5 II, ie no requirement of a general law is foreseen. 
However, the Court goes further, and declares that the next question is proportionality of 
official reaction, ie if possible, only a condition should be imposed, but if that is not 
enough to avert the danger, then a ban might also be constitutional.  
In general it appears from the complicated jurisprudence795 of the Court that 
public order can be the basis for restrictions on modalities, but not on the content of the 
expression, be it on an assembly or anything else.796 Content can only be restricted if 
public safety, understood to include substantive legal values, is directly endangered. In 
this case, necessarily, also a ban might be constitutional,797 and it is even preferred 
(mandated) over imposing a condition on content, as the state is forbidden from forcibly 
changing the substantive message. In the case of modalities, however, imposition of 
condition will regularly be a less restrictive means if public order is endangered, and as 
the limit is public order, not the substantive public safety, there is no need to examine if 
the law restricting freedom of assembly is a general one in the sense of Art. 5 II GG.   
In an even more curious decision from 2005 the German court also found 
permissible a rerouting of a far right demonstration away from both the Holocaust 
Memorial and the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on the day of the 60th anniversary of 
capitulation of Germany. This decision, discussed in detail below,798 was however not 
decided on public order grounds but partly on human dignity, and partly on balancing 
competing rights of the youth organisation of the Nationalist Party and of the general 
                                                 
795 To get a general sense of the conundrum around public order see Ulrich Battis & Klaus Joachim 
Grigoleit, Rechtsextremistische Demonstrationen und öffentliche Ordnung – Roma locuta? NJW 2004, 
3459. It is partly overridden by the decision related to the Rudolf Hess memorial marches, discussed supra 
text accompanying notes 718-737. 
796 HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 795 at 29. 
797 See HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 795 at 29 and 135-156. 




public who wanted to attend a government-organised commemorative event at the 
Brandenburg Gate. Still, the special date played a role in the whole scheme, and the Court 
also found the date weighty as an argument in favour of restricting the rights of the young 
Nationalists, even though they were the first to notify the authorities about the planned 
march.  
2. Duration, time limit, frequency  
 
An important question for the demonstrators might be how long and how often they are 
constitutionally entitled to demonstrate. From a theoretical point of view, the answer 
largely depends on the rationale of the protection of the right to assembly.  
If assemblies (demonstrations) are simply about expression in the narrow sense, 
then the first and only time might suffice, and it would not need to take a longer time than 
what is sufficient to express the message. After all, we are all sensible persons and 
understand the message already the first time, with no need for repetition.  
However, if assemblies are also or foremost about thematising a new issue, 
creating a new social meaning, ‘raising awareness’, setting an agenda or exerting political 
pressure, then they might need to take longer and might occur repeatedly, even if the 
message is the same every time.  
How long and how frequently though are not questions answerable in the abstract. 
Maybe then it is no wonder that not too many high court cases have dealt with this 
question.  
A rights-friendly approach would probably require that as a default demonstrators 




increasing burdens or externalities such an enduring or repeating demonstration puts on 
the normal daily life of the community. In practice, the boundary is probably determined 
through negotiation between police and demonstrators, and it will depend on the 
particular circumstances of a locality, with all that this brings about in relation to non-
mainstream groups. Very few points seem clear. Obstructive demonstrations, if they are 
tolerated at all,799 will not be tolerated too long or too often. 
As to frequency, in general, all over the jurisdictions, previous unlawful action is 
ground for denying permits, or imposing conditions, or issuing injunctions.  
In this latter regard, recall the controversy in the U.S. about abortion protests, and 
especially who is bound by the injunction.In the United Kingdom, harassment provisions 
are applied to prevent repetition of protest events, well below the threshold of 
obstruction, even well below causing alarm or distress. Injunctions may be issued – and 
increasingly often are issued – against protests directed at unidentified persons who 
belong to ‘loosely formed unincorporated organisations’800 such as campaign groups.  
On the other hand, recurring yearly (or monthly, as with the Critical Mass) single 
cause demonstrations are common events all over the countries, some of them, like 
religious or other traditional processions, regularly exempted even from the notification 
requirement.801 On its own, the recurring nature is not a problem anywhere. 
As to duration, there is again likely a practical negotiation between police and 
demonstrators, depending also on the quality of the place where the demonstration is to 
be held.  
                                                 
799 See Chapter 4 above. 
800 David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and Regulations in the Human Rights Act Era 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2010) at 276.  




In case of demonstrations or marches on roads and streets, certainly traffic 
rerouting is unlikely mandated by human rights for a significant period of time. The 
famous Schmidberger decision of the ECJ802 is beyond the scope of this project, but is 
still notable. To allow for a 30-hour complete closure of the Brenner Pass, a vital 
transportation route in Europe, for an environmental demonstration, is certainly among 
the most extreme, and most unlikely scenarios to happen under the jurisdictions 
examined here. Also, it appears to me, that the ECJ would not (even cannot) go as far as 
to mandate such a restriction on the free movement of goods in order to protect freedom 
of assembly, thus the EU countries examined in this book have a certain national 
discretion in this regard.   
Parks are arguably different, where there is no traffic; thus, demonstrators can 
stay longer, as they cause less of a hassle for others. As will be shown below under 
manner restrictions on appearances and aesthetics, the USSC rejected the proposition that 
the First Amendment protects a demonstration for homeless people to continue through 
the night on the National Mall and Lafayette Park in D.C.803  It is all the more ironic, and 
clearly shows the distortions of content neutrality and public forum doctrines, that the 
Occupy Wall Street protesters (ie a demonstration which had not as its purpose to 
specifically point out the plight of the homeless by the expressive activity of sleeping) 
could camp and sleep in Zucotti Park in New York for almost two months, only because 
Zucotti Park is privately owned. Though the demonstrators were finally removed by 
police for reasons of sanitary and safety hazards, and some possible criminal activity like 
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drug use. If there really was – as probably was – a sanitary hazard, unaverted but caused 
by the demonstrators themselves, then at some point the state must step in, and two 
months appear a generous deal, especially given that residents were also complaining, 
even staging a protest at the City Hall themselves against the passivity of police in 
handling the situation in Zucotti Park.804 Demonstrators were allowed to return after the 
park has been cleaned up, but they were not be allowed to start camping again. This 
question of course entirely depends on the private owner of the park, and certainly no 
court would find unconstitutional a limitation on demonstration which is way below the 
one found constitutional in the homeless sleeping tent case by the USSC for publicly 






Acceptable regulation on the ‘manner of an assembly’ refers to three main issues: first 
and most famously the question of symbolic speech, inherently related to the above 
discussed relation (or difference) of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly;805 
secondly, the noise made either intentionally or necessarily by the demonstrations; and 
finally, the litter and other aesthetic harm which is created on such occasions.  
                                                 
804 City, Zuccotti Park owners order protesters to leave until park has been cleaned, by Associated Press, 
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Although some of these issues might sound uninteresting, they are in fact part and 
parcel of a system of restrictions which often affect the essence of the freedom which is 
inherent in assemblies.   
1. Banned and protected symbols  
 
Symbols at an assembly come in many varieties. Social movement history testifies that 
symbols play a probably more important role than anything else in making an efficient 
protest event. Symbols induce unity and a sense of strength, but they also convey the 
message in a compact form. They can be worn on clothes, brought with, drawn or printed 
on placards, and so on. What is more, not only material objects can bear or become 
symbols. Symbol also is marching in formation, special gestures, or dancing a special 
dance,806 or the various uses of fire, itself a symbol of growing multiplicity.807 Symbols, 
valuable as they are to the protesters, often seem threatening to the authorities or the 
general public exactly because of their powerful unifying capacity. Also, symbols may 
hurt more than words as the recognition of the symbol immediately recalls a range of 
associations. Moreover, symbols are simplifying and far more apt to stir emotions than 
reasoned argument.808 Finally, there is a competition between symbols of protesting 
groups and state symbols, best exemplified by the flag desecration cases.   
Therefore, it comes at least as no surprise that courts tend to grant less protection 
to so-called symbolic speech than to the ‘default’ category of reasoned argument. The 
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808 Cf. Justice Jackson’s statement: ‘Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. 
The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality is a short-cut from 




USSC’s symbolic speech doctrine is a case in point where a court explicitly says so, 
while in the other jurisdictions the constitutionality of serious limitations, or selective 
outright bans on symbols at demonstrations are often not even questioned in and by 
courts.  
  Various symbols, though widespread in the practice of demonstrations 
everywhere, have attracted a differing amount of legislative and judicial attention in the 
different countries. These differences will be taken into account in the following 
discussion.  
1.1. Symbolic speech in the U.S: fire, draft-card, flags, swastikas and crosses  
 
Symbols have always been in use at assemblies, but until the middle of the 20th century 
theoretical questions of symbolic speech had not come to the forefront of debate. The 
1931 decision Stromberg v. California for instance is about a ban on displaying the red 
flag, ie a symbol, although the decision does not revolve around what speech protection 
symbols should enjoy. The statute in Stromberg proscribed displaying a red flag in a 
public place or in a meeting place809  
as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organised 
government, or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, 
or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character. 
 
In this case, however, the question was not to what extent waving the red flag is 
expression, but whether displaying the red flag with any of the proscribed meanings is 
                                                 




constitutionally protected. Thus, the Court had to deal not with the symbolic conduct part 
of the expression, but exactly with the content part (opposition to organised government, 
stimulus to anarchistic action, or propaganda of sedition). As such, it found that the latter 
two (incitement or solicitation kind) categories are proscribable, but the state cannot 
prohibit using the red flag as symbol of opposition to organised government. The line is 
very thin in this pre-’clear and present danger’, and of course pre-Brandenburg case, but 
it is nonetheless existing as between stating a view (opposition to organised government) 
and incitement to action. Thus, in Stromberg, the Court has not yet questioned whether 
speech by symbolic conduct is speech, nor has it indicated that it would be worthy of less 
protection.810    
The symbolic speech doctrine has its origins proper in a later dispute over what 
counts as speech and what is conduct, unprotected by the First Amendment. Justice Black 
was the most prominent representative of the view that speech should be afforded 
absolute protection while conduct (or action) zero.811 The court itself on many occasions 
made clear that though not subscribing to a rigid speech-action theory, it maintains a 
difference in the protection afforded to pure speech and ‘speech plus.’ In Cox v. 
Louisiana I, the Court per Justice Goldberg stated what later came to be cited many 
times:812  
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to 
those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as 
                                                 
810 It obviously could not have done so, as the statute at hand itself was based on the assumption that 
displaying the red flag was speech. 
811 See, eg, Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969),  609 ff (Justice Black, dissenting.).  




patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as 
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by 
pure speech. …it has never been deemed an abridgment of 
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal 
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed. 
 
Note the remarkable lack of any reference to the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble with regard to marching and picketing. Even within the speech framework, 
what counts as ‘pure speech’ – if existing at all – , has never been defined. Almost all 
speech worthy to its name makes use of symbolism and includes some material element 
or modality, even in our virtual world.  
In the classic symbolic speech decision in 1968, in O’Brien the Warren Court 
upheld criminal conviction for burning the draft card in opposition to the Vietnam 
War.813 According to the newly enacted four-step standard,814  
 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
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Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest. 
 
Then the Court went on to find that the registration system was certainly within 
governmental power and was useful in many regards, fulfilling substantial governmental 
interest. Jurisprudentially, the decisive point is that proscription of destroying the draft 
card is an incidental regulation on speech, and incidental regulation is subjected to less 
stringent constitutional requirements. Justice Harlan adds in concurring that O’Brien had 
many other ways to convey his message than by burning the draft card, and a contrario, 
if a message can only be conveyed in a way which violates an ‘incidental’ regulation, 
then that would be found an unconstitutional burden. Clearly, the majority and the 
concurring do not find important that to burn the draft card is certainly among the most 
effective and powerful ways of protesting against the war. Neither does it bother the court 
that in effect it imposes its own view on how to communicate a specific message.  
However, already in the next year, in Tinker the Court did not rely on O’Brien. It 
found that wearing an armband for the purpose of expressing opposition to the Vietnam 
War is ‘the type of symbolic act’ protected by the First Amendment, and ‘closely akin to 
‘pure speech.’’815 It was high school students who got suspended wearing the armband 
after the school board adopted such a policy in reaction to the rumours that some students 
were going to wear it. It therefore is different from O’Brien as the regulation was not 
incidentally burdening speech, but aimed at preventing disruption resulting from speech 
                                                 




feared by authorities.816 In distinguishing from other scenarios, the Court noted that the 
case at hand ‘does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group 
demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 
“pure speech”.‘817 Is it then implied here that group demonstrations involve ‘indirect’, 
‘secondary’ rights, akin to ‘impure’ speech?  
Tinker does not cite O’Brien, and does not analyse the question of symbolic 
expression any further than the declaration that wearing a black armband is closely akin 
to pure speech. The only focus is the potential for disruption, which was found to be 
without any merit. As such, Tinker properly favours free expression and affirms the 
commonplace that symbolic conduct has meaning and should be constitutionally 
protected along the same lines as any other expression. Tinker, however, does not affect 
the precedential status of O’Brien, not overturned to this day.818  
O’Brien however has been cited, and importantly, distinguished out, in the flag-
burning, flag-desecration and flag misuse controversy, in circumstances which involve 
state symbolism even more markedly than O’Brien. In a series of cases, the American 
flag was either burned, wore on trousers, or modified by affixation. In Street v. New York, 
appellant burned his own American flag in reaction to the news that James Meredith, a 
civil rights leader was killed by a sniper. He said on the street corner next to the burning 
flag that ‘We don’t need no damn flag’… ‘[I]f they let that happen to Meredith.’819 He 
got a suspended sentence under a flag desecration statute. The Supreme Court reversed 
                                                 
816 Similarly John Hart Ely, ‘Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis’, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1975), 1489.  
817 309 U.S. 508, emphasis added. 
818 O’Brien finds notable application in the nude dancing and public nudity decisions, Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991), City of Erie v. PAP’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).   




the conviction, but did not decide on the issue whether burning a flag is an expressive 
activity protected by the First Amendment.820 The four dissents attached to the Court’s 
opinion are more interesting as they do not avoid the issue of whether flag burning 
amounts to protected speech. Among the dissents, one can find a whole range of reasons 
focusing on the flag, on the fire, and on the difference between speech and action which 
purport to deny that flag burning is protected. Justice Black thinks flag-burning as 
conduct is outside First Amendment protection, Justice Fortas argues that the applicable 
statute is a general law which serves safety and undisturbed traffic, while Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice White in separate dissents strangely take for evident that flag 
desecration can be constitutionally criminalised.  
In Spence v. Washington,821 the Court faced a similar challenge, but again 
declined to decide the real issue. Spence was not burning a flag, but affixing on it a peace 
symbol in protest to the invasion of Cambodia, and the Kent State killing of four 
protesters by the police. This was found violating a flag misuse statute. The Supreme 
Court reversed and found the statute as applied unconstitutional. The per curiam decision 
found O’Brien inapplicable, as it took the statute to be directly related to expression. 
Assuming arguendo that the state might have a legitimate interest in preserving the 
integrity of the flag, it found that there was no evidence that anybody would have taken 
Spence’s modified flag to be endorsed by government.   
The assumption part of the Spence decision was brought again to the Court in 
Texas v. Johnson, the penultimate case in the saga of flag desecration. Johnson burnt a 
                                                 
820 Because the majority found the conviction could have been at least partly based on not what he did to 
the flag, but what he said about it. This is an uncommon way of seeing the lower court’s judgment, as the 
issue was phrased as related to burning the flag unanimously in the Court of Appeals. The majority was 
sharply criticized for this avoidance of the issue by the dissenters.  




flag in protest against the Reagan administration, and was convicted for ‘damaging the 
flag … in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to 
observe or discover his action.’822 The difference between this and the previous statutes is 
thus that here the (likely) reaction of the onlookers was the turning point. Whether one 
feels offended by the burning of a flag, however, can only be a result of communication 
of an idea. A flag burning by itself – for instance, as a result of a natural catastrophe – 
does not offend any reasonable person. The interest of the state of preserving national 
unity in the symbol of the flag is thus an interest not unrelated to expression. Therefore, 
O’Brien does not apply. As the protection of the flag’s integrity is even a content-based 
restriction, it should be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. In this light, the issue 
turns into the state’s interest to prescribe what shall be orthodox or to protect the society 
against offensive ideas; and neither of these is a legitimate concern. In reaction, the Flag 
Protection Act was enacted which criminalised any person who ‘knowingly mutilates, 
defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon’ a 
United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a ‘worn or soiled’ flag.823 
Government argued that unlike the statute in Johnson, this text aims only to protect the 
physical integrity of the flag, independent of any expressive conduct and without regard 
to onlookers’ reaction. U.S. v. Eichman invalidated the act because government could not 
show that the interest in protecting the flag’s integrity is unrelated to suppression of 
expression. The interest in preserving the flag as a symbol for national ideals is 
implicated only ‘when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates [a] message’824 
inconsistent with the ideals. O’Brien thus does not apply, and under Johnson there is no 
                                                 
822 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
823 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 




uncertainty as to the unconstitutionality. The Flag Protection Act entails not only content-
based, but even viewpoint-based discrimination, to use a later, but more precise doctrinal 
language.  
At this point, it is worth recalling the Skokie controversy and the R.A.V. and 
Virginia v. Black cases. In Skokie the would-be demonstrators wanted to march in full 
Nazi paraphernalia, wearing the swastika. In both R.A.V.825 and Virginia v. Black, a cross 
was burnt. Injunctions in Skokie against the march and the wearing of the swastika were 
found unconstitutional for failure to fulfil Brandenburg criteria.  
As to the facts in R.A.V., the defendant burned a cross on a Black family’s lawn 
and was convicted under a Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibits display of a 
symbol which one knows or has reason to know ‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ Although the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota claimed to have narrowed the scope of the ordinance to fighting words, it 
disregarded the fact that anger, alarm and resentment are not sufficient evils under the 
Chaplinsky doctrine (concurring opinion by Justice White). Nevertheless, the majority 
did not reach this issue, deciding the case on content-neutrality grounds. The novelty of 
the reasoning is that even low value speech cannot be regulated on the basis of content 
unless one of the following criteria is met. Firstly, ‘the basis for the content 
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is 
proscribable’, or, secondly, the state is concerned only about the ‘secondary effects’ of 
the speech, or a ‘particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech’ is 
‘swept up incidentally within the reach’ of the legislation, or, finally, ‘the nature of the 
content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression 
                                                 




of ideas is afoot.’826 Assuming arguendo that the ordinance as applied only prohibited 
fighting words, Scalia J. finds that none of the four possibilities applies. Rather, the 
legislation is impermissibly content-based insofar as it prosecutes fighting words only on 
the basis of race, gender, or religion and impermissibly viewpoint-discriminatory since it 
punishes fighting words based on intolerance but not those advocating tolerance in line 
with the state’s commitment to equality. 
As Justice Scalia’s example goes, using aspersions upon a person’s mother in 
support of racial, religious etc. tolerance would not be covered by the statute. The 
legislation is impermissibly content-based insofar as it prosecutes fighting words only on 
the basis of race, gender, or religion and impermissibly viewpoint-discriminatory since it 
punishes fighting words based on intolerance but not those advocating tolerance in line 
with the state’s commitment to equality. The most radical implication of the R.A.V. 
majority is that even within low value categories strict scrutiny applies. Therefore, R.A.V. 
is decided on content-neutrality grounds, and not so much on symbolic speech grounds. 
Nonetheless, the underlying assumption is that symbols can amount to fighting words, 
but that symbols are only regulable if they actually constitute fighting words.827   
In Virginia v. Black828 the Court faced a very similar challenge. There was also 
cross-burning, and a statute which made it a crime ‘for any person ... , with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group ... , to burn ... a cross on the property of another, a 
highway or other public place,’ and specifies that ‘[a]ny such burning ... shall be prima 
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.’ The Court found in favor of 
the cross-burners because the prima facie evidence provision was unconstitutional. Apart 
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from that, however, it accepted that cross-burning can be prosecuted if committed with 
the intent to intimidate. The evidence provision is unconstitutional because it takes away 
the very reason why the felony itself is constitutional. The majority of the Justices agreed 
on the proscribability of cross-burning as an instance of true threat if made with an intent 
to intimidate. (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also found constitutional the evidence 
provision, though they had also differences.) True threats are low value speech, therefore 
constitutionally regulable if one of the R.A.V. criteria is met. In this case, according to the 
majority of the Justices, a ban on cross-burning with an intent to intimidate falls under the 
first criterion. The basis for the ban ‘consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech at issue is proscribable,’ because cross-burning is a particularly virulent 
expression of intimidation.  
The dissenters and literature maintain that the ruling is inconsistent with R.A.V. 
and earlier doctrine.829 It is easy to show that the statute is viewpoint-discriminatory, just 
like the ordinance in R.A.V. ‘One could argue that cross burning is the most potent arrow 
in the white supremacist’s quiver. Those who wish to deliver a message of racial 
harmony are extremely unlikely to use cross burning as their mode of communication. 
Consequently, when the state regulates cross burning, it is undoubtedly handicapping one 
side of the debate.’830 As Justice Souter points out, for such cases the Court applies strict 
scrutiny, and, since the state has failed to show a compelling interest in opting for such 
viewpoint-discrimination instead of a content-neutral statute proscribing any kind of 
                                                 
829 Eg Frederick Schauer, ‘Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning’, 
2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 197, 209; Guy-Uriel E. Charles, ‘Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the 
Triumph of the Crits?’, 93 Geo. L.J. 575 (2005). 




intimidation, the statute is unconstitutional.831 Justice Souter’s main concern is that under 
a statute banning a particular symbol it is most likely that prosecutors and courts would 
find an intent to intimidate, though exactly that would be the question to be proven, 
basically independent of whether intimidation results from using a symbol or just plain 
words.    
A few lessons can be drawn from this complex case law on symbols in the US. 
Jurisprudence on flag desecration turns out to be the most straightforward. Here the state 
promotes a symbol, and as a symbol is per definitionem expressive, its promotion is also 
per definitionem expressive. Every conduct which uses the symbol as symbol is therefore 
also necessarily expressive, be it that of the state ‘protecting’ or that of a demonstrator 
‘criticising’ the symbol.  
It is true, on the other hand, that regulating the draft card is not necessarily 
expressive as the draft card is not necessarily a symbol. However, in my view the USSC 
deliberately ignored the fact that anything can become expressive or a symbol (what is 
more, especially a draft card or any other official paper). If something is used as a 
symbol, its use as a symbol ought not to be sanctioned, that’s the principle behind the flag 
desecration cases. This does not mean of course that O’Brien could not have been obliged 
to compensate for the cost of issuing a new draft card. Just as the unconstitutionality of 
flag desecration does not mean that you can tear down a flag from an official building of 
the state without being liable to pay for the cost of a new flag.  
Cross burning and swastikas are similar to the flag in that they are necessarily 
symbols. However, contrary to the flag, they are symbols (of hatred) that the state 
‘dislikes’ and does not identify with. Under content-neutrality, this exactly cannot make a 
                                                 




difference: the state’s view about a symbol is necessarily expressive, too, and thus, 
restrictions based on that view are content-based. That’s why Justice Souter is right 
arguing for a total impermissibility of regulating symbols qua symbols.  
US jurisprudence has failed, but struggled to recognise a unified principle 
regarding symbolic speech or conduct. European countries, discussed next, apply an even 
more contradictory approach towards banned and protected symbols.                   
1.2. Banned signs in Germany and France 
1.2.1. Germany: militant democracy 
 
Symbols in general are protected speech under the Basic Law, covered by Art 5 on 
freedom of expression of opinion. This includes the protection of symbols on 
demonstrations.832 There is no doctrinal disadvantagement of symbolic speech or conduct 
as it is observable in the US doctrine. Nonetheless, many more symbols cannot be 
displayed in Germany than in the US. All the grand symbolic conduct cases, except for 
O’Brien, of course, would very likely turn out the other way around in Germany. The 
reasons and structure of the argument are very different, though common ground is that 
the simple dislike of the content of the message is not enough to restrict it. German 
doctrine also tries to uphold the principle of content neutrality, but there is a near 
universal consensus among legislators and courts that more important values can justify 
restrictions on the free use of some symbols if the restriction does not in itself target the 
idea which is expressed by the symbol. This criterion is accepted to be fulfilled if the 
banned symbol happens to be that of a constitutionally banned organisation.  
                                                 




The central norm – as luckily in German law often there is one – is Art. 86a of the 
German criminal code, criminalising the distribution and public use of symbols (rather: 
signs) of banned parties and organisations and their substitute organisations.833 Banned 
organisations are those which have been or are being banned under the Basic Law’s 
militant democracy834 clauses,835 but also those which were banned right after the Second 
World War.836 The overwhelming majority of banned organisations are Nazi, neo-Nazi, 
or other extreme right wing organisations,837 the GFCC banned a Nazi (Socialist Reich 
Party)838 and a Communist party.839 Symbols according to s. 86a Criminal Code include, 
in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting, and also symbols 
which are so similar to the banned ones that they can be mistaken for them. As 
interpreted, a photo or Abbildung of Hitler is also a symbol for the purposes of section 
                                                 
833 Substitute organisation can be a party or an association of which it is incontestably (unanfechtbar), ie at 
the final stage of review, established that it is a substitute for the banned one. Section 86 StGB. (Criminal 
Code). 
834 For the concept see Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I’, 31 American 
Political Science Review 417 (1937), and Id., ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II’, 31 
American Political Science Review 638 (1937). For recent theoretical and comparative discussions see the 
contributions in András Sajó (ed.), Militant Democracy (Utrecht, Eleven, 2004), on the German approach 
most recently see Markus Thiel, ‘Germany’ in The 'Militant Democracy' Principle in Modern 
Democracies, 109- 146,  Markus Thiel ed, (Surrey, Ashgate, 2009). 
835 Art. 9 (2) allows, in effect, requires banning associations whose aims or activities contravene the 
criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international 
understanding. Under Art. 21 (2), parties which by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, 
seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany shall be banned by the Constitutional Court. (Translation of the text is from Andreas 
Stegbauer, ‘The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols According to Section 86a of the German Criminal 
Code,’ 8 German Law Journal 173 (2007) 177 at note 14.)  
836 Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, ‘Zur Bedeutung des Art. 139 GG für die Auseinandersetzung mit 
neonazistischen Gruppen’, NJW 1289, 1294 (1988) as cited by Stegbauer, above n 835 at 177.   
837 Though FDJ-Westdeutschland, the West-German branch of the GDR’s only legal (and basically state-
maintained) youth movement was also banned.  
838 BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952). 




86a, 840 but not that of Rudolf Hess who became a symbol of the extreme right wing only 
after 1945.841  
As it can be seen, the prohibition on symbols on a demonstration is not specific; 
but is regulated by the general laws realising militant democracy in Germany, not only in 
the political arena, but in general. The aim of s. 86a is interpreted to avert ‘social 
habituation’ to symbols which might induce the revival of the banned organisations.842 In 
the interpretation of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH, the highest ordinary court for 
civil and criminal matters) the aim is also the maintenance of political peace.843 As the 
BGH put it:844  
 
Thus, the aim of the criminal provision has to be understood not 
only as preventing a revival of the banned organisations or of 
their anti- constitutional endeavours, to which the prohibited sign 
symbolically refers. The provision also serves to preserve the 
political peace because it avoids even the appearance of such a 
                                                 
840 BGH MDR 1965, 923; OLG München NStZ 2007, 97 as cited by Ellbogen, ‘86a StGB’, Rn. 2 in 
Beck'scher Online-Kommentar StGB, von Heintschel-Heinegg ed. (15th edn, 2011). 
841 OLG Rostock NStZ 2002, 320; Bartels/Kollorz NStZ 2002, 298 as cited by Ellbogen, ibid. Ellbogen 
claims that speeches of Hitler also are punishable under s. 86a, eg if displayed in the form of ringtone of a 
cell phone.  
842 Consistently, there is an exception clause in paragraph III covering the use of such symbols in art, 
scholarship, research and teaching. (For uncertainties in interpreting the limits of this so-called social 
adequacy clause, see Ellbogen, Ibid Rn. 12  and Fischer StGB § 86a Rn 22, as cited by Ellbogen id.)  
843 Bundesgerichtshof: Verwenden des ‘Hitlergrußes’ aus Protest gegen Polizeiaktion, Urteil vom 
18.10.1972; Az.: 3 StR 1/71 I , BGHst. 25, 30, 33. Stegbauer, The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols 
above n 835 referred the author to this case.  
844 ‘Als Schutzzweck der Strafvorschrift ist dabei im einzelnen nicht nur die Abwehr einer Wiederbelebung 
der verbotenen Organisation oder der von ihr verfolgten verfassungsfeindlichen Bestrebungen, auf die das 
Kennzeichen symbolhaft hinweist, zu verstehen. Die Vorschrift dient auch der Wahrung des politischen 
Friedens dadurch, dass jeglicher Anschein einer solchen Wiederbelebung sowie der Eindruck bei in- und 
ausländischen Beobachtern des politischen Geschehens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vermieden 
wird, in ihr gehe es eine rechtsstaatswidrige innenpolitische Entwicklung, die dadurch gekennzeichnet sei, 
dass verfassungsfeindliche Bestrebungen der durch das Kennzeichen angezeigten Richtung geduldet 




revival. It also prevents foreign or domestic observers of political 
events in the Federal Republic of Germany from assuming that 
behaviour opposed to the constitution and the rule of law, as 
symbolised by the sign, is tolerated in German politics. 
 
Political peace, though undefined, covers the post-WW2 value consensus in which 
National Socialist ideas do not have a place. The reputational interest of the 
Bundesrepublik is somewhat more concrete, and it is also a regular concern in relation to 
extreme right wing activities in Germany ever since the end of the Second World War.  
The GFCC, on its part, does not refer to political peace regarding banned signs, 
but only to the prevention of revival of banned organisations and their endeavours. 
Rather, it states that the rationale of section 86a Criminal Code is to ban such symbols 
from the entirety of political life in Germany, and in effect to institute a ‘communicative 
taboo’.845  That’s why the will behind displaying the symbols is irrelevant, or at least that 
seems to be the view of the GFCC. Critical uses of symbols thus can also be punished 
constitutionally.846 The BGH appears settled in the opposite direction,847 exemplifying a 
rare case where the ordinary court grants more freedom than the GFCC would require.848 
The BGH has since 1972 consistently remanded cases of conviction when the symbol is 
used ‘clearly and unequivocally in a manner hostile’ to the ideology behind the symbol. 
                                                 
845 BVerfG, 1 BvR 150/03 vom 1.6.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 26), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20060601_1bvr015003.html, Abs.-Nr. 18. 
846 BVerfG NJW 2006, 3050, 3052.  
847 At least when there is clear and unequivocal hostile tendency against the ideology referred to by the 
symbol. BGH, Urteil vom 15. 3. 2007 – NJW 2007, 1602 (reversing a conviction for selling articles 
displaying eg the swastika in clearly Nazi hostile manner for punks, a left-wing subculture).  
848 I do not mean to imply that according to the Constitutional Court the constitution prescribes, instead of 




Besides, satirical uses of banned symbols might fall under freedom of art and thus cannot 
be proscribed according to the GFCC either.849  
As to the substitute similarity requirement, the GFCC has decided despite 
scholarly views to the contrary850 that the slogan ‘Ruhm und Ehre der Waffen-SS’ [fame 
and honour of the Waffen-SS] is so dissimilar to the ‘Blut und Ehre’-slogan [blood and 
honor] of the Hitlerjugend that it cannot be constitutionally prohibited.851 Newly invented 
slogans which were never used by a banned organisation are within constitutional 
protection of free speech. That also includes using ‘Blood and Honour’ as a slogan in 
English, because it was in this form never used by the Hitlerjugend.852 
This cursory discussion already shows that the condition of previously banned 
organisation is though content-based, at least is quite rigid, and many would claim even 
dysfunctional and alien to the challenges of real life.853 As to viewpoint-discrimination, to 
use the US terminology, the BGH took a stance distinguishing hostile and sympathetic 
uses. This, however, does not prevent lower courts in recurrently sticking to the idea that 
section 86a cuts in both ways,854 an interpretation the GFCC also would not mind. This is 
indeed a serious question to which I do not see any principled answer, because the 
                                                 
849 BVerfGE 82, 1, mocking Hitler T-shirt. This ruling is consistent with BVerfGE 77, 240, reversing a 
conviction for using an emblem of FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend, the only recognized youth organisation in 
the GDR whose West-German branch was banned in the FRG), on placards advertising the staging of a 
Brecht play, Herrnburger Bericht.   
850 Eg before the decision of the GFCC: Jan Steinmetz, ‘”Ruhm und Ehre der Waffen-SS” - 
Verwechselbares Kennzeichen i.S. des § 86a II 2 StGB?’, NStZ 2002, 118., and after the decision came out 
Andreas Horsch, ‘Das BVerfG, die Ähnlichkeit i. S. des § 86a II 2 StGB oder: Zeit für die Entdeckung der 
Lebenswirklichkeit’, JR 2008, 99.  
851 BVerfG, 1 BvR 150/03 vom 1.6.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 26), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20060601_1bvr015003.html, 
852 BGHSt 54, 61. The ruling does not affect possible illegality on other grounds, among them, as 
displaying the symbol not of the Hitlerjugend but of Blood and Honour, a Neo-Nazi organisation banned in 
Germany.  
853 Eg Horsch, Das BVerfG, die Ähnlichkeit i. S. des § 86a II 2 StGB, above n 850. 
854 To their benefit it has to be noted that the BGH also held this view, though back in 1970. BGHSt. 23, 




underlying approach is contradictory. The ambiguity of delineating banned symbols very 
clearly expose the vulnerability of content-based restrictions which are justified by 
abstract and mediated dangers855 of revival of a horrible past, and law’s inadequacy of 
dealing with such dangers.   
1.2.2. France: symbols and garment of organisations or persons responsible for crimes against 
humanity 
In French law it is a contravention (a least serious offense in the penal regime, next to 
crimes and delicts) to wear or display in public uniforms, insignia or symbols reminding 
of those of organisations or persons responsible for crimes against humanity.856  
The article refers to organisations banned and persons convicted, ie the scope in 
this regard is reasonably narrow, and similar to that in Germany. Exception is granted for 
films, spectacles (theatre performances) or exhibitions evocating history. ‘In public’ is 
understood broadly. (Public  includes even the internet as this article has been the basis of 
the famous Licra c. Yahoo! controversy between French and U.S. courts,857 of no interest 
to us here apart from the commonplace that it very well displayed the unbridgeable gap 
                                                 
855 Section 86a is a so-called abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt, criminaliscriminalising a ‘conduct typically 
capable of bringing a dangerous situation into existence, even if in any given case the subject of protection 
is not actually exposed to the danger concerned.’ Stegbauer, ‘The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols  
above n 835 at 175, citing Troendle and Fischer, § 13 Rn. 9 in Strafgesetzbuch (53rd ed., München, 2006). 
This, as must be obvious by now, is very far from even the loosest US standard as exemplified by Virginia 
v. Black.  (As to the distantly possibly relevant Beauharnais, see supra text accompanying note 762Error! 
Bookmark not defined., I share the view of those who claim it is not good law anymore, being aware that 
it was not formally overruled.) 
856 Art. R. 645-1 of the Code Pénal. French law widely employs an editorial technique compiling both 
legislative and regulatory level norms in one document, called code. (Though the concept is different from 
the original, rigorous and systematizing understanding of code as in the Napoleonic codes, or in the civil or 
criminal code in Germany, etc.) This is the case with the penal code, whose first part is the legislative part, 
including crimes and delicts, and the second part is the regulatory, including contraventions. The R. in the 
numbering of the article shows that the provision belongs to the regulatory part, ie it is a contravention.  
857 Finally settled in an interpretation friendly towards French law, questioning extraterritorial effect of the 
First Amendment in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 433 F.3d 1199, Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and 




between the First Amendment and the French understanding of free speech.) There is no 
controversy in France parallel to that discussed in Germany about the interpretation of 
‘rappelant’, ie what counts as a similar symbol, uniform, etc. Of course, the lack of 
awareness or sensitivity in this regard does not exempt French law from the problems 
inherent in such a regulation, as discussed with regard to analogous German law on the 
previous pages.  
1.3. Flag disparagement in Germany and France 
1.3.1. Germany: oscillation between militant democracy and authority of the state 
 
As one commentator emphasises, and in contrast to the US, the federal flag in Germany 
has not been an object of veneration, at least since World War II.858 Still, according to 
section 90a (Disparagement of the State and its symbols)859 of the Criminal Code   
(1) A person who publicly, in an assembly, or through the 
dissemination of writings 
1. insults or maliciously disparages the Federal Republic of 
Germany, one of its regional states, or its constitutional order or 
2. disparages the colours, the flag, the coat of arms or the anthem 
of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its regional states 
                                                 
858 Ute Krüdewagen, ‘Political Symbols In Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration Decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court’, 19 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. 
L. 679 (2002). 










This again is a potentially endangering offense,860 in other words, a doubly mediated 
endangering-endangering.861  
As the state does not have dignity, the protected object must be derived from 
something more particularly embedded in the constitution. The GFCC had the occasion 
to examine this provision’s compatibility with the Basic Law in the so-called Federal 
flag decision from 1990. However, in the case it relied on freedom of art,862 and not on 
freedom of expression or assembly, as the flag was portrayed disparagingly on the back 
cover of a book.863 Thus, the result – reversing the conviction – is not automatically 
applicable to a demonstrator. Rather, it seems the Court made an exception solely 
because freedom of art was at stake. Notably, it accepted that the provision itself is 
                                                 
860 Jan Steinmetz, ‘StGB § 90 a Verunglimpfung des Staates und seiner Symbole Rn. 2’ in Münchener 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 2/2 (Wolfgang Joecks & Klaus Miebach eds., Beck, München, 
2005), for the concept see above n 855. 
861 ‘Gefährdungs-Gefährdungsdelikt’: Herwig Roggemann, ‘Von Bären, Löwen und Adlern - zur 
Reichweite der §§ 90 a und b StGB. Meinungs- und Kunstfreiheit im gesamtdeutschen Verfassungs- und 
Strafrecht.- Verfassungskonforme Einschränkung oder Streichung der §§ 90 a und 90 b?’ Juristenzeitung 
1992, 934, 938. (Though at that point it is about section 90 b, entitled anticonstitutional disparagement of 
constitutional organs [like legislative organ, government or constitutional court or its member in this 
capacity]). 
862 Freedom of art is guaranteed in art. 5 III of the Basic Law. Its specificity is that there is no mention of 
possibility of restricting freedom of art (similarly to the guarantee of indoor assemblies). Nonetheless, the 
Court interpreted this and similar (so-called vorbehaltslose) provisions as still underlying limits inherent in 
the constitution [verfassungsimmanente Schranken] itself. Thus, for example, in the Mephisto case it ruled 
that post-mortal dignity protection overrides (at least temporarily) freedom of art. BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971).  
863 BVerfGE 81, 278 (1990). In the ordinary courts, a producer of a pacifist book (Laßt mich bloß in 
Frieden – Just leave me in peace) was held responsible for a collage, where one part displayed a flag while 
another part a urinating men’s torso, put next to each other in a way that the urine was pouring upon the 






constitutional. The constitutional value served by the provision is explained in the 
following way:864  
The purpose of these symbols is to appeal to the citizens' sense of 
state [Staatsgefühl in original, translated as ‘sense of civic 
responsibility’ by the Institute of Transnational Law865] …As a 
free state, the Federal Republic relies rather on the identification 
of its citizens with the basic values represented by the flag. The 
values protected in this sense are represented by the state colours, 
stipulated in Art 22 GG. They stand for the free democratic 
constitutional structure. … The flag serves as an important 
integration device through the leading state goals it embodies; its 
disparagement can thus impair the necessary authority of the 
state. From this, it also follows that state symbols only enjoy 
constitutional protection in so far as they represent what 
fundamentally characterises the Federal Republic.  
 
Compared with the language of the U.S. decisions, the striking difference is that 
maintenance and promotion of the authority of the state is a constitutional value, a value 
rooted in the Basic Law, a stance the USSC ultimately dismissed in Texas v. Johnson and 
Eichman.  
                                                 
864 BVerfGE 81, 278, 293 et seq. 






At the same time, most commentators interpret the aim of art. 90a being more the 
protection of free democratic basic order than authority of state. Or, to be fair, these two 
intermingle, just as can be seen from the above quote. The German court also explicitly 
adds that ‘the protection of symbols must not lead to an immunisation of the state against 
criticism and even against disapproval.’866 However, as state authority and freedom of art 
are both protected by the constitution, there is a conflict which can only be resolved by 
(ad hoc) balancing, the more ad hoc, more ‘fine-tuned’ to the particular circumstances of 
the case, the better. The GFCC appears to exercise rather rigorous review whether 
ordinary courts normally mandated to execute this balancing process867 have properly 
done so.  
In another decision decided on freedom of art grounds, the GFCC basically 
applied the same approach. In the case a left-wing868 demonstration was organised where 
a song ‘Deutschland muss sterben, damit wir leben können’ [Germany has to die so we 
can live] was sung.869 The song included the following verse, whose reference to the 
flag’s colours served as the basis for conviction:870  
Black are the heavens, and the Earth is red, 
And gold the hands of those bastard fat cats, 
But the German eagle will crash down dead, 
                                                 
866 BVerfGE 81, 278, 294, as translated in the web site of The University of Texas School of Law,  
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=632, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft. 
867 BVerfGE 18, 85, 92; BVerfGE 85, 248, 257 et seq, BVerfGE 93, 266, 296.  
868 Environmentalist, antifascist, anti-multinational companies, antimilitarist. See the text of the song: 
BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 33), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html 
869 BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 33), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html 
870 Schwarz ist der Himmel und rot ist die Erde,  
stolz [richtig: gold] sind die Hände jener Bonzenschweine,  
doch der Bundesadler stürzt bald ab,  




For, Germany, we carry you to your graveyard bed. 
(transl. Joseph Windsor) 
 
The GFCC found flaw in the application of law by the ordinary courts because they did 
not classify the song as protected by freedom of art. After a long discussion of what 
counts as art which should not be of interest to us, it found that the song was not more 
radical, and critical-bitter than one of Heinrich Heine, and also otherwise it fulfilled 
criteria of art. In a way, the Court found that the song continued the tradition – so familiar 
in Central (and Eastern) Europe – of visioning the doom of country and death of 
nation.871 Furthermore, the refrain line is a reference to a fight fought via memorials 
between those venerating the first (and possibly second) world wars and those who 
perceive them in a very different light.872  
After stating these analogies, the Court remanded the case, but made some 
unusual, important comments. As the lower court has not properly recognised the core 
message of the song, the GFCC did not find it necessary to decide whether the lower 
court misstated the limits of freedom of art by songs used as ‘Kampfmittel’, warfare 
agent. It stated, however, that endangerment of the integrity (Bestand) of constitutional 
democracy can justify restriction on freedom of art. Nonetheless, it found doubtful 
whether a three-minute song, already apparently known to the 50 people listening to it, 
                                                 
871 ‘Der künstlerische Anspruch des Liedes und die daraus resultierenden Anforderungen an eine diesem 
Anspruch gerecht werdende Interpretation werden durch ein - ungleich bedeutenderes - literarisches 
Vorbild verdeutlicht, das sowohl formal als auch im Ansatz und in der Metaphorik weitgehende 
Ähnlichkeit aufweist. In einem 1844 erschienenen Gedicht formuliert Heinrich Heine eine kaum weniger 
radikale und bittere Kritik an den Zeitumständen, und auch er sieht sein Vaterland dem Untergang geweiht’ 
BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. 23, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html 




would realise the endangerment.873 This is clearly a weakening of the abstractness of 
danger as normally understood in German criminal law, certainly a welcome 
development from the point of view of constitutional rights. (It is though still a far shot 
from simply finding, as the USSC did, after all, that flag disparagement was flat-out 
protected speech.)  
 Finally in 2008, the Court had to explicitly address the issue of freedom of speech 
(not freedom of art) and flag disparagement. In the so-called Schwarz-Rot-Senf case a 
speaker at a right wing demonstration referred to the black-red-golden coloured federal 
flag as black-red-mustard.874 He was convicted for disparaging the flag. Ordinary courts 
have not mentioned or weighed the value of freedom of expression of opinion in their 
judgments. That this was going to be found problematic by the GFCC comes to no 
surprise. Free speech notably also belongs to the fundaments of the free democratic 
constitutional/basic order, now clearly a ruling concept in interpreting flag disparagement 
cases, as it facilitates constant intellectual interaction so necessary in a democratic 
state.875 Thus, ‘the reputation of the state and the right to criticise it stand in a relationship 
of tension that needs to be resolved in the individual case by way of practical 
                                                 
873 Id. at § 31.  
874 BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 15. 9. 2008 - 1 BvR 1565/05. Extract from the 
speech: ‘No, comrades, we do so simply because for us the fate of our German fatherland matters. We have 
all been born into this community of life and destiny. We cannot as easily unsubscribe. We cannot get a 
document on which there is - well, well, we are not Congolese or Siberians, no, we are now even German. 
From birth on. The question is - are we as Germans assholes who can be canned here by this system? Or 
will we stand by our flag? And by that I do not mean the black, red and mustard. Under these 
circumstances. Oh, sorry, black, red and gold, could I possibly be so misinterpreted. We stand by our flag. 
We’re in this deep dark night of Germany. But just as on 12.21 the nights start getting shorter and the days 
are longer, and just as after the deepest and darkest night is again a sunrise, so one day our people and our 
Reich will stand up in new splendour. And this is for we stand for, why we fight and what we can be proud 
of. The fact that we have been the first but not the last. Hail to our beloved Germany. Hail to the German 
Reich.’ (my transl.) 




concordance,’876  As such a resolution was not attempted by ordinary courts, it was clear 
that the application of law is deemed to fail constitutional muster.   
Here again, the GFCC went further than simply remanding by stating that the 
ordinary court has to examine how free speech concerns counterbalance values promoted 
by section 90a of the Criminal Code. In a last paragraph the GFCC recognised – also 
citing sources from 1929, 1925/26 and 1997 as evidence – that Schwarz-Rot-Senf was a 
reference to the Weimar Republic where ‘right wing extremists’ protested against the 
liberal republican state with this labelling of the flag.  Still, in the Court’s view it is not 
evident that this historical reference is still ‘present in the consciousness of the 
population’, and thus it would be comprehended in this way in the particular situation.  
But even if this historical reference is judged relevant and lively, it has to be thoroughly 
examined if to call the Golden colour in the flag mustard means in the concrete situation 
a ‘sensitive vilification or a particular contempt capable of hollowing out and of 
undermining the respect of the citizens for the integrity of the rule of law democracy in 
the Federal Republic,’ 877 language recalling the ‘Germany has to die’ decision discussed 
above. This last paragraph hardly can be interpreted other than as a kind suggestion to the 
ordinary court of ‘no punishment’.  
All in all, the argumentation seems twisted. The Court on the one hand sticks to 
the constitutionality of section 90a, not even discussing it on rule of law grounds,878 but 
then does not let a rather clearly disparaging message be punished. To this it adds up that 
                                                 
876 Valerius, 90a StGB, Rn. 13 in Beck'scher Online-Kommentar StGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 15th 
edn  2011). 
877 BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 15. 9. 2008 - 1 BvR 1565/05, Absatz-Nr. 16. 
878 Somewhat similarly to US overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, uncertainty of criminal provisions 
might amont to violating art. 103 II of the GG, as hinted by a commentator, Mareike Preisner, ‘”Schwarz-




the GFCC employs two type of audience as measure of the endangerment necessary by 
so-called ‘expression delicts’. First it refers to the ‘average audience’, then in the 
mentioned last paragraph to the ‘population’, apparently apolitical and historically 
ignorant.879 (Recall, that with such potentially endangering crimes this audience is 
anyway a ‘virtual construct.’880) Even if one assumes that no historical connection to 
Weimar would be typically established in the hearers, the ‘objective sense’ of the 
message was clear in the context, as one critique correctly points out.881 It is very hard, 
even for a very ignorant listener, to understand the whole speech in question, according to 
which birthright Germans ‘not Congolese or Siberians’ hail ‘our German Reich’ as not 
being ‘contemptuous’ for the rule of law democracy.882 The Court would have been 
consistent either striking down the norm itself or not questioning the clear meaning of the 
mustard message. Maybe future constitutional jurisprudence would tip the scale one or 
the other way, and I would certainly prefer the former. Till then, upholding 
constitutionality of a norm in effect disadvised ever to apply is simply a twisted 
undertaking which invites police, administration, and ordinary courts to honestly not 
quite capture it.     
 
1.3.2. France: outrage as a criminal delict and contravention 
 
                                                 
879 Preisner’s expressions, id. 
880 Stegbauer, The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols above n 835 at 178. 
881 Preisner, ‘”Schwarz-Rot-Senf” above n 878 at 898.  




If the GFCC goes into a curious undertaking saving the cabbage and the goat, then the 
French Conseil Constitutionnel is simply deferring to legislative judgment. It is true 
although that the original legislative ban was more limited than the German law.  
The ban to outrage the flag was introduced in a 2003 law883 as a delict,884 and 
rendered punishable to outrage the flag or the national anthem during a demonstration 
organised or regulated by public authorities. Demonstrations regulated by public 
authorities, as explained by the travaux preparatoires, and cited by the CC,885 are sports, 
recreational or cultural events where security and health regulations necessarily apply for 
reason of the number of participants.  
The CC886 found the law constitutional, by referring to the constitutional 
provisions on both freedom of opinion, and on the flag and the anthem. Nonetheless, it 
emphasised that intellectual works (works of the spirit or mind – ‘oeuvres de l’esprit’), 
expressions uttered in private circles and demonstrations not organised or regulated by 
authorities are excluded from the scope of application.  
In a 2005 case, during a street theatre festival a 25 year old climbed to the façade 
of the Mayor’s office in Aurillac, tore down the flag and threw it on the gathering few 
hundreds people. Then he ignited, and waved it until complete combustion. The 
delinquent told that he destroyed the flag out of protest against the government, as a 
symbol of the actual government, in a festive ambience, and did not mean to destroy the 
                                                 
883 Art. 113 of Loi n°2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 - art. 113 JORF 19 mars 2003 inserting article 433-5-1 in 
the criminal code, legislative part.  
884 A (penal) delict is a middle serious criminal act between crimes and contraventions, the most and least 
serious offenses. Contraventions are defined by the regulatory power, ie by decree in Conseil d’Etat, see 
Art. 34 of the Constitution of 1958, but the punishments for the different classes of contraventions are 
determined by law, by the Parliament. The regulatory power is entitled to decide into which class a 
contravention should fall. 
885 Décision n° 2003-467 DC du 13 mars 2003, Loi pour la sécurité intérieure, Recueil, p. 211 - Journal 
officiel du 19 mars 2003, p. 4789, considérant 104. 




symbol of the nation, and he regrets his deed. The Riom Court of Appeals found he 
committed outrage of the flag, but considering his active repentance, only a moderate fine 
was inflicted.887 This is a case which fell under a demonstration organised and regulated 
by public authorities, as the CA emphasised. The webpage only displays the festival from 
2010 and among the partners it mentions as logistical supporter the city of Aurillac.888 It 
is not possible to discern from the decision whether anyone claimed in court that the 
festival was actually an artistic one, which seems to be taken out of the scope of the ban 
at least by the CC. (Though it also is not completely clear if the CC meant that artistic 
performances where authorities do need to provide organisational or logistical support for 
this reason get back under the ban. Or, maybe, the CC would start distinguishing art, or, 
‘oeuvres de l'esprit’889, from cultural events.) Also it is true that the person actually 
committing the outrage of the flag was not (and not claimed to be, as I understand) an 
artist, and the delict was not (claimed to be) part of an art performance.  
The flag outrage ban was broadened in 2010. The topic became once again hot in 
spring 2010, when a photograph showing a man wiping his back side by the tricolour was 
widely circulated in French media. The government reacted by enacting a contravention 
of fifth class (most serious among the regulatory offenses),890 banning to do the following 
with the flag if committed with the intent to outrage the flag and in conditions capable of 
troubling public order:  
                                                 
887 RP/NC DOSSIER N 06/00167 ARRÊT DU 14 JUIN 2006 No COUR D'APPEL DE RIOM, 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT0000069510
41&fastReqId=676395021&fastPos=1. 
888 http://www.aurillac.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157&Itemid=318&lang=fr  
889 Décision n° 2003-467 DC du 13 mars 2003 at considérant 104. 





1- to destroy, to deteriorate or use it in a degrading manner, in a public place 
or a place open to the public 
2- and for the persecutor of the mentioned acts, even if they occurred in 
private, to distribute or make distribute the recording of pictures related to 
the commission of those acts. 
Légifrance search does not yield any results, though there has been at least one case when 
the new article was applied. In December 2010 a young Algerian has broken and threw 
towards a man a pole of a flag in a hall of a prefecture out of anger about slow, 
inadequate and at times, insulting or degrading public service.891 Possibly, there was no 
appeal against the decision of the Tribunal correctionnel de Nice, the first instance court, 
where he was convicted to 750 euros (suspended) and also to a citizenship training at his 
own cost. A stage de citoyenneté is a proper mandatory course, where the convict gets 
familiarised with republican values of tolerance, and of respect of dignity of the human 
person,892 a sanction introduced in 2004, and also inflictable for wearing a burqa and 
other, apparently ‘un-French’ conduct. It is not hard to imagine how cynical this sanction 
might have appeared to the young man who actually protested against intolerant and 
disrespectful treatment by French authorities… 
The differences between the delict examined by the CC and the new 
contravention are important, though both can be considered more of a symbolic, than of a 
                                                 
891 Decision of the Tribunal correctionnel de Nice of 22 December 2010. The decision cannot be found 
online, I have to rely on articles from the press: Première condamnation pour outrage au drapeau, 
LeMonde.fr, Mis à jour le 22.12.10, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/12/22/premiere-
condamnation-pour-outrage-au-drapeau_1456880_3224.html, Un jeune homme condamné pour outrage au 
drapeau français, Liberation.fr, 22/12/2010, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/01012309542-un-jeune-
homme-condamne-pour-outrage-au-drapeau-francais. 
892 Art. R. 131-35. of the second part of the criminal code, inserted by Décret n° 2004-1021 du 27 
septembre 2004 portant modification du code pénal et du code de procédure pénale (deuxièmes parties : 
Décrets en Conseil d'Etat) et relatif notamment au stage de citoyenneté, à la composition pénale, aux 
sûretés prononcées dans le cadre d'un contrôle judiciaire et à la juridiction de proximité, NOR: 




real repressive nature for reason of relatively loose sanctions. Some would argue the new 
contravention is unconstitutional because it takes away a factor which the CC considered 
important when examining the proportionality of the delict. Notably, the contravention 
bans to outrage the flag in public, and public is really understood broadly. This means 
that the French government moved from the rationale of separating state and degrading 
the flag to exclude degrading the flag from the entirety of public life, real or virtual.  
The Conseil d’Etat examined this provision,893 and found it was valid, but 
significantly restricted – or, as French legalese has it, ‘neutralised’894 – its interpretation. 
Accordingly, only such physical or symbolic degradation of the flag can be punished 
which is capable of causing ‘grave troubles to public security and tranquillity (sic!)’ and, 
secondly, which is ‘committed with the sole purpose to destroy, vandalise or degrade it.’ 
Thus, the sanction does not apply if the degradation of the flag is part of the ‘expression 
of political or philosophical ideas’ or ‘artistic activity’. However, as commentators also 
point out, the decision leaves lower courts with the task of defining what qualifies as an 
oeuvre de l’esprit and what not.895 In law, normally, oeuvre de l’esprit is a notion used in 
intellectual property law describing the objects protected by author’s rights.896 Hopefully, 
courts would not start interpreting the flag degradation contravention as excluding 
punishment only for art works protected by copyright.   
1.4. Banned signs and flag desecration in the UK  
                                                 
893 Under a jurisdiction for excess of power. CE, 19 juillet 2011, n°343430, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme 
c/ ministère de la justice. 
894 Ligue des Droits de l’Homme Toulon, ‘Le Conseil d’État neutralise le décret sur l’outrage au drapeau 
tricolore’, http://ldh-toulon.net/le-Conseil-d-Etat-neutralise-le.html, jeudi 1er septembre 2011 
895 Eg Roseline Letteron, ‘Outrage au drapeau et liberté d'expression’, 7 juillet 2011, 
http://libertescheries.blogspot.hu/2011/07/outrage-au-drapeau-et-liberte.html  





The UK has no ban on any symbols, neither does it accord (in any of the jurisdictions) 
legal protection against desecration of any of the official flags and other state symbols. 
This seemingly liberal approach is compromised though by the ban on uniforms, 
discussed below, which is interpreted very broadly, and would eg certainly prevent 
wearing the swastika by more persons on a demonstration. Thus, what is truly 
exceptional about the UK is only that flag desecration is not explicitly regulated.  
However, the Public Order Act’s section 5 entitled ‘Harassment, alarm or 
distress’ has found application to flag desecration. In Percy v DPP897 an anti-proliferation 
protester daubed ‘Stop Star Wars’ across a US flag and waved it in front of a US Air 
Force base in England, then threw it to the road in front of a US vehicle and tramped on 
it. She was convicted by the District Judge under section 5 POA for using threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour likely causing harassment, alarm, or distress. The 
District Judge found there was a pressing social need ‘to prevent denigration of objects of 
veneration and symbolic importance for one cultural group’898. The Divisional Court 
accepted this as legitimate aim, despite the irony of according a status to the US flag in 
the UK that would be unconstitutional in the US.  However, it found the criminal 
punishment disproportionate for failing to consider relevant other factors, such as  
whether899  
the behaviour went beyond legitimate protest; that the behaviour 
had not formed a part of an open expression of opinion on a 
matter of public interest, but had become disproportionate and 
                                                 
897 Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125. 
898 Id. H14 (6).  




unreasonable; that an accused knew full well the likely effect of 
their conduct upon witnesses; that the accused deliberately chose 
to desecrate the national flag of those witnesses, a symbol of very 
considerable importance to many, particularly those who were in 
the armed forces; the fact that an accused targeted such people, 
for whom it became a very personal matter; the fact that an 
accused was well aware of the likely effect of their conduct; the 
fact that an accused’s use of a flag had nothing, in effect, to do 
with conveying a message or expression of opinion; that it 
amounted to a gratuitous and calculated insult, which a number of 
people at whom it was directed found deeply distressing 
 
These ‘factors’ are totally unable to provide guidelines on how to interpret section 5 in 
harmony with the HRA. Some of them are part of the offence itself, others are 
conclusions rather then premises, 900 all in all, they clearly not make up an identifiable 
standard.  
1.5. ECtHR: the red star cases  
 
                                                 
900 Andrew Geddis, ‘Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace? - ‘’Insulting’’ expression 




The ECtHR’s most important case at hand is clearly Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), where the 
Hungarian criminal code’s provision901 related to totalitarian symbols was found applied 
in violation of Art. 10.  
The applicant was a prominent member of the Workers’ Party which operates 
legally, but never reaches the threshold to get to parliament. He wore the red star on a 
demonstration, where he was a speaker. Vajnai was convicted on the basis of section 
269/B of the Criminal Code prohibiting the ‘dissemination, public use or exhibition of 
signs of totalitarian regimes, including swastika, an SS-badge, an arrow-cross, a symbol 
of the sickle and hammer or a red star, or a symbol depicting any of them.’902  The 
provision was upheld by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in an abstract norm control 
proceeding, in a decision much criticised as being inconsistent with previous case law on 
freedom of expression.  
The ECtHR found the conviction amounted to a disproportionate interference 
with the right to free speech. Restrictions on political speech need to be examined with 
utmost care, and blanket bans are especially suspicious as they might overreach to speech 
which cannot be legitimately restricted. Most crucially, the Court found the red star had 
multiple meanings, among them it is the symbol of the international workers’ movement, 
and it was not established (nor claimed) that Vajnai advocated totalitarianism or defiance 
of rule of law. Also, the party was not banned in Hungary, the demonstration was lawful, 
and no actual or even remote disorder triggered by the display of the red star was ever 
reported. In a way, the Court applied U.S. doctrines of overbreadth, and chilling effect, 
                                                 
901 On the tormented and problematic history of its adoption see Gábor Halmai, A véleményszabadság 
határai [Limits of freedom of opinion] (Budapest, Atlantisz, 1994) 258-260. 




and hinted that the showing of some actual danger is required for restrictions on political 
speech to pass the test of the Convention.  
Apart from these similarities with American doctrines, the emphasis on the 
lawfulness of the party might imply that a German or French type ban, not blanket, but 
strictly linked to banned organisations, would get a more lenient treatment on the part of 
the Court. Although even then it would need to be shown that the red star is displayed in 
a particular case in sympathy with a banned party, and, of course, the party ban would 
also need to pass human rights standards. In relation to this, tabooisation arguments of 
German courts are necessarily absent, too.  
As to militant democracy, the Court noted the basically insignificant support the 
party enjoyed in Hungary, and the assurances the Republic of Hungary has provided to 
victims of Communism. In a unique paragraph, the Court stated that ‘dictates of public 
feeling – real or imaginery –’ do not authorise the state to restrict human rights, as 
‘society must remain reasonable in its judgement’ for to count as democratic.903  Four 
follow-up cases against Hungary based on the same facts merited condemnation at the 
ECtHR since the Vajnai judgment.904 
In my understaning, the Vajnai judgment turns on the multiplicity of meanings of 
the red star, from which arises the need to examine every case of display carefully in its 
context, as context decides which meaning is salient in the particular instance. However, 
as every symbol has multiple meanings, a contextual examination is necessary in every 
case, and it needs to be shown that the use of a particular symbol either amounts to 
                                                 
903 Vajnai v. Hungary, § 57.  
904 Fratanoló v. Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, Judgment of 3 November 2011, Horváth and Vajnai v. 
Hungary, Application nos. 55795/11 and 55798/11, Judgment of 24 September 2014, Noé, Vajnai and 
Bakó v. Hungary, Application nos. 24515/09, 24539/09, and 24611/09, Judgment of 24 September 2014, 




totalitarian propaganda (as the Court seems to accept in both § 25 and § 56), or creates an 
actual danger of disorder. The Vajnai arguments could apply also to the display of the 
swastika, and other Nazi symbols. Thus, the Court would still check the context in which 
the symbol is displayed. However, it would be a rare scenario where eg a swastika is 
displayed without identification with totalitarianism.905  
Other concerns, such as eg dignity of the victims, do not play an important role in 
the equation under the Vajnai approach. The categorisation of victims’ concerns as 
‘irrational fears’, ‘sentiments’ and ‘feelings’ might in effect imply a rejection of dignity 
claims.  
All in all, the watermark is the one U.S. jurisprudence also was struggling with: 
whether to draw a line between advocacy of ideology and advocacy of actions, and 
maybe adding to the latter some probability requirement. As long as that line is not 
clearly drawn, ECtHR jurisprudence would be exposed to the ambiguities of content-
based restriction just as much as German (or, implicitly, French) is.  
 
 
2. Uniforms and masks 
2.1. Uniforms 
 
Wearing uniforms are, under conditions, expressly prohibited on demonstrations in 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and they are clearly allowed in the United 
                                                 
905 But consider the Hindu movement in Germany to stop criminalising the use of the swastika, reasoning 
that they are entitled to use it as they were before Nazism appropriated it and provided it with a hateful 




States in light of the symbolic speech and content neutrality doctrines. The ECtHR has 
not discussed the issue so far.  
2.1.1. United Kingdom  
 
In the United Kingdom, section 1 of 1936 POA proscribes the wearing of uniforms 
associated with political organisations while section 2 proscribes paramilitary 
organisations. The new powers were mostly enacted in order to enable the police to 
handle properly the violence provoked by the Fascist movement in Britain. According to 
section 1  
any person who in any public place or at any public meeting 
wears uniform signifying his association with any political 
organisation or with the promotion of any political object shall be 
guilty of an offence.  
 
The chief officer of police, with the consent of the Secretary of State might permit the 
wearing of a uniform on any ceremonial, anniversary, or other special occasion, if the 
occasion will not be likely to involve risk of public disorder. Apparently, the legislator 
chose the more restrictive way of regulation.  
From a human rights perspective, the rule would be the permissibility of wearing 
uniforms, and only in the likelihood of public disorder a ban could have been introduced. 
As logically this must have been the rule before the 1936 act came into force (at a time 
when eg only common law breach of the peace powers were available), there must have 
been a serious fear of ‘radicalisation’ resulting from the Nazi paramilitary marches of the 




of course, whether there would have been a real radicalisation of the UK population at 
large without this and other, more restrictive rules and practices, for instance that ‘[t]here 
was, in fact, an almost continuous ban on processions in London from 1937 until after 
World War II.’906  
There is no legal definition of what counts as uniform, but there is one case which 
rendered the notion of uniform a little bit more concrete. In O’Moran v. DPP907 the 
demonstrators wore black berets, dark glasses and dark clothes, somewhat similar to IRA 
uniform. According to Lord Widgery, even the wearing of the beret in itself would 
amount to a ‘uniform’ in the sense of section 1 of the act, if wore by a number of persons 
appearing together, since it shows their association. The minimum criterion he 
established for ‘wearing a uniform’ was that it must be an article of cloth, thus, for 
instance badges do not qualify. It might well be, but it is not necessary that the article had 
been used in the past as a uniform by an organisation. But simply wearing a uniform, eg a 
beret by a number of persons could also qualify if it indicates their association with each 
other, and if they ‘by their conduct indicate that that beret associates them with other 
activity of a political character.’ Apart from that, one has to look at all circumstances. 
That might give rise to arbitrary selection of those against whom the ban is enforced, but 
the low number of cases might also suggest that British police are not making use of this 
discretionary power.908 It is quite probable that its application would not survive an 
HRA/ECtHR challenge after Vajnai. 
                                                 
906 Rachel Vorspan, ‘”Freedom of Assembly” and the Right to Passage in Modern English Legal History’, 
34 San Diego L. Rev. 921 (1997) at 1000 referring to 1 Home Affairs Committee, Fifth Report: 
The Law Relating to Public Order, 1979-80, H.C. 756-I & II at 13. 
907 O’Moran v. DPP [1975] QB 864. 
908 Similarly David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and Regulations in the Human Rights 




In addition to the Public Order Act, a ban on uniform might come from the 
unexpected source of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 13 introduced a new offence for 
wearing uniform of a proscribed organisation, where proscribed appears to include 
organisations proscribed before the law entered into force as well. Also, being a member 
is not necessary as wearing an item of clothing or displaying an article in a way arousing 
reasonable suspicion that the person is a member of such an organisation suffices. The 
law is thus the worst example of guilt by association, in fact, even guilt by non-
association or ghost-association, and it lacks absolutely any showing of material harm. 
Accordingly, in Rankin v Murray909 the provision was found applicable to someone 
wearing a ring (!) with the inscription UVF, a common abbreviation for Ulster Volunteer 
Force, a proscribed organisation. Absurd as it may sound, the Court affirmed in a clear 
textualist fashion that even if the ring was received as a gift, ie indeed the beholder is not 
a member of the proscribed organisation, the provision still applies, as what matters is the 
objectively reasonable suspicion which already flows from the wearing itself. The Court 
also rejected a kind of seriousness standard, which would not construe the provision as 
including foolish or out-of-bravado displays. This led David Mead to a must-quote 
remark that ‘woe betide Mr and Mrs Anderson giving their daughter Isobel Rachel a 
coming-of-age bracelet engraved with her initials.’910 Another commentator contemplates 
what might then happen to ‘deluded youths’ wearing swastikas on T-shirt as a ‘post-
                                                 
909 Rankin v Murray (2004) SLT 1164, see Andrew Lothian, ‘Time, gentlemen? Latest criminal cases, 
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circumstantial prof; road traffic’, 1 Aug 04, theJournal online, The members’ magazine of the Law Society 
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modern iconic statement’ or even ‘in a kind of New Age way’ referring to oriental 
mysticism, unlikely recognised by police officers.911  
2.1.2. Germany 
 
In Germany, the ban on uniforms is two-folded. First, there is a ban of wearing uniforms 
of banned organisations in public, as discussed above. This ban also includes symbols 
such as buttons or parts of uniforms as explained.912 Apart from this, the old federal 
assembly law has banned wearing ‘in public or in an assembly uniforms, parts of 
uniforms or similar pieces of clothes as expression of a general political attitude’ 
[Gesinnung].913  
This latter provision has found application both to the extreme right and to a 
significant extent the left, anti-nuclear protestors, the Autonoms, etc. a famous image 
being the ‘Schwarzer Block.’ Some claim the law overreaches as it not only regulates 
uniforms on assemblies, but generally in public.914  
The GFCC never ruled on this problem of overreach. The ban itself was found 
unproblematic in a 1982 decision,915 whose reasoning will be put out here in short.  
The starting point is that freedom of expression and assembly protect pictorial and 
suggestive collective manifestations of opinion. However, uniforms expressing common 
political attitude are capable not only to reinforce the outer effect of collective 
expressions, but to excite ‘suggestive-militant effects in the direction of intimidating, 
                                                 
911 Lothian, ‘Time, gentlemen?’ above n 909. 
912 Above text accompanying nn 832 — 855. 
913 Art. 3 VersG. For the status of the federal assembly law after the federalism reform, see above, Chapter 
1, n 142. 
914 Eg Dietel, Gintzel & Kniesel, above n 920,, I-5. 19.  




uniform militancy.’916 This militancy inherently encroaches upon the ‘free battle of 
opinions’, and therefore, the constitution does not prevent the legislator to inhibit from 
the outset the public wearing of uniforms, including forms which are meant to evade this 
restriction.  
Such ‘Umgehungsformen’ are in particular civilian clothes which look essentially 
unitary and display references to historically known militant groupings in a recognisable 
fashion, especially if their wearing is accompanied by other such references, such as 
marching in formation or other militant conduct. The more visible the similarity to 
uniforms, the more relevance the assembly law’s ban has even when members of groups 
show up in a seemingly scattered way.917  
In spite of this decision, much unclarity remained or even might have occurred 
following this judgment. Clear seems to be only that those who regularly wear uniforms, 
eg soldiers, are not allowed wearing it on political demonstrations.918  
Inversely, however, wearing a Bundeswehr-uniform (available freely in 
commerce) during a sports training does not fall under the ban, if the common political 
attitude is not apparent for the audience.919  
City of Konstanz’ prosecutor’s office considered blue-yellow anoraks at an 
election campaign by members of the Liberal Party FDP fell outside the uniform ban, 
basically reciting the GFCC’s grounds word by word.920 The Osnabrück prosecutor’s 
office, in a widely read decision recently found that wearing plastic strikewests did not 
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919 BGH, Urteil vom 29.11.1983 - 5 StR 811/83, NStZ 1984, 123. 
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qualify as uniform because the demonstrators’ ordinary clothes were visible under the 
west. It did not qualify as similar piece of cloth either because its single-use character 
prevented it from being perceived as an ordinary cloth. Thirdly, the office distinguished 
the trade union strike related to a collective agreement as not being a political strike.921 A 
commentary of the assembly law similarly claims that uniformed officers participating at 
a demonstration furthering ‘professional’ interests do not fall under the ban for lack of 
common ‘political attitude’.922  
From these instances it appears that the accepted scope of the uniform ban is quite 
narrow at least compared to the text.  
Firstly, the 1982 GFCC decision is understood to have narrowed the scope of the 
uniform ban to ‘mass suggestive’ and militant uses. What those LeBonian terms mean are 
naturally left to evaluation in the particular case. For OLG Koblenz, the reason for the 
ban is that uniform symbolises organised violence, and this court understands the GFCC 
by narrowing the applicability of the ban to such occasions.923 The new Bavarian 
assembly law – whose different provisions were found preliminarily unconstitutional924– 
only bans intimidatory uniforms,925 an even narrower term, which on its face might even 
satisfy US standards. Recall in addition that the GFCC argued that militancy hinders free 
battle of opinion – in a different way of saying that you should fight on the level of 
                                                 
921 StA Osnabrück: Entscheidung vom 28.04.2006 - 730 UJs 12661/06, BeckRS 2006, 07664. StA 
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922 Dietel, Gintzel & Kniesel, above n 920, § 3 Rn. 13, 141.  
923 OLG Koblenz: Beschluss vom 11.01.2011 - 2 Ss 156/10, BeckRS 2011, 02088. 
924 The GFCC in a preliminary expedited proceeding rendered inapplicable several important provisions of 
the law: BVerfG, Beschl. v. 17. 2. 2009 – 1 BvR 2492/08, NVwZ 2009, 441, and this ‘injunction’ was 
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the law, thus it might happen that the GFCC will not deliver a final decision. (Law from 4.22. 2010, GVBl 
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925 Art. 7 BayVersG, Khwaja Mares Askaryar, ‘Das bayerische Versammlungsgesetz – Überblick über 




reasoned argument and not by physical threats. Still, I have an understanding that if the 
GFCC had wanted to restrict limitation of uniform bans to intimidation and threat, it 
would have clearly said so. Ordinary courts and policing authorities appear reasonably 
cautious though when interpreting the grounds for a ban.  
Secondly, what counts as common political attitude is also in two ways limited. 
On the one hand, it has to be comprehended as such by the public, the audience, similarly 
to what was discussed above in relation to ‘expression delicts’ in the criminal code.926 On 
the other hand, ‘political’ itself is narrowed down: it is doubtful on the basis of the above 
examples if for instance a labour strike would ever count as ‘political’. 
2.1.3. France 
 
French law does not have a demonstration specific ban on uniforms. It does have the 
mentioned ban on symbols and garment of organisations or persons responsible for 
crimes against humanity, 927 but apparently there is no belief that uniforms automatically 
enhance the potential for violence or militancy, as it is in the U.K. and Germany. The 
other general dress code, the recent burqa ban could be conceived as a ban on uniform 
clothing, but the law itself only mentions concealing the face, thus I will discuss it shortly 
under masks.  
 As to the flipside, in an interesting contrast to German law, French law prohibits 
wearing the uniform for reservists on any political or syndical event or demonstration.928 
Recall that German courts try to limit political as not meaning labour strikes. Here in 
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France the idea is that the military uniform is the symbol of state, which should be 
outside or elevated over any debate of a certain intensity of interests.   
2.2. Masks 
 
Masks can be removed by police in the UK, and are banned under conditions in Germany 
and France. The US, strangely enough, has not produced a coherent jurisprudence on the 
issue of masks, and the Supreme Court does not appear to be willing to take a case. The 
ECtHR has not faced the issue of masks yet.  
2.2.1. United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, Art. 60 AA CJPOA has authorized the police to ‘require any person to remove 
any item which the constable reasonably believes that person is wearing wholly or mainly 
for the purpose of concealing his identity.’ The next paragraph authorizes the constable to 
seize such items. Those powers are quite often used, just as demonstrators often tend to 
wear masks, helmets, scarves and similar clothes to disguise their identity.  
Nonetheless, none of the cases I found deal explicitly with possible problems 
inherent in prohibiting masks. In Laporte929 there was such a seizure under section 60AA, 
because the police found some masks. However, the House of Lords judgment only 
mentions the removal and seizure of disguises among the facts, and pursued no further, 
normative examination in that regard. In Austin,930 still the Queen’s Bench Division, made reference to 
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Laporte, again without challenging the order for removal and seizure, and in neither case 
made any of the judges any thoughts related to it. In Broadwith,931 the fact that the 
person wore a mask strengthened the court’s accepting that he could be reasonably 
believed to be a demonstrator. Nobody questioned the adequacy of such a conclusion. 
Therefore, there seems to be no legal controversy around the power of removal or its 
application. What was settled by the Divisional Court is only that guarantees surrounding 
stop and search powers are not applicable to the mask removal power, thus eg the 
constable requiring removing the mask does not need to tell their name and station, etc.. 
Consequently, the person denying the removal is not exempted by the fact that the police 
officer did not identify themselves.932  
2.2.2. Germany 
 
Art. 17a of the German federal assembly law prohibits bringing so-called Schutzwaffen to 
public events933 and to hide identity. Schutzwaffen or ‘protective weapons’ are protective 
covers, gas masks, helmets or similar devices capable of averting law enforcement 
activities of authorities.  
Art. 17a para. 2 also prohibits any makeup, design or appearance [Aufmachung] 
capable of, and, according to the circumstances, designed to prevent the identification of 
the participant or the would-be participant on her way to the assembly. Same applies to 
objects brought for the same use and with the same intent. Exemption can be granted if 
there is no reason to fear an endangerment of public security or order.934   
Art. 27 of the assembly law orders punishment of up to one year or fine for 
violating art. 17a, or, in a curious parallel, bringing weapons to a public event. It shows 
the legislative finds masks and helmets all in all just as dangerous or undesirable as 
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arms. This connection supports the view shared by constitutional lawyers that both the 
uniform and the masking ban are the concretisations of the peacefulness requirement,935 
as if these bans were not limits, but are inherent to the substance of the right 
[Grundrechtsausgestaltung]. I cannot subscribe to this view even if I accept that 
unpeaceful assemblies are out of the scope of constitutional protection. To claim, 
however, that non-wearing of masks and uniforms is evidently as necessary to maintain 
peace as not being violent, is just to spare authorities from providing evidence on an 
empirical question. Available data, including social psychology by far does not 
unequivocally suggest such a stance. Sometimes, there might be an increased readiness 
for violence for reasons of a bigger chance of not being caught, but deindividuation 
studies show that such a correlation is not necessary.936 Clearly, the exempted 
categories, and the possibility to lift the ban in particular cases show that the legislator 
itself knows not every masked demonstration turns violent. Art. 17a was first introduced 
in 1985 after several occasions of masked violence. Before that, the police was entitled to 
impose the condition of not wearing masks if it found necessary to prevent endangerment 
of public order and security. Basically the legislator decided to shift ‘the burden of proof’, 
and since 1985 the rule has been the ban, the immunity the exception. This would not be 
in itself problematic. However, the norm finally accepted only authorises, and not obliges 
the authority to lift the ban in case there is no danger to public order and safety, an 
anyway too broad concept. Such a discretion granted is unfounded.  
These severe concerns are well registered by German legal scholarship. Some 
thus maintain that the ban is unconstitutional.937 Others suggest an interpretation which 
is consistent with constitutional principles, which thus considerably narrows the scope of 
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the ban. For instance, there should not be discretion in lifting the ban in case there is no 
reason to fear unpeaceful activities (and not simply danger to public order and safety). 
Also, for exercising freedom of art and of non-verbal expression an exception should be 
carved out.938 Hoffmann-Riem explains that participants must be able to bring protective 
objects if they only want to protect themselves from militant counterdemonstrators.939  
Courts also interpret the bans restrictively, though they do not go as far as 
Hoffmann-Riem. Brokdorf is relevant as there the GFCC reinforced the general principle 
that administrative discretion is always limited by fundamental rights,940 thus 
theoretically the wearing of masks and bringing ‘protective weapons’ is allowed every 
case there is no risk to public order. For instance, the GFCC found that wearing animal 
masks on a protest entitled ‘Patenting of life’ in front of the European Patent Office in 
Munich cannot be subjected to the condition that ‘protesters wearing masks identify 
themselves at the request of the police’ as there was no showing of direct danger to 
public order or safety.941  
What counts as protective weapon or similar device capable of being used as such 
appears reasonably limited, eg a gumshield as more capable of preventing accident than 
averting an attack was found outside the ban.942 A Hannover court, in line with earlier 
decisions, found that there must be a proven intent to not being identified by law 
enforcement authorities, hiding faces from counterdemonstrators or the political 
opponents photographing the protestors does not fall under the ban on masks.943   
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In a similar vein, it has been found that wearing sports gloves, reinforced by glass 
sand by the knuckles are though capable of being used as a protective weapon, but 
specific intent to use them that way is needed for it to fall under the ban.944 Thus, intent 
to evade law enforcement is necessary in both wearing mask and having protective 
weapons (or, at least, objects capable of being used as such), otherwise there is no 
criminal responsibility. This does not mean inversely that law enforcement must be 
lawful, as even unlawful law enforcement must not be averted by protective weapons. 
Such use can only be exempted on the basis of general criminal norms of self-defence.945  
2.2.3. France 
 
In France, recent years has brought governmental hostility towards hiding faces in public 
to the surface. In the last years two bans both relevant to assemblies have been 
adopted. First has been a 2009 decree on the illegal covering of face on public 
demonstrations, the second has been the (in)famous burqa ban.   
The 2009 decree946 was adopted in the aftermath of the April NATO summit 
protests where ultra leftist groups in the tradition of Black Block destroyed banks and 
industrial spots in Strasbourg. The decree inserted in the criminal code a fifth class (most 
serious) contravention. Art. R. 645-14 prohibits voluntarily hiding one’s face in order not 
to be identified on or in the immediate proximity of a demonstration on the public route 
in circumstances giving rise to fear of attacks to public order. Para. 3 allows for 
exemptions in case of assemblies conforming to local usage and when the covering of the 
face is justified by a legitimate reason. The first one – conforming to local usage – 
probably refers to religious processions, as the same formulation is applied in the 1935 
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decree law (and, since 2012, in Art. L211-1 of the Code of internal security) exempting 
such processions from the notification requirement. 
The Conseil d’État rejected a challenge to this contravention,947 as the applicant 
has not proven a grave and manifestly illegal violation of a fundamental liberty, as it is 
required in the référé-liberté procedure. The decree was strongly criticised, even by 
police as being a grotesque and inapplicable measure.948 The main police union thinks 
they would be obliged to go in the middle of demonstrating mass, basically a provocation, 
enhancing the chances of clashes.949  
It was for some time unclear whether the provision ought to be understood as 
imposing a ban in every case, or only in circumstances giving rise to risk of public order, 
and this latter element of the sentence refers to the cases where someone needs to be 
identified, ie opening the possibility for identification. This interpretation would mean that 
on assemblies conforming to local usage a mask can be worn even if the circumstances 
give rise to fear to public order.  
The provision went once again to the Conseil d’Etat in 2011 in a challenge of 
excess of power, initiated by several national level general and specialised unions like 
that of high schools and attorneys. The CÉ found the regulation both constitutional and 
conform to the European human rights convention, emphasising the precise definition of 
the scope of the ban, the existence of such ban in other countries, and judicial 
supervision as a safeguard. Most importantly, the CÉ explained that the provision does 
not target masked demonstrators as long as their masking does not aim at preventing 
identification by police forces in a context where their conduct constitute a threat to 
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public order that their identification could prevent.950 This is quite a narrow reading of the 
text, but of course, it does not explain in any way when exactly a threat to public order 
exists. The process of explaining to police that actually one is not wearing the mask for 
avoiding identification is also hard to imagine. Theoretically, however, after this decision 
of the CÉ, one can always argue that there is no threat to public order in the actual 
circumstances, thus, masks can be worn without hindrance. What that exactly means, 
will be tested in practice. As mentioned, police appear quite reluctant to strictly enforce 
the law in any case.  
The other ban, which clearly has been in the lime light in and outside France, has 
been enacted as law in 2010.951  Art. 1 states that ‘nobody shall, in public, to wear a 
garment destined to conceal the face.’ Art. 3 sanctions the violation by a fine for second 
class misdemeanours, ie wearing the burqa ‘in the public space’ is considered less serious 
than hiding face at a demonstration, in my view, certainly rightly so. Among the possible 
sanctions is a citizenship training [stage de citoyenneté]952 where the delinquent gets 
familiarised with republican values of tolerance, and of respect of dignity of the human 
person,953 a sanction introduced in 2004.  Public space [espace public] includes ‘streets, 
places open to the public, or affected by a public service’954. Exempted is the garment if 
‘prescribed or authorized by law or regulation, or if it is justified by health or professional 
reasons, or if it is worn in the context of sports training, or artistic or traditional feasts or 
such demonstrations’955. The same law also criminalises ‘forcing another person or 
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persons by threat, violence, or duress, abuse of authority or power, to conceal the face, 
for reason of their sex.’ This is a proper crime, with serious punishment,956 raising no 
constitutional concerns.  
The Conseil Constitutionnel examined the law in preliminary review proceedings 
and found it constitutional, though it made a constitutional reservation in interpretation. 
Notably, it would be unconstitutional if the ban on concealing the face would restrict 
exercise of freedom of religion ‘in places of worship open to the public’. The Conseil 
thereby carved out an exception, but otherwise found the legislator realised a not 
manifestly disproportionate reconciliation of public order on the one, and constitutionally 
protected rights on the other hand (considérant 5).957 By adopting the general ban, the 
legislator has only ‘generalised and completed’ rules so far reserved for individual 
situations of protecting public order, and the Conseil seems to accept the argument that 
‘women concealing their face – voluntarily or not – are placed in a situation of exclusion 
and inferiority manifestly incompatible with constitutional principles of liberty and 
equality’ (considérant 4, emphasis added).  
The burqa ban has been discussed worldwide in both journalistic and scholarly 
writings, and earned quite some critique in terms of freedom of religion.958 It can also be 
strongly criticised from the point of view of freedom of assembly, as such a ban also 
deprives burqa wearing women from their right to assembly. In one case, there were 
arrests on a demonstration against the burqa ban, the demonstration was dispersed, and 
at least one person in niqab was interrogated by police, however, not on the basis of the 
dissimulation provision, but for lack of prior notice.959  
                                                 
956 Article 225-4-10 Code Pénal: ‘Le fait pour toute personne d'imposer à une ou plusieurs autres personnes 
de dissimuler leur visage par menace, violence, contrainte, abus d'autorité ou abus de pouvoir, en raison de 
leur sexe, est puni d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 30 000 € d'amende. Lorsque le fait est commis au 
préjudice d'un mineur, les peines sont portées à deux ans d'emprisonnement et à 60 000 € d'amende.’ 
957 No 2010-613 DC du 7 octobre 2010. 
958 In English see eg Britton D. Davis, ‘Lifting the Veil: France's New Crusade’, 34 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 117 (2011). 





For these cases I would argue that the ban on masks on demonstration is lex 
specialis, and thus carves out an exception from the burqa ban in cases where it is worn 
on a demonstration for legitimate reasons, eg to protest against the burqa ban itself, or 
against religious discrimination, or even for any reason unrelated to the burqa, because 
the individual cannot be made to choose between exercising her freedom of assembly or 
freedom of religion. As the CC takes to accept that wearing a burqa in public is per se a 
threat to public order, the CÉ’s above interpretation on protest masks does not help; so 
one would have to rely on the exceptions, most easily that of legitimate reason. It only 
adds to the confusion that the Conseil d’Etat earlier had also given a (strictly confidential) 
advisory opinion on ‘the general ban of the integral veil’ in which it expressed serious 
doubts about compatibility with constitution and convention.960 The CÉ’s principled 
opposition to a full ban though does not imply a resistance to the CC’s deferential 
decision.  
2.2.4. United States  
 
In the U.S., there is a strong tradition of valuing anonymous speech, which goes back to 
the experiences of the colonial or even English period. As the Supreme Court noted:961   
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have 
played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted 
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been 
able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously 
or not at all. 
                                                                                                                                                 
vigueur_1505688_3224.html#xtor=EPR-32280229-[NL_Titresdujour]-20110411-
[zonea]&ens_id=1502515n 
960 See only the press reports on it: ‘Le Conseil d'Etat contesterait une interdiction totale du voile’ 
LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 14.05.10, Cécilia Gabizon, ‘Burqa : l'interdiction générale écartée par 
le Conseil d'État’, Le Figaro, 26/03/2010. 





On this basis, the Supreme Court has struck down laws requiring the divulgence of 
membership lists of NAACP,962 or the law mandating that on every handbill names and 
addresses of the sponsors be displayed,963 or another one requiring identification for 
door-to-door canvassing.964 However, this line of jurisprudence is not necessarily 
applicable to wearing masks at a demonstration. The USSC has never decided on exactly 
this issue, just issued denials of certiorari. As there appear to be some arguments – 
discussed in relation to other jurisdictions like enhanced dangerousness, or intention of 
adverting law enforcement – for distinguishing anonymous speech from anonymous 
(especially crowd) protest, the USSC’s opinion would be useful. Also, we know in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio a meeting in hoods was found constitutionally protected, though the 
main thrust of the decision was quite unrelated to this issue.  
There have been attempts to ban masks on demonstrations in the U.S. as well. A 
Georgia Anti-Mask statute was found constitutional by the state supreme court, but it 
never went to the federal level. As the Georgia Supreme Court is of the view that the 
Georgian Constitution protects speech more broadly than the federal constitution,965 it is 
worth looking closer at their arguments allowing for the ban on masks. The Anti-Mask 
statute966 was adopted in 1951 in reaction to several occasions of lynching and other 
violent ‘vigilante’ events mostly carried out by the Ku Klux Klan. The current application 
of the law was also related to a KKK member, who went to streets wearing KKK regalia, 
including the hood with mask concealing the face. The applicable test was O’Brien, and 
the Georgia Supreme Court found that the statute, regulating conduct including both 
speech- and nonspeech elements, furthered substantial government interest unrelated to 
                                                 
962 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
963 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comission, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995). 
964 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
965 The State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (1990): ‘The 1983 Constitution of Georgia provides even broader 
protection’ [than the First Amendment].  




speech, no more burdensome than necessary, for the following reasons. Concealing the 
face is ‘an effective means of committing crimes of violence and intimidation’, as it 
hinders law enforcement, and ‘calms the criminal’s inward cowardly fear.’967 In an 
impressive passage, the Court adds:968  
A nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the human heart. But, 
remove the mask, and the nightmarish form is reduced to its true 
dimensions. The face betrays not only identity, but also human 
frailty. 
 
The ban was to prevent not only threat, intimidation or violence, and apprehension of 
criminals, but also ‘restore confidence in law enforcement by removing any possible 
illusion of government complicity with masked vigilantes.’969  
This latter can be quite an important, but not obvious concern not only in the US before 
the civil rights movement, but also in every society where police regularly mistreats 
discernible social groups. These are rightly said to constitute substantial or even 
compelling government interests, quite independently of whether – as the Georgian court 
claims – it also counts as the affirmative constitutional duty of the state.  
As to claims of content discrimination and overbreadth, the Court replied by a narrow 
construction of the (in my view, clearly content-neutral) statute to cases where the mask 
worn is perceived intimidating or threatening by a reasonable person, though I think the 
concurring is right in requiring also actual intent.970 This is a kind of reasoning clearly 
similar to Virginia v. Black, the 2003 USSC cross burning case, but in the Georgia case 
                                                 
967 Id. by quoting M. Abram & A. Miller, ‘How to Stop Violence! Intimidation! In Your Community’ 
(August 15, 1949).  
968 260 Ga. 669, 671-672. 
969 Id. at 672. 




without the problems Justice Souter raised stemming from a ban on particular symbols. 
To wear a mask as intimidation in my view is different from cross burning as 
intimidation because mask really helps evading law enforcement. Thus, I disagree with 
dissenting justice Smith who believes the statute is content-based and Brandenburg 
should apply.971 Even so, however, the dissenting justice might be right that in the 
particular case, circumstances indicate that the KKK member wore the mask out of 
protest against the anti-mask statute, not for intimidation, thus his conviction shall not 
stand.  
More striking is the decision of the Second Circuit from 2004 dealing with New York 
state’s anti-mask statute. This statute was enacted in 1845 in response to attacks on police 
by disguised farmers; and goes as follows:972  
A person is guilty of loitering when he: 
Being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural 
attire or facial alteration, loiters, remains or congregates in a 
public place with other persons so masked or disguised, or 
knowingly permits or aids persons so masked or disguised to 
congregate in a public place; except that such conduct is not 
unlawful when it occurs in connection with a masquerade party or 
like entertainment .... 
 
The district court found the provision unconstitutional,973 but the Second Circuit974 
reversed. The USSC denied certiorari.975  
At issue has been a KKK related organisation, the Church of the American 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, which was denied a permit to demonstrate in front of a 
                                                 
971 Id. at 677 ff, Presiding Justice Smith, dissenting.  
972 Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 201, C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2004. 
973 Church of American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 232 F.Supp.2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. Nov 19, 2002). 
974 Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2004. 




courthouse in masks. Circuit Judge Cabranes found that the ‘mask does not communicate 
any message that the robe and hood do not. The expressive force of the mask is, 
therefore, redundant.’ With this, the Court dispensed of any apparent need to examine 
free speech doctrines, be they of anonymous speech or symbolic conduct, and spelled out 
flatly that mask wearing does not fall under the First Amendment. As a critic notes, the 
precedent referred to – a case which held that the operator of a place of prostitution could 
not rely on the First Amendment against the closure of his business simply because the 
premises were also used as a bookstore976 – is clearly inapplicable as the burden on 
wearing masks is certainly not an incidental burden on expressive activity, as it was in the 
prostitution-bookstore parallel. The reasoning is all the more surprising as in this case 
some Knights actually experienced violence in a previous, non-masked gathering at the 
same place,977 and this circumstance cries, if not for the application, then at least the 
discussion of anonymous speech precedents mentioned above. Strangely, the Supreme 
Court did not find necessary or useful to review this decision. Basically the same 
argumentation in a 1992 Virginia case was also not reviewed by the USSC.978  
All in all, from the six federal and eighteen state cases ever decided related to 
wearing masks in public,979 no clear pattern emerges. More or less certain appears that 
                                                 
976 Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986) as cited by N.N., ‘Constitutional Law--Free 
Speech--Second Circuit Upholds New York's Anti-Mask Statute Against Challenge By Klan-Related 
Group.--Church Of The American Knights Of The Ku Klux Klan V. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004)’. 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 2777, 2781 (2004). 
977 Id. at 2778. 
978 Hernandez v Superintendent, Fredericksburg-Rappahannock Joint Secur. Center (1992, ED Va) 800 F 
Supp 1344, cert. denied by Hernandez v. Superintendent, Fredericksburg Rappahanock Joint Sec. Center, 
510 U.S. 1119 (1994). 
979 Thomas R. Trenkner, ‘Validity and construction of state statute or ordinance prohibiting picketing, 
parading, demonstrating, or appearing in public while masked or disguised’, 2 A.L.R.4th 1241 (originally 




overbreadth and vagueness concerns figure in this area as well,980 especially post-WW2 
cases, when the current speech doctrine was gradually taking hold. However, parallel to 
this, lower courts sometimes stick to a rigid speech-conduct doctrine – of a kind never 
approved by the Supreme Court itself –, which even leads to non-application of the rather 
permissive O’Brien test either. Again other courts would find that the American Knights 
of the KKK wore the mask for expressive reasons, – among them, to preserve anonymity 
for fear of retaliation – and thus strict scrutiny (not simply O’Brien) applies. I think such 
a view is correct, especially if there is indication that the ‘Knights’ experienced threats, 
violence, etc. in the past for reasons of their views.981 To put the burden of proof on the 
speaker in this regard completely982 appears though to me dubious.  
The lesson is that masks can be worn both out of fear of being intimidated, just as 
with the purpose of intimidating others. As intimidation can be banned without reference 
to masks, therefore, in my view, there is no need for statutes specifically targeting masks 
on a demonstration.  
3. Noise 
 
Public assemblies make noise. Part of the noise is essential to the activity itself, to convey 
some message normally requires some sound, most naturally the sound of speaking. In 
addition, assemblies are typically accompanied by music, chants, clapping, shouting 
slogans, etc. Even at small or middle-sized events sound amplification might be needed 
                                                 
980 Eg Ghafari v Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial Dist. (1978, 1st Dist) 87 Cal App 3d 255, 150 
Cal Rptr 813, 2 ALR4th 1230, Knights of Ku Klux Klan v Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers (1990, MD 
Tenn) 735 F Supp 745, Robinson v State (1980, Fla) 393 So 2d 1076. 
981 American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, Ind., 50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 




to reach audience and passersby. Thereby, assemblies can cause quite an auditional 
nuisance. One man’s noise, however, is another’s music, to paraphrase Justice Harlan.983 
Sound level regulations are part of general law in every country, and rightly so. Equally 
obvious is that sound is integral to the exercise of the right to assembly. In the following, 
I will discuss those few cases where courts had to face a choice between tranquillity and 
protest.  
Two famous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, both shaping general free 
speech doctrine, have to be discussed first in this relation. Kovacs v. Cooper984 is a 1949 
case, involving a city ordinance prohibiting the use of sound amplifiers attached to 
vehicles. Kovacs was emitting music and statements related to a labour dispute from a 
soundtruck on a street.985 He was found violating the ordinance for employing sound 
amplifier emitting ‘loud or raucous noise’ ‘on or upon the public streets, alleys or 
thoroughfares’. A strongly divided Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. A prior 
restraint case, where the Chief of Police had total discretion in granting advance 
permission for dissemination of ‘news and matters of public concern and athletic 
activities’986 was quickly distinguished out, for the ordinance in case involved neither 
prior restraint, nor discretionary powers, and ‘loud and raucous’ – though certainly not 
exact – can be interpreted reasonably clearly. More indicative is perhaps how the Court 
distinguishes another case where an ordinance prohibiting hand-billers or pamphleteers 
                                                 
983 ‘One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.’ Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) majority opinion by 
Justice Harlan in the ‘Fuck the draft!’ case.  
984 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).  
985 The message itself was not reported in the litigation. 




summoning the homeowners to their doors was found unconstitutional. As the Kovacs 
lead opinion put it:987  
The Court never intimated that the visitor could insert a foot in 
the door and insist on a hearing… The unwilling listener is not 
like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but 
cannot be made to take it. …In his home or on the street, he is 
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by 
loudspeakers except through the protection of the municipality. 
The harshness of this equalisation of the street to the home is striking, just as the 
unusually speculative intimation that actually Kovacs used the sound truck because this 
way he could save money:988  
[T]hat more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by 
sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous 
supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for 
what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a 
nuisance when easy means of publicity are open. [emphasis 
added] 
It is very hard not to see a strong elitist-conservative stance in this reasoning.   
The strong separate dissents by Justices Murphy, Black, and Rutledge (and even 
concurring Justice Jackson, but from the opposite angle) fault the Court for disregarding 
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that as interpreted by state courts, Kovacs was convicted for using sound amplification as 
such – not for emitting loud and raucous noise by sound truck, as the text of the 
ordinance would suggest. The lead opinion cursorily states that ‘[w]e cannot believe that 
rights of free speech compel a municipality to allow such mechanical voice amplification 
on any of its streets’989 while elsewhere it appears only to decide on the use of emitting 
loud and raucous sounds by amplification on public streets. In the meantime, the two 
concurring necessary for the majority find a flat ban on sound amplification in streets and 
parks constitutional.990 Apart or maybe inherent to this cacophony, it remains equally 
doubtful what test – if any – the Court is applying. Maybe the beginnings of the TMP 
thinking can be found in references to ‘hours and place,’991 even if the quote is taken 
from Saia, the mentioned case decided under a whole different philosophy I think.  
The other central precedent relating to noise and protest is Ward v. Rock against 
Racism992 from 1989 relying on the new test currently applicable to TMP restrictions in 
general. The dispute was about a New York City Central Park regulation which made it 
mandatory for performers in the band shell to use city-provided sound amplification, 
administered by the city’s technician who would thus also control volume levels and 
sound mix in order to avoid volume problems. The Court found the regulation 
constitutional relying on Clark993 according to the majority, and modifying it according 
to the dissent. In any case, the regulation was deemed content-neutral as it was justified 
                                                 
989 336 U.S. 87. 
990 Justice Black even argues that the lead opinion affirmed the conviction on grounds on which Kovacs 
was neither charged nor tried, thereby the Supreme Court itself violated due process. 336 U.S. 99. Justice 
Rutledge notes that „[i]n effect, Kovacs stands convicted, but of what it is impossible to tell, because the 
majority upholding the conviction do not agree upon what constituted the crime.’ 336 U.S. 105.  
991 336 U.S. 89 citing Saia v. New York.  
992 Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).  
993 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288 (1984), see also above Chapter 7 text 




without reference to the content of the speech, certainly a correct statement. As such, the 
content-neutral test should be applied which only requires a substantial (as opposed to 
compelling) government interest, which in the present case is double: to protect citizens 
from unwelcome noise, and to provide sufficient sound amplification for those who wish 
to listen to the music, ie the audience on the concert ground.994  Note the somewhat 
strange argument – especially from a Court not normally favouring positive rights – that 
one and the same regulation is at once a restriction on speech and a promotion of 
listeners’ speech interests. Still, the Court found the restriction was narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial government interest, especially also because it did not have ‘a 
substantial deleterious effect on the ability of bandshell performers to achieve the quality 
of sound they desired.’995 Finally, the guidelines also left open ‘ample alternative 
channels of communication’, thus it met the third step of the content-neutral restrictions 
test. In this regard, the Court emphasises that the regulation did not restrict speech at any 
particular time or place. The fact that the regulation might reduce the number of the 
audience as people far away would not hear the concert, was found irrelevant because 
RAR did not show that ‘remaining avenues of communication [were] inadequate.’ 996  
Dissenting Justice Marshall thinks the regulation fails the narrow tailoring 
requirement, and it is an impermissible prior restraint.997 As the majority defers to 
governmental determination as to volume levels, I subscribe to the view that it is not 
narrow tailoring. Instead of total control over volume level and sound mix, it would have 
                                                 
994 491 U.S. 791 ff. 
995 491 U.S. 801. 
996 491 U.S. 802. 
997 For reasons of the discretion granted in the Guidelines. The majority thinks there is no impermissible 
prior restraint because the regulation does not authorise suppression of speech in advance of actual 




been equally effective but less intrusive to ban excessive noise itself. 998 For the majority, 
it was enough to ascertain that the city technician tried to compromise and fulfil the 
wishes of the performers, including the concern to reach the audience on the concert 
ground. The dissent points out in reply that then why not simply maximising permissible 
decibel level, and what is the need for the city equipment and technician at all? The 
majority contents itself that the Guidelines exclude taking into consideration what content 
of speech is to be delivered. In reply, one could say, it is one thing to proclaim an 
obligation, and another is to institute mechanisms which ensure eo ipso the realisation of 
that obligation. Especially problematic here is the lack of judicial supervision – the 
Supreme Court renounced it.  
The difference between the approach of the majority and the dissent shows 
exactly the weakness of the content neutrality test, but also the more hidden esoteric of 
general tests: the majority claims the applicable test is not one of least intrusive means, 
while the dissent thinks in any case, narrow tailoring was not fulfilled. The prongs of 
narrow tailoring and least intrusive means are in effect merged.999   
Germany is the other jurisdiction where the issue of noise and freedom of 
assembly figures prominently. Significantly, general noise regulations are as a rule not 
applicable to those assemblies where sound amplification is necessary for conveying the 
message,1000 the idea being that the means of exercising a basic right is protected by the 
                                                 
998 491 U.S. 807, Justice Marshall, dissenting.  
999 A commentator thinks the narrow tailoring was in effect abolished Carney R. Shegerian, ‘A Sign of The 
Times: The United States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for 
Time, Place and Manner Restrictions’, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 453 (1992). 




right.1001 There is no indication that the test applicable to such means is different from the 
one applicable in general to the basic right.  
However, sound amplification is protected only during the demonstration, and not 
for its preparation or invitation. These latter ones, I take it, must be covered at least by 
general freedom of action under Art. 2 II of the Basic Law, with weaker (more 
permissive) justificatory grounds though. Also, on the opposite side, sound amplification 
will often be protected by freedom of art, a right not subject to statutory limits, only to 
inherent constitutional ones. Whether a particular use of sound amplification is related to 
an ongoing demonstration, or not, or whether it is part of an art performance, will be 
ultimately determined by the authorities, subject to judicial review. 1002 
As general noise regulations do not apply, the use of loud speakers and similar 
devices on a demonstration can only be restricted when criteria in assembly laws for 
imposing conditions or ban are met. These, even if not anymore unitary on the entire 
federal territory, are still subject to unitary constitutional control. In effect, only those 
conditions are permissible which are suitable, necessary and proportionate in case of 
foreseeable likely direct endangering of public safety, this latter one meaning protection 
of central legal goods like life, limb, property, liberty, honour etc. Thus, certainly it is 
clear that noise endangering health can be constitutionally restricted. Such protection 
extends to the police, too. For instance, when accompanying a demonstration in order to 
protect it from counter-demonstrators, police cannot be exposed to too much noise.1003  
                                                 
1001 Id. by referring to BVerwGE 7, 125, 131, BVerwG, DRiZ 1969, 158, etc. 
1002 In general see Wilhelm Kanther, ‘Zur „Infrastruktur’ von Versammlungen: vom Imbissstand bis zum 
Toilettenwagen’, NVwZ 2001, 1239.  




Among lower courts, there is disagreement about the interests sufficient to justify 
restrictions on sound levels.  
The high administrative court (OVG) Lüneburg has decided in 2010 related to a 
music event by the extreme right wing party (NPD), that noise levels can be restricted 
even if they do not endanger health. I am doubtful about the constitutionality of its 
reasoning, which nonetheless points to a very typical view about freedom of assembly: 
the Lüneburg court namely takes that noise endangering public safety can be restricted 
(this much of the argument is clearly right in application of the federal assembly law 
logic), and public safety includes the whole of the legal system, including thus eg federal 
emissions protection law. In my view this understanding of public safety goes against 
Brokdorf where it was interpreted only to mean ‘central legal goods’, not any legal norm. 
Secondly, in effect the Lüneburg court makes exercise of assembly, a basic right, 
dependent on other – lower level – statutory norms, and, in substance, on lower-ranking, 
though legitimate interests than basic rights. More consistent is then the US approach 
confessing that modal restrictions on assembly are judged by a less stringent 
constitutional standard.  
Fortunately, the view of OVG Lüneburg is not the homogeneous view of all 
German courts. The high administrative court of Berlin-Brandenburg, eg, has undertaken 
a more thorough review related to an anti-Iraq war demonstration. Firstly, it differentiates 
between inner and outer communication, referring to communication between 
participants and between participants and audience or would-be audience.1004 Both of 
these types are covered by the right to assembly, and to use loudspeaker to reach 
participants and would-be audience belongs to the self-determination of the organiser of 
                                                 




an assembly.1005 In addition, OVG Berlin-Brandenburg also makes clear that police or 
local authorities cannot legitimately fix the permissible volume level so as passersby can 
only perceive that some (unintelligbile) speeches are going on at the assembly. Instead, 
the volume level needs to be allowed to be high enough for passersby to hear also the 
content of the speech, as a function of assembly is to turn public attention to an issue. 
Thirdly, and consequently, the Berlin court discards that any legal norm is sufficient to 
justify restrictions on sound level, and affirms that only those protecting interests of 
traffic particpants, passersby, and residents which have a basic rights relevance, though 
the list is technically only exemplificative.1006 A specifically emphasised basic right 
aspect is the negative right to assembly of passersby, in effect a generalised and theorised 
captive audience concern, which would protect against coercing another to participate in 
an assembly or listen to a speech to which one does not want to. In my reading, the 
threshold for coercion is not set too low: you cannot exclude hearing what the other 
wants to say, you just can go away, and be let in peace after you have once heard the 
message. Thus, how loud a particular assembly can become, must be decided considering 
the circumstances of the case at hand. It appears in any case that the Berlin court would 
dispute the (later enacted) standard applied by OVG Lüneburg, and requires a thorough 
examination or balancing of constitutional interests on every side. Clearly, the test is 
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balancing and not categorical, as always in German constitutional law, but it is the 
normal basic rights standard, not a lowered standard.1007  
Finally, apart from the US and Germany, the ECtHR has touched the issue. 
Though it was not overly occupied by the human rights problems of noisy 
demonstrations, it pronounced in Galstyan v. Armenia that a certain amount of noise is 
unavoidable at a demonstration. Thus Armenia violated Art. 11 by condemning to three 
days administrative detention someone for ‘making loud noise’ at a demonstration, 
without eg any allegation that the noise would have included obscenity or incitement to 
violence.1008 The decision is clearly incapable of providing a more detailed view of the 
Court on this question, because the particular circumstances unequivocally have shown 
abuse on behalf of the Armenian authorities.  
4. Modes and means of protest as aesthetic harm  
 
Similarly to noise, assemblies might create visual nuisance as well, or indeed might well 
not be in harmony with majority views on beauty or cleanliness of surroundings. There 
are aesthetic or sanitary regulations interfering especially with leaf-letting, hand-billing, 
displaying billboards, and similar activities regularly accompanying demonstrations, or 
being necessary to inform about an upcoming demonstration. Leaflets and handbills are 
transient media of the protestors, means of expression. Of similar function is the practice 
of signage, be it on public or private property; and US case law treats it analogously. 
Still, signage relates only indirectly to freedom of assembly, most importantly as 
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invitation to a demonstration. In its semi-permanent nature signage shares a function with 
billboards and information desks or installations.  
If these (especially any of these) are not available for the organisers of a 
demonstration, it certainly influences also the exercise of the right to assembly. In 
contrast, the more these means are publicly available, the more the means of 
demonstration to show grievances or other concerns becomes an option for the most 
deprived, not only the wealthier relatively or subjectively deprived. The possibility or not 
of posting to billboards, of signage to the façade of one’s own home or to the (public) 
utility pole, or of installing temporary information desks on the street might prove crucial 
in an assembly to come about at all.  
Material objects put or left behind on streets and parks are different from noise 
discussed above (and odours) in that the eye can be averted while the ear (and nose) 
cannot.1009 On the other hand, the ‘litter’ or visual clutter left behind is a damage which 
stays there unlike the noise which fades away.  
4.1. United States 
 
In the U.S., litigation to aesthetic regulation has revolved to a large extent around 
(commercial) billboard regulations. In the first decades of the twentieth century such 
regulations were perceived as an attack on property rights, and mostly discouraged by 
courts. Aesthetics alone was explicitly judged insufficient for restricting property 
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rights.1010 Later, more or less parallel to the demise of Lochner,1011 property rights of the 
neighbours have also come to the forefront. Finally, in the seminal Berman v. Parker 
(1954) decision the Supreme Court allowed even taking of property for aesthetic 
reasons.1012 In a famous passage, the Court described how wide the deference to police 
power is in this regard:1013 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled. 
The Berman rationale has been cited many times to allow for billboard regulations, and 
by 1984 the Supreme Court declared it ‘well-settled that the state may legitimately 
exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values.’1014  
It was only in the middle of the sixties that the First Amendment has gotten to be 
seen involved. Signs on our surroundings have become seen not only as the legitimate 
object of police power, but increasingly as expression and communication. Meanwhile, in 
accordance with their overwhelming use, billboards are considered more within 
commercial speech, a low (or at least somewhat lower) value speech category in U.S. law 
                                                 
1010 See, eg, Darrel C. Menthe, ‘Aesthetic Regulation and the Development of First Amendment 
Jurisprudence’, 19 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 225, 238 (2010), similarly David Burnett, Note: ‘Judging the 
Aesthetics of Billboards’, 23 J.L. & Pol. 171 (2007) 193 ff. 
1011 Id. 
1012 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
1013 Id. at 33, opinion of the Court by Justice Douglas (internal citations omitted). 




developed by around 1980.1015 On this basis, a contrario, in 1981 it was decided that non-
commercial speech cannot be disadvantaged as opposed to commercial speech. In 
Metromedia1016 the Court invalidated a billboard regulation in part for the reason that it 
allowed onsite commercial billboards, but not noncommercial billboards.  
Secondly, the regulatory technique of allowing a few exceptions1017 for 
noncommercial signs was found clearly unconstitutional as it favoured some content for 
public debate while excluded others. Metromedia on its own is an easy case, less easy is 
to figure what follows from it for the topic of this work. Certainly the holding disallows 
favouring commercial over noncommercial and some sorts of noncommercial over other 
sorts of noncommercial speech. Thus, whenever a city allows for billboards as 
exceptions, it cannot do it in a way which would harm persons most relevant here, ie 
organisers of protests, demonstrations, or other sorts of (‘noncommercial’) assemblies. 
However, when a city absolutely, unconditionally bans all billboards, it would be 
probably constitutional on the basis of Metromedia. The Court namely starts out of the 
assumption that ‘billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however 
                                                 
1015 The commercial speech jurispudence of the Supreme Court is somewhat fluid. A specific commercial 
speech test was first announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) and stated the following steps:  (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech 
only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected 
commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly 
advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. This test 
was restated in Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453. U.S. 490, 507 (1981), but later cases might have 
strengthened the test actually. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island , 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and then 
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001) and Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) 
not clarifying exactly what test should apply. 
1016 Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453. U.S. 490  (1981). 
1017 ‘A fixed sign may be used to identify any piece of property and its owner. Any piece of property may 
carry or display religious symbols, commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and 
organisations, signs carrying news items or telling the time or temperature, signs erected in discharge of 




constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm’.’1018 Thus, Metromedia would allow 
aesthetics alone to justify suppressing (all kinds of) billboards as means of expression. 
Parallel to these developments, aesthetic regulation has always been exposed to 
challenges of vagueness and overbreadth.1019 Early on, Schneider v. State1020 (1939) 
spelled out that a blanket ban on handbilling was unconstitutional, as those who actually 
littered should be sanctioned and not those who expressed their views via handbills. 
Further on, unbridled discretion of the mayor in issuing newsrack permits resulted in 
unconstitutionality in 1988, as newsracks were considered being included under 
dissemination of newspapers (thus, ideas). 1021 Basically, the prior nature and the 
discretion required strict scrutiny notwithstanding that ‘manner’ regulation is normally 
subject to less strict standards.1022 For example, in 1984 in Taxpayers for Vincent1023 the 
Court upheld a ban on posting signs on public property (slogan of a political candidate on 
utility poles). The decisive argument in the judgment applying a merged O’Brien-content 
neutrality standard seems to be that the ban on signs on public property, -- unlike the ban 
on handbilling in Schneider v. State – leaves open ample alternative modes of 
communication. That means that a municipality cannot shut down all means of 
expression, thus Metromedia also needs to be read in this light. Nonetheless, in which 
case there are ‘no ample alternative means’ and what the standard is for comparing 
‘alternatives’ appear increasingly opaque, just as the question of the relationship between 
                                                 
1018 Id. at 510.  
1019 See in general Randall J. Cude, ‘Beauty and the Well-Drawn Ordinance: Avoiding Vagueness and 
Overbreadth Challenges to Municipal Aesthetic Regulations’, 6 J.L. & Pol'y 853 (1998).  
1020 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
1021 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
1022 Therefore, newsracks possibly can be banned altogether. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill 
Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1996) as cited by Cude, ‘Beauty’ above n 1019 at  883, note 
114.  




the substantial interest pursued and the means applied. The following two seminal, but 
heavily criticised cases helped to clarify the doctrine applicable to ‘content-neutrally 
regulated symbolic speech’. 
Heffron v. ISKCON1024(1981) was about a 12-day state fair where solicitation of 
donation, and sale and distribution of literature were only allowed from rented booths. 
The International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) asserted that the ban 
would prevent them to practice Sankirtan, a ritual of going to the streets and distributing 
or selling literature and soliciting donations, claiming infringement of their speech rights 
(but not accommodation under free exercise). The majority found the rule constitutional, 
while Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote in partial dissents that the ban on 
distribution of literature violated free speech for being not narrowly tailored to substantial 
interests of crowd control or fraud prevention.1025 The test applied by the Court itself 
sounded the same, but the majority has not taken into account at all that simply 
distributing leaflets surely does not hinder the flow of people any more than not-
prohibited other activities, like people being stopped by a speech or other performance. 
Thus, the narrow tailoring is certainly not as narrow as understood normally in 
fundamental rights doctrine.  
An even more problematic decision related to sleeping in a park as a way of 
political protest came in 1984. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence1026(CCNV) an NGO highlighting the plight of the homeless staged a protest in 
central Washington D.C. areas, such as the Mall and Lafayette Park, both under the 
                                                 
1024 Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
1025 Justice Brennan thought solicitation and sale could be restricted to fixed places in order to prevent 
fraudulent activites, while Justice Blackmun found the exchanging moves involved in solitication and sales 
raise special crowd control concerns 452 U.S. 657 (J. Brennan), 452 U.S. 665 (J. Blackmun). 




management of the National Park Service. The use of the parks can be regulated by such 
means as conform to the fundamental purpose of the parks, which is1027 
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and 
the wild life therein . . . in such manner and by such means as will 
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.  
 
According to park regulations, camping was not allowed except in designated areas, 
which were none in Lafayette Park or the Mall. Camping included sleeping, making 
preparations to sleep, storing personal belongings, making fire, etc., but also the 
reasonable appearance of camping, independent of the intent of the participants. CCNV 
was permitted to install 20 tents in Lafayette Park and 40 tents in the Mall ie two 
symbolic tent cities, and to stage a 24 hour protest, but protestors were not allowed to 
sleep in the tents. Protestors claimed sleeping was inherent part of the expression, and 
thus should be allowed. An extremely divided Court of Appeals – the bench included 
Judges Ginsburg and Scalia, on different sides – ruled in favour of the protestors. The 
USSC reversed. Justice White ‘assumed’ that the sleeping would be expressive conduct, 
and relied on O’Brien, Taxpayers for Vincent, and public forum cases, and after all 
applied a mixture of these tests, as is regular in these cases. The regulation was certainly 
‘content-neutral’, the majority not finding it objectionable that the sleeping ban was 
actually introduced after the same NGO staged protests elsewhere in national parks. The 
substantial interest furthered– according to the majority – is ‘maintaining the parks in the 
heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition,’1028 clearly an ‘aesthetic 
                                                 
1027 39 Stat. 535, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1 as cited by Clark at 468 U.S. 290.  




interest.’ The regulation was found narrowly tailored to further attractive and intact 
condition of the parks, dismissing argument of protestors that if a 24 hour vigil is 
allowed, then the ban on sleeping only incrementally furthers said interest. Justice White 
replied that the First Amendment does not require the Park Service to allow the 24 hours 
vigil in tents accommodating 150 people in the first place, let alone sleeping. Also, he 
dismisses the wish of sleeping for being largely only ‘facilitative’ to the demonstration as 
the organisers wrote in the permit application that without hot meal and sleeping space 
homeless people likely would not show up. Referring to Heffron he maintained that the 
validity of such regulations is not to be judged ‘solely by reference to the demonstration 
at hand’1029, ie the sleeping ban is necessary because otherwise several other groups 
would also want to sleep in core areas, and that would present ‘difficult problems for the 
Park Service.’1030 This appears to be an argument against dissenting Justice Marshall who 
emphasises that the First Amendment cannot be abridged in order to avert what he calls 
‘imposter’ uses,1031 in this case sleeping not as expression, but just simply sleeping. 
Justice Marshall thinks such uses need be prevented by means other than abridging 
political protest at central sites of American history. That this does not persuade the 
majority is a consequence of the loosened test applied by Justice White:1032  
If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
National Parks are adequately protected, which we think it has, 
and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the 
sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation 
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under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the 
manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.  
This basically reduces the test applicable to manner regulation to a rational basis test, a 
highly deferential standard. Already in 1987 Geoffrey Stone criticised these standards for 
being too deferential,1033 and the critique since then has only intensified. Still, the test 
remains the same, and, as explained above, in Ward v. RAR Justice Kennedy made 
explicit that ‘narrowly tailored’ does not mean ‘least intrusive’ in the TMP doctrine.1034  
Clark and Ward were cited in the decision affirming the ban on marching at all in 
New York City against the nearing Iraq war in 2003 which thus turned stationary, not 
being able to march past the UN building, among others, for unsubstantiated fear of a 
terrorist attack.1035 Clark, though not exactly applicable, was cursorily discussed and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 2011 funeral protest case, too.1036 
Finally, to add to the aesthetic puzzle, a 1994 case need be referred to which 
applied the content-neutral test and found a violation, a rare occurrence. In Ladue v. 
Gilleo,1037 the USSC declared a city ordinance banning residential signs (on private 
property) unconstitutional by finding that no ample alternative substitutes were available, 
and intimating that the use of an entire medium was foreclosed.1038 Residential signs are 
distinct as they provide information about the speaker’s identity, ‘an important 
                                                 
1033 Geoffrey R. Stone, ‘Content-neutral Regulations’, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 46 (1987) 79. 
1034 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-799 (1989). 
1035 United for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) For an 
excellent analysis see Nick Suplina, ‘Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, 
Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism’, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 395 (2005). 
1036 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011), 1217. 
1037 Margaret Gilleo, a Ladue resident placed on her front lawn in December 1990 a 24- by 36-inch sign 
printed with the words, ‘Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.’ The sign was removed by 
someone and,  police, when asked to help, advised Ms Gilleo that such signs violated a city ordinance.  
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43 (1994) 
1038 Justice O’Connor concurs by contending the ordinance’s list of exceptions renders it content-based, but 




component of many attempts to persuade,’1039 as they are cheap and convenient, and as 
they are especially apt to address the neighbours, an audience ‘that could not be reached 
nearly as well by other means.’1040 (Why it is more worthy of protection to reach 
neighbours than anyone else evades my comprehension.) The Court also stresses that 
‘individual liberty in the home’ mandates a special treatment. Ladue thus merges several 
rationales, and it is not quite clear which one would be self-standing. Seen in the light of 
the other TMP decisions, I would think most important was here the distinctiveness of the 
home,1041 a concern not normally present in relation to freedom of assembly, only as a 
limit. Still, the Court emphasises that the case law strongly dismisses foreclosure of an 
entire medium,1042 mentioning early cases on distribution of pamphlets and handbills.  
Therefore, Ladue reinforces that activities more relevant for my purposes, ie 
handbilling, distribution of literature and the like on the street are each a separate 
medium, thus cannot be fully banned even by content-neutral regulations. However, 
Ladue does not affect the loose approach as to what counts as alternative channel or 
means of communication, as settled in the previously discussed decisions. 
                                                 
1039 512 U.S. 56, citing Aristotle 2, Rhetoric, Book 1, ch. 2, in 8 Great Books of the Western World, 
Encyclopedia Brittanica 595 (M. Adler ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
1040 512 U.S. 57. 
1041 This seems to be the view of another commentator, Jason R. Burt, ‘Speech Interests Inherent in the 
Location of Billboards and Signs: A Method for Unweaving the Tangled Web of Metromedia, Inc. v. City 
of San Diego’, 2006 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 473, 499 et seq. 
1042 ‘Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of 
expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets 
within the municipality, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 
(1938); handbills on the public streets, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 
869 (1943); the door-to-door distribution of literature, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-149, 
63 S.Ct. 862, 864-866, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164-
165, 60 S.Ct. 146, 152, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), and live entertainment, Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 
75-76, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2186, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486, 108 
S.Ct. 2495, 2503, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (picketing focused upon individual residence is ‘fundamentally 
different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in 
residential areas’). Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or 
viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent-by eliminating 




  To sum up, aesthetic regulations in the United States can often limit freedom of 
expression and assembly in ways which do not seem justified not only to me, but to 
American commentators. Vagueness and overbreadth sometimes can be serious limits 
against references to aesthetics, just as content-based restrictions will not regularly 
survive constitutional scrutiny. However, if an ordinance is framed and applied in a 
content-neutral fashion, but for special cases including foreclosure of an entire medium, it 
has good chances to survive an ever loosening review by the Supreme Court.  
4.2. Germany 
 
In Germany the relation of expression and aesthetic regulation came up in the seventies in 
the issue of littering.  
About handbill littering a decision of the Federal Administrative Court is of 
importance.1043 The Berlin law on city cleaning required an official preliminary 
certificate for the distribution of handbills (precisely: Werbemateriel, ie advertising 
material). The Court (and all the lower courts) found the application of the law by police 
reached over to constitutionally protected expression especially that no exception was 
granted to handbills with political content. The Court emphasises that not only the 
opinion itself, but also means and forms of its expression are protected by Art. 5 GG. The 
law clearly interferes with Art. 5, and it is not justified by any grounds listed in Art. 5 II. 
The aim of the law is solely the prevention of pollution of the streets by castaway paper. 
The concern in effect is an aesthetic one; the law does not protect eg health. Promotion of 
street cleanliness is not a value at least as important as freedom of expression, thus it 
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cannot justify restrictions on expression. What is more, the prior permit is required only 
to better prepare the authorities on how to clean the streets afterwards, a fact which belies 
that the restriction meets compelling needs.  
The GFCC issued a decision similar to that in relation to handbill distribution in 
1991.1044 An association founded by members of the Scientology Church protested 
against ‘inhuman treatment’ of psychiatric and drug patients by distributing handbills in 
Hamburg pedestrian streets. The district authority prohibited the distribution by arguing 
that the members have pursued economic activity, which requires a specific prior 
permission and payment. The OVG (higher administrative court) found the requirement 
served to ensure a safe and smooth flow of traffic, and thus, though interfered with 
freedom of opinion, as a general law in the sense of Art. 5 II it was justified. The GFCC 
found the value of safe and smooth flow of traffic was generally not sufficient to 
counterbalance a prior restraint on freedom of opinion in the form of a permit. Especially 
unwarranted appears the claim with regard to pedestrian zones and other streets with low 
traffic, as it is possible to evade the distributor. In a typical turn, however, the Court finds 
safe and smooth flow of pedestrian traffic a legitimate aim, but still one which cannot be 
proportionally pursued by way of a prior permission on the exercise of freedom of 
expression.1045 Thus, it can be more or less safely concluded that handbill distribution in 
Germany cannot be made dependent on prior approval, except maybe where it causes real 
safety or health hazards (eg on a very busy traffic line, or on a highway, etc.). Certainly, 
again, the applicable constitutional standard is the general proportionality.  
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  The GFCC reviewed the question of constitutionality of fees within imposition of 
conditions on assemblies in 2007.1046 It stated that such a fee can only be exacted if 
conditions of imposing condition on assembly are met; ie public safety or order is directly 
endangered and cannot be averted by milder means. This implies that general street 
cleaning regulations are only applicable to the extent the constitutional conditions of 
freedom of assembly are upheld, proportionality requirements apply. Also, the GFCC 
confirmed individual responsibility in the sense that the organiser cannot be held liable 
for deeds outside his or her circle of action, thus, in principle cannot be made to pay for 
the litter and other damages caused by participants. This now seems to be accepted for 
the situation where authorities would impose the fee as part of a condition on the 
assembly.1047  
Earlier case law of ordinary courts, eg two decisions1048 of the Federal 
Administrative Court from 1989 differ(ed) however from the view of the GFCC in 
relation to imposition of compensation for cleaning the streets after or during the 
assembly by city services. The administrative high court notably treated street cleaning 
regulations as generally applicable laws which do not interfere with freedom of assembly, 
as their regulatory scope is different. Thus, it is not settled yet whether cleaning fees or 
compensation imposed not as part of a condition should also fulfil criteria of direct 
danger to public order or safety, and individual responsibility. I argue it should, because 
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1047 Eg VGH Mannheim, Urteil vom 21. 1. 2009 - 1 S 1678/07, VGH Mannheim: Verwaltungsgebühr für 
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the GFCC – though referring to Art. 15 of the Federal Assembly Law on conditions on 
assemblies -- the interpretation of that very article is rooted in Art. 8 of the GG.1049  
A further issue arose in Germany in relation to information desks. In a case which 
went to the GFCC, four persons installed an information stand on a street in order to 
distribute political message.1050 They have not applied for a special use permit, and thus 
were fined. The GFCC has not taken the case, reasoning sparsely that the regulation is a 
justified interference into freedom of expression as long as the fee is not prohibitive, and 
the discretion not unlimited. The right to freedom of assembly is not even affected, to 
install information desks is not covered by the right, thus it can be regulated by general 
laws other than the law on assembly.   
4.3. United Kingdom and ECHR 
 
In the U.K., the same section 5 of the POA that was applicable in Percy v DPP to ‘flag 
desecration’ above,1051 also was applied to placards and posters. To recall: the section 
criminalises causing harassment, distress, or alarm by threatening, abusive, insulting 
behaviour, words, or signs. Conviction for holding a sign inscripted with ‘Stop 
immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’ and ‘Stop Lesbianism’ was upheld in Hammond v 
DPP1052 as discussed above.1053 Norwood v. DPP1054 was about a BNP politician 
displaying a poster from his own window stating that ‘Islam out of Britain’ and ‘Protect 
                                                 
1049 Interestingly, a comment on fee paying and freedom of assembly highlighting the difference between 
constitutional and administrative ultimate courts does not explicitly express a similar stance. Holger Greve 
&  Fabian Quast,’ Gebührenerhebung versus Versammlungsfreiheit’, NVwZ 2009, 500.  
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Sondernutzungserlaubnis für Informationsstand auf öffentlichen Straßen, NJW 1977, 671. 
1051 See above text accompanying nn 897-900. 
1052 Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin). 
1053 Chapter 5, above text accompanying nn 94-95. 




the British people’ next to a photo of 9/11 twin towers in flame, and a crescent and star 
surrounded by a prohibition sign. His conviction was upheld on the basis that the display 
was not an intemperate criticism of the tenets of Islam, but an ‘insulting attack’ on its 
followers.1055 However, these cases do not appear to turn on the modes and means 
employed, neither on directly perceived aesthetic harms, but on the substantial message.   
The ECtHR, similarly to UK courts, has so far not developed a doctrine of content 
neutrality in the sense of a lesser standard applicable to modal restrictions, and it has not 
dealt with such claims raised by governments in any significant decision reflected in the 
literature. Two decisions on means of protest exemplify this, as there is no discussion on 
whether the specific means by which the expression is pursued requires the application of 
lower standards. An (otherwise important) leaflet decision is Incal v. Turkey where a 
politician of a later dissolved Turkish Kurdish party was jailed for a leaflet protesting 
against ‘state terror’ towards Kurdish and, partly, Turkish people or proletarians. The 
Turkish government was unsurprisingly unsuccessful to make believe Commission and 
Court that to portray a group as suffering discrimination is incitement to violence.1056  
However, the Norwood case discussed above in relation to UK was declared inadmissible 
by the ECHR, finding Art. 17 applicable, as1057  
the words and images on the poster amounted to a public 
expression of attack on all Muslims in the United Kingdom.  Such 
a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the 
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the authorities by setting up ‘neighbourhood committees’. Incal v. Turkey, Application No. 
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group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible 
with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, 
notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination. 
 
This is a very clear content(viewpoint)-discrimination, earlier only applicable with regard 
to denial of facts, largely as a form of racial hate speech,1058 as was discussed above in 
relation to dignity.1059 A speculation that the extension comes in a case related not to 
verbal, spoken expression, but to largely symbolic one because of a tendency to grant 






Place, similarly to time and manner, has also entertained the imagination of protesters, 
legislators, and courts. The fundamental cause of this utmost attentiveness is simply the 
fact that places are full or filled with meaning, and thus act just like a theatrical setting 
which colours, enriches or reinforces a message, even to the extent of changing the 
meaning of the place itself. If you manage to change the meaning of a place, you have 
changed the identity of your people: it is the power of redefining, maybe the one true 
power one (or more, out of compromise) might ever have. No wonder it is so attractive.  
                                                 
1058 Ian Leigh, ‘Damned if they do, damned if they don't: the European Court of Human Rights and the 
protection of religion from attack’, 17 Res Publica 55 (2011) 63. 




In some cases the place has a commemorative meaning, as it reminds of a specific 
historical event, either because historically it happened there, or because subsequently it 
became a(n official) memorial site. Such protest-free sites have been widely designated 
around Europe especially in remembrance of the Holocaust, and against Neo-Nazi 
demonstrations. In other (though sometimes overlapping) cases, the place has meaning 
because the object of protest or the target of the request made by demonstrators lies there, 
such as governmental buildings, prisons, courts, residency of a public person, or even 
abortion clinics. Special cases have arisen in relation to cemeteries, and in the United 
States even the term ‘funeral protest’  was coined.  
As a flipside, there are not only protest-free zones, but also protest-zones which 
designate the place for protest in an exclusive way, the most vivid memories of such 
being probably the speech pens in NYC before the Iraq war or the ‘caging’ of protestors 
in national conventions of the main US parties, but even next to diplomatic events of the 
global world.   
Restrictions related to special places (or spaces even) are widespread in most of 
the examined jurisdictions and can be classified in several ways. As all activity covered 
by freedom of assembly takes up some public space, the whole book could be 
restructured along the criterion on restrictions on space. Reasons for preventing the use of 
specific (or less specific) places by assemblies are also extremely diverging across the 
jurisdictions. In the following I am sticking to a more or less simply intuitive structure, 
putting together firstly residence, cemetery, hospital and other more private-oriented 




function, and then, thirdly, memorial sites as sites designated for assemblies, just not the 
ones banned, and, finally, the speech pen or cage phenomenon.  




Protest in cemeteries shows in extreme version the many conflicting values that can be 
involved in the context of freedom of assembly. A cemetery is normally a quiet, private 
place dedicated to the remembrance of close friends and relatives in a certain atmosphere 
of sadness and restraint contemplating the tragedy of life and death. A funeral is an event 
designed to make death acceptable and normal, so one can go about their everyday life. 
Protest, to the contrary is a public, loud, agitated event, which exactly does not aim at 
normalising, but at changing and eliminating the painful. In the cemetery the central 
feeling is grief, in a protest it is grievance.  
Still, a cemetery might become politicised in several ways which then opens up an 
occasion for the exercise of freedom of assembly. Commemoration, official or social, 
also often takes place in cemeteries, which otherwise function as natural places for 
exercising rights of privacy and, importantly, religion. Two European cases 
straightforwardly show this potential of the ritual around the dead, while the American 
case is a more atypical exploitation of the same potential.  
The ECtHR dealt with cemetery protest in Öllinger, and found a compromised 
solution. In the case, Austrian authorities banned a protest demonstration against 




death of SS soldiers in WW2 on All Saints’ Day at the Salzburg Municipal Cemetery.1060 
The Court rejected that Art. 9 rights of cemetery-goers would prevail over Art. 11 rights 
of Öllinger, a Green MP protesting against the crimes of the SS. Though the Government 
tried to argue, the ECtHR rejected that the dignity and quiet required in a cemetery 
absolutely prevents Öllinger in doing so, especially that he and his fellows organised a 
silent event, without chanting or banners. The ECtHR noted that there was no previous 
violence (only heated discussion at other such occasions), neither would have been the 
protest noisy or in other ways directed against cemetery-goers’ beliefs. A contrario then, 
freedom of religion is possible to be involved in cemetery protest cases, and also being 
quiet and as we have seen, possibly not using banners, might be a permissible limit on 
such assemblies.  
 The German constitutional court also handed down a ruling recently in the context 
of assembly and cemeteries. This time, the victims of the 1945 Dresden allied bombings 
were commemorated by the city of Dresden and a civil society organisation in a 
cemetery, and counter-protestors showing banners were fined for violating the dignity of 
the place. The GFCC the counter-protest was protected by freedom of assembly. The 
Court pointed out that in general the cemetery is a place which is destined only for 
specific, limited purposes, and is in general not to be considered a public place open for 
general communication. However, in the concrete case, the cemetery was voluntarily 
opened up for communication by the city, thus it was rightly used by protestors as a place 
for communicating their views on the commemoration. The Court emphasises that the 
protestors reacted to the communicative event created or allowed by the city, and that 
                                                 




their protest was silent.1061 It is unlikely therefore that protest on a different topic, let 
alone assemblies in cemeteries in general (ie which are not specifically opened up by the 
state for other communicative events) could not be rather easily restricted.    
Partly similar concerns, and similar answers have arisen in Snyder v. Phelps,1062 
decided in 2011 by the USSC. Phelps is the founder of Westboro Baptist Church which 
has picketed funerals in the last twenty years, protesting against various issues, such as 
the American tolerance of homosexuality, or the Catholic Church’s paedophile scandals. 
Basically the congregation appears to believe that God is killing Americans as a 
punishment for their sins. By 2008, the church, consisting of around 75 members, mostly 
relatives, managed to irritate so much the American public that the federal government 
and forty-one states have adopted laws restricting funeral protests.1063 Snyder is the father 
of late Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in Iraq. Westboro conducted a picketing on the 
day of Matthew Snyder’s funeral. The picketing started 30 minutes before the funeral, 
and was on a public plot adjacent to a public street at about a 1000 feet distance from the 
church in which the funeral was held. When Snyder drove to the funeral, he saw the top 
of the picketers’ banners, but did not get aware about the content of their message until 
later when he saw a news broadcast on the Westboro protest. Snyder claimed that the 
Westboro protest caused him intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion 
upon seclusion and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding1064 
the tortious nature of Westboro’s speech, but nonetheless found that the First Amendment 
shielded Phelps from tort liability. Most important concerns were the following. The 
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1062 Snyder v. Phelps. 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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location of the protest was a public land adjacent to a public street, a par excellence 
traditional public forum, the sort of place on which speech enjoys highest constitutional 
protection.1065 Also, speech on public matters, as the Court found Phelps’ to be, is again 
in the core of First Amendment. Dispositive in deciding if a speech is of private or of 
public concern is ‘content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record.’1066 As the 
content was clearly of public concern, it did not matter whether – as Snyder tried to argue 
– the context, ie the funeral of his son, was rather private. Even so, the Court by Chief 
Justice Roberts goes on quoting Clark v. CCNV, such speech of public concern in a 
traditional public forum can be subject to reasonable time, manner and place regulation, 
ie content-neutral regulation. However, as Phelps’ picket was out of the sight of those in 
the church, it was not interfering with the funeral itself. Thus, any objections to the 
protest were clearly content-, even viewpoint-based, and as such, impermissible.1067 The 
captive audience claim also did not stand because of the distance of the protest from the 
funeral.1068 The decision is not as simple as it appears. Justice Breyer added a concurring 
emphasising the narrow holding of the Court, and Justice Alito was the only one to 
dissent. Alito bases his dissent in a broader context; he namely also includes more 
personally assaultive language by Westboro stated in a press release and online post 
before and after the picketing itself, and claims these also reinforce the equally personally 
attacking nature of the banners at the picket itself. Actionable speech should not be 
immunised just because it is interspersed with protected speech.1069 The majority counters 
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that these pre- and post-picketing communications were outside the issue in the case as 
Snyder did not rely on them.  
These two perspectives demonstrate vividly how hard choices are necessarily 
made by lawyers when interpreting what actually was meant by ‘an expression.’ Justice 
Alito undoubtedly has a point when he emphasises that unprotected speech of private 
matter does not get protected just because it is infused with matters of public concern. 
Also, I tend to agree with him on the point that actually in the case Matthew Snyder’s 
death was used to create public (including media) attention for Westboro Baptist Church. 
Death and especially the ritual around it are symbolic moments very well exploitable for 
expressing political views or promoting one’s interests, as we have just seen on both 
sides of the Öllinger case. On my part, however, I would still allow for the protest to go 
ahead as it did, non-interfering with the funeral. Nonetheless, the tortious press release 
and post-picket online communication should remain actionable independent of the 
protest, though I doubt the torts would pass constitutional muster, unless a new 
jurisprudence emerges.1070 True, the Snyders were clearly non-public persons, and they 
should have been able to remain so, I take Hustler v. Falwell clearly inapplicable. I think 
such an approach would not mean that civility (as opposed to intrusion)-based privacy 
interests, so characteristically and importantly rejected in classic American jurisprudence, 
would override free speech rights.1071 However, the possible torts at hand were not 
defamatory: not false statements of facts, but offensive or outrageous. Thus, 
jurisprudence allowing for speech restrictions for reasons of negligent false defamatory 
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statements of private persons, such as Gertz,1072 does not apply here either. Outrage or 
feelings of rage or hurt are probably unavoidably categories of speech content which 
cannot be a basis for restriction for the classic reasons.1073  
Snyder v. Phelps has been all what the Supreme Court decided specifically about funeral 
protests. Lower courts seem to agree that (unlike surrounding public streets) the cemetery 
itself is a non-public forum, and for the protection of mourners, buffer zones might be 
constitutional if the funeral protest would closely coincide in time with a funeral.1074 
‘Unreasonable’ and ’interfering’ sounds and images might be constitutionally prohibited 
according to some courts, but a blanket ban is unconstitutional for overbreadth and lack 
of narrow tailoring.1075 Also, a floating buffer zone within 300 feet of any funeral 
procession was found unconstitutionally overbroad in one case.1076 The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in a case where the 8th Circuit found that criminalising protest activities 
‘in front of or about’ funeral locations would likely turned out ‘not narrowly tailored’ or 
‘facially overbroad’ on closer inspection.1077 Thus, in sum, it seems that in the U.S. 
intermediate scrutiny applies to funeral protest restrictions if the regulation is content-
neutral, but courts tend to exert a rigorous version of the scrutiny, especially in relation to 
overbroad statutes. It is not clarified exactly how big a buffer zone is constitutional. The 
logic of the decisions is not simply spatial, but rather visual and aural: funeral-goers can 
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1074 Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Neb. 2010) as cited by Fern L. Kletter, ‘Actions 
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be constitutionally protected against even simply ‘unreasonable’ images and sounds 
because of their privacy interest in non-intrusion. The problem is that ’unreasonable’ 
sounds like a content-based criterion, at least in relation to images. Here again the general 
approach is that the eyes can be averted, while the ear cannot. This approach has a 
general validity, though there might be cases where extreme visual nuisance might create 
a captive audience, especially in closed places what one cannot avoid going there. 
Clinics 
 
Abortion clinics have been a similar target of protest outraging parts of the 
American public, and resulted in intense legislation and litigation, but the height of the 
litigation preceded the funeral protest issue. Therefore, some similarities will be easily 
recognisable in this – to a large extent – earlier jurisprudence. One difference is, 
however, that abortion clinics protests have clearly taken place in traditional or 
quintessential public forums, while funeral protests would sometimes occur on the 
territory of the cemetery itself. The jurisprudence to abortion clinic protests appears quite 
settled. The Court in Madsen struck down a 300 foot no approach zone around the clinic 
and residences of doctors performing abortion, a ban on displaying ‘images observable’ 
from the clinic, and a 36 foot buffer zone on private property to the north and west of the 
clinic. Meanwhile the Court upheld the injunction as to the 36 foot buffer zone around 
clinic entrances and driveway, and the limited noise regulation as these passed a 
heightened1078 content-neutral test and did not burden more speech than necessary to 
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accomplish the ‘significant governmental interests in protecting a pregnant woman’s 
freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services, public safety and order, free flow 
of traffic, property rights, and residential privacy’.1079 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, a 
second major decision on the abortion protest controversy similarly upheld fixed buffer 
zone regulation (15 feet from clinic doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances), but 
struck down so-called floating buffer zones requiring protestors to stay 15 feet from 
people and vehicles entering and leaving clinics.1080 In Hill v. Colorado1081, in a 
somewhat different fashion, the Court upheld an eight-feet floating buffer zone, ie 
knowingly approaching another person within eight feet, unless such other person 
consents,1082   
for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a 
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with 
such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a 
radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care 
facility 
 
The Court in a much criticised opinion upheld the floating buffer zone, again finding the 
regulation content-neutral, thus applying a Ward-type loosened test. Critics and dissenters 
would argue that oral protest, education or counselling are categories of speech, and as 
such, are content-based. What is more, as pro-choice activists would likely get consent 
                                                                                                                                                 
both not content-neutral and a prior restraint, thus would apply strict scrutiny, while Justice Stevens thinks 
injunctions pose a lesser risk to free speech than statutes as the former are issued as a consequence, or 
punishment for prior unlawful action. For an analysis see Tiffany Keast, ‘Injunction Junction. Enjoining 
Free Speech after Madsen, Schenck, and Hill’, 12 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 273, 293 ff. (2004). 
1079 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 767 ff.  (1994) 
1080 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
1081 Hill v. Colorado, 503 U.S. 703 (2000). 




for such activities (supporting the right to abortion) next to abortion clinics, the regulation 
is even viewpoint-based. In any case, referring to the loose Ward test, the majority 
remains unwilling to look into evidence hinting that the purpose of the regulation was 
indeed discriminatory against one type of speakers, and was not simply motivated by 
privacy and health interests of hospital-goers. That the Supreme Court does not 
investigate legislative motive in free speech (and all the more so in speech-plus like 
scenarios) cases, is an unfortunate heritage of O’Brien, a self-limitation of the Court not 
present in free exercise, establishment, or equal protection cases.1083 Both Justice Scalia 
and Kennedy in separate dissents argue that already on its face (banning protest-type 
attitudes only, not eg gratification) is the regulation content-based.1084 The majority per 
Justice Stevens emphasises that it is only the place that is regulated, and it in effect is 
only ‘a minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with 
unwilling listeners.’1085 I find this labelling quite unsatisfactory as where else can one 
find targets for anti-abortion speech for the purposes of face-to-face communication than 
around abortion clinics. Clearly, here place is part of the communication. In addition, it is 
not in accordance with general First Amendment standards to impose the obligation of 
getting consent for a speaker. Normally, nobody has a right not to be talked to. 
Communication, on the other hand, is a dynamic interactive process where actually one 
can change his or her mind about being willing to listen or not. Part of the 
communication is to persuade someone to listen to what one says. I find the consent 
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provision wholly vague and ignorant or disregarding of how everyday talking actually 
happens.  
That health interests might justify restrictions on speech has been settled already 
in Madsen, but the very mediated connection between speech and rising stress levels and 
thereby increased health ‘risks’ is even more distant in Hill as it was not based on 
previous unlawful action. Also, if feelings normally are not justifying restrictions on 
political speech – as both Hustler and Snyder v. Phelps apparently affirm – then what 
indeed lies behind the reference to health needs to be thoroughly checked. That would 
require a strict scrutiny – an inquiry blocked by the Supreme Court in these cases by 
claiming content-neutrality. Thus, these cases demonstrate perfectly the way the 
categorisations as ‘content-neutral’ and ’place restriction’ effectively prevent any 
meaningful discussion of countervailing values or interests in the abortion protest 
context. If abortion protests happened not ‘in place’, then content-neutrality arguments 
would have much less teeth. Therefore, the abortion clinics controversy shows in a 
palpable way how originally speech-protective doctrines can be twisted to deny the right 
to assembly and protest, upholding regulations which would certainly fail the normal 
speech tests for at least overbreadth or vagueness, if not simply for illegitimate purpose 
of integrity of feelings. All this happening when there is clearly a possibility under classic 
speech doctrines to prevent or punish physical obstruction, violence, coercion, threats, or 
stalking which certainly have occurred in much of the abortion protest events. If one 
compares the funeral and the abortion protest jurisprudence, the different outcomes are 
striking. It remains to be seen how the funeral protests jurisprudence might evolve in the 




special sensitivity shown towards aborting women and their doctors. It has to be seen that 
in the abortion clinics setting real persons are the target, while in the funeral protests 
cases a dead person is used as the opportunity to spread an ideological message, and thus, 
health risks cannot be involved per default.    
Residence 
Finally, the residential picketing issue is also partly an abortion related issue in 
the U.S., but the case law originates in a civil rights protest around a mayor’s home who 
did not support busing of schoolchildren. The Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown (1980) 
struck down a ban on picketing around residences and dwellings because there was a 
content-based exception for labour picketing.1086  This decision has also spelled out very 
clearly that ‘public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods,’ were public 
fora.1087 The less straightforward 1988 case, Frisby v. Schultz arose out of a controversy 
where anti-abortion advocates picketed the home of a doctor performing abortions. In 
reaction, an ordinance was enacted banning residential picketing. The ban was judged 
content-neutral, narrowly construed by the Supreme Court (ie against the broad 
construction of lower courts, a rare move) to only ban focused picketing in front of one 
residence or dwelling, and not banning marching into residential neighbourhoods, or 
protesting, demonstrating there at large. The significant governmental interest in 
‘residential privacy’ was described by the Court in really elevated language, partly 
stemming from earlier case law, such as the following:1088  
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‘The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and 
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and 
civilized society.’ Our prior decisions have often remarked on the 
unique nature of the home, ‘the last citadel of the tired, the weary, 
and the sick,’ and have recognized that ‘[p]reserving the sanctity 
of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair 
to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an 
important value.’ One important aspect of residential privacy is 
protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, 
we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to 
hear, the home is different. ‘That we are often `captives' outside 
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech . . . 
does not mean we must be captives everywhere.’ Instead, a 
special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own 
walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to 
avoid intrusions.  
Later, the Court adds that1089  
[t]he resident is figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within 
the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such 
picketing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted 
speech.  
 
                                                 




Thus, even though the street in front of a ‘home’ is public forum, the resident in his or her 
home can become a captive audience as a result of the ongoing focused picketing in front 
of the house.  Six years after Frisby, in Madsen, the Court upheld a 300-foot buffer zone 
around residences of staff of abortion clinics, as mentioned above. What emerges clearly 
in relation to residential protest in the U.S. is that general protest is protected, but focused 
picketing can be regulated in content-neutral way if narrowly tailored to a significant 
governmental interest such as tranquillity of the home, and – in a somewhat strained 
meaning – prevention of a captive audience. It is worth recalling how German courts 
struggled with the notion of coercion and the differences between psychological and 
physical pressure, but also how the famous Skokie controversy appears to conclude to the 
fact that Skokie residents could just leave their home for the duration of the Nazi march, 
thus they are not captive audience.  
At the ECtHR, the closest decision is Patyi v. Hungary (No. 1.), where creditors 
losing their money as a result of insolvency of a company were not allowed to 
demonstrate in front of the residence of the prime minister. The police banned a series of 
demonstrations on different days, sometimes bringing up reasons bordering the 
ridiculous. Police claimed the five-meter-wide pavement was not enough to harbour the 
twenty protestors for twenty minutes without disturbing (vehicular) traffic; and no 
alternative route for the buses was available. In one case, disturbance to traffic was 
heightened because on All Saints Day a lot of people would go to cemeteries, thus the 
road had to bear intensified traffic, while later the winter weather prompting intensified 
travelling to ski resorts around Budapest necessitated allegedly the demonstration to be 




Eve – when buses stop running around 4 p.m. The Court of course has not taken these 
statements at face value,1090 and found violation, applying the type of scrutiny generally 
applicable in Convention jurisprudence (some sort of proportionality review).  
Malls and airports 
 
Demonstrations in malls have been the other issue where both the USSC and the 
ECtHR have voiced their view. In Marsh v. Alabama (1946)1091, the issue phrased 
carefully by Justice Black was ‘whether a State … can impose criminal punishment on a 
person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-
owned town contrary to the wishes of the town’s management.’1092 He found that the 
state lacked that authority, and the First Amendment rights of Jehovah’s witnesses prevail 
over the state’s interest in protecting property rights. Justice Black believes whether the 
title of a land belongs to government or to a private person is not decisive, as ‘the more 
the owner opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more his rights 
become circumscribed’1093 by the rights of those who use it. As in the case the company 
town was basically a functional equivalent of a municipality, First Amendment was 
found to apply. Marsh v. Alabama, however, is not the end of the story, and though it 
never was overruled, basically it appears to be in decline or only surviving in 
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exceptionally narrow situations. Firstly, however, in Logan Valley1094 (1968) Marsh was 
applied in an extensive way to labour picketing inside a shopping mall directed against 
one of the stores, thus equalising a simple shopping centre to a company town. A few 
years later, in the opposite case of Lloyd v. Tanner,1095 similar protection was denied to 
anti-war leafleting, the Court reasoning that the leafleting was unrelated to the shopping 
centre or to any tenant of it, and thus could have been performed as effectively outside 
the premises of the centre as inside. A final blow to a broad interpretation to Marsh 
seems to be Hudgens1096 from 1980 where the – extremely divided – Court clarified that 
it does not see a private shopping mall as a place where the First Amendment applies. 
The Supreme Court also held,1097 however, that state constitutions could grant more 
extended speech rights than the federal Bill of Rights. Indeed, quite some state courts 
have interpreted their own documents as granting rights of expression and protest in 
places private, but open to the public in a way which benefits the owner. On my part, 
together with very many authors, I see reason for such an extension, especially because 
‘truly’ public space is rapidly shrinking,1098 while government still needs to be controlled 
and criticised. Also I agree with Justice Black’s idea about the voluntary ‘publicisation’ 
of property for gain, which – quasi in exchange – extends the reach of constitutional 
protection. Still, it is clear that all this is apparently irreconcilable with the idea of a strict 
line between public and private, quite fundamental in constitutional law. This problem is 
registered by state courts which then examine these cases first in terms of state action, a 
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complicated doctrine outside the reach of this project.1099 Important to note is however 
that even if a court finds state action in a given situation, it does not mean that the 
applicable standard to the speech restriction will be the same as it would be for state-
owned public places.1100  
As to the European Court of Human Rights, Appleby v. UK1101 is the parallel case. 
The owners of a private shopping centre that also functioned as the town centre denied a 
group permission to collect signatures against a local plan to build in on a part of the only 
remaining park area in the vicinity of the town centre. The Court first of all denied that 
some sort of quasi-public forum requirement would flow from the Convention. It also 
stated that it does not have much relevance that the town centre had originally been built 
by a government owned company, and only later sold to the current private owner. Based 
on a comparative analysis where the Court considered cases from the United States and 
Canada, it concluded that there is no emerging consensus that would bestow ‘automatic’ 
access rights to private property. Nonetheless, the Court was cautious not to exclude all 
possibility of access rights for the future. In case the bar on access to property would 
have the effect of preventing any effective exercise of expressive rights, or would destroy 
the essence of the right, a positive obligation of the state might arise.1102 The Court refers 
to Marsh v. Alabama to demonstrate an example where – if happened in Europe – a 
positive obligation to grant access rights to private property would be imposed by the 
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Convention.1103 However, in the present case, demonstrators had the option to go to the 
old town centre (frequented by much less people), or employ alternative means of 
communication like door-to-door canvassing etc.1104 The decisive consideration here is 
basically the same as in U.S. TMP and content-neutrality doctrines: whether or not there 
are alternatives to the one restricted. The Appleby decision could be reframed in ‘U.S. 
legalese’ as saying that the property right of the owner is a significant government 
interest, the restriction on place is minor, thus narrowly tailored to the significant interest, 
and the restriction left open alternative channels of communication. Dissenting Judge 
Maruste criticised that the forum was not considered public or quasi-public especially 
that it went from the public hand to the private, and that applicants were discriminatorily 
denied permit which was granted to various other groups, including – significantly – to 
the local government for statutory consultation purposes. Thus, Judge Maruste could be 
reframed in U.S. language to the effect that the discretion granted to the private owner 
resulted in content-discrimination. Judge Maruste does not claim that freedom of 
expression should always prevail over property, but makes this important point:1105 
It cannot be the case that through privatisation the public 
authorities can divest themselves of all responsibility to protect 
rights and freedoms other than property rights. They still bear 
responsibility for deciding how the forum created by them is to be 
used and for ensuring that public interests and individuals’ rights 
are respected.   
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This feature of previous public forum could have made the Appleby case an occasion for  
more analysis of positive obligations or how to resolve the tension between privatisation 
of public spaces and classic vertical effect of human rights. I doubt whether the kind of 
essence doctrine hinted in the judgement would be a principled reply, as that would 
discriminate between private owners according to the contingent features of the given 
vicinity: whether there are other available channels and places for protest is not 
dependent on the owner of a single shopping mall, except in the case of a company town 
unlikely in Europe. Critics of the decision advocate reasonable access rights, what the 
national legislator would be required by positive obligation to secure.1106 The ECtHR has 
all in all chosen a solution similar to the U.S. Supreme Court: the Convention does not 
require the States to grant access rights to private land, except for narrowly understood 
company town situations where there are no alternative places, but it also did not 
proclaim an absolute property right which would prevent Member States to legislatively 
grant such access.   
The German Court, the one could be expected to develop a full-fledged theory on 
the constitutional evaluation of privatisation of public spaces has yet only partially done 
so. Recently it handed out a decision proclaiming that there is a right to assembly on the 
Frankfurt Airport, owned by Fraport AG, a joint-stock company. According to the Court, 
the airport is bound directly by basic rights, basically because the state has a 52 % share 
in the company. Earlier interpretations already clarified that businesses owned (solely) by 
the state are directly bound by basic rights. The current decision adds to that that 
                                                 
1106 For more details see David Mead, ‘Strasbourg Succumbs to the Temptation ‘To Make a God of the 
Right to Property’: Peaceful Protest on Private Land and the Ramifications of Appleby v UK’, 2004 
Journal of Civil Liberties, 98 (2004), Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Property and Participation: A Right of Access for 




undertakings with mixed (private and public) ownership are also directly bound by basic 
rights if the state has a ‘controlling influence’ in the enterprise. Controlling influence is 
certainly there if more than half of the shares are publicly owned. The Court declined to 
discuss the applicability of basic rights below the level of 50 % public share.1107 In the 
present case, the 52 % public share, and the controlling influence theory thus enabled the 
Court to straightforwardly proclaim the prevalence of the subjective right to expression 
and assembly, without the need to balance it against a countering property right of the 
airport, under the certainly correct, but here in application a bit strained theory that the 
state does not have fundamental rights. The Court goes as far as to intimate that those 
private shareholders who do not like their company getting bound by the constitution, 
should sell their shares or influence the management to get rid of the controlling state 
influence..1108 Despite all its apparent radicality, this part of the decision is reasonably 
moderate, even minimalist, as after all it does not address – even explicitly excludes1109 – 
the way more challenging issue of protest rights on (fully, or largely) privately owned 
public places. Certainly basic rights can have application in such situations in the form of 
                                                 
1107 BVerfG, 1 BvR 699/06 vom 22.2.2011, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 128), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110222_1bvr069906.html, Rn. 53 
1108 Id. at 53: ‘Die Rechte der privaten Anteilseigner erfahren hierdurch keine ungerechtfertigte Einbuße: 
Ob diese sich an einem öffentlich beherrschten Unternehmen beteiligen oder nicht, liegt in ihrer freien 
Entscheidung, und auch wenn sich die Mehrheitsverhältnisse erst nachträglich ändern, steht es ihnen - wie 
bei der Änderung von Mehrheitsverhältnissen sonst - frei, hierauf zu reagieren. Sofern sich Private indes an 
solchen Unternehmen beteiligen, haben sie an den Chancen und Risiken, die sich aus den 
Handlungsbedingungen der öffentlichen Hand ergeben, gleichermaßen teil. Ohnehin unberührt bleibt ihre 
Rechtsstellung als Grundrechtsträger insbesondere des Eigentumsgrundrechts unmittelbar gegenüber den 
öffentlichen Anteilseignern oder sonst gegenüber der öffentlichen Gewalt.’ 
1109 See id. at  56: ‘cc) … Je nach Gewährleistungsinhalt und Fallgestaltung kann die mittelbare 
Grundrechtsbindung Privater einer Grundrechtsbindung des Staates vielmehr nahe oder auch gleich 
kommen. Für den Schutz der Kommunikation kommt das insbesondere dann in Betracht, wenn private 
Unternehmen die Bereitstellung schon der Rahmenbedingungen öffentlicher Kommunikation selbst 
übernehmen und damit in Funktionen eintreten, die - wie die Sicherstellung der Post- und 
Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen - früher dem Staat als Aufgabe der Daseinsvorsorge zugewiesen 
waren. Wieweit dieses heute in Bezug auf die Versammlungsfreiheit oder die Freiheit der 
Meinungsäußerung auch für materiell private Unternehmen gilt, die einen öffentlichen Verkehr eröffnen 
und damit Orte der allgemeinen Kommunikation schaffen, bedarf vorliegend keiner Entscheidung.’ 




indirect binding force or in the form of protective duty of the state, the parallel German 
doctrines to state action and positive obligations on their own outside this discussion. 
How far this application would go for real is explicitly undecided by the GFCC.  
A comparable case at the USSC turned out in exactly the opposite way. In a much 
criticised opinion, the majority of the USSC bluntly declared the (entirely!) publicly 
owned airports of New York and New Jersey being a non-public forum where only a 
reasonableness standard applies to restrictions on some expressive activities. In 
International Society for Krishna Conscieousness v. Lee (1992)1110  the Court faced a 
Port Authority ban on solicitation and on sale or distribution of literature in the entire 
area (including publicly accessible parts) of the major New York-New Jersey airports. 
The divided court managed to issue a majority opinion on the constitutionality of ban on 
solicitation, and a plurality opinion on the unconstitutionality of the sale or distribution of 
literature (leafleting basically). Most importantly the majority agreed that the freely 
accessible terminal areas are non-public forum, and thus only a reasonableness test 
applies, and solicitation is reasonably banned for disturbance to the proper running of the 
airport, and of the people minding their own business (somehow the Court seems to take 
that air travellers have less time and are busier than ground travellers1111). Justice 
Kennedy concurred in the result as to the solicitation while maintaining the airport a 
public forum. He wrote the lead opinion on leaf-letting, to which Justice O’Connor wrote 
a concurring who thinks airport terminals are non-public forum, still the leaf-letting ban 
fails the reasonableness test. Thus, all in all, solicitation can be banned, while leaf-letting 
cannot, but it is unclear why, and what tests are applicable. Though the particular case 
                                                 
1110 ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).   




was clearly ‘speech plus’, the fact that the majority considers a publicly owned airport a 
non-public forum also extends the easy regulability (ie simple reasonableness review) to 
any sort of assembly. Certainly this is a very surprising result from the USSC – especially 
if compared with the GFCC – and the fault again lies with undue respect paid to 
‘tradition’ in the forum analysis, this time going as far as to pronounce that clearly 
airports are not public fora as they are a new phenomena.1112 Note, however, that this 
argument, though lacking any normative explicative power, might actually leave place 
for later flexible application – though how late remains a question as the decision is from 
1992, and till today it was not overruled. The archaic property logic still appears to haunt 
the public forum doctrine in the US.  
In the UK, a planned 8 day long camping demonstration near Heathrow Airport 
was enjoined for reasons that the camping would likely be accompanied by direct action 
protests. The Court rejected that a simple direct action would automatically realise 
harassment, especially that the would-be protestors have not committed harassment in the 
past.1113 However, there were calls for mass direct actions,1114 clearly aimed at slowing 
down airport operation. These were found to have ‘serious and damaging consequences’ 
on the operator and users of the airport, especially as the resulting disruption would 
increase the risk of a terrorist attack against the users of the airport. The decision to grant 
the injunction clearly turns on the disruptive aim of the planned assemblies, thus the facts 
are very different from the facts of the airport cases discussed in relation to the US or 
Germany. The disruption might seriously hinder not only the lawful business of hundreds 
                                                 
1112 ‘[G]iven the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for 
the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been held in the public trust and used for 
purposes of expressive activity.’ 505 U.S. 680, majority opinion per Chief Justice Rehnquist.  
1113 Heathrow Airports Ltd and Bullock v Garman and others [2007] EWHC 1957 (QB) at § 99. 




of thousands at Heathrow, but also authorities in preventing, averting or containing the 
effects of a potential terrorist act, an argument which takes its bite from the expected 
mass feature of the protests, widely publicised in UK press. Note this is different from the 
argument sometimes found in US discourse where the protestors themselves are to be 
protected from terrorist attacks.1115  
With this in all – but the UK airport case – jurisdictions discussed one faces a 
similar situation: while courts tend to see that privatization of public places results in a 
shrinking possibility for the exercise of assembly right, and thus, they typically would not 
prevent any ‘democratic majority’ to grant access rights to privately owned open places, 
courts are at this moment unwilling to create a fundamental right of access on their own. 
In my view this is an acceptable approach from a court in general, and I only see 
inconsistency in US jurisprudence in this regard. If in one segment, abortion protests, the 
USSC is willing to loosen First Amendment protection on traditionally speech-friendly 
parts of public property, ie streets and sidewalks, for quite mediated privacy interests, 
then in the other segment (shopping malls, airports, etc.) it should be willing to 
strengthen First Amendment protection on private or quasi-private (government-owned, 
but ‘managerial’) property where no privacy interests are at stake.  
2. Governmental buildings: managerial or authoritarian protection? 
 
                                                 
1115 Eg Nick Suplina, ‘Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political 




Protest around governmental1116 buildings (eg parliaments, courts, prisons) is often 
restricted. Sometimes such restriction might be justified by interests in running the 
government, perhaps a subcategory of what Robert Post influentially meant by the 
‘managerial function’.1117 Managerial function would first imply that access needs to be 
secured as government has to run properly, and government work, be it legislative 
debates, court hearings and deliberations or executive decision-making, should not be 
threatened by mob violence or even only disruptive noise. There would be no problem 
with such restrictions if they really served the undisturbed work of government by 
preventing extortious or otherwise clearly decapacitating ‘speech’, substituting rule of 
law for the rule of street. Nonetheless, government is the last institution in a democracy 
to be shielded from public criticism, and any prohibitive scheme runs the risk of 
degenerating into an authoritarian means which isolates the mighty machinery from 
public scrutiny. Thus, protest restrictions around government buildings would be the best 
field to analyze the Janus-faced nature of the right to freedom of assembly of being the 
most important, but at the same time the most dangerous right.   
Two countries, Germany and the UK have instituted famous protest restrictions around 
government buildings, but the stories behind them are strikingly different. The United 
Kingdom is the easier case as the highly criticised authorization scheme for 
demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament has been repealed in September 2011.1118 
                                                 
1116 Government in this chapter, just as in general in the book is meant to cover all three branches of power, 
ie not only the executive and administration. 
1117 It is certainly only a subcategory, Post’s claim and theme are more general. See Robert Post, ‘Between 
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum’, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713 (987). 
1118 Section 141 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/part/3/enacted. The original provisions, the 2005 SOCPA 
Sections 132-138 required authorization for demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament which could be 
granted subject to conditions of place, time, period, noise levels if it served the purpose of preventing 




Thus, the most notorious UK place restriction belongs to the past, had lived only six 
years. Stationary protest meetings can again be held on the streets around Westminster 
without prior restraint, and processions are subject to the normal regime under the Public 
Order Act. However, the offence of trespass on a designated site, introduced in the same 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 2005, remained in force.1119 Sites on 
Crown land, and on private land of the Queen and her heirs can be designated without 
any further condition in the law, while any other (ie even private) sites can be designated 
if the Secretary of State finds it appropriate in the interests of national security (section 
128 of SOCPA). The site is thus to be designated not by law, but by the Secretary of State 
in an Order. Indeed there have been several dozens of such sites designated so far, 
including nuclear sites (power stations, but also research sites), all sorts of RAF bases, 
and a wide range of royal, governmental, and parliamentary sites, thus including basically 
all important government and Parliament buildings in London.1120 Being designated 
prevents access to the inside of the site, but it does not preclude holding protest events 
outside, in front of, the site. Therefore, these provisions do not on their own directly 
hinder protests on adjacent public streets, but create an arrestable offence for those who 
do not do anything else than put a foot on the designated area, and threaten with 
imprisonment of up to 51 weeks and level 5 fine, a quite severe punishment for an 
activity not harming anyone. It is a defence if the person proves that ‘he did not know, 
                                                                                                                                                 
operation of Parliament, (c)serious public disorder, (d)serious damage to property, (e)disruption to the life 
of the community, (f)a security risk in any part of the designated area, (g)risk to the safety of members of 
the public (including any taking part in the demonstration).’ For a detailed analysis and critique of the 
original provisions and related case law see eg David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest. Rights and 
Regulations in the Human Rights Act Era (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2010) at 148-162. 
1119 S. 125-131 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.  
1120 A list as of 2007 can be found in the schedules to The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 





and had no reasonable cause to suspect,’ that the site was a designated site. The 
provision, though might fall into desuetude, is criticised for several reasons.1121 First, 
there is no tangible harm required, simple entrance is enough. If there was some tangible 
harm, then other offences would come into play, which then makes the offence of 
trespass on a designated site appear superfluous. Recall eg that aggravated trespass is 
committed if the trespasser disrupts or obstructs some activity. The argument from 
national security, basically prevention of terrorist acts, is not convincing either, as there 
are ample powers under terrorism legislation to stop someone suspected with being a 
terrorist. Finally, it also is pointed out rightly in the literature that the mode of 
designation in Order by the Minister, ie not in law, might raise rule of law concerns, but 
at the same time opens up the possibility for courts to strike it down for incompatibility 
with the ECHR under the HRA.1122 Time will show how police and courts will apply, if 
at all, and interpret the designated site provisions. There is certainly a way to interpret 
them only to secure access to and safety of employees of the designated site, which 
would raise no serious questions of the right to protest or assembly.  
In Germany, so called Bannmeilen have been instituted in 1920 around buildings 
of representative bodies, to prevent incidents similar to the Weimar Reichstag Bloodbath 
in which 42 protestors and 20 policemen were killed in a chaotic and mismanaged effort 
to prevent protestors to enter parliament deliberating a controversial law on works 
councils. Hitler’s first day as a Reichskanzler saw the law abolished, and later the 
Ermächtigungsgesetz was adopted among shouts from SA and SS troops ‘We want the 
                                                 





law – or blood and thunder!’.1123 The Bonn Republic reintroduced such a law,1124 but that 
became obsolete with the government relocating to Berlin. Art. 16 of the federal 
assembly law banned open sky assemblies in so-called ‘pacified districts’ or ‘pacified ban 
zones’ (befriedete Bezirke or befriedete Bannkreise) around legislative organs of the 
federation and the Länder, and of the GFCC. A 1999 federal law1125 introduced pacified 
districts around the Bundestag and Bundesrat in Berlin, and around the GFCC in 
Karlsruhe, the zones being significantly smaller than the previous ones in Bonn.1126 In 
2008, basically for reasons of transparency and federalism reform,1127 the 1999 law and 
the relevant norms of the federal assembly law were incorporated in a single new law on 
pacified districts.1128  
According to the old-new scheme, it is prohibited to demonstrate in these zones, 
unless authorised by the minister for internal affairs jointly with the president of the 
respective organ. An authorisation could be given when no interference with the activities 
of the respective bodies, their organs or boards, including parliamentary fractions is to be 
expected neither would the free entrance to the buildings blocked. As a rule, on days 
when Bundestag and Bundesrat are not in session, the authorisation is to be granted.  
                                                 
1123 Alfred Dietel, Kurt Gintzel & Michael Kniesel, Versammlungsgesetz, 15th edn, (Köln, Carl Heymanns, 
2008), Rn. 11 zu § 16, 337 with reference to Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (probably 1999, 
Harper & Row), 251 and William L. Shirer, Aufstieg und Fall des Dritten Reiches (n.a.) 195.  The same 
sentence and references (with different page numbers) can be found in Sasha Werner, ‘Das neue 
Bannmeilengesetz der “Berliner Republik”’, NVwZ 2000, 369, 370 and note 17. 
1124 See Bannmeilengesetz vom 6. August 1955 (BGBl. I S. 504) 
http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/text.xav?bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D'bgbl
155s0504.pdf'%5D&wc=1&skin=WC 
1125 Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Schutzes von Verfassungsorganen des Bundes vom 11. August 1999 
(BGBl. I S. 
1818),http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/text.xav?bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D'bgbl155s0504.pdf'%5D&wc=1&skin=WC 
1126 Michael Kniesel,’ Versammlungs- und Demonstrationsfreiheit - Entwicklung des Versammlungsrechts 
seit 1996’, NJW 2000, 2857, 2866. 
1127 See the reasoning in the bill introduced to the Bundestag, Drucksache 16/9741, 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/097/1609741.pdf 




The violation of the ban was decriminalised, but remains an administrative 
offence (fine up to 20 000 euros, § 4). Thus, there is currently a regime of preventive ban 
subject to the possibility of authorisation1129 (präventives Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt), 
a reverse of what normally would be the case with fundamental rights, though with 
limited discretion on the authorities, or, a claim right to authorisation if conditions are 
fulfilled.1130  
Strong counter-arguments arise regarding the necessity of Bannmeilen regulation, 
since, under general law, police (or other authority) are entitled to impose conditions on 
the time, manner, and place of an assembly, and can even declare a no-go zone 
(Platzverweisung) if public safety or even the looser German concept, public order is 
seriously endangered.1131  
Commentators also argue that historically the Bannmeile served purposes either 
quite irreconcilable with a democratic rule of law state or was a reaction to very specific 
crises of it. In the Middle Ages, Bannmeilen served to protect friends and keep outside 
(of the castle, or of the city) foes,1132 while during the Weimar era, the law on 
Bannmeilen – in itself a constitutional amendment – was adopted as a reaction to a series 
of emergencies.1133 The mentioned Reichstag bloodbath, or the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch 
attempt, the federal government and the federal president being moved from Berlin to 
Stuttgart all provide very specific evidences of serious violence and serious physical 
threats against constitutional institutions.  
                                                 
1129 For the translation (referenced by SAvL), see the forum discussion on 
http://dict.leo.org/forum/viewUnsolvedquery.php?idThread=148684&idForum=1&lp=ende&lang=de 
1130 Werner, Das neue Bannmeilengesetz  above n 1123 at 369. 
1131 Hans-Peter Schneider, ‘Frieden statt Bann - Über eine Reform, die nichts kostet, aber auch wenig wert 
ist’, NJW 2000, 263, 264. 
1132 Schneider, ibid at 265. 




From this one gains not only an impression that the 1920 Bannmeilengesetz 
introduced in reaction to serious violent events was anyway swept away ‘by history’, but 
the current German constitutional state has not in any sense ever faced such clear 
challenges of its existence or legitimacy. Some certainly would think the high legitimacy 
of post-WWII German constitutional institutions might be supported by measures similar 
to the Bannmeilen regulation. Even if so, as Werner points out, the Weimar precedent 
only aimed at preventing physical intrusion and threats of physical violence, not in some 
more vague sense the promotion or protection of the representative function of parliament 
this way, as hinted in the explanation of the bill.1134 Quite to the contrary, assemblies and 
protests actually ought to be free to influence, even to pressure, though not to extort 
political decision-making in the logic of the Brokdorf decision of the GFCC.  
Another serious question is the relation of the Bannmeilen scheme to the general 
notification regime. One wishing to demonstrate within the Bannmeilen, needs both to 
notify the police (or authority competent for assemblies), and to request authorisation by 
the minister and the president of the respective organ. As Art 8 I GG grants freedom of 
assembly without notice or permit, it is highly problematic (disproportionate) to impose 
both, even if one accepts that notice is constitutional under Art 8 II.  
Furthermore, spontaneous demonstrations are clearly disadvantaged by the 
scheme, and recommendations to dispense with the Bannmeilen regulation exactly with 
regard to spontaneous (unorganised) demonstrations will be unlikely followed in legal 
practice.1135 One of the promoters of the 1999 law, an MP for the Social Democratic 
Party simply takes for granted that spontaneous demonstrations are excluded from the 
                                                 
1134 Ibid. 




pacified districts.1136 It might help though in police practice that even he acknowledges 
police’s margin of appreciation (principle of opportunity instead of legality) not to 
interfere in the Bannkreise when the wrong done by the assembly (Unrechtsgehalt) is 
insignificant, and a police intervention would risk escalation rather than achieving formal 
integrity of law.1137 Note again however the language: it is very far from saying that the 
police is accountable for securing the exercise of a fundamental right, or only intervening 
when absolutely necessary. Clearly, such an interpretation would render the scheme close 
to meaningless, or at least redundant, as then the general test for bans would apply.  
While the existence of the scheme is thus highly problematic, its jurisprudence is 
ambivalent, courts strictly limiting its scope of application, but within that scope not 
exercising rigorous review. Generally, the authorisation has to be granted not only at 
session-free times, but also when the target of the protest is not parliament or the 
GFCC,1138 or even the protest is not aiming at the issue currently deliberated by the 
respective body.1139 I think an interpretation conform with the constitution would require 
a case-by-case risk analysis of whether any planned demonstration would with high 
probability significantly hinder or extortiously influence the deliberation inside the 
buildings even if the topics are the same. In general commentators also require a close 
                                                 
1136 Dieter Wiefelspütz, ‘Das Gesetz über befriedete Bezirke für Verfassungsorgane des Bundes - ein 
Gesetz, das seinen Zweck erfüllt’, NVwZ 2000, 1016,  1017.  
1137 Wiefelspütz, ibid at 1018. 
1138 OVG Münster, NVwZ-RR 1994, NVWZ-RR Jahr 1994 Seite 391 = NWVBl 1994, NWVBL Jahr 1994 
Seite 305 (NWVBL Jahr 1994 Seite 309); VG Hamburg, NVwZ 1985, NVWZ Jahr 1985 Seite 678 as cited 
by Werner, Das neue Bannmeilengesetz  above n 1123  at 371. 
1139 OVG Münster, NVwZ-RR 1994, NVWZ-RR Jahr 1994 Seite 391 = NWVBl 1994, NWVBL Jahr 1994 




examination of same facts,1140 but I have not found any clear stance taken on such 
particular issues, even if the commentator recommends abolishment of the scheme.  
Courts generally stay within the reverse logic of the law, thus in effect apply a 
rationality type of loose review. Recently, even freedom of art – recall, the usual suspect 
for overriding legal incapacitations on freedom of assembly eg with regard to flag 
desecration – was found limited to performances outside the pacified district around the 
Reichstag,1141 in a judgment based on warnings of enhanced danger of terrorist (!) acts 
against Germany. The decision of the Administrative Court of Berlin, as it often happens 
with terrorism, does not discuss in any substantive way the existence of such a threat, and 
whether the ban (in the form of condition imposed as to the place) is proportionate to the 
aim pursued, but applies a kind of ‘no alternative channel’ argumentation, finding that it 
would be no big deal for the performance to be displayed a few hundred meters away 
from the Western ramp of the Reichstag. 
Apart from English and German law, the ECtHR had to deal with a place 
restriction around parliament. Two decisions were handed down related to a blanket ban 
imposed by police around the Hungarian parliament in effect for months. Nonetheless, as 
domestic courts found that the order declaring a ‘security operational zone’ was illegal, 
the Strasbourg Court has declared that the order did not have any basis in law, thus there 
was no need to go into the discussion whether the interference was necessary in a 
democratic society.1142 
                                                 
1140 Werner for example claims that the authorization cannot be denied if there is ‘a complete lack of details 
about the endangerment of the purpose of the protection’ (‘Hinweise auf eine Gefährdung des 
Schutzzweckes völlig fehlen’), Werner, Das neue Bannmeilengesetz  above n 1123  at 372. A ‘complete 
lack of details’ sounds like recommending a very weak rationality test, indeed where the state has not 
provided any reason for the restriction.  
1141 VG Berlin: Beschluss vom 20.05.2011 - VG 1 L 174.11, 1 L 174/11,  NVwZ-RR 2011, 726. 




In the United States, unsurprisingly, there are nowadays no federal laws 
designating no-protest areas around governmental buildings. This does not mean, 
however, that it is constitutionally always impermissible to restrict protest around such 
buildings. Protest around courts, on capitol grounds, prisons, and military bases evoked a 
significant, though not necessarily doctrinally consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
In relation to Capitol Grounds, or grounds where state representative bodies have 
their seats, the jurisprudence is clear: the grounds are traditionally places of assemblies, 
and as such, there is no cause for special restriction, peaceful assembly on the sidewalks 
is clearly protected by the First Amendment.1143 Dicta from a decision on an antinoise 
ordinance related to demonstrations around schools seem to imply that even noisy 
demonstrations must be allowed on such grounds normally open to the public.1144  
As to courts, the jurisprudence seems settled that courts need a higher level of 
isolation and quiet than legislative bodies, but the contours are unclear. In Cox v. 
Lousiana II (1965) a ban on picketing ‘near’ a courthouse with the intent to obstruct 
justice and impede access was found constitutionally permissible.1145 The Supreme Court, 
though quite divided, appears unified in the understanding that 2000 people protesting 
101 feet away from the courthouse against what they considered an illegal arrest, hoping 
to persuade the court to dismiss the charges, is an attempt to influence the judicial 
                                                 
1143 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), (breach of the peace statute found unconstitutional, 
see above text accompanying notes 540-542),  Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 342 
F.Supp. 575 (DDC), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 311, 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972) (a complete ban on 
assemblies on Capitol Grounds found violative of the First and Fifth Amendments). 
1144 Cf. this quote from Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) 120 : ‘We recognize that the 
ordinance prohibits some picketing that is neither violent nor physically obstructive. Noisy demonstrations 
that disrupt or are incompatible with normal school activities are obviously within the ordinance's reach. 
Such expressive conduct may be constitutionally protected at other places or other times, cf. Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)….’ 
1145 Though application in the present case was reversed for reasons that officials told protestors they were 




process, and is not constitutionally protected expression, but conduct regulable for 
reasons of integrity of law and order. The Supreme Court supported the need for no 
outside influence or pressure on the courts or any judicial officer because ‘mob law is the 
very antithesis of due process’. One could add that protestors’ singing and clapping could 
be heard inside the building1146 – which necessarily influences the work inside. A 
compromise solution – with regard to courts only, because of the special needs to protect 
judicial integrity and due process – would be to disallow not only physically obstructive 
or clearly threatening, but also noisy (audible from the inside of the building) protests, 
but still keep with the principle of the ‘eye can be averted’, and thus allow assemblies for 
or against some judicial outcome to go on in a distance not interfering with ingress and 
egress. However, the Court’s argumentation in Cox rather implies that restrictions on 
protests around courts could go further than that, especially that the distance might be 
bigger than the one that guarantees no noise penetrating inside the building, but no exact 
criteria are set.  
In other cases related to protest around courts, the Supreme Court did not address 
the question of the limits of protests threatening or influencing judicial action any further, 
but did make clear a few other principles related to protest around courts. In 1968, it held 
in Cameron v. Johnson that picketing in front of a courthouse against racial 
discrimination in voter registration could be constitutionally banned as the law did not 
serve to stifle protest, but to ensure unfettered access to municipal buildings to all 
                                                 
1146 See the facts in Justice Clark’c partial dissent and concurring: ‘The record is replete with evidence that 
the demonstrators with their singing, cheering, clapping and waving of banners drew the attention of the 





citizens.1147 The law prohibited ‘picketing . . . in such a manner as to obstruct or 
unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any county . . . 
courthouses. . .’ Before the enactment of the statute, protests were allowed to go on with 
the exception of a barricaded march route, while after the statute entered into force, some 
pickets were dispersed, some were tolerated, some protestors were arrested, but no 
charges brought against them, thus no criminal conviction issued. The facial challenge at 
the Supreme Court failed, and I think rightly so with regard of the text of the statute. It is 
less obvious however that it was not applied in bad faith to some of the protestors, but the 
USSC did not engage in a close examination of this for procedural reasons (injunctive 
relief). All in all, the provision was the sort which – if correctly applied – properly 
delineates rights of assembly on the one, and proper functioning of government (even 
though it was a courthouse, the activity in question was voter registration, but the logic 
could equally apply to judicial activity proper) on the other hand. That such a managerial 
concern is clearly present, is also shown in U.S. v. Grace, where the USSC annulled a 
federal ban on ‘displaying any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into 
public notice any party, organisation, or movement’1148 on the grounds of the USSC 
which included public sidewalks around the building. As public sidewalks are considered 
‘public forum’, and the sidewalks in question were ‘indistinguishable from any other 
sidewalks in Washington, D.C.’, the Court thus applied the rules to public forum, and 
dispensed any claim of private property of government. The purpose of the act was the 
‘protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property therein, as well as 
the maintenance of proper order and decorum,’ which is a legitimate purpose. 
                                                 
1147 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).  




Nonetheless, the Court went on to find that the nexus between pursuing this interest and a 
total ban on displaying any signs on the public sidewalks around the Court is insufficient. 
There was no showing that protestors ’in any way obstructed the sidewalks or access to 
the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way interfered with 
the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds.’1149 I take this list 
– obstruction of access, injury to person or property, interference with the administration 
of the building – supplies those dangers which can be constitutionally averted by 
restrictions on protest. Note that the USSC in Grace does not repeat Cox II concerns 
about influencing the judicial process, though clearly does not repudiate any of them 
either. Thus, doctrinally, Cox II remains the closest explanation in that regard. 
Apart from (publicly open) capitol grounds and courts, the USSC has ruled on 
protest restriction with regard to jailhouse grounds and military base. The 1966 Adderley 
v. Florida1150 found a trespass conviction for entering the premises of a county jail for 
protesting segregation in prisons constitutional. Justice Black, not inconsistently with his 
general hostility towards ‘speech plus’, considered the law a general one regulating 
conduct, which was applied to the protestors without discrimination. Edwards1151 was 
distinguished out inter alia because there the protest was on South Carolina State Capitol 
grounds, not on jailhouse grounds, and ‘traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the 
public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not.’1152  
In a similar vein, the USSC found ban on political partisan speeches and prior 
approval of distribution of literature within the confines of a military base in Greer v. 
                                                 
1149 461 U.S. 171, 182.  
1150 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
1151 See supra text accompanying note 540. 




Spock1153 constitutional. Regulations granted free civilian access to some unrestricted 
areas of the base, still the Court has not found the content-based regulation on partisan 
speech and the discretionary prior restraint on distribution of literature impermissible. 
Basically the majority has considered the military’s function as decisive here which 
clearly excludes there would be a constitutional free speech and assembly right on the 
premises of the fort. Greer thus rejected that the military base would be a public forum, 
irrespective of the fact that it was opened up for civilian access, where people sometimes 
for some purposes would assemble and discuss some issues. What matters are not the 
particular circumstances of the particular military base, but that in general, traditionally, 
or in abstract, military installations are not meant for First Amendment activity.1154 
Without really giving any justification, Greer firmly established – or revived as Robert 
Post shows – the basic divisions of places for First Amendment activity: ‘non-public’ 
forums are outside any protection except against ‘irrational, invidious, or arbitrary’1155 
government action. A military base is a non-public forum, where there is simply no 
constitutional right to speech or assembly.  
   
3. Memorial sites: identity fight over collective memory   
 
Memorial sites are places of common remembrance, places of regularly held 
commemorative assemblies, and, thus, places where other types of assemblies, 
                                                 
1153 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
1154 See the classic discussion by Robert Post, ‘Between Governance And Management: The History and 
Theory of The Public Forum’, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713 (1987) 1739-1745. 




questioning the commemorated meaning of the site, might want to be restricted by the 
state.  
There has not been much legislation, litigation and jurisprudence related to protest 
on or near memorial sites, except in Germany. This does not mean that such protests do 
not happen elsewhere. In the United States, for instance, the same Westboro Baptist 
Church which regularly pickets funerals in order to spread what they call ‘God’s hate 
toward homosexuals’, also organises anti-Jewish events, including protesting at the 
Holocaust Memorial in D.C. and other cities, but no constitutional concerns have 
arisen.1156  
In accordance with general free speech law, there is no way in the U.S. – 
apparently even no serious political will, unlike in the case of the funeral protests – to 
prevent such protests. Other groups might occasionally protest at Holocaust Memorials, 
but solely a police report could be found about an arrest for disturbing a public assembly 
– a commemoration of Holocaust in Boston.1157 Apparently no litigation followed in 
either of the cases.  
In the United Kingdom, apart from the quite different bans on demonstrations 
around Stonehenge1158 and the general possibility of issuing banning orders discussed 
above,1159 there is no specific protection provided to memorials either. When activist 
Peter Tatchell, an invited guest in the UK Parliament at the 2005 Holocaust Memorial 
                                                 
1156 See, eg, http://www.dallasobserver.com/slideshow/summer-vacation-of-hate-with-the-westboro-baptist-
church-30319832/ 
1157 Boston: Anti-Semite Arrested at Holocaust Memorial Day Event. Arrest Report Revealed. 
http://www.solomonia.com/blog/archive/2010/04/boston-anti-semite-arrested-at-holocaust/index.shtml and 
here apparently the arrest report: 
http://www.solomonia.com/blog/images/2010/04/bob%20bowes%20arrest.pdf 
1158 See above Chapter 2, text accompanying nn 123-129. 




Day started to shout after the ceremony in protest of the planned quota on asylum, he got 
arrested, but released in two hours.1160 Further details could not be verified. 
In France, in a strange but rights friendly inconsistency with the mushrooming 
lois mémorielles and fight against ‘negationnism,’ there are no special laws restricting 
protest around or on memorial sites, or else there probably would have been some 
litigation or public discussion on their usefulness. Arguably, however, any imaginable 
need for such laws is eliminated by the otherwise very many restrictions on expression 
causing troubles to public order, etc., discussed throughout this book. 
A specific ban on assemblies around memorial sites has been introduced in 
Germany in 2005. A second paragraph was added to Art 15 of the federal assembly law, 
the article authorising conditions and bans of assemblies directly endangering public 
safety and order. The newly added paragraph II states that ‘in particular’ an assembly can 
be banned or made subject to conditions if the assembly or procession takes place at a 
location which as a memorial site of ‘outstanding historical and supra-regional 
significance’ commemorates the victims of National Socialist violence and tyranny, 
which treated them in a way violating human dignity.  
The ban or conditions may only be imposed if at the time of the imposition 
particular circumstances make it likely that the dignity of the victims would be 
infringed.1161 The law designates a site around the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin as such 
                                                 
1160 See Tatchell Arrested in Holocaust Memorial Day Asylum Protest 
Protest at Michael Howard’s asylum quota to block refugees. 
London – 27 January 2005, his own website, http://petertatchell.net/a2/print_versions/419.htm 
1161 §15 II VersG: ‘(2) Eine Versammlung oder ein Aufzug kann insbesondere verboten oder von 
bestimmten Auflagen abhängig gemacht werden, wenn 1. die Versammlung oder der Aufzug an einem Ort 
stattfindet, der als Gedenkstätte von historisch herausragender, überregionaler Bedeutung an die Opfer der 
menschenunwürdigen Behandlung unter der nationalsozialistischen Gewalt- und Willkürherrschaft erinnert, 
und 2. nach den zur Zeit des Erlasses der Verfügung konkret feststellbaren Umständen zu besorgen ist, dass 




a place, and leaves to the Länder to designate such other sites within their borders. The 
law was adopted to prevent the NPD, the nationalist party to march along the 
Brandenburg Gate to the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. Thus it is at least 
strange that the law after all does not limit protest around the Brandenburg Gate, but only 
around the Holocaust Memorial.  
The law was criticised for many other reasons as well. Scholars pointed out that if 
read properly, the law limits the recourse to public order beyond the restrictions read in it 
by the GFCC,1162 such as the explicitly granted possibility to reschedule Neo-Nazi 
demonstrations from the Holocaust Memorial Day to another day,1163 or other permissible 
‘manner’ restrictions of aggressive and provocative, intimidating conduct leading to a 
‘climate of violence’, whatever that might mean.1164 Maybe most significantly, the law 
leaves out a large number of favoured Neo-Nazi sites which are not memorial sites, but 
festive or military sites of the NS Regime, or smaller memorial sites (including less well-
known former concentration camps designated as memorial sites) lacking a supra-
regional significance.1165  
On its own, the new provision was found constitutional shortly after its adoption 
by the GFCC in a short Chamber decision rejecting a request for injunctive relief 
(‘einstweilige Anordnung’ to suspend the restrictive condition).1166 The youth 
organisation of NPD planned a march entitled ‘60 years of Liberation Lie – End the guilt 
                                                 
1162 Wolfgang Leist, Die Änderung des Versammlungsrechts: ein Eigentor? NVwZ 2005, 500, 501. 
1163 See supra text accompanying notes 789-798. 
1164 NJW 2004, 2814, 2815, citing BVerfG [1. Kammer des Ersten Senats], NJW 2001, NJW Jahr 2001 
Seite 2069 [NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 2071]; NJW 2001, NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 2072 [NJW Jahr 2001 Seite 
2074]; NVwZ 2004, NVWZ Jahr 2004 Seite 90 [NVWZ Jahr 2004 Seite 91]  
1165 Claudia Haupt, The Scope of Democratic Public Discourse: Defending Democracy, Tolerating 
Intolerance, and the Problem of Neo-Nazi Demonstrations in Germany, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 169 (2008) 193. 





cult!’ from Alexanderplatz till Brandenburg Gate, passing by next to the Holocaust 
Memorial. Police imposed a shortened route, which would end before reaching the 
Holocaust Memorial and would also not get to the Brandenburg Gate.  
The Court found that such a shortening of the route is permissible because the 
march obviously would fulfil criteria of Art 15 II of the assembly law. Most importantly, 
the authorities could correctly assume that human dignity of Jewish persons would be 
violated by such a march along the Holocaust Memorial on the anniversary of the 
capitulation of Germany. The march – as it can be inferred from its motto – would 
portray millions of Jewish victims as ‘object’ of a cult (§ 21 of the judgment), which in 
accordance with the usual Kantian approach is a violation of human dignity. In this case, 
unlike (years later) in relation to the Rudolf Hess Memorial march, the Court thus found 
the dignity rationale explicitly applicable and fulfilled. Thus the rationale is not public 
order, neither manner-type ban on provocation, but simply human dignity as a 
constitutional limit. Consequently, it appears to me that the legislator could (but is 
constitutionally not required to) equally introduce legislation to the effect of banning such 
marches anywhere else, as the described objectification is realised independent of the 
time and place of the expression.  
As to the portion of the rerouting away from the Brandenburg Gate, the Court has 
accepted that the Senate of Berlin (the government of the Land Berlin) has primacy in 
using the place for a commemorative event, called ‘Day for Democracy’, even if the 
request was submitted after the NPD youth organisation had notified the march. Not 
because it is initiated by the government who does not have basic rights claim, but 




right protection because of the public who wish to participate in it. Practical concordance 
thus requires to balance the rights of the public with that of the NPD youth organisation. 
The special character of the date (anniversary of capitulation) and the place as being 
representative of the whole of the German federal republic and its polity, also weighs in 
favour of the Day for Democracy, overriding a strict, mechanical application of the 
principle of temporal priority of the requests. Otherwise such common interest events 
could always be pre-empted by special interest groups, reserving a certain place 
symbolising the whole of the political community and identity for years in advance.  
The GFCC thus had no difficulty declaring that the otherwise constitutionally 
mandated state neutrality is unaffected by such an arrangement, ie by proclaiming which 
commemoration is the ‘common’ one, of general interest. One wonders how this scheme 
would fare in the opposite case when the NPD – a lawful party – would be on 
government in Berlin, and the ‘democratic’ parties would want to organise an assembly 
protesting against the official commemoration of the capitulation day in the spirit of the 
NPD.  Obviously, that would be much more important to counterbalance, but this 
decision would actually sanction the priority of the NPD commemoration in such a case.  
Thus, in my view, it would be more consistent and wise to stay with the luck-
directed temporal principle as it does not elevate to the level of common value an event 
organised by government, and not sacrifice the long-term consistent solution for saving 
face today. After all, Brandenburg Gate is not even the site of the Parliament or any 
government building. As a complementary rule a time limit on the submission of advance 
notice could be introduced, eg maximum three months before the planned date of the 




some sort of militant democracy consideration (a democratic state does not have to give 
media space for promoting an anti-democratic agenda), then that should have been 
clearly said and discussed by both the ordinary courts and the GFCC. Also, under general 
doctrine, the Court could just have said that the entire march could have been even 
banned for violation of human dignity, thus the lesser restriction is clearly constitutional. 
Violation of human dignity normally does not get balanced away in a practical 
concordance. 
4. Designated zones: speech pens, protest cages  
 
A final phenomenon of limits on assemblies virtually ‘imprisons’ protestors in one way 
or the other. Some techniques like preventive detention and kettling raise the question of 
right to liberty and security as well, an issue touched upon earlier.1167 But detainment-like 
restrictions also can arise in the form of specific place restriction: circumscribed ‘free 
speech’ zones, speech pens (actually cages) designated by authorities for demonstration 
have increasingly appeared in practice in the US.  
The issue has become salient at the 2004 Democratic National Convention where 
would be protestors were relegated more than a block away, in something with ‘overhead 
                                                 
1167 Recall the German practice of preventive police detention to avert dangers found violating Art. 5 by the 
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netting, chain-link fence, razor wire and armed guards’1168 which the judge described as 
follows:1169  
I at first thought, before taking a view (of the protest zone), that 
the characterization of the space being like a concentration camp 
was litigation hyperbole. Now I believe it's an understatement. 
One cannot conceive of other elements put in place to create a 
space that is more of an affront to the idea of expression than the 
designated demonstration zone. 
 
 Still, in the decision, he upheld the restriction,1170 as did others with similar ones, on 
content-neutrality grounds, especially if coupled with fear of terrorism.1171  
As it must be clear by now, content neutrality doctrines basically mandate to 
uphold such restrictions, and nobody (except for scholars) actually wonders when no 
protestor shows up and takes her place in the cage.1172  
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
1168 David S. Allen, ‘Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks To Free Speech 
Zones’, 16 Comm. L. & Pol'y 383 (2011). 
1169 Judge Douglas P. Woodlock as quoted by Theo Emery, Judge Upholds ‘Free Speech Zone’ But Permits 
March on FleetCenter, Associated Press, July 22, 2004, available at http:// 
www.boston.com/news/politics/conventions/articles/2004 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) as cited by Allen, 
Spatial Frameworks above n 1168 at 384. 
1170 Coalition to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 78 (D. Mass. 
2004). 
1171 Suplina, Crowd Control above n 1115. 
1172 Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors, Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places 




Specific comparative findings 
Forms and values of assembly  
 
On their face, the examined jurisdictions vary strongly in what sorts of gatherings they 
consider assembly, and how they go on to categorise them. Three dividing lines appear 
relevant: the one between (i) stationary or moving assemblies, (ii) indoor and outdoor 
assemblies, and (iii) deliberative and demonstrative assemblies. The jurisdictions’ choice 
of which criterion to apply and which not appears haphazard.  
All three dimensions are present in the definition of the French understanding of 
réunion, which is stationary, indoor, and deliberative (at least this is the starting point of 
the Benjamin argument, which broadens deliberation to the possibility of dialogue).  
German constitutional law oscillates between (ii) and (iii) in that constitutional 
text only mentions in- and outdoor, while jurisprudence and scholarship deal with 
demonstration, too. The federal law on assemblies is entitled law on assemblies and 
processions, implying a type (i) categorisation present as well. In fact, however, 
constitutional jurisprudence operates with the general test of proportionality, which 
homogenises protection given to all assemblies to a large extent.  
The English understanding appears to comprise deliberation (iii) and stationary (i) 
in the concept of ‘meeting’, while moving and demonstrative are understood to go 
together.   
The USSC and the ECtHR are entirely out of this discussion. While the ECtHR 
explicitly endorses all these mentioned varieties without much differentiation among 
them, the USSC is stuck with the content-based/content-neutral and public/nonpublic 
distinctions, in theory equally applicable to any ‘expression’.   
The generalising or homogenising tendency of the German jurisprudence is in 
sharp contrast especially with the American, where very different tests apply to speech 
and speech plus. This is all the more puzzling because both the US and the German court 
maintain the division between content and form, one in the split between content-based 
and content-neutral restrictions, the other by splitting the scope of the applicable rights 




difference. The USSC derives the applicable test partly from the nature of the restriction 
(content-neutrality) and partly from the place of the activity (public forum doctrine) and 
partly from the nature of the activity (speech or speech plus). Meanwhile the German 
court deals first with the scope of the rights, and thereafter applies a proportionality test 
of the restrictions by a unified theory on permissible limits, where, however, again the 
importance of the value in the particular case plays a decisive role, always weighed 
against competing (conflicting) values in the particular setting.  
Both the German and the US approach diverge significantly from the fragmented 
English understanding on both free speech and public order law within which is located – 
at least traditionally – assembly, except for the curious right to passage.  
The ECtHR, where it does not actually matter much if something is decided under 
art 10 or art 11, may be true to its nature as international court, because this way it can 
accommodate the certainly even more diverse concepts of member states’ domestic law 
than it is apparent in this book.  
In France, conceptual unclarities clearly relate to the very distinct nature of rights 
doctrines in French law  (if there are any at all, and we should not instead speak of the 
doctrine of loi), and to historical contingency where réunion was protected by 
proportionality standards for long, but manifestation was – much later – accorded 
constitutional protection or else it would not have had any.  
Freedom of assembly’s status as a fundamental constitutional right is not self-
evident all over the compared jurisdictions, though the hesitating ones – UK and France – 
are signatories to the ECHR, and thus, to varying degree, but acknowledge that it is a 
‘human’ right. Maybe more importantly, the issue of ‘ranking’ does not by far give a 
conclusive answer to the extent to which ‘assembly’ is protected. The French, after all, 
manifest all the time, and it would be hard to deny that there is quite a lively culture of 
assembly events in the UK as well. There might be in important regards lesser burdens on 
freedom of assembly in these countries than in others, even if the high status is not 
recognised at all. A good example is the lack of prior notification on stationary meetings 
in the United Kingdom. Lack of a higher constitutional status does not necessarily result 
in lesser assembly activity. However, it might very well influence – ie limit in a selective 




exercising the rigorous or more transparent review a constitutional right at stake normally 
induces. This (dis)advantage of not dealing with a fundamental right gets very apparent in 
some English decisions, and is less apparent in the extremely short French decisions 
(where brevity is often itself a sign of under-rationalisation of what is at stake). 
While the notions of assembly and the status accorded to freedom of assembly 
show immense variations in the jurisdictions, the values or rationales behind freedom of 
assembly proved to be strikingly similar. All courts – though the English only through the 
mediation of the Human Rights Act and the ECtHR – find that assemblies are eminently 
related to expression, participation and democratic governance. They have all left behind 
historical views about assembly being unnecessary in a representative system, and 
embrace its mediating function between minority and majority, people and government, 
in more or less elaborate terms. In principle, the courts thus do understand the importance 
of freedom of assembly. This almost perfectly overlapping value consensus however 
cannot be overrated in light of the rest of the findings: it is possible to proclaim abstract 
values in the first phase of review in the strongest terms, and then to allow all kinds of far 
reaching restrictions at the end of the review.  
Prior restraints 
 
This is in fact what happens with regard to prior restraints. All the legal orders I dealt 
with in this book claim that notice or permit is necessary for distribution of place, and 
balancing interests of others, which is a fairly reasonable motivation. But they also find 
notice or permit necessary so the police could prepare for securing the event itself, ie in a 
sense the notification is imposed for the benefit of the demonstrators as well. There might 
be much in this argument, however, from this it only follows that a voluntary notification 
be introduced, as suggested eg by Edwin Baker. Therefore, a mandatory notice or even 
permit regime necessarily has to rely on arguments from public interest, rather than on 
paternalistic arguments. In consequence, the mandatory prior restraint on assemblies has 
to benefit someone else other than the demonstrators, for instance, rights of passersby, the 




Nonetheless, the argument is valid that notice – unlike censorship – is not 
necessarily an occasion to suppress the assembly, but it might be an occasion for 
reconciling conflicting interests in using the public place on which many rights, not only 
that of assembly, and not necessarily that of only one particular assembly can be 
exercised. Thus, it appears reasonable that for such strictly practical, distributory 
purposes the notice requirement is acceptable.  
Beyond that, it is doubtful that principled arguments really exist for the 
requirement of notice. Most emphatically, enhanced readiness for violence is not more 
often a companion of assemblies than of a lot of other conduct, and it is especially 
unlikely that people who wish to be violent would adhere to the notice requirement 
anyway. In such cases the notice requirement clearly functions as a pretext (an 
authorisation) for preliminary police measures, which are normally possible only by 
concrete suspicion or with judicial authorisation. To what extent the police can 
constitutionally employ compulsive measures for crime prevention or prevention of 
disorder is quite unclear. Any such measure necessarily involves a risk assessment, a 
prediction for something which – if the measure taken is effective – will not materialise. 
If that measure is a prior restriction, then the danger might not materialise because its 
entire context – the assembly itself – has not materialised, or just because it would not 
have materialised anyway. The seemingly most important concern behind the notice 
requirement is to prevent degeneration of the assembly into riot. This can happen, but 
more often than not it does not seem so that advance notice or permit would be able to 
prevent it, or to prepare the police how to handle it.  
Another point is that in terms of prevention of violence, police presence is not 
necessarily the best solution, as police are exactly the outgroup for the protesters, as often 
protest is against the state or at least the mainstream. The duty and/or practice to bargain 
with police before the assembly takes place might certainly help reducing the 
‘outgroupness’ of police, but is theoretically problematic, and practically more likely 
anyway in cases where hostility is minimal (ie more mainstream protestor groups).  
As to the general view of particular jurisdictions to prior restraint, there are 
significant variations. In U.S. constitutional law, there is a very strong historical aversion 




to freedom of assembly. This, however, happens through the wide understanding of the 
concept of the press, and not through a wide understanding of the ban on prior restraint: if 
you leaflet, you have better chances to be able to hold your demonstration. Ordinances 
which condition the holding of a march, a demonstration or a meeting in general on a 
prior permit, are substantively acceptable.  
On the other hand, the USSC has for a long time been cautious to decrease the 
discretion inherent in permit ordinances to a considerable degree. This is not a negligible 
step from the point of view of fundamental rights: the Court has regularly struck down 
ordinances for granting too much discretion, eg interpreting the expression ‘preventing 
riot’ or ‘religious cause’ is in itself too much discretion, and in such cases, the protestor 
can go ahead with the protest even in the lack of a permit. However, the obligation for the 
state to provide an effective and speedy remedy is conspicuously missing from the U.S. 
jurisprudence on freedom of assembly, including prior restraints. 
Unlike in the U.S., in Germany, prior restraint has not become a central issue in 
freedom of assembly, and perhaps neither that of free speech. This is somewhat peculiar 
regarding strong textual and historical aversion towards prior restraint. Prior restraints on 
assemblies in German law are not seen as inherently more problematic than any other 
restraint. Although the prior ban of Neo-Nazi demonstrations gave rise to an important 
debate in Germany, it revolved around the interpretation of substantive values like 
dignity and public order, and, finally, around the basis of post-war German 
constitutionalism itself. Thus, the issue of banning Nazi demonstrations was not 
conceptualised at all as a question of prior restraints.  
A peculiarity of the German regime of prior restraints on assembly is clearly the 
constitutionalisation of the duty to cooperate with police, problematic for requiring 
private persons, as Kunig emphasised, to ‘co-form state power’.  
Unlike the duty to cooperate, the other originally German doctrine of 
‘spontaneous assemblies’ is rightly conquering the continent, but hopefully without the 
calculation whether there was pretension in a flash mob or not.  
In the United Kingdom, bad memories of the Star Chamber do not seem to be as 
lively as in the United States in the argumentation of the courts. Still, this country 




countries (especially the United States). The UK is also – silently – the most liberal with 
regard to exemptions from the notice requirement, without much theoretical effort.   
In France, there is an important theoretical distinction between preventive and 
repressive regimes of public liberties, with a clear preference of repression, ie a 
subsequent restriction. This is an issue which is discussed and kept in mind not only in 
relation to freedom of the press or art, but also with regard to freedom of assembly. The 
ever manifesting French show this particular sensitivity in scholarship, though not in 
positive law. Scholarship warning against a sliding into authorisation implies that prior 
notice is acceptable, but not the possibility of prior ban.  
  The ECtHR also employs in general free speech jurisprudence a presumption 
against the validity of prior restraints. Nonetheless, it accepts advance notice and even 
prior permit requirements widespread in the Member States without much ado, implying 
that the advance notice or even permit is not even an intervention in the scope of freedom 
of assembly. The explanation of the ECtHR is often especially apt to only justify a 
voluntary notification system. The ECtHR has to be credited for a sensible application of 
the spontaneous demonstration doctrine, though to introduce the concept of urgent, but 
still notifiable assemblies, as in German law, is suggested. 
Peacefulness, prevention of violence and disorder 
 
The requirement that assemblies be peaceful is not equally elaborated in the jurisdictions. 
German law and ECHR jurisprudence offer the most detailed interpretation of 
peacefulness as this question defines whether an activity falls within the protected scope 
or not. The German Constitutional Court in effect limits this exclusionary notion to the 
occurrence of concrete violent acts of a considerable intensity, while the ECtHR requires 
the state to show that the violence was or was to be pervasive. Neither the US, nor UK 
law is structured specifically around the question of scope, though of course these 
countries also disallow unpeaceful gatherings. US law is special in that there is no 
general ban on wearing guns at a demonstration, mirroring the contrast with Europe 




The jurisdictions examined also differ in the notion of disorder, ie what amounts 
at all to a state of affairs which is so imperative to prevent or eliminate that freedom of 
assembly should bow. Secondly, the jurisdictions also differ in the degree of probability 
of the occurrence of that state of affairs which might justify intervention into freedom of 
assembly. An important common principle is that of individual responsibility. At a 
minimum, no legal (civil or criminal, or even disciplinary) responsibility can arise unless 
one personally participated in or supported violent acts. A harder question is when an 
assembly can be dispersed or kettled for anticipation of disorder. Here the jurisdictions 
are not very consistent, and thus probably the judgment of police is taking over, and 
review might be limited. Germany and the United Kingdom increasingly make use of a 
kind of pre-emptive detention, often arresting masses of people from whom later only a 
tiny number will be convicted. The mass arrest emerges therefore as a prior measure 
intended to prevent the demonstration, or the participation of specific persons, perceived 
as ‘trouble makers’, without any specific data as to their intents, let alone a precise 
assessment of the imminence of violence.  
More or less settled appears that there is no right to heckle while there is a right to 
counterdemonstration in every examined jurisdiction. The United Kingdom is the only 
country where the issue of counterdemonstration is not clearly thematised, and might be 
hidden by the practice of general banning orders (by the way a clearly content-neutral 
mode of regulation).  
The extent of the protection granted in case of potential clashes is much less 
settled. German law explicitly concedes that there might not be enough police force at 
disposal, and this justifies even prior ban. US courts, especially lower courts might 
actually go as far as to accept the first part of the German view (not always possible to 
prevent violence), but that would not mean that the demonstration cannot constitutionally 
take place. This is the exact opposite of German thinking; perhaps because the figure of 
positive obligations is absent in US law, or because German law is more focused on 
preventing danger. In France, the few cases available spell out that a demonstration 
cannot be banned solely because of the risks inherent in a counterdemonstration, but 
previous violent clashes, where the source of the violence is unclarified, might justify 




German approach, but might find UK and French blanket- and quasi-blanket bans 
disproportionate. 
Coercion, direct action and disruption 
 
Jurisprudence related to the question of coercion proved perhaps even more deferential 
than that related to disorder. Especially courts in the United Kingdom are not willing to 
provide protection even to minimal disruption. With regard to obstruction, protestors can 
go unpunished only if they show they somehow fit within the exceptions of the norm: a 
clash frozen halfway between a privilege and a right. 
In the United States, the relatively consistent and generous jurisprudence towards 
sit-ins and coercive speech clearly broke down in the abortion protest cases, hardly 
masked by claims of content-neutrality. The Supreme Court allows restrictions on 
conduct way below obstruction, intimidation, or threat, in a quintessential forum (public 
street), in fact it allows bans on entering an area. What is more, injunctions are applied to 
persons who are not aware of it, who have come to the area for the first time, for the sole 
reason that they are acting ‘in concert’ with organizations cited in the injunction in case 
they express an anti-abortion view. A similar trend might be in the make with regard to 
‘animal rights’ or environmental protests, facilitated by this jurisprudence. 
The German compromise with regard to direct action appears quite clear, 
although it is anything but principled. After a long and complicated line of cases, the 
Court seems settled that direct action without using any tools – chains, cars, etc. – does 
not qualify as coercion. What is more, even actions which do might be so important for 
debate on public matters that a restriction cannot be justified. As to France, no detailed 
theorisation on the question was possible to find, their standard appears to be somewhat 
below the German one.  
The ECtHR basically does not grant protection to coercive, disruptive, obstructive 
or any direct action type of protests. This cautious stance might well be due to the fact 
that European states – certainly the ones examined here – are also not clear and consistent 







Dignity-type arguments arise especially in Germany and France, in relation to the 
Holocaust, Jews, people of colour, immigrants, and so on, ie what is commonly called 
hate speech. Therefore, dignity in this part of human rights law acts like a buffer between 
different groups, it basically functions as protecting social identity, as a perimeter (and 
not, eg, as an autonomy-enhancing argument). That’s why in some jurisdictions, dignity 
appears to mingle with public order, also a dubious concept with at times identity, at 
times authoritarian, at again other times militant democracy overtones. German legal 
language here focuses on the individual, while in French law the focus on discrimination 
might signal a more collective identity-based approach.  
Though English law is exempt from a specifically dignitarian argument, it 
embraces restrictions for similar scenarios often to a larger extent than German or 
perhaps even French law. The ECtHR’s somewhat chaotic hate speech jurisprudence 
increasingly rubberstamps national restrictions in pursuance of interests way below the 
German standard. The US Supreme Court has unsurprisingly proved most resistant to 
explicit or implicit dignity-like interests. 
Time, manner and place 
 
Content-neutrality is a more or less explicit principle of free expression law in every 
examined jurisdiction. When applied to freedom of assembly, however, content neutrality 
is often insufficient to protect the protestor. The reason for this is another principle which 
primarily affects the exercise of freedom of assembly. An idea deeply engrained in both 
the US and the German approach is to split ‘expressive content’ and modality of 
expression or conduct.  
Accordingly, modality is the form of expression, in contrast to the substance or 
message of the expression. Modality includes at the abstract level the questions of when, 
how, and where an idea is expressed. In free speech law, there is a very legitimate reason 
to perceive modal limits less harmful to liberty than substantive limits:  substantive limits 




operate as an alteration of the time, place, or manner of saying whatever the speaker 
intends to say. Logically, for courts then there is less an urge to apply the same rigorous 
standard of review to modal than to substantive limits. All the more so, as the choice of 
modalities of the speaker – time, manner, and place – might well conflict with the choice 
of modalities of other exercises of human rights, or other important interests. Everything 
happens within the modalities, after all. The legislator (and, by its authorisation, local 
administrators) might seem more equipped to distribute modalities than courts, and more 
legitimate even.  
This above argumentation would indeed be flawless but for one decisive 
misrepresentation which weighs even heavier when applied to protests and 
demonstrations. Meaning is not only substance, it is modality, too. Any linguist would 
find the argument from content versus form/modality wholly unscientific and 
misrepresentative of how semantics actually works. Most of them would probably claim 
that what is called by me (and by courts) ‘modal’ or ‘content-neutral’ might convey more 
meaning than what is called substance or content. In interpersonal psychology and 
communication studies, nonverbal communication is certainly understood to convey at 
least as much if not more – and more accurate, reliable – meaning than verbal 
communication.1173  
Relegation of some aspects as modality or conduct is largely missing from the 
language of the ECtHR, and is also not present in the English or French legal discourse. 
However, while the fact that the ECtHR does not apply a looser test for restrictions on 
modalities so far is laudable, in France and the United Kingdom there are so many 
restrictions on protest anyway that these countries just do not need this doctrinal trick, 
they can instead rely on the heavy hammer of substantive restrictions, often not content-
neutral at all, targeting only one type of modality of expression, or even discriminate 
substantively between viewpoints.   
                                                 
1173 Eg Mark L. Knapp, Judith A. Hall, Nonverbal communication in human interaction, 7th edn 
(Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, Boston 2010), Paul Ekman & Friesen, W. V, ‘The repertoire of nonverbal 
behavior: Categories, origins, usage, and coding’ 1 Semiotica (1969) 49–98; Id, ‘Basic Emotions’, 45-60 in 





General evaluation, critique and path forward 
 
Among the examined courts, the US Supreme Court certainly went furthest when 
voluntarily adopting an obligation not to look at the real issue when it comes to 
assemblies – by relying on content-neutrality as understood by scholars and judges, ie 
letter and argument. Overall, the results of this study strongly challenge the commonplace 
belief that US American law so much protects free expression, and provide a much more 
fragmented and nuanced picture.  
The German Constitutional Court makes constant effort to keep shadows of the 
past controlled without simply suppressing them, and at the same time preserving at least 
some firmness to the notion of human dignity. The Hess memorial march decision – 
claiming Nazism is exploding general categories of human thinking, thus its legal 
treatment can also not be submitted to and scrutinised by rational categories – might be 
the closest to lawyerly honesty, naturally at the price of severe inconsistency with the 
carefully balanced architecture of basic rights jurisprudence. German law however is the 
most incoherent in another regard: the very elevated language about freedom of assembly 
in the scope phase and the very numerous and often openly viewpoint-discriminatory 
limits the GFCC allows on assemblies. The general feature of German law, i.e. the fact 
that human dignity is used to limit other rights naturally also applies to freedom of 
assembly. Indeed, there is no one subcategory examined in this book, where German law 
does not allow for restriction, apart from speech pens.  
UK law regarding assemblies still oscillates between public order protection and 
granting a fundamental right. Thus, courts often expect the protestor to disprove the 
legitimacy of a restriction, which in number likely exceeds all the other countries 
examined here. Albeit in many regards the liberty framework – coupled with an 
apparently functioning representative government (see, e.g. the withdrawal of prohibition 
around Parliament, abolition of ASBOs, or the quite sensible policing visible in the last 
riots) – proved to be quite liberal, especially with regard to prior restraint, the lethal 
weapon of blanket bans is always at hand, just as the many-many seemingly unrelated 
provisions (e.g. harassment or anti-terrorism provisions) which get applied to protests and 




French jurisprudence on assemblies proved way too intransparent to base very 
certain conclusions on it. Clearly it also strongly stays within the expression framework, 
though this has probably more textual reasons than conceptual ones. The understanding 
of a droit législatif and accompanying textualism still appears to animate much of the 
field, despite the – necessarily fragmented, punctual – efforts on the side of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel and Conseil d’État. The whole system is undergoing fundamental 
changes in the référé-liberté and the QPC procedures, the fruits of which might be visible 
in years to come, probably shifting French fundamental rights law in the German 
direction. However, on a more practical basis, looking at the amount of demonstrations, 
protests, and importantly, strikes constantly going on in France, coupled with a largely 
reasonable policing, it is very difficult to state that freedom of assembly is so much more 
limited in France than elsewhere. Formally maybe it is, but in fact assemblies are likely 
handled very generously in practice, at least by and large, and that is what makes 
unnecessary too much theorisation or the development of sophisticated judicial doctrines. 
The ECtHR rubberstamps governmental claims about legitimate aim, but then 
exerts an increasingly strong review in the proportionality phase, both in terms of 
procedural and substantive guarantees. Maybe not much more can be expected from an 
international organ in need to preserve its integrity and acceptance on the part of Member 
States.   
Freedom of assembly doctrine involves various tensions in itself as well, largely 
valid in each of the examined jurisdictions. The most general is clearly the high value 
accorded to it when the court tries to define the scope of the right, and the very wide-
ranging limitations allowed in the second or third step of rights review – as if to hide a 
mystic secret: what is most important is at the same time the most dangerous and fearful. 
Another contradiction is between some of the values and the limits: for instance, that the 
German court claims the function of freedom of demonstration is being the main element 
of a political early warning system on the one hand, and the various, widely available 
prior restraints on assemblies on the other. A demonstration prohibited in advance or a 
demonstrator put in jail cannot in any way serve as a signal, as an early alarm that 
something is going wrong in the political process. Also, there is a tension in some aspects 




and the application of the content neutrality and symbolic speech principles to 
demonstrations, as most of the times such restrictions affect disparately groups diverging 
from the mainstream in one way or the other. 
The empirical ‘assembly’ was seen an object of ‘freedom of assembly’ not very 
often at all by courts. Freedom of speech and opinion was the first category courts would 
put assemblies in, and this approach often harms the meaning generating function of 
assemblies. Here and there, freedom of art was referred to as a potential – this time 
beneficial – surrogate of freedom of assembly. Leaf-letting protestors are also luckier, 
because they can get under the protection of freedom of press.  
Art and press are at first look a far shot from assemblies. I claim, however, that 
they appear not accidentally in some decisions on assemblies. They testify to the narrow 
sense in which ‘expression’ is used by courts, because their sudden appearance reveals its 
imperfection. In fact, no court examined in this book made their understanding of 
‘expression’ clear. We might have gained some vague sense about what is ‘speech plus’, 
and ‘Art und Weise’, but it remains fully unexplored what is ‘pure speech’, or expression.  
In my view, courts implicitly see reason and argument, especially in its written 
form, as the worthiest of legal protection. That explains both the twists and turns of the 
content neutrality doctrines and the luck of protestors who get under the protection of 
press. By valuing reason and argument, courts can remain safely embedded in the 
Enlightenment tradition, and keep away from the abyss of aesthetisation of politics.1174  
There are, however, at least two serious problems with such a methodology to 
keep away the evil. Both problems relate to honesty and thus the integrity of the judicial 
process, quite important concerns in an enlightened democracy.  
Firstly, such a narrow construction of expression is plainly wrong and false. In a 
commonsensical understanding, expression shall be used in a broader sense. An adequate 
concept also encapsulates non-verbal, non-argumentative and other forms of expression, 
and necessarily also the ‘form’ in which the ‘expression’ is expressed. Translated to the 
issue of freedom of assembly, this means that performances or other symbolic actions are 
expressive not only because of what they perform and what they symbolise, but also 
                                                 
1174 See, eg, Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity. Chapters in the History of Ideas, 2nd edn 




because or with regard to the element of performance or symbolism. In short, the content 
depends on the form or changes with the form, or content and form cannot be 
meaningfully separated. Furthermore, properly seen as expressive activity, expression 
encompasses also especially the process of creation of expression: ie the creation of 
meaning, in the case of assembly, social or political meaning.  
To clarify further these two senses of expressive, it is useful to extrapolate them 
to activities protected by other rights. Expressive activity in the narrower sense reaches 
its highest and most sophisticated form in scholarly writing: it is the reasoned argument 
or argumentative essay, the process of arriving at it is scientific research with 
accompanying methodology. At the other end of the expressive spectrum, which is 
encompassed by the use of expressive in the broader sense I propagate in the context of 
assembly, can be found artistic activity: every artistic activity is expressive, nonetheless it 
is also essentially, or maybe even primarily a process of creation.  
The activity of assembling can be conceived as being in a sense situated between 
these two activities, scientific and artistic. Of course, assembly is most of the time neither 
science, nor art as it lacks the quality we expect from science and art. All three, ie 
science, art, and assembly, are however expressive in the wider (and commonsensical) 
sense of the word. Thus, in my view, it is not possible to grant protection to freedom of 
art without giving protection to the expressive ‘modalities’ of assemblies as well.  
As to the second problem with avoiding esthetisation by a narrow concept of 
expression: it also has to be clearly seen that the construction by courts of a separate 
category of facially content-neutral or modality restrictions, let alone highly infirm 
concepts like public order, peace, and the like is not only a reductionist pseudo-
rationalisation of street theatre, but at the same time a judicial rationalisation of highly or 
deeply emotionalised legislative (and majoritarian) politics. It results in avoidance of 
looking into the abyss – if and to the extent it is an abyss – of self-perception of the 
community, especially into the boundaries of who belongs in and who is out. Courts 
should not make themselves believe that by this they are not constructing identity. The 
apparently neutral categories of time, place, and manner, or concepts seemingly unrelated 
to expression like public peace, public order or dignity are the backdoor through which 




come back and find their place in legal reasoning, on its own image an outstandingly 
rationalised process. It is not to mean that there is necessarily no abyss into which it is 
better not to look. After all, social psychology and sociology are not able to completely 
disprove Le Bon, Freud, Canetti or Moscovici. It is just if there be any hope for the 
‘abyss’ ever to disappear or shrink at least, honesty, transparency, and certain courage 
ought to be constantly aspired, otherwise there is no sense in not looking into it. Judges 
are always most vulnerable to the type of critique exacted throughout these pages, 
because they are the anointed protagonists at the centre-stage of that hopeful 
performance, institutionally vested with the independence of the scholar and the artist, 
coupled with the authority of the state. 
This book took the stance that assembly is about expression in the broad sense. 
Thus, to apply the frame of expression in the narrow sense upon assembly is a 
misconstruction of the potential of freedom inherent in the exercise of this right.  
A few potential critical points to this use of concepts needs to be addressed.  
Firstly, it is very important to keep in mind that associative aspects of assemblies 
– as Inazu rightly pointed out -- need to be protected. Nonetheless, in my view, this 
should be taken care of within freedom of association. The United States might be special 
in this regard as the First Amendment does not protect association in its text. This 
American-only textual lacuna however does not mandate a different use of concepts 
elsewhere and globally.  
Secondly, and in contrast, some might argue that it is unfortunate to stay within 
the framework of expression, however broadened, and a more distinct label should be 
found to denote the specificities of assembly.  
My reply to this is twofold. Firstly, it is courts, and not me, who wrongly use the 
word ‘expression’. Philosophy and other disciplines take it for granted that the aspects 
left out by the courts – ie action or conduct, time, manner, and place or modalities as 
opposed to ‘content’— are or might be expressive. Secondly, therefore, courts’ use of the 
label ‘expressive’ can be corrected without dispensing with the label: by adequately 
changing jurisprudence to include expressive in the broad sense.  
In addition, nothing in my argument prevents courts from actually granting 




Quite to the contrary: since assemblies are more important in this regard than ‘pure 
speech,’ the almost absolute protection granted to political speech necessarily applies a 
fortiori to assemblies in the framework suggested here.  
On the other hand, the broadening of the notion of expression or ‘content’ in the 
sense suggested here would mean the application of the same standards to the full range 
of expressive activities, but would still allow potentially more severe limits on 
assemblies, if a thorough examination finds them justified. 
 
 
 
 
 
